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Abstract
The thesis examines the interplay of business, politics and the economy 
during the 1930s. Relationships are studied through the analysis of the tariff 
introduced in 1932 by the British government. The introduction of the tariff in 
1932 was important because this marked a clear break in government policy 
toward international trade, Britain having had a long tradition of free trade. The 
work is not concerned with the macroeconomic effects of the tariff and its overall 
impact on the economy. The focus instead is upon policy formulation and 
business involvement in this process.
Government knew the tariff could be used as more than a revenue earner, 
importantly the tariff also provided them with the opportunity to negotiate with 
industry, enabling intervention and promotion of industrial policy aims. On the 
other side, business wanted a given level of protection and would lobby to achieve 
their aims: while at the same time they were unwilling to undergo change.
The thesis provides the first detailed analysis of the work of the Import 
Duties Advisory Committee [IDAC] and their attempt to develop a ‘scientific’ 
tariff from its inception in 1932. A two-pronged approach is taken to the work 
considering the process from the point of view of the government and business. 
The first perspective, that of government, considers what the government wanted 
from the tariff and the extent to which these objectives were met. The second 
perspective analyses what business wanted and how successful business was in 
‘capturing’ benefits.
An overview of how the committee arrived at its decision for all additional 
duty applications made between 1932 and 1939 is offered in the thesis. This 
brings to light the factors at play in convincing the Committee that extra 
protection was justified. Additionally, the work provides an in-depth analysis of 
selective industry cases.
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Abbreviations Used.
ABCM Association of British Chemical Manufacturers
ABCC Association of British Chambers of Commerce
AP Sir Allan Powell
AWH Sir Alfred W Hurst
BBMA British Bath Manufacturers Association
BEA British Engineers Association
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ICI Imperial Chemical Industries
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EDAC Import Duties Advisory Committee
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MinAg Ministry of Agriculture
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MTTA Machine Tools Trade Association
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NFBTE National Federation of Building Trade Employers
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PEP Political and Economic Planning
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Chapter 1: British Tariffs 1932-39: who pulled the levers?
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationships between business 
pressure groups, and the evolution and operation of economic policies. This will 
consider business-govemment relations as they evolved in 1930s Britain. The 
intention is to study this relationship through an analysis of additional duty 
applications put before the Import Duties Advisory Committee [IDAC] between 
1932-1939.
The main issue of this thesis is the interplay of business, politics and the 
economy during the 1930s. Relationships are studied through the analysis of the 
tariff introduced in 1932 by the British government. The introduction of the tariff 
in 1932 was important because this marked a clear break in government policy 
toward international trade, Britain having had a long tradition of free trade. The 
work is not concerned with the macroeconomic effects of the tariff and its overall 
impact on the economy. The focus instead is upon policy formulation and 
business involvement in this process. It considers the extent to which business 
mobilised state power (or vice versa) and the sources of the strengths and 
weaknesses o f various sectors. Government knew the tariff could be used as more 
than a revenue earner, importantly the tariff also provided them with the 
opportunity to negotiate with industry, enabling intervention and promotion of 
industrial policy aims. On the other side, business wanted a given level of 
protection and would lobby to achieve their aims1: while at the same time they 
were unwilling to undergo change.
The Import Duties Advisory Committee [IDAC] was a body set-up in 
1932 to administer tariff policy in the UK. The Committee was given the task of 
introducing a ‘scientific’ tariff to the country. The Import Duties Act of March 
1932 had introduced a general ad valorem duty of ten per cent.2 It was the
1 The concern was with effective rates of protection, they wanted to secure the highest possible 
rates on their own products and at the same time, the lowest rates on their inputs.
2 There were exceptions to this rate. Items covered by existing protective legislation, such as the 
McKenna duties, were not covered. There was also a free list of goods. These were not subject to
11
responsibility o f the Committee to impose additional duties for the protection of 
particular industries. In making their decisions the Committee needed to consider: 
‘the advisability in the national interest of restricting imports into the United 
Kingdom and the interests generally of trade and industry in the United Kingdom, 
including those o f trades and industries which are consumers of goods as well as 
those of trades and industries which are producers of goods’.3 The way in which 
this would be achieved was left in the hands of the Committee.4
The objectives of this paper are to provide the first detailed analysis of the 
work o f IDAC and their attempt to develop a ‘scientific’ tariff from its inception 
in 1932. This area of contact between government and industry is seen as part of 
a bargaining process; the output of the process being the resultant tariff position 
and resultant industrial strengths. A two-pronged approach is taken to the work 
considering the process from the point of view of the government and business. 
The first perspective, that of government, considers what the government wanted 
from the tariff and the extent to which these objectives were met. The second 
perspective analyses what business wanted and how successful business was in 
‘capturing’ benefits. The analysis is conducted largely through the examination of 
IDAC papers and Minutes.
any duty (most foodstuffs, raw materials and coal), and Commonwealth goods were exempt from 
the tariff.
3 Hutchinson, Sir Herbert, Tariff-Making and Industrial Reconstruction, (London: 1965).p.21
4 The committee did not have power of decision. This ultimately was in the hands of the Treasury. 
However, evidence shows that the Treasury accepted the recommendations of IDAC and that their 
role was little more than a ‘rubber stamping’ exercise. The Treasury was not able to increase duties 
itself: it could only ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the recommendations. The imposition of the tariff was by 
Treasury Order subject to passing in the House of Commons. An Order was then effective 
immediately.
12
History Of Protectionism in the Early Twentieth Century5
McKenna first introduced import Duties in 1915 these covered a limited 
number of luxury items such as motor cars clocks and watches. They were 
designed to raise revenue, and were introduced as temporary wartime measures. 
They were renewed annually throughout the war, were briefly repealed in 1924, 
and re-introduced. Hence, they were still in force in 1938, at which time they were 
incorporated into the General Tariff. Further acts in the 1920s included the 
Dyestuffs Act of 1920, introducing duties on chemicals, and the Safeguarding of 
Industries Act in 1921, placing duties on goods deemed to be of ‘strategic’ 
importance.6 Items covered by Safeguarding were extended during the twenties, 
but no significant moves were made towards the introduction of a general tariff. 7 
Capie notes: ‘The measures that had been taken in the 1920s were all rather 
insignificant in terms of the volume of imports they affected but they were of
o
some importance for their inroads on free trade ideology’.
5 Summary details of the duties imposed in the first part of the Twentieth Century are shown at 
Appendix 1.1.
6 Percy Ashley, ‘An Experiment in Tariff-Making’ pp. 1-45 The Manchester School XI. Nol April 
1940, notes that the Safeguarding duties introduced in 1921 were wholly protective in purpose. 
Before that the tariffs were revenue tariffs with any protective element being incidental. That said 
the proportion of total imports covered by the Safeguarding Acts was very small.
Part I of the Act introduced in 1921 was intended to protect industries of vital importance to 
defence as well as to industrial protection generally. Duties of 33’/3% were imposed for a period of 
five years on the following items: scientific instruments, wireless valves, magnets, synthetic 
organic chemicals, laboratory glass and porcelain ware, and hosiery needles. A duty of 50% was 
imposed on optical glass. In 1926 the tariff on these items was renewed for a further ten years. Part 
II of the Act imposed duties in 1926 for industries suffering from especially severe foreign 
competition, 'dumping’. These duties were imposed for 5 years. The definition of dumping and the 
levels of evidence to be produced were such that very few industries were able to gain protection 
under the Act.
7 The iron and steel industry aimed to get protection under safeguarding for pig iron, but its 
application failed. The granting of protection to such a large industry that was itself a major 
supplier to other sectors of the economy might have made a general tariff unavoidable.
8 Forrest Capie Depression and Protectionism: Britain between the Wars (1983) p.41
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The 1906 General Election was fought over the issues of ‘protection’ and 
‘imperial preference’, the electorate did not support these policies however, and 
free traders won the day. Even by 1923, the electorate was not persuaded that 
protectionism would be beneficial for the country. In 1923 the Conservative Party, 
under Baldwin, sought re-election and chose to promote a policy of protection. 
This issue dominated the election, but it appears that the electorate feared the 
tariff would increase the price of foodstuffs. Consequently the Conservatives lost 
the election, with a minority Labour Party forming the government with the 
support of the Liberals. Politicians thereafter, were wary of the protectionist issue, 
and Britain was firmly set in favour of free trade. ‘In 1923, when the 
Conservatives advocated the imposition of a tariff as a response to the 
unemployment problem, the party suffered such a decisive electoral defeat that it 
campaigned thereafter on the basis of a pledge not to impose new duties’.9 The 
pledge was neither to introduce a tariff on foodstuffs nor to introduce a general 
tariff the party remained keen on safeguarding however.10
In 1924, with this pledge not to extend protection, the Conservatives 
returned to power. Winston Churchill, a free trader, was appointed as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and this would help the government to keep their promise on 
protection.11 Between 1924-1929, the Baldwin government adhered to their 
pledge not to introduce protection and the extension of safeguarding was limited. 
In the 1929 election, Baldwin was still unprepared to shift on the policy. As Ball 
notes: ‘most of the opposition within the party was based on electoral expediency 
and not on fundamental beliefs’.12
9 Eichengreen Sterling p.4
10 According to Stuart Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party: the crisis o f 1929-1931 (London, 
1988), the issue of tariff reform dominated Conservative Party history in the period 1903-31. 
Joseph Chamberlain in 1903 had opened the campaign. The 1906 election was lost because of fear 
of food taxes, and two further elections in 1910 were lost. Following the loss in the election of 
1923, the party in 1924 pledged to only increase protection via the safeguarding of selected 
industries.
11 Rooth T. British Protectionism and the international economy: overseas commercial policy in 
the 1930’s, (Cambridge, 1993) p.38
12 Ball Stuart Baldwin p.38
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In formulating policy in the wake of defeat in the 1929 election Baldwin 
was concerned to preserve party unity as well as to ensure that policies were not 
electoral liabilities. He felt that protection was likely to split the party and that any 
suggestion of imposing tariff on foodstuffs would be electorally fatal especially in 
seats in the midlands and the north of England.13 From autumn 1929, the party’s 
attitude began to shift back toward adopting a policy of protectionism. By 
February 1930, Baldwin was prepared to promise that a future Conservative 
government would extend safeguarding duties to steel and textiles.14 In the 
summer of 1930, Neville Chamberlain advocated an emergency tariff and in the 
summer of 1932, the Conservative Research Department published its work on the 
tariff.
The Labour government throughout the 1920s were opposed to tariffs on 
principle, but the ensuing depression and the international climate of the early 
thirties was to encourage the introduction of a tariff.15 World-wide trade barriers 
grew steadily after the First World W ar16 and with the financial crises and 
economic depression of 1929-32: ‘a fresh outburst of protectionism appeared and 
world trade collapsed’.17 The government began to face pressure from many sides,
I fteven ‘expert’ opinion shifted in favour of introducing a revenue tariff.
Budgetary problems in 1930 and 1931 would also promote the tariff as a solution 
to revenue shortfalls. The depression aggravated the budgetary problem both by
13 Rooth Protectionism p.55
14 See Ball Stuart Baldwin p.56 on Baldwin’s February Coliseum speech.
By many, this would have been taken to mean that the party would have to introduce a general 
tariff. These two large industries had knock-on effects on so many other sectors.
15 Eichengreen, Sterling, suggests the opinion of the Labour Party did change under the influence 
of such prominent individuals as Keynes. The Economic Advisory Council also supported the 
introduction of the tariff. pp6-14
16 Initially the widespread appearance of quotas and prohibitions along with currency depreciation 
were more important as barriers to trade than changes in tariffs. Tariffs remained relatively stable 
in the first eight years following the war but began to rise from 1927 onwards.
17 Capie Depression and Protectionism, p.2
18 Rooth Protectionism p.49, this refers to Keynes, and other key members of the Economic 
Advisory Council
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reducing revenue, and by increasing expenditure on unemployment benefits. In 
1930 unemployment increased from 12 to 20% of the insured labour force; 
deflation accelerated; and the Balance of Trade deficit increased.19 The tariff was 
not introduced however, until after the Labour government lost office. Shortly 
after the National Government came to power, the Abnormal Importations Act 
was enacted in November 1931.20 ‘The Conservatives dominated the national 
government. Men who believed in protection led the party, and it had been 
committed to a protectionist policy since autumn 1930’.21 The Import Duties Act 
followed shortly afterwards in February 1932. This imposed a 10 per cent tariff on 
all goods, except those specifically exempted; this was quickly increased to a 
basic rate of 20 per cent.
Trade Association views on Protectionism
There has been considerable debate in the literature regarding the reason 
for the introduction of protectionism in 1931. Part of the debate centres around the 
extent to which it resulted from business pressure. Some authors have argued that 
the introduction of protection came after a period of sustained pressure, whilst 
others have suggested it was simply a matter of expediency, being adopted as a 
result of crises. Forest Capie is a proponent of the former view. He argues there 
was a sustained build up of protectionist pressure before the slump. Thus the 
implementation of the protectionist policy should be seen more as the culmination 
of over a decade of pressure by interested parties, which built up to produce a 
powerful force when worsening economic conditions developed at the end of the 
1920s’.22 Stephen Krasner also feels that there were forces in the longer-term 
which would make protectionism inevitable. He argues that free trade suits the 
strong, with Britain’s weakened position in the twentieth century, and the loss of
19 Eichengreen Sterling p. 17
20 This was introduced as an emergency measure because it was argued imports had started to rise 
at an unprecedented or ‘abnormal’ rate
21 Rooth Protectionism p.69
22 Capie Depression and Protectionism, pp.45-46
her hegemony, it was necessary to have a change of trade policy. The depression 
acted as the spur for change, bringing about the necessary return to protection.23 
Beer, suggests that the foundations for a protective tariff were laid in advance. He 
points out that by early 1931 the Conservative Research Department had produced 
a complete tariff scheme ready to be pushed through parliament and introduced 
when required.24 Rooth argues that opinion in Britain had already begun to move 
in favour of the tariff by 1930. He states that the steady erosion of support for free 
trade in the late 1920s helps to explain the speed with which it collapsed once the 
country was hit by the world-wide depression.25 A different view of events is 
however, taken by Eichengreen, who sees the tariff as a response to the immediate 
pressures of the depression, and especially to the deterioration of the balance of 
payments.26 He argues: ‘the authorities’ distrust of the effects of a floating 
exchange rate formed the basis of their decision to impose the General Tariff in 
1932’.27 The main objective in introducing the tariff was to secure the exchange 
rate and avoid hyperinflation. The debate about tariffs changed in 1931, and 
although protectionist demands remained strong, the greatest pressure for the 
remainder of the life of the second labour government stemmed from the budget 
deficit and the financial crisis'.28
The most comprehensive examination yet of the relationship between 
business interests and government policy towards protection during the period 
1902 to 1932 is the work of Andrew Marrison.29 Marrison provides an analysis of 
industry by industry attitudes towards protectionism before the First World War. 
For the period up to 1913, the focus is on the Chambers of Commerce, reviewing 
the position of each local chamber, and on the Tariff Reform League. Amongst
23 Stephen Krasner, ‘State Power and the Structure of International Trade’, World Politics. 28 
(1976) pp.317-48
24 Beer Samuel H. Modem British Politics: a study ofparties and pressure groups (1965) p.288
25 Rooth T. Protectionism p.45
26 Eichengreen, Sterling, does note the importance of pressure groups, and suggests they were 
important for the shaping of the tariff structure.
27 Eichengreen Sterling p.3
28 Rooth Protectionism p.59
29 Marrison A. British Business and Protection, J903-32 (Oxford, 1996)
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the local chambers, Marrison found early support for tariff reform. The ACCUK 
however, remained essentially Free Trade up to 1914.
Marrison argues that the introduction of Safeguarding post-war did not 
require a significant move away from free trade ideology but served to dampen 
the effectiveness o f tariff reformers' propaganda.30 Industries to be protected 
under the Safeguarding Act were determined by the Board of Trade to whom 
applications had to be made. Their list of protection disappointed industries such 
as hosiery, toys and even automobiles.31 Nine applications received by the Board 
of Trade appealed for anti-dumping protection but all failed. In the first five 
months twenty-four applications were received seeking protection against 
currency depreciation, sixteen were either rejected or withdrawn, and eight were 
referred on to committees. By March 1922, seven committee reports were 
announced with four having a favourable result.32
Forrest Capie notes, in the recession of 1921 a powerful deputation from 
the National Union o f Manufacturers [NUM] visited Baldwin, the President of the 
Board o f Trade, urging prompt action.33 The Safeguarding of Industries Bill soon 
followed. According to Capie: 'It was a clear case of protection (even if only of 
modest extent) resulting from business pressure'.34 He further argues that the 
NUM kept pressure up with the result being that by 1923 the greater part of 
British industry was willing to lend support to the campaign. The 1923 election 
having been fought based on the protectionist question.
Capie also considers the work of the Empire Industries Association [EIA]. 
The EIA was formed in 1924 with the purpose of lobbying for a tariff. This 
organisation had the support of many backbenchers in Parliament. The body is
30 Marrison Protection p.256
31 Marrison notes, the Board of Trade rejected the claims of the Association of British Motor and 
Allied Manufacturers for 33% commercial duty on cars [p.257 and footnote 8]. The Nottingham 
Chamber of Commerce were disappointed that embroidery, lace cotton hosiery, and gloves were 
not afforded key industry status [p.259, from Nottingham CoC Annual Report 1919)
Marrison Protection pp.257-259
32 Marrison Protection p.263
33 Capie Depression and Protectionism p.72
34 Capie Depression and Protectionism p.72
seen as playing an important part in the eventual introduction of the tariff. Seeing 
the importance of iron and steel for other industries the EIA supported calls for 
introduction of a protective tariff for the industry, believing that this would 
ultimately have to lead to the introduction of a general tariff. 'The EIA became a 
most powerful pressure group in the course of the next few years, cultivating the 
press and public opinion assiduously'.35
Several historians have taken the view that the Federation of British 
Industry [FBI] was heavily divided in its attitude towards tariffs. Stephen Blank 
has written of the inability of FBI leaders 'to take any stand in favour of Protection 
because of the opposition of many groups within it'. Further, according to Blank 
the FBI sacrificed a radical line on industrial policy in order to secure membership 
size and growth.36 ‘Until the fall o f 1930, the FBI’s leaders believed that any 
action with regard to tariff policy would irrevocably split the membership and 
thus destroy the organization’.37 The FBI recommended tariffs to the government 
in 1931, and the Import Duties Bill was introduced in 1932, but by 1931 tariff 
reform was not a controversial issue. ‘Protection came not because of what the 
FBI did, but because in the economic crisis all opposition had melted away and, 
when this had taken place, those individuals like Chamberlain who had long been 
committed to tariff reform were prepared to act’.38 This was likely to be true of 
other ‘umbrella’ or high-level trade associations that represented a large number 
of sectional interests.
Holland, in his study, of the FBI 1929-39, examined the composition of 
the organisation. He points out that a high level of membership came from the 
traditional export staple industries; iron and steel, shipbuilding and engineering, 
with cotton and coal interests also being important.39 Because of this bias towards 
export industries, discussions within the organisation were dominated by the 
theme of Britain's international competitiveness. However, because export trade
35 Capie Depression and Protectionism p.74
36 Blank Stephen Industry and Government in Britain (Famborough 1973) p. 15
37 Blank Industry p.27
38 Blank Industry p.28
39Holland R.F. ‘The Federation of British Industries and the International Economy’,
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affected members to differing extents there was no consensus in the FBI regarding 
tariffs. It was not until 1930, with the worsening of Britain's international trading 
position, that agreement in favour of tariffs was reached. Holland argues that the 
FBI was unclear about the government’s intentions and this limited the action they 
could take.40 Tariffs did become the central policy of the FBI though, as they 
gambled on government support for protection of British Manufacturing.
'By the autumn of 1930 the FBI, increasingly concerned that it might other 
wise become marginalised as the voice of industry, had joined the protectionist 
bandwagon’41 The FBI joined the Empire Economic Union, the EIA, the National 
Council of Industry and Commerce and the NUM in a Co-ordinating Committee 
on Fiscal Policy that was set up to launch a protectionist propaganda campaign.42
Marrison also examined the FBI and its views on protectionism after the 
War. In the immediate post-war years the organisation attempted to poll its 
members views on the subject of tariff reform, and their fiscal views.43 The FBI 
had considerable difficulty in completing their investigation into members' views 
since certain industrial groups would not respond. Marrison argues that the 
membership was more protectionist than earlier historians had previously 
acknowledged. Once the Safeguarding of Industries Act had been passed the FBI 
were happy to become involved on behalf of their members - applications under 
the legislation were seen as legitimate activity. The FBI helped prepare many 
applications for safeguarding, but with limited success. The FBI by 1930 was 
overwhelmingly protectionist. Most 'free traders' within it no longer supported the 
removal of safeguarding duties, but there remained an embargo on discussing 
tariff reforms. Because the FBI believed a permanent body would be set up to 
review tariff procedure they believed it was unnecessary to undertake heavy 
lobbying.44
Economic History Review Vol 34 (1981) p.287 
^Holland ‘FBI’ p.290
41 Rooth Protectionism p.47
42 Closer involvement of banks with industry in the late twenties and early thirties, made them 
more disposed to view protection favourably.
43Marrison Protection p.294
^Marrison Protection p.413
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In British Protectionism and the International Economy, Rooth examines 
the roots of the 1932 General Tariff in the policies of the 1920s.45 He examines 
the McKenna duties and the Safeguarding of Industries. Rooth considers the 
views of various trade bodies. The British and Allied Manufacturers' Association 
[sic] gave evidence to the Balfour Committee on Industrial Efficiency and 
requested a protective tariff 46 The fine chemicals industry also said it relied on 
the continuance of protection. Austin and Morris were both involved in the 
campaign for continued protection of the motor industry. Sectors of the textile 
industry also favoured protection by 1925. This was the case with hosiery 
manufacturers who were dependent on dominion markets.
'Even the steel industry, which gave the government more trouble about 
tariffs than any other sector, was fairly muted in its demands until after 1925'47 
Referring to this industry Rooth asserts that because there was some division of 
opinion the government was able to ward-off claims for protection. By the late 
1920s, opposition had almost entirely disappeared from the industry. Demands for 
protection and for imperialist policies gained fresh momentum from 1925. The 
NUM and the EIA led this. The EIA aimed both to lobby MPs and government as 
well as to educate the public. The agricultural sector had never taken to free trade. 
In 1927, the NFU launched a campaign calling on county branches to pressure 
local MPs for help 48 By the end of the twenties Chambers of Commerce were 
increasingly willing to declare a protectionist stance. In July 1930 the British
45 The main focus of Rooth’s work, Protectionism, is a consideration of how Britain abandoned 
free trade in 1931-32 and then used protection as a bargaining tool in establishing bilateral trade 
agreements. The tariff was regarded as a tool for bargaining with other nations, and it is this aspect 
which forms the bulk of Rooth's study. The Import Duties Advisory Committee which was set-up 
to make recommendations on higher selective duties is mentioned, but there is no in depth study of 
its workings and relations with trade associations.
46Rooth Protectionism pp.38-39, the information is from the Board of Trade records on the Balfour 
Committee
47 Rooth Protectionism p.40
48 Rooth Protectionism p.43
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Engineers' Association found from a poll of members that 96% favoured
49protection.
Steven Tolliday, in ‘Tariffs and Steel, 1916-1934: The Politics of 
Industrial Decline’, notes steel industrialists called for tariff protection in the 
twenties. However, they were not sufficiently unified to be able to exert pressure 
upon government: ‘The industries where governments had been most ready to 
intervene had been those such as cellulose, dyestuffs or fuel oil where a compact 
body of employers with a clear plan had been able to win the support o f a 
government department for a specific course of action for a specific purpose’.50 
He argues that NFISM (the main trade association for the Iron and Steel industry) 
was significantly silent in the tariff election of 1923. Largely this was because the 
industry had been lulled into a false sense of security concerning its prospects - 
the German industry was severely disrupted, and they had experienced an 
immediate post-war boom. Only as the real pattern of international trade began to 
emerge, did calls for protection grow stronger.51 There still remained some 
division of opinion however, and this took pressure off successive governments to 
act.52 A clear link could not be established between the tariff and the regeneration 
of the industry. Whilst industrialists called for protection the Government called 
for the rationalisation of the industry.53
Attitudes toward protectionism were by no means uniform during this 
period. The Safeguarding of Industries Act was a special case, with only those 
industries of strategic importance benefiting significantly from the legislation. 
Safeguarding bought about a change in the role of the state, but as Roberts argues, 
this did not significantly increase or change the type of contact officials had with 
businessmen.54 The Board of Trade merely had to process applications which
49 This information comes from a BEA Report cited in Rooth T., Protectionism, p.46.
50 Tolliday, Steven, ‘Tariffs and Steel, 1916-1934: The Politics of Industrial Decline’ Businessmen 
and Politics, ed. John Turner, (London, 1984) 50-75. p.53.
51 Tolliday ‘Tariffs and Steel’ p.53
52 Tolliday ‘Tariffs and Steel’ p.54
53 Tolliday ‘Tariffs and Steel’ p.55
54 Roberts R. ‘The Administrative Origins of Industrial Diplomacy: an Aspect of Government- 
Industry Relations, 1929-35’, Turner J. (ed.) Businessmen and Politics (1984) pp.93-104
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were required to meet certain published criteria, their decisions were thus not 
subjective. Attitudes tended to change with the economic fortune o f the nation, in 
the immediate post-war depression there were calls for protection, but these 
abated as the economy recovered. For most of the twenties, the prevailing mood 
was in favour of free trade, although there were always some calls for 
protectionism. Trade association opinion tended to be divided along industry or 
product lines. Rooth argues that business opinion at this time was ambiguous, so it 
was easy for Government to quell any calls for protection.55
By the end of the twenties, business opinion was less divided however: 
‘There may have been a growing consensus in the business world in 1930 about 
the need for protection and imperial preference, but from June 1929 it was met by 
a government that at the outset was profoundly opposed to tariffs’.56 By the end of 
the twenties the mood was swinging in favour of protectionism. With the onset of 
depression, calls for protectionism grew in intensity. The majority of trade 
associations were in favour of the introduction of tariffs by the early thirties. By 
August 1930 the ABCC adopted a report in favour of Safeguarding, and in 
October 1930 the FBI found 96% of its membership supported protection.57
Marrison argues that protectionist sentiment and protectionist consensus 
did indeed grow during the 1920s. However, given the Conservative Party’s 
recent history protectionist pressure from business was stifled. Business wanted 
protection but they wanted a Conservative government (with low taxation and 
support of business) even more. Thus, it was not until it became apparent that the 
Conservative Party was again committed to tariff reform that business expression 
strongly emerged. Commitment to protection by the party was clearly established 
by the autumn of 1930. This was the time for business to come out into the open 
and begin to exert pressure.
55 Rooth Protectionism p.38
56 Rooth Protectionism p.48
57 Capie Forrest ‘The Pressure for Tariff Protection in Britain, 1917-31’ Journal of European 
Economic History 119801. p.438
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The desire for protection rose to a peak by 1931, both in and out of 
Parliament. The Abnormal Importations (Customs Duties) Bill was introduced on 
16/11/31, coming into force on the 25th of that month, and imposing duties of 
50% on a range of manufactured goods. The Act was a foretaste of the General 
tariff legislation that came three months later.
Trade Associations and the British Government: a brief history.
In the nineteenth century, despite espousal of laissez-faire doctrines, state 
intervention was deemed acceptable, particularly in order to overcome market 
failures such as the regulation or control of emerging monopolies. However, 
‘Despite the advances of the state and the popularity of municipal enterprise in 
certain fields, the spirit of laissez faire, and business distrust of any government 
intervention, remained strong’.58
Although businessmen before the First World War had canvassed 
government intervention, especially by those calling for tariff protection, the idea 
was not generally accepted. Hannah argues that in terms of international 
comparisons, Britain traditionally had low levels of government intervention in 
the economy. He notes that as late as 1911 Britain had only 73 public officials per 
10,000 population, compared to the US with 113, Germany with 126, and France 
176.59 Britain was unusual in that government expenditure in the economy was 
limited, and this grew at a slower rate than did national income.
In World War I however, the state was forced to intervene: ‘Initiatives 
which had been electorally impossible in peacetime now became political 
imperatives. Import tariffs were introduced on a limited basis in 1916 to raise 
revenue and protect strategically important industries; the government was also 
involved in the promotion and financing of companies to manufacture goods 
previously imported from Germany or vital to the war effort, like dyestuffs or
58 Hannah L. ‘Government and Business in Britain: The Evolution of the Modem Relationship’, 
Nakagawa Keiichiro (ed) Government and Business (Tokyo, 1980), p.l 11
59 Hannah ‘Government and Business’ p. 107
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aircraft dope’.60 Government aided the growth of chemical and optical industries 
by providing cheap loans and technical assistance.61 A system of state controls 
gradually emerged where the state directed more and more of the economy’s 
activities, with business being made subject to a wide range o f controls. The 
railways, for instance, were placed under state control early in the war, to aid the 
mobilisation of troops. The British Government became embroiled in the running 
o f industry to ensure that the nation was able to fight the ‘total war’.
In the case of economic policy, most wartime measures were temporary, 
even if links between Whitehall and industry were strengthened.62 Traditional 
views suggest, once the crises was over, the government could not return the 
‘reins’ to industrialists quickly enough. Business was to be run by businessmen. 
The state no longer wanted to intervene in the economy, and wished to pull back 
to its traditional position, re-adopting a policy of laissez-faire. There were strong 
pressures, from the City and the Treasury, to restore the traditional “arms-length” 
British relations of industry and the state. The government retreated substantially 
from its control over the economy. State intervention would again be limited in 
nature. The State intervened to regulate certain sectors of the economy, such as 
controlling railway rates. It intervened in the supply of electricity, and it had a 
selective tariff policy to protect a limited number of specific industries.
Kirby and Rose present a modification of this view63. They acknowledge 
the validity of explanations that stress the post-war resurgence of political and 
economic orthodoxy (including the pursuit of laissez faire), but they argue that 
this provides only a partial explanation. To illustrate their argument, they 
examine, what was a major objective of public policy, the reconstruction of 
industry. The Ministry of Reconstruction aimed to perpetuate improvements in 
business organisation and efficiency in the post-war era.64 However, according to
60 Hannah ‘Government and Business’ p.l 12
61 Peden G. C. British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Thatcher (1990, 2nd ed.) p.35
62 Peden George to Thatcher p.53
63 Kirby Maurice & Rose Mary B. ‘Productivity and Competitive Failure: British Government 
Policy and Industry, 1914-19’, Jones Geoffrey & Kirby Maurice (eds) Competitiveness and the 
State: Government and Business in Twentieth-Century Britain (Manchester 1991), pp.20-39
64 Kirby & Rose ‘Competitive Failure’ p.25
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Kirby and Rose this policy was largely unsuccessful. The Ministry could not 
implement its policies because the climate of co-operation between employers, 
labour and government no longer prevailed. Employers and labour no longer 
worked in harmony. There was also a division of opinion within the business 
community: ‘whilst government plans for industry may have reflected the ideas of 
industrialists, they were derived it seems, from a vocal minority of productioneers 
and trade warriors who were not representative of the majority of businessmen’.65
Kirby and Rose further argue that the impetus for reconstruction 
diminished with the collapse of the German military. This latter point is reiterated 
by Turner in his examination of the FBI: ‘peak organisations signally failed to 
transform British politics in a ‘corporatist’ direction during and after the First 
World W a r... Their [FBI] efforts to enlist state support were constantly undercut 
by their members’ hostility to state intervention, based on the wartime experiences 
which had first driven them into the FBI. Unable to control their members, they 
could not hope to strike bargains with the government, and their corporatist 
aspirations flowed into the sands of ‘decontrol’ and the apparent collapse of 
German commercial competition in the immediate post-war period’.66 The 
removal of the necessity of reconstruction for national security, complaints about 
levels of government expenditure, and the restoration of Treasury control over 
Whitehall machinery, combined with the ideological desire to ‘return to
( \ 7normalcy’ all acted to inhibit closer govemment-industry relations. Indeed, 
Roberts argues that, by the mid-twenties, the relationship between government 
and industry had returned in many respects to that which had existed at the end of 
the nineteenth century. However, there was still a belief in some circles that for 
the sake of industrial efficiency government involvement was both necessary and 
desirable. It was clear that British industry needed reorganisation, but most felt 
this should be achieved voluntarily without any compulsion from government.
65 Kirby & Rose ‘Competitive Failure’ p.27
66 Turner J. ‘The Politics of ‘Organised Business’ in the First World War’, Turner J. (ed.) 
Businessmen and Politics (1984), p.48
67 Kirby & Rose ‘Competitive Failure’ pp.29-36
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The economic crisis of the early 1930s acted as a catalyst, bringing a 
revolutionary change in the role o f the state in Britain. The National Government 
moved into, what was in essence ‘uncharted territory’; for the first time since 
Britain had lost her dominant position in world trading, the country faced major 
cyclical and structural problems. The state was called upon to act to solve these 
problems. It was required to adopt policies to assist recovery as a matter of 
expediency: ‘Above all it [British Government] traditionally sought to provide a 
stable framework within which industrialists could carry on their own affairs. 
When the crisis of the inter-war years undermined this simple position, 
government had to develop a new relationship with a set of industries already well 
established and representing powerful entrenched vested interests.’68
Those policies introduced by government were in the main ad hoc. They 
had no overarching theory or policy on how to address micro-economic problems 
at this time. Increased intervention in the economy was seen by many as a 
necessary evil, not especially welcome in principle, but crucial in the short term. 
According to Roberts, officials still believed that the government should not 
intervene in the economy, but were able to come to terms with events by 
distinguishing between the short-term and the long-term. Intervention was 
regarded as a temporary expedient. The form of contact between government and 
business, one of ‘industrial diplomacy’, was not a haphazard development. ‘It 
came about, rather, as a reflection of the anxieties felt by officials about the 
conflicting demands of economic theory and economic policy and about the need 
to preserve the role of Parliament in government’.69
Roberts notes that by 1935, the relationship between government and 
industry had substantially changed. With the depression, the government had 
become increasingly involved in the economy, to protect business and aid long­
term recovery. The government introduced the General Tariff, promoted the 
rationalisation of the coal, iron and steel and cotton industries, and developed a 
regional policy: ‘Whatever their effect, these activities changed the relationship
68 Tolliday ‘Tariffs and Steel’ pp.74-75
69 Roberts ‘Administrative Origins’ p.98
27
between the state and businessmen’.70 Ministers were more likely to aid industry, 
and there was a rise in the number of contacts between officials and businessmen. 
Trade Associations, and other business organisations, were the main focus of 
contact with government throughout this time. The government, being more than 
willing to consult, and negotiate, with these bodies. Turner, points out: ‘The 
institutions of business politics - lobbying groups, and trade and employers’ 
associations - were ready to go to work on the issues of business politics - industrial 
relations, social welfare, commercial policy and tariffs, and state regulation of 
industry’.71 The relationship between government and business (as represented by 
trade associations) was fundamentally and, permanently changed. The trade 
associations had gained access to the political process, and it was not something 
they would give up willingly.
At the same time, the more the government became involved in the 
economy the more it relied on the assistance of business representatives: ‘the 
government had neither a bureaucratic apparatus nor the expertise to tackle the 
problems of the industry and government departments profoundly doubted their
72own competence to intervene and deal with the complexities that would arise’. 
Grant argues, co-operation with pressure groups is important because it legitimises 
government actions. 'On the part of government, there is a tendency to see business 
associations as 'lobbies', legitimate interlocutors with government, but not part of 
the system of governance itself.73 For government there are three benefits to the 
relationship with business groups: they receive information for policy design, 
consent for policy clearance, and co-operation for policy implementation. The 
government therefore, had as much to gain from the newly emerging relationship, 
as did business. The relationship was in fact symbiotic - a continual process of 
change, of response and counter-response. The consequence of greater government 
involvement of course was that the trade associations wanted a more substantial role 
in the political environment: ‘If there is to be interference with industry and
70 Roberts ‘Administrative Origins’ p.94
71 Turner J. Businessmen and Politics (1984), p.7
72 Tolliday Tariffs and Steel’ p.73
73 Grant Wyn Business and Politics in Britain (Basingstoke, 1993) p. 12
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commerce, then it is necessary for industry and commerce to show when and how 
this might be harmful’.74
The expanded role of the state bought government necessarily into closer 
contact with industry. The change was not simply a ‘hiatus’ but was to auger a 
permanent alteration in the nature of state involvement in the economy, and in the 
relationship between the state and industry. It was from this time, along with the 
subsequent experiences of World War II, that the modem interventionist state was 
to emerge. Given this was when the foundations of the modem relationship were 
laid the 1930s is a crucial period in which to study business-govemment 
relationships as they unfold. A study of a phenomenon in its infancy may provide 
a useful insight into its future development, and it is this which will form the basis 
of this work.
Development of the state/government policy intervention
The extent to which government had begun to manage the economy in the 
1930s has been much debated. Overall, the literature suggests that policy was ad 
hoc, piecemeal, and therefore not ‘management’. Tiratsoo and Tomlinson suggest 
that the government could not have had an innovative75 policy because of tight 
budgetary controls they kept in place. The state is seen as generally being 
reluctant to intervene in industry and therefore ‘by the outbreak of the second 
world war Britain had little more of a ‘developmental’ state than in 1900’.76
74 Tivey L. & Wohlgemuth E. ‘Trade Associations as Interest Groups’ Political Quarterly Vol.29 
(1958) p.70.
75 Tiratsoo Nick & Tomlinson Jim, Industrial efficiency and state intervention: Labour, 1939-51, 
(London 1993) use a narrow definition of ‘innovative’ here. Specifically they are referring to the 
government’s failure to adopt Keynesian-style fiscal policy, public works schemes, and more 
direct government intervention in industry.
76 Tiratsoo & Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency p.7
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Authors who dissent from this view include Booth and Middleton.77 Booth 
proposes that the government were pursuing a coherent strategy to increase prices 
and profits to stimulate recovery.
Middleton argues not for a coherent policy across government but at least 
for more consistency in Treasury policy than previously acknowledged.
Moreover, he adds that the government had begun to intervene deliberately in the 
economy before World War n.78 While this intervention was not according to a 
fully developed strategy, it had gone beyond the pre World War I view of a 
passive government.79 The government did not have a full package of tools and 
instruments which they could use to meet micro- and macro- objectives but they 
were beginning to get them.80
Middleton sees inter-war regional policy from 1934 making a clear break 
from pre-war laissez-faire because it is discriminatory. This is equally true of 
tariff policy at the time. The use of ID AC, which worked effectively as an 
arbitration council, meant that certain industries benefited more than others. A flat 
rate tariff was introduced but this could be bargained up or down. As this work 
argues, the government, rather than using the tariff as a simple revenue earner or 
as a protector of strategic and infant industries, chose to use it as a broader policy 
tool.
In terms of industrial policy, Middleton refers to subsidies to industry, 
sponsorship and promotion through provision of cheap loans, but argues these 
were minimal. He suggests that because of the small scope of these they were not
77 Booth Alan ‘Britain in the 1930s: a managed economy?’ Economic History Review Second 
Series XL 4 (198) pp.499-522, and ‘An administrative experiment in unemployment policy in the 
‘thirties” , Public Administration 56 no.2 (1978) pp. 139-357
Middleton Roger, Government versus the Market: Growth o f the Public Sector, Economic 
Management and British Economic Performance, c.J890-1979, (1996)
78 Middleton, Government versus the Market
79 Middleton, Towards the managed economy: Keynes, the Treasury and the fiscal policy debate o f 
the 1930s (London, 1985), earlier argued that government did only what was politically expedient 
and only so long as they could keep to ‘orthodox’ financing and balancing budgets.
80 Particularly important in this respect were regional policy in the 1930s and policy in respect of 
the agricultural sector
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entirely significant in terms of policy. The activities of the DSIR (who ‘prodded 
the private sector to expand research’) were written off as being insubstantial by 
Tiratsoo and Tomlinson.81They conclude: ‘It is apparent, firstly, that industrial 
modernisation and efficiency had never been the primary goal of any British 
government before this date’.82
These are frequently made arguments; intervention is said to have had 
limited impact because it was fragmented across government departments. 
However, from the study of ID AC, this does not seem so transparent: impact may 
have been less fragmentary. IDAC had responsibility for a specific policy area but 
they co-ordinated their activities with those of other government departments as 
far as possible.83 They were well aware, as were all government departments, of 
overall government policy aims and areas of responsibility across ministries. They 
had an understanding of how they could assist other departments in promoting and 
pursuing particular objectives. This suggests that Tiratsoo and Tomlinson were 
looking at the wrong institutions. Activities across government may not have been 
officially co-ordinated but the different arms of government were trying to 
achieve the same objectives.
Lowe examined the evolution of labour policy in the Ministry of Labour in 
the 1930s. He suggests that though ‘orthodox’ policy was followed, as civil 
servants became more experienced they were in a position to lead policy rather 
than just follow. ‘Involvement in the practical realities of labour policy may not 
have enabled the ministry to define a theoretically rigorous ‘alternative 
philosophy’; but at least it had encouraged legislative experiments which, in the 
pragmatic tradition of British policy-making, theorists could later legitimise’. 84 A 
similar process was working in IDAC. Through its activities, various policy tools 
and instruments of intervention were tried and tested. This was not because of the
81 Tiratsoo & Tomlinson Industrial Efficiency p.8
82 Tiratsoo & Tomlinson Industrial Efficiency p. 18
83 This includes the Board of Trade, the Treasury, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research.
84 Rodney Lowe ‘Labour Policy’ in The Road to Full Employment ed. Sean Glynn and Alan 
Booth, London 1987. pp 140-153
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development of formal theories. However, IDAC’s experience provided lessons 
for future intervention.
Producing a scientific tariff85
Middleton rightly suggests that the introduction of the tariff in 1932 gave 
an opportunity for ‘rent-seeking’ that had never before existed. However, he goes 
on to note that: ‘in the eyes of the authorities such a situation was guarded against 
by the creation of the IDAC which, rather than the Board of Trade, was charged 
with overseeing the operation of the tariff and considering applications from 
specific groups for further tariff protection’. He argues that this was part of a
85 The term ‘scientific’ is elusive. Joseph Chamberlain first used it in a speech in Dec 1903. His 
‘Tariff Commission’ again referred to a ‘scientific tariff’ in 1904 [see Marrison Protection p.34]. 
The term referred to the objective of producing a tariff beneficial to all. The tariff was not simply 
to benefit industry but all sectors of the economy as well as consumers.
The use of the term by Neville Chamberlain in relation to the 1932 tariff was more 
limited than that of his father. It focused instead upon benefits to all industries both producers and 
users. The emphasis for other sectors and the consumers was that it should not harm them. When 
questioned Neville Chamberlain stated that he did not expect the tariff to have an impact on the 
cost of living because of stocks of foodstuffs and freelisting [Hansard, House of Commons 4th 
February 1932 col.290]. A summary of the claims Chamberlain made for the general tariff can be 
found in chapter 2, as can a review of what the Committee felt they had to do.
The term scientific also implied something about the method of production and at the 
least that the tariff would result from an impartial enquiry. As Baldwin expressed it, he did not 
want to be responsible for making Great Britain a ‘profiteers paradise’, he wanted to make the 
tariff ‘knave-proof, and to take it as far out of politics as possible. The term ‘scientific’ to describe 
the method of enquiry was in keeping with its usage in the USA. However, what ‘scientific’ 
actually meant in the US was as elusive as in Britain. Page in his book Making the Tariff in the 
United States (New York, 1924) brings this to light. It could mean the ‘proper adjustment, of 
commercial legislation to business needs’, or that tariff rates will lead to equality of opportunity 
for foreign and domestic industries [p.217]. It was accepted however that neither of these 
objectives could truly be achieved. At best therefore, ‘scientific’ was concerned with the gathering 
and analysis of relevant information and facts by highly trained men experienced in research and 
competent to judge what facts had significance for tariff making and what had not [p. 178].
86 Middleton Government versus the Market p.393
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R7broader process of appearing to depoliticize economic questions. The use of the 
word ‘appearing’ is key here: the tariff was not ‘depoliticized’. IDAC was not 
strictly ‘independent’ of government: it was free to make its own decision but 
ultimately if its actions had not met with the Chancellor’s approval, it could have 
been abolished. The tariff remained open to rent seeking behaviour making the 
task facing the Committee a difficult one.
The members of IDAC were asked to produce a scientific tariff and yet at 
this time economic understanding and knowledge in government itself was 
limited. As is well known, Treasury officials, in particular, lacked any formal 
training in economics. During the inter-war period and especially in the 1930s 
officials increasingly encountered economists on various committees and advisory 
bodies, and through institutional innovations such as the Economic Advisory 
Council [EAC].88 Despite such groups, there was no real understanding of how 
the economy worked, and no ‘economic model’ to assist decision-making.89 
National Income Accounts did not exist and the information available was limited 
and/or of poor quality. Official statistics were inadequate, collected mainly as 
information for Parliament.90 Given this dearth of economic training and 
knowledge in the Civil service how were IDAC to develop a ‘scientific tariff?
IDAC was perhaps, better placed that the Treasury itself to attempt such a 
task. Its members included the former Chief Economic Advisor to the Board of 
Trade (Sir Sydney Chapman), a former lecturer in History and Public 
Administration (Percy Ashley), a Barrister (Sir George Powell) and other 
businessmen and civil servants. Several of them had been active members of the 
EAC working on various committees. These men understood no more of a 
‘model’ of the economy than the government itself but they had practical 
experience of business and the economy and their hands were not tied by 
departmental practices and principles. They had more room to manoeuvre and to
87 The Government was willing to intervene but was at pains to conceal this. They also wanted to 
remove themselves from the influence of direct lobbying.
88Eichengreen, Sterling, notes that the EAC was the first government agency in which the virtues 
of a tariff were actively debated (p.9)
89 Keynes did not publish his ‘General Theory’ until 1936
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be perhaps more inventive. They endeavoured to make the tariff scientific 
considering its knock-on effects as far as possible.
Percy Ashley, in his review of the Committee’s work noted that their 
attempts to introduce a ‘scientific tariff were constrained because of other aspects 
of the government policy.91 In particular he noted that the special relief for the 
Shipbuilding industry, the exemption from duty of empire and dominion goods 
and Trade treaties agreed with foreign countries limited the extent to which the 
tariff could be scientific. On the relief for the ship-building industry, he 
commented: ‘These concessions were made in order to assist the shipbuilding 
industry, which had for long been seriously depressed and to which no tariff could 
be directly beneficial whilst it might to some extent be positively 
disadvantageous. But they were prima-facie inconsistent with the general 
principles on which the tariff scheme was based in that they singled out one 
particular industry for special treatment without any detailed and judicial 
investigation as was postulated in all other cases.’92
Despite these constraints and their inability to measure the effects of the 
tariff93 overall, they tried to keep to their remit of working in the ‘national 
interest’. IDAC did the best that they could to make the tariff coherent, linking it 
to wider policy concerns and implications and to their own knowledge of the 
domestic economy. In the individual consideration of cases, they were unable to 
take account of all repercussions but they did consider the obvious ones.
90 Middleton Government versus the market p.355
91 Percy Ashley, ‘An Experiment’ pp. 1-45
92 Percy Ashley, ‘An Experiment’ p. 12
93 They were unable to measure the effects of their tariff, as suitable data simply did not exist 
did they have a developed model of how the international economy worked.
.Nor
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The rent seekers
Because of the way, that IDAC administered the tariff, it became a prime 
area for business to target government policy because the policy was 
discretionary.94 Different levels of protection could be granted to industry if a 
satisfactory case could be made. There have been attempts to quantify this using 
evidence from US tariff history. There were a number of factors determining a 
sector's ability to ‘capture’ high levels o f protection. These include size and 
concentration of the sector and regional concentration.
In his work, Capie considers the applicability of such theories to the tariff 
developed by IDAC. He argues in fact that, in contrast with the US, industries in 
Britain with strong market power (measured by the degree of concentration in the 
industry) did not secure the highest tariff levels during the 1930s.95 Oligopolies
94 It is clear from studies of other countries that tariffs are notoriously open to special pleading, see 
for example F.W. Taussig The Tariff History o f the United States Volume 8 (New York, 1964); 
E.E. Schattschneider Politics, Pressure and the Tariff (New York, 1935); J.J. Pincus ‘Pressure 
Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs’ Journal of Political and Economic Planning 83, no.4 (1975) 
pp.775-778; Baack & Ray ‘The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the United 
States’ Explorations in Economic History 20 (1983) pp.73-93; and, Hayford & Pasurka ‘The 
Politcial Economy of the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts’ Explorations in 
Economic History 29 (J992) pp.30-50..
95 Capie Depression and Protectionism
He argued that the effective tariff structure was a function of the size concentration of industry (S), 
the regional concentration of industry (R), and some measure of import concentration (F), i.e., Te 
= f  (S, R, F) such that: Te = a - b|S + b2R + b3F. His findings supported this argument, though the 
measure of import concentration proved to be insignificant. Size concentration was expected to 
have a negative coefficient because large concentrated industries were less in need of protection, 
and because in Britain at this time large industries were unlikely to cooperate with one another. 
This is opposed to US tariff theory that suggests highly concentrated industries use excess profits 
to exert pressure. Capie suggests this did not occur in Britain during the 1930s because oligopolists 
were unwilling to co-operate. He also makes the point that highly concentrated industries were, in 
any case, less likely to need protection. Regional concentration was expected to have a positive 
effect because this was likely to facilitate co-operative activities and, in later years, because the 
IDAC may have taken into account ‘regional policy’.
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were unlikely to co-operate especially as the evidence required by IDAC was of a 
sensitive nature.96 Capie argues instead that the least concentrated industries, with 
the most to gain, should have obtained the greatest protection.
Analysis of IDAC Committee papers, however, shows a more complex 
picture. Concentrated industries were only less likely to secure high levels of 
protection if their case was fundamentally weak and/or if they could not convince 
IDAC that they would not exercise monopolistic powers to raise prices97. 
Importantly, their success depended upon how well they were able to 
argue/present their case (it turns out that rhetoric and data analysis were both 
important).
The picture emerging from this work is of the limited ability o f business to 
influence government via IDAC. This was not because IDAC were unwilling to 
listen but because the business lobby (with some notable exceptions such as the 
BISF the association representing the Iron and Steel industry) were so poorly 
organised that they were incapable of putting a coherent case before the
AO
Committee. The Committee clearly had strong views, and worked to strict 
guidelines, on the eligibility for higher rates of protection. If they were not 
convinced that a case met their criteria, there seems little that business could do to 
convince them otherwise. The Committee rebuffed persistent claims.99
Capie also considers the argument that regional factors may also explain 
the incidence of tariff. He argues that, in Britain: ‘An industry that was clustered 
geographically would have found it easier to pursue, and present, a united case; an 
industry thinly dispersed across the country was unlikely to possess sufficient
96 They required details of sales, costs and prices.
97 Even this does not always deter IDAC from granting protection, this will depend on who the 
consumer is and how they will be affected by the price rises. There are also other over-riding 
factors which IDAC consider such as the level of efficiency in the home industry.
98 This backs up the work of Turner Businessmen, Blank Industry and Grant Business and politics. 
Success rates are relatively low with around two-thirds of applications for additional duty being 
turned down by IDAC.
99 Some applicants were told that they should not reapply for a given period of at least 12 months 
because their application would not be reconsidered before that period, at least, had elapsed.
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cohesion to promote its interests effectively’.100 This argument ties in nicely with 
the findings mentioned. Anything that makes it easier for a group of businessmen 
to co-operate (removal of barriers and costs) helped them in presenting a case to 
IDAC. Also of importance was the prevailing degree of organisation and co­
operation in an industry. The existence of trade associations was important for 
this. A successfully unified Trade Association would be able to overcome some of 
the barriers to co-operation posed by geographical dispersion. That said, it turned 
out that industries based in ‘depressed regions’ were in any case likely to be 
favoured. IDAC throughout the 1930s, and especially from 1935 after the passing 
of the Special Areas Act, were particularly conscious of the need to protect 
employment in depressed localities. It may therefore, be difficult to pick out what 
is driving the levels of protection in such cases. It may be the effects of greater co­
operation due to regional proximity alone, or due to concerns over regional 
unemployment, or some combination of these.
Capie used regression analysis to ascertain the factors deriving the 
effective rates of the tariff for different industries. He used a measure of market 
concentration101 and a measure of regional concentration.102 His findings support 
the hypothesis that market concentration had a negative effect and regional 
concentration a positive one. Capie notes that there are a number of weaknesses in 
the exercise, largely because of the aggregated nature of the available data. In 
addition, he notes that this does not actually test the importance of size of the
100 Capie Depression and Protectionism p.84.
This argument, both in the work of Capie and US literature, is based on the premise that the tariff 
is a ‘public good’. As with all ‘public goods’ pressure groups will encounter ‘free-riders’. Where 
industries/businesses are geographically clustered, they are more likely to be cohesive, the costs of 
forming pressure groups will be lower and the free-rider problems will be minimised.
101 Two measures are tested, the first based on the share of employment controlled by the top 10% 
of firms, and the second based on share of net output controlled by these firms.
102 For this, there are three measures. The first is the number of establishments in a particular 
industry in a region. The second based on the number of employees in that industry in a region, 
and the third the net output of that industry per region.
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industry just market concentration, though in testing the size of an industry proved 
insignificant.103
Capie notes that: ‘The argument that the least concentrated by size would 
have been the most needy and therefore most likely to secure higher protection 
can be supported to some extent by reference to the mood of the time, which was 
to encourage concentration - though the term used was rationalisation’.104 The 
cotton industry was not concentrated by size. Its rationalisation was encouraged, 
and it received relatively high effective rates of protection. However, it was also 
regionally concentrated and an important employer in a depressed region.105 It 
was not possible from the regression results to determine what was, in fact, 
driving these high effective rates for this industry. Some of these difficulties are 
overcome by the detailed analysis of Committee decisions. These provide details 
at the individual product level and will identify what factors mattered.106
Capie also hypothesises that the level of import penetration107 was 
explicitly considered by IDAC in coming to a decision. Yet testing by Capie did 
not find this to have significance for the level of protection gained.108 In fact, it 
was more likely to explain whether they did or did not get some measure of 
additional duty. Analysis o f the IDAC papers shows this was one o f the key 
criteria used by them even if this were not applied in a systematic way. There 
existed no strict guidelines stating if import penetration reached x  percent then an
103 Capie Depression and Protectionism pp.86-87
104 Capie Depression and Protectionism p.93
105 This is also true of other industries Such as Glove making where rationalisation was to be 
encouraged in what was a regionally concentrated industry.
106 In genera] terms, size only seems to matter where the industry is very small. Very small 
industries are unlikely to be granted additional protection. IDAC do not want to open the 
'floodgates' to lots of small claims and they are aware of the administrative burdens this would 
place on Customs and Excise. Level of employment in an industry also seems to be a more 
important factor for IDAC than regional concentration per se.
107 Measured by the growth in the volume of imports and growth in imports as a proportion of 
home production.
108 It is also worth noting that Capie looks at the growth in import penetration over the period 1924 
to 1930 whereas the Committee explicitly only consider the preceding 6 to 12 months in the 
review of any case.
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additional duty was to be granted, nor was it the case that a particular rate of 
acceleration in imports would trigger an additional duty.109
The analysis of the Committee papers suggests that there were a number of 
broad reasons why they granted additional duties. In practice, an applicant was not 
successful because of one reason alone, it was likely to be a combination of 
factors, and the overall ‘weight’ of the case (and how it was presented) that would 
win the day. These reasons included such factors as the level of import 
penetration, the existing level of organisation and efficiency in the industry, infant 
industry arguments, anti-dumping measures, employment factors and regional 
location.
The structure of the thesis
Tariff policy in the inter-war years has been studied from several 
perspectives, focusing on political and economic developments leading up to the 
introduction of the general tariff.110 Though attitudes up to the introduction of the 
tariff within business, government and the electorate have been chronicled in 
detail, little attention has been given to the post-tariff introduction period.111
Most of the current literature focuses on the role that the tariff played in 
recovery from the depression. Much of this work is critical of the impact of the
109 A low level of imports (variously measured) was most likely to lead IDAC to respond by 
rejecting the application during the initial review stage. On the other hand, in successful cases the 
rate of protection granted would not be linked to the relative level of import penetration but more 
directly to relative prices. The applicant usually supplied this information on prices to IDAC with 
the Committee trying to get corroborative evidence where possible.
110 This has been of interest because the introduction of a general tariff involved such a major 
change in policy. While some authors suggest this was the result of the gradual build-up of 
business pressure (Capie Depression and Protectionism, Rooth Protectionism, Finer S.E. The 
Federation of British Industries’ Political Studies IV (1956) pp.66-67, and Beer British Politics for 
example) others, such as Eichengreen Sterling argue its introduction was a matter of expediency in 
response to the immediate pressures of the depression and Balance of Payments difficulties.
111 The Abnormal Importation Act of November 1931 marked the introduction of comprehensive 
tariff protection in the UK; this was consolidated by the Import Duties Act of 1932.
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tariff on recovery,112 or at best suggests that while the tariff did not make a 
positive contribution to the recovery, at least it was not harmful.113 However, a 
study only of the effective rates of protection, does not adequately cover the 
possible impact of the tariff. Nor is it possible to gain a true perspective on the 
business role in the tariff process from aggregate data.
More recently, the possible effects of the tariff outside of ‘effective rates’ 
have received some attention. Rooth and Scott114 found the tariff, amongst other 
factors115, was important for stimulating Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the 
1930s: this FDI having long-term economic benefits through technology transfers 
and increasing competitive pressures. Kitson also suggests that the tariff was 
important, along with the general re-orientation of government policy towards 
domestic matters, for business confidence and this in turn boosted investment.116
112 See especially Capie, Depression and Protectionism, who argues that effective rates of 
protection were negative for some of the industries, such as Construction, which were vital to the 
recovery. The work of Capie has not been without its critics. Most famously Foreman-Peck in 
The British Tariff and Industrial Protection in the 1930s: An Alternative Model’ Economic 
History Review 91981) pp. 132-139 and Kitson and Solomou, Protectionism and economic 
revival: the British inter-war years (Cambridge 1990), have criticised his methodology in 
calculating the effective rates.
113 Richardson H Economic Recovery in Britain 1932-39 (Bristol, 1967), Foreman-Peck op cit, 
Kitson & Solomou op cit
114 Scott, Peter & Rooth, Tim, “Public Policy and Foreign-Based Enterprises in Britain Prior to the 
Second World War,” The Historical Journal 42.2 (1999): 495-515.
115 Other factors included: leaving the Gold Standard and the devaluation of sterling; the 
governments patent policy which did not convey rights to overseas companies; government ‘buy 
British’ purchasing policy; and also domestic ‘push’ factors (particularly important in the case of 
Jewish refugees from Europe).
116 Kitson, Michael, “Recession and Economic Revival in Britain: The Role of Policy in the 1930s 
and 1980s.” Contemporary European History 8.1 (1999): 1-27.
Kitson argues that government policy at this time (devaluation, exchange rate management, cheap 
money, balanced budgets and the tariff) was not harmful and that this is evidenced by a catch-up in 
the productivity gap between Britain and the US in the period 1929-35. The catch-up was only at 
very moderate rates in the 1930s at around 3% per annum, but in the previous decade, the gap had 
been widening by around 1.6% per annum, p. 13
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This analysis of IDAC will build on the work of those who have studied the 
indirect effects of the tariff.
Another literature focuses on the workings of government and the 
management of the state in the inter-war years.1,7 This frequently argues that 
British government had not significantly progressed in policy terms since the start 
of the century.118 It has been widely argued that development of the state and 
economic management came during the Second World W ar and thereafter. 
Analysis of the work of IDAC suggests that it might have begun on a small scale 
beforehand, particularly in the area of industrial policy.119
This research shows that the role o f IDAC has been seriously understated. 
The Committee did considerably more than implementing tariffs. While the tariff 
it produced could not be regarded as ‘scientific’ by today’s standards, the 
Committee’s approach and its thinking were ‘cutting-edge’ in their day. This 
thesis offers an overview of how the committee arrived at its decision for all 
applications that were made for additional duty. This brings to light the factors at 
play in convincing the Committee that extra protection was justified. The work 
also provides an in-depth analysis of selective cases.
117 The majority of literature in this area is particularly concerned with the influence of Keynes on 
government and the extent to which the Treasury had adopted ‘Keynesian’ style demand 
management policies. This is not the concern of this work. However, the analysis of IDAC papers 
does bring to light a whole area of government intervention in the economy not previously known.
118 Maurice Kirby in ‘Industrial Policy’ The Road to Full Employment, ed. Glynn Sean, and Booth 
Alan, (London, 1987): pp. 125-139, would support this view. They argue that Treasury insistence 
on following orthodox fiscal policy largely prevented them from becoming more involved and 
developing industrial policy and interventionist instruments. Others include Peden see for example 
Keynes, The Treasury and British Economic Policy (London 1988) and Winch see for example 
‘Britain in the ‘Thirties: A Managed Economy?” in The Managed Economy ed. Charles Feinstein 
(Oxford 1983) and Economics and policy: A historical study, Twentieth century studies (London 
1969).
119 This builds on other literature emerging in this area such as Lowe’s work on regional policy. 
Lowe, Rodney, ‘Labour Policy’ pp. 140-153.
Chapter 2 will examine both the public interests, as represented by IDAC, and the 
private interests as represented by Trade Associations. It reviews the record of 
government business relations as they had developed up to the 1930s. It also 
examines what the two sides expected to gain from the tariff. Additionally, it 
addresses what influenced the Committee’s approach and how they set about their 
task.
Chapter 3 explains the main documents used for this research and then moves 
onto an analysis of additional duty applications made to IDAC between 1932 and 
1939. This explores some initial conclusions to be drawn: who applied, number of 
applications, timing, reasons for needing, decisions made, and reasons for .those 
decisions. These findings are, necessarily, not as subtle as would be wished for. 
Hence, subsequent chapters examine some of the decisions and relationships in 
more detail through specific case studies.
Chapter 4 provides the first case study and is concerned with the Building 
industry. This provides an interesting example of how IDAC approached their 
work. It reviews why they were interested in a particular industry and why they 
were particularly interested in building. It looks at the way than the Committee 
approached the industry and what they hoped to achieve. It examines their method 
of working and the information that was available to them.
Chapter 5 provides a second case study, this time it concerns the Engineering 
industry. The chapter considers how and why a close relationship between IDAC 
and the industries’ trade associations evolved, mainly focusing on the British 
Engineers Association [BEA]. Examining both IDAC and BEA papers the chapter 
reviews what both party hoped to gain from this relationship and considers the 
outcome. It clearly shows that the BEA failed to profit in the way they hoped from 
their close involvement with IDAC. The chapter also examines the impact on the 
engineering industry of the iron and steel tariff from the point of view of the using 
industry itself.
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Chapter 6 considers the role of IDAC and wider policy issues. Following on from 
the detailed analysis of additional duty applications and the two industry case 
studies, the chapter will pick out those examples of IDAC work that highlight 
their interest in wider policy issues other than the tariff itself. These include the 
promotion of Trade Associations and Cartels, rationalisation of industry, 
industrial efficiency, research and development and technology transfers. It shows 
how IDAC worked with other government departments and sheds light on the 
extent to which they were willing to intervene in industry.
When introducing a discretionary tariff there will always be winners and 
losers. Some industries will benefit more from the tariff than will others. Some 
will not do well despite their best efforts to convince IDAC of their way of 
thinking. This finding supports earlier works which show that despite the 
existence of many Trade Associations at this time, it turns out that business was 
not always efficiently organised. An industry’s ability to get what it wanted from 
government depended largely on how well organised and cohesive that industry 
was. A fragmented industry (even if it had a representative trade association) 
could achieve relatively little, whilst a strong co-ordinated industry could resist 
government pressures to reform and still get the protection it wanted.
The current literature argues that, because of the tariff, industries were not 
forced to reorganise and therefore there was little state sponsored modernisation 
in these years.120 This study suggests otherwise. IDAC was intervening in 
industrial /business affairs in areas outside its remit, for example, research and 
development, technology transfers, industrial reorganisation, special areas, new 
products, FDI. These activities were significant in terms of the recovery and the 
longer-term competitiveness of British industry. The engineering industry for one 
was able to improve its competitive position whilst protected. This industry 
introduced new lines of production which it had hitherto been too risk-averse to 
contemplate. IDAC was able to reduce the risk involved significantly, thereby 
stimulating the recovery of a vital industry.
120 See, for example Tiratsoo & Tomlinson Industrial efficiency
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This analysis is also important in that it suggests the government (through 
bodies such as IDAC) may have been more interventionist in the inter-war period 
than has hitherto been supposed. There may not have been well-developed plans 
and policies in place before World W ar II but there were at least attempts to 
intervene at a micro level in the economy. This may have not been tightly co­
ordinated from the centre. However, IDAC clearly knew what the government’s 
policies and objectives were and acted in the best way to achieve them. They had 
also tested, on a small scale, some interventionist instruments. The scale of the 
intervention however, may have been less important than the lessons it provided 
post-war government and interventionist policy-makers.
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Chapter 2: The public and the private interests
After 1918 the economic purposes of associations were most in mind and their 
fortunes fluctuated with the state of trade. The imposition of tariffs and the 
establishment of the Import Duties Advisory Committee brought the negotiating 
functions of associations to the fore again.121
The focus for this thesis will be the relationship between industry (as mediated for 
by various Trade Associations) and the IDAC. Contact between trade associations 
and IDAC will be examined throughout its period of operation from 1932 through 
to 1939. This period is important because of the policy change: Britain had a long 
history of Free Trade before adopting Protectionism. Histories of the period 
suggest that there was a gradual build-up of business pressure throughout the late 
1920s calling for protection.122 When, in 1932, government finally introduced the 
general tariff it was a prime area for trade associations to target government policy 
in that the policy was discretionary. Different levels of protection could be 
granted to industry if a satisfactory case could be made. The task of constructing 
and introducing the tariff was to fall to IDAC.123
121 Tivey L. & Wohlgemuth E., ‘Trade Associations’ p.60
122 For this see amongst others: Capie Depression and Protectionism, Rooth Protectionism, Finer 
‘The FBI’, Beer British politics. A dissenting voice however, is that of Eichengreen Sterling who 
sees the tariff being introduced in 1932 more as a matter of expediency.
123 Not only is this area of study important in the field of government-busi ness relations, it may 
also contribute to the literature on the role of the tariff on recovery in the 1930s. Debate centers 
around how beneficial the tariff was for the economic recovery, and can be found in the works of 
Richardson H Economic Recovery, Capie Depression and Protectionism, Eichengreen Sterling, 
Foreman-Peck ‘Alternative Model’, and Kitson and Solomou economic revival. Part of the 
argument considers how tariffs affected individual sectors of the economy. Capie puts forward the 
notion of effective tariff rates, and argues these were negative for some crucial industries. His 
method of calculating these effective rates has been criticised, especially by Foreman-Peck and, 
Kitson and Solomou. However, if effective rates were important, it is noteworthy that, Capie 
suggests that businessmen in the 1930s were aware that it was this rate, rather than the nominal 
rate of protection, that was most important to them. If this were the case, it should have affected
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The first part of this chapter will examine Trade Associations and their interests. 
Background on the development of Trade Associations up to 1932 is provided. 
This reviews how they worked with Government. The extent to which Trade 
Associations could exert influence over government policy is then considered. 
Examination of the literature on the US tariff and that on pressure-group activities 
sheds light on what the expected outcomes might be, i.e., which industries or 
groups were likely to be most influential and gain high tariffs for their products.
The second part of the chapter turns to a consideration of IDAC. This looks at 
why they were set-up in the manner which they were (supposedly independent of 
government). What their remit was and, what powers they held? Who the 
Committee were and how this might have influenced their activities? It considers 
how they worked to establish tariff rates and the approach they adopted. Finally 
the section outlines what the Committee hoped to achieve.
The Development of Trade Associations
The movement towards the formation of trade associations began in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. By the 1930s, Associations existed in all branches 
of trade and industry.124 Growing competition and the weakening of Britain’s 
international position probably helped to promote this activity.125
applications made (and opposition to these) to IDAC. It will be important to consider which 
industries applied for amendments to duties, and equally those which did not.
In his work ‘The United States Tariff and Industrial protection in the Late Nineteenth 
Century’ Economic History Review (1975) pp.84-99 Hawke studies effective rates of protection 
for industry. Hawke asserts that: ‘although the notion of effective protection was unknown at the 
turn of the century, the effect of tariffs on inputs was not. Congress, and even more lobbyists and 
pressure groups, sought to ensure that the tariff on industrial outputs compensated for tariffs on 
inputs and the calculations of effective protection show that these efforts were more than 
successful’ p.91. Hawke also suggests that notions of effective tariffs could not have had much 
impact on policy before the 1960s p.92.
124 Prager T., ‘Trade Associations in Great Britain’, Agenda: A Quarterly Journal of Reconstruction. 
Vol.3, November 1944 p. 137, notes that, in 1918, the Committee on Trusts reported 500 trade
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The growth in the number of Trade Associations in the twentieth century 
could be seen, in part, as a reflection of the increasing role of government in 
economic affairs. With greater intervention in the economy, the government took on 
a number of new functions. These new functions increased the points of contact 
between government, its departments and trade and industry. Business responded to 
this by forming its own representative associations that were able to work with 
government. The PEP study suggests that the First World War and the introduction 
of tight economic controls encouraged the development of trade associations. The 
government needed help in organising the economy and called upon trade 
associations for this purpose.127 As a result, during the war and immediately
associations, all exerting a substantia] influence on the course of industry and prices. In November 
1944, Prager noted some 2500 associations.
125 This is the case put forward by Checkland S. in British Public Policy, 1776-1939 (Cambridge, 
1983), p.270
Beer British Politics p.74, argues that growth of trade associations went alongside the increased 
corporate structure of business and the growth of trade unions in what could be seen as a general 
movement towards collectivism.
Brady Robert A., Business as a System o f Power (New York, 1943) p. 12, argues that the history of 
the FBI sums up the move away from laissez-faire in Britain. The body was formed because of 
concerns over the rising power of labour and over the decline of British dominance in overseas 
trade. Earlier efforts at forming a “peak association” had failed because they were premature.
126 PEP Industrial Trade Associations: activities and organisation, 1957 (1957) p5.
John Turner, who examined the emergence of employer organisations, in particular the FBI in 1916 
and the NCEO in 1919, also concludes this. He states that: ‘Their emergence during the war owed 
much to the ebb and flow of state intervention in die economy, but was also in part a response to 
labour militancy and in part a reflection of the new acceptability, in wartime political conditions, of a 
xenophobic nationalism’, p.33
John Turner ‘The Politics of ‘Organised Business’ pp.33-49
127 Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society (London 1979) argues that organisations 
representing both business and labour interests were encouraged by British governments in the war 
and pre-war period in order to maintain public consent. This was important in times of political 
strife elsewhere. This bought the associations into closer contact with government on a day-to-day 
basis. Since employers played such an important role in the running of the war, Middlemas argues 
that the views of the business community reached the centre of government in an unprecedented 
fashion, p.l 14
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afterwards, there was considerable expansion in the number, scope and coverage of 
trade associations.
Concern over specific policy issues also induced businessmen to form these 
associations. In Victorian Insolvency, Markham Lester peruses the history of 
bankruptcy legislation in Victorian and Edwardian Britain. One aspect of the work is 
concerned with the groups and individuals that had a major influence on insolvency 
law reform. He argues that concern over bankruptcy legislation was one of the 
causes behind formation of two important national business or business-related 
organisations: the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the UK in 1860, and the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in 1870.128 From its inception, the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce's primary purpose was to influence legislation.
Aside from bankruptcy law reform, other major issues which promoted 
action from business included policy relating to the utilities industries, railway 
regulation, Company Law reform, Patents and Trade Marks Acts, Factories Acts, 
etc. To take just one example, the Leicester Chamber of Commerce Annual Report 
of 1912 shows interest in Bankruptcy Law Reform, the National Insurance Act and 
the Electric Lighting Bill. Many other examples can easily be found from perusal of 
chamber of commerce and trade association Annual Reports and published Journals.
The history of trade associations was also strongly linked with cartelisation 
and was, as such, a pro-active response to changing market conditions. ‘Most firms 
by the 1920s belonged to the Trade Associations or Federations and the worse the 
structural decline of industry, the more individual employers tended to look to these 
organisations for support in wage-bargaining with the unions, while they sheltered 
behind their corporate relationship with government in such matters as price-fixing 
and cartels’.129
128 Lester V. M. Victorian Insolvency: bankruptcy, imprisonment for debt, and company winding-up 
in nineteenth-century England (Oxford, 1995) p.5.
129 Middlemas K. Industrial Society p. 182
Mercer H., Constructing a Competitive Order (Cambridge, 1995) p24, found that, up to 1950, of 
all trade associations affiliated to the FBI, 31.3% had been formed to negotiate prices or for 
reasons of price maintenance.
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The potential use of trade associations in the reorganisation o f industry 
was considered important in a period concerned with industrial rationalisation.130 
Government effectively encouraged rationalisation through the promotion of large 
firms, encouraging strengthening of trade associations and chambers of 
commerce, and through cartels.131 Discussions on these issues were to be a focal 
point of contact for business and government. Two other major policy concerns 
for both government and business during the inter-war years were the operation of 
the Gold Standard and Protectionism. In forging policy on these issues, the 
government and business associations were to come into contact on many 
occasions and in numerous ways. PEP argues that: 'Official support for schemes 
of rationalisation, and the introduction of the tariffs, were the chief contributions 
of the inter-war years towards the development of associations'.132
How Trade Associations work with government
The historical literature provides clear examples of how trade associations 
interacted with government during this period. It is noted that associations were 
involved in what may be regarded as informal methods of contact, such as lobbying
I ^and publicity campaigns. More important than this type of contact, though, was 
the contact established at a more formal level.134 This took place in the form of 
direct contact with government departments and through being active on
l30Although there was a substantial increase in industrial concentration in Britain in the 1920s, the 
state continued to show a high degree of tolerance to both mergers and cartels. Competition 
legislation was not passed until the 1948 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act.
131 This tendency will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6.
132 PEP Industrial Trade Associations p.24.
133 Finer S.E. ‘The FBI’ pp.66-67 observes that the FBI was known to conduct lobbying activities - 
ad hoc representations, representations on the Budget, and representations on bills. It also watched 
legislation, both local and public, and sought amendments. Mostly, the FBI was arguing over 
details rather than over policy itself.
134 Finer, ‘The FBI’ p.63, argues there are two types of contact with government: in  the first, the 
Federation is, so to speak, passive, the advice it offers being at the Government’s request. In the 
second, the Federation, having evolved its own views, presses them on Government’.
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government committees and commissions.135 One outcome of this could have 
been to establish a continuous process of bargaining and negotiation between 
business and government.136
Holland, in his study of the FBI in the interwar years, suggests that the FBI 
was disappointed in the outcome of the Ottawa Agreements137. The FBI had 
wanted binding agreements with Dominion countries rather than the vague 
assurances that came out of the meetings. However: 'the part the FBI played in 
"selling" the agreements to its membership contributed substantially to its success
135 Finer, ‘The FBI’ p.65, notes that the FBI sat on numerous official committees, and was invited 
to give evidence to commissions or committees of inquiry, Government departments often sought 
the Federation’s views on draft bills, orders, and regulations [p.65].
136 Blank, Industry, surveyed the work of the FBI focusing mainly on the period 1945-1965. Blank 
considers the relationship between the FBI, government and politics. Viewing the FBI as being the 
leading industrial organisation in the country, he suggests it could have been seen as the 
representative of industrial opinion. He argues that the relationship between government and 
industry has only fundamentally changed in the post-second-world-war era, with the two sectors 
having become increasingly interlinked. The relationship has become intimate, continuous and 
institutionalized, and this has changed the process of decision making within British government: 
'As the authority of the State has increased in all aspects of economic life, the part played in public 
affairs by private interests, such as labour and industry, has grown', pp.2-3.
J. D. Stewart, British pressure groups: their role in relation to the House o f Commons 
(1958), examines British pressure groups and their role in relation to the House of Commons during 
the period 1945-55. He notes the importance of consultation for government in the political process: 
‘Consultation has brought a relationship of confidence and continuing contract between group and 
government’ (p7). He argues that by regularly participating on advisory committees the trade 
associations are given a place in the formal structure of government.
Tivey and Wohlgemuth, ‘Trade Associations’ suggest that, by 1958, businessmen were 
highly organised to deal collectively with matters of common concern. In their study of trade 
associations in 1958, they saw the most frequent contacts occurring between the permanent 
officials of associations and civil servants of assistant secretary rank, by letter, telephone, and by 
visits to the department. ‘As the range and number of issues on which trade associations desire to 
make representations, or on which they are asked to give advice and information, have increased, 
there has developed a clearly defined network of administrative relations, both formal and 
informal, between industries and departments’ (p.63).
137 Holland ‘FBI’ pp.292-299
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in obtaining the affections of government'.138 This suggests that the FBI were able 
to benefit from a process of bargaining and negotiation in the longer term: their 
involvement over one issue increased the receptiveness of government over 
others. According to Holland, this was the period of greatest strength for the FBI. 
'During the 1930s it [FBI] lost members and revenue as subscribers were 
liquidated or drew back from an organization which seemed dangerously close to 
government. But this was the price it paid for winning recognition by Whitehall as 
the main body representing industrial opinion'.139
Although this pattern of govemment-industry relations emerged in the inter­
war years, the impact of this increasingly formal involvement is not clear. Some 
authors argue that business associations were able to gain close access to 
government and as such were able to exercise considerable influence over policy 
making. Others recognise changes in the relationship between government and 
business but argue that business associations were unable to influence government; 
instead, they acted as ‘servants’ of government.
Trade Associations’ influence on policy before the Second World 
War.
Since the 1960s, a large body of literature has been produced in the field of 
political science focusing on pressure groups and their role in the policy-making 
process. Works on the process of policy formation in the United States and Britain 
have followed two main approaches: ‘Pluralism’ and ‘Corporatism’. The former 
approach propounds a situation where there is competition amongst all viewpoints, 
the latter suggests that holders of certain viewpoints have preferential status 
meaning competition is not equitable. Both have been criticised, particularly by 
those writing from a Marxist perspective, and alternative theories have been put 
forward. Other theories are often variations on a theme.
138 Holland ‘FBI’ p.292
139 Holland ‘FBI’ p.299
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Pluralists argue that policy is made through a competition of viewpoints. 
The system works via the representation o f the public through the leadership of 
interest groups. The interest groups are not, however, all powerful, i.e., groups 
influential in one area will not necessarily be influential in others. A major part of 
the process is that all participants are willing to bargain and negotiate to achieve 
their aims.140 Power in society is thus, diffused widely among individuals and 
leaders of groups representing different sectors o f society.141
In Britain, the notion of ‘corporatism’ relates to the idea of insider-group 
relations developed with government departments. In this way, modem institutions 
and processes play a pivotal role in mediating conflicts in industrial society. The 
idea was put forward by Finer in his work Comparative Government, where he 
points out that group leaders and civil service officials become interdependent. 
Those working in government departments need the interest groups just as much as 
the groups need them.142 Theorists see the role of groups as one of inter-mediation 
rather than simple representation. This highlights the belief that the groups act as 
instruments of government as well as of their members. Access to government leads 
to consultation, but some groups have privileged access leading to bargaining and 
negotiation.
A modification of the corporatist theory is the ‘policy-community’ 
approach: a view put forward by Middlemas in ‘Politics in Industrial Society’. 
Again, it is noted that the majority of the policy-making task is conducted not by 
ministers but by civil servants. These officials rely on outsiders for advice and 
Middlemas argues that they have a tendency to consult the same groups. This 
allows some groups even greater access to the political process. The main source of 
group influence is in this area of official policy making. From this viewpoint, 
bargaining and negotiation are seen as more important for the groups than direct 
parliamentary action. An exchange-based relationship is developed between the 
government and the interest groups. Government departments not only need the
140 Jordon A.G. & Richardson J.J. Government and Pressure Groups in Britain (Oxford, 1987) 
p.46
141 David W.L. Political Economy o f Economic Policy (New York, 1988) p. 196
142 Jordon & Richardson Government pp.92-93
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advice of groups: they need their co-operation in the implementation/administration 
of policy. Middlemas argues that these organisations or groups become ‘governing 
institutions’ i.e. a body which assumes functions devolved on it by government, 
while other institutions decline in significance: ‘To put it simply, what had been 
merely interest groups crossed the political threshold and became part o f the 
extended state: a position from which other groups, even if they too held political 
power, were still excluded’.143
In applying pluralist theory to business organisations in Britain, this 
suggests that groups should be able to compete equally and achieve equal success in 
influencing the policy-process. In some circumstances, one organisation will be 
more successful than others, but this will not always be the case. It would be 
expected that many groups would be involved in the policy-process. Further, it 
should be apparent that no particular group, or groups, is able to dominate this 
process. Factors such as the size of the business organisation and its 
representativeness should not significantly alter the chances of success.
In relating corporatism to the study of business organisations in Britain, it 
would be expected that certain organisations would dominate the policy-process. 
Their domination would be based on the intimate relationship forged with 
government departments over a period of time. The main thrust of activities should 
therefore be directed towards civil servants who are involved in the drafting and 
implementation of policy, for it is in this area that they are most likely to be able to 
achieve their goals. Many groups could be excluded from the policy process 
because they were not successful in winning the ‘ear’ of government. Factors such 
as the size of the organisation are more likely to matter from this perspective. 
Competition is not open: access is denied to groups who do not have a pre- 
established relationship with government. In looking at the inter-war period this 
theory may have some limitations, not least because this is arguably the time when 
relationships were first becoming established. In other words, it is not clear that, in 
the 1920s and 1930s, certain groups had gained preferential access.
For Tivey and Wohlgemuth, the strength of an association ultimately 
depended upon its internal cohesion. The power it could wield would be related to
143 Middlemas Industrial Society p.374
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what they were able to offer government in terms of co-operation and provision of 
information. ‘Certainly as far as the trade associations are concerned it is this two- 
way traffic of information and periodic exchange of views, the direct approach and 
close contact with the departments, which they regard as the principal means of 
advancing their case’.144 They argue that trade associations were powerful pressure 
groups. This is because they could frequently persuade government departments to 
make changes on specific matters where the policy content was not important, or 
where it was mainly a case of how the policy was carried out. They had 
indeterminate, but profound, influence on the framing of policy by ensuring full 
awareness of the problems and attitudes of industry. They could on occasion, make 
the work of government difficult by organising criticism and by becoming less and 
less co-operative.
There is a distinct difference of opinion regarding the success o f trade 
associations in influencing government policy during the twentieth century. Some 
historians have argued that the trade associations had limited power at this time. 
They also were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to influence policy. A major 
reason why associations are said not to have influence is that they exerted 
insufficient pressure. The amount of pressure they could apply was constrained 
because of ambiguities and disagreements within the associations themselves. Other 
historians suggest that the relationship between business (as represented by trade 
associations) and government operated in such a way that business did exert 
influence over political policy. They differ in their views as to the extent of this 
influence. While those such as Middlemas suggest they played a fundamental part 
in the process, others see the role as important but more limited with business only 
able to influence policy at the margins.
A contemporary view of trade associations is provided in the work of 
Robert Brady, ‘Business As A System of Power’. Brady argues, ‘The influence of 
the FBI in governmental circles appears to have become exceedingly great’.145 
This was expressed in two ways. First, through representation on government
144 Tivey & Wolgemuth ‘Trade Associations’ p.63
145 Brady Business p. 176
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committees; second through the lobbying of Members of Parliam ent.146 Brady 
provides example of the work of the FBI arguing that, in 1931, the National 
Government adopted the FBI’s main recommendations on fiscal policy. After the 
general tariff was introduced in 1932, the FBI set up a special department to help 
members prepare applications to be submitted to ID AC.
Samuel Beer sees trade associations as having a central role in formulation 
of policy in the interwar period. ‘Associations among producers were greatly 
encouraged and were brought into regular contact with government. In this 
structure of “quasi-corporatism”, the relationship was neither one o f business 
pressure groups dictating to government nor of government agencies planning the 
activities of business. Decisions were made rather, in a process of bargaining and 
negotiation’.147 This was a gradual process with business increasingly becoming 
involved. Referring to the 1930s, Beer states that: ‘Group consultation had been 
on the rise for many years. But it is not too much to say that the scale and nature 
of state intervention under the National Government founded a system of quasi­
corporatism in which industry and government were brought into regular and
1 4 0
contmuos contact’.
Finer believes the FBI had substantial successes in influencing 
government policy in the period between 1931 and 1939, using the introduction of 
the tariff as an example of this.149 He notes the success of trade associations 
arguing: ‘The employer groups had it all their own way in this period because
146 Brady Business p. 175
147 Beer British Politics p.297
148 Beer British Politics p.298
Middlemas, Industrial Society p.l 14, argues an even stronger case for these organisations. He 
views trade associations as having significant political power in the twentieth century. Since 
employers played such an important role in the running of the war, Middlemas argues the business 
community reached the centre of government in an unprecedented fashion. He argues that these 
organisations became ‘governing institutions’, i.e., a body which assumes functions devolved on it 
by government; while other institutions such as the church, voluntary societies and the press, 
declined in significance.
149 Finer The FBI’ p.77
He acknowledges that the FBI were not alone in pushing for the tariff, noting the support of the 
TUC as well as that of the NUM and ABCC.
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there was no countervailing pressure.’150 Finer suggests the Labour Party were 
weak in Parliament during this period and that the dominant Conservatives were 
always more likely to support employers because of their similarity o f policy 
objectives. Furthermore, trade unions were in a weak position, at this time, 
because o f the high rates of unemployment.151
Mercer also argues this: ‘It is becoming increasingly clear that while 
businessmen have had to negotiate with government over what they have wanted, 
they have been able to limit the extent and effectiveness of government 
intervention in industry, and to ensure that the government could not carry out 
policies with which business did not agree’.152 A major theme of Mercer’s thesis 
is the extent, nature and success of business veto of proposed government 
measures. It is argued this was possible because both of the main political parties 
saw industry as creators of economic wealth and as necessary for the countries 
economic progress. In Constructing a Competitive Order, Mercer points out that, 
in order to gain recognition from government, the Associations needed to be as 
representative of their trade as possible. The associations, therefore, steadily
150 Finer ‘The FBI’ p.78
151 Finer ‘The FBI’ p.78
A number of examples of specific successes for business organisations can also be provided. 
Roberts, ‘Administrative Origins’ p.97, examining the question of municipal enterprise in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, found that business organisations achieved some success. 
Although the campaigns failed to secure legislation against municipal trading, they achieved 
success via the implementation of policy through Whitehall and local government. In examining 
the British Shipping industry in the 1930s, Roberts highlights another example of successful 
business negotiation with government. In the 1930s, the industry was suffering from the 
international over-capacity of shipping and from heavily subsidised competition. In December 
1933, the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steamship Owners’ Association, called for 
government subsidies to match those given abroad. Before this the industry had been opposed to 
any form of government intervention. Representations were made by these organisations at 
Cabinet Committee meetings, and after long negotiations, the government agreed to provide 
subsidies for the financial years ending April 1936, 1937, and 1938.
152 Mercer H. The Evolution of British Government Policy Towards Competition in Private 
Industry, 1940-56 (PhD London, 1989) p.30
expanded in size and scope from the 1930s.153 ‘There thus emerged a recognisable 
system, which combined economic control with political influence’.154 Mercer 
acknowledges that, by the time of the outbreak of the Second-World-War these 
associations could bring political pressure to bear: ‘Thus, as the British Engineers’ 
Association remarked, in so far as it represented leading interests and could 
formulate effective policy, the association could “bring strong pressure to bear on 
the Government, both on high level and legislative matters and on detailed 
administrative questions’” .155
Conversely, other authors argue on the other hand that, at this time, trade 
associations lacked any real influence in the policy-process. According to Grant, 
British trade associations had proved largely ineffective because of the suicidal 
individualism of the British manufacturer right up to the outbreak of war in 1939.156 
The main problem was the being division of interests between different sectors of 
the business community: factors such as size, product and technological 
heterogeneity prevented the development of common interests. Grant notes a 
cleavage of interests between small and large firms who served different markets 
and consequently faced a different set of problems.
Turner argues that: 'Most of the new bodies established by the mid-century 
aimed above all to influence government, but in practice the flow of influence was 
often the other way'.157 Turner asserts that the actual power of the associations was 
limited as they were unwilling to use what market power they had in direct 
confrontation with government. They were also reluctant to accept state help if it
153 Mercer Competitive Order p.9
154 Mercer Competitive Order p.9
155 Mercer Competitive Order p.21
156 Grant Business and Politics p. 14
157 Turner John ‘Servants of two masters: British Trade Associations in the First Half of the 
Twentieth Century’ p. 173, in Trade Associations in Business History eds. H & M Miyamoto 
Yamazaki (Tokyo, 1988) pp.173-198.
In ‘The Politics of ‘Organised Business’ in the First World War’ p.44, John Turner reiterates this: 
the FBI was not particularly successful in its efforts to influence the state. This was largely 
because of the methods it adopted: they concentrated their attention on government officials and 
ministers, stressing the virtues of the FBI as an authoritative spokesman for ‘business views’.
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meant sharing too much information with others. The trade associations had very 
little power or influence over the government. The government was the main 
beneficiary of any developing relationship: ‘Often enough the state turned the 
tables, and used the industry associations as instruments of policy1.158
A similar picture is presented by Blank in his study of the FBI. He argues 
that the association was much less effective in influencing government policy prior 
to 1945 than was previously supposed. For Blank, the preservation of industries 
independence, rather than the increase of its influence, was the dominant goal of 
industrial organisation during the period between 1916 and 1965, i.e., it wanted to 
prevent interference from government. He also notes that, as the organisation 
expanded, consensus amongst members was harder to achieve: 'Compromises in 
policy were the price of wider unity'.159 After 1919: 'More and more, the focus of 
the Federation’s activities was turned to the provision of services to its members 
and the protection of immediate industrial interests, rather than to the formulation of 
industrial policies or the leadership of British Industry'.160
Blank examines the relationship between the FBI and the National 
Government by concentrating on two policy areas: Protection and Industrial 
Reorganisation. He argues that the influence of the organisation was weak: 'The 
Federation remained unwilling to take up issues that might provoke divisions within 
its membership. With such a wide range of interests represented in the organisation, 
few issues posed no danger. For the most part, matters which were likely to raise 
controversy within the organisation were studiously avoided, and this included 
almost every one of the critical issues which affected industry during the period'.
The activity of the FBI, and therefore its influence, was constrained by the wide 
variety of interests which this peak organisation represented. A consensus could not 
easily be reached on policy matters with such a highly diversified membership and 
this problem was exacerbated as membership expanded. ‘The FBI was never very
158 Turner ‘Servants’ p.192
159 Blank Industry p. 15
160 Blank Industry pp. 19-20. He states that the NUM was far more overtly political than the FBI, 
but suggests that the NUM benefited less than the FBI from close links with government 
departments.
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effective as a pressure group. We shall find that its ability to exercise influence on 
government was particularly inhibited by a number of factors-by the structure of 
business and industry in Britain, by the nature of the industrial organisations, by the 
values and attitudes toward industry in British culture and by industry’s own self- 
image, and by the nature of the Federation’s relationship with government’.161
This thesis shows that business, through trade associations, became 
increasingly involved with government during the 1930s. ID AC had more contact 
with businessmen than any government department had done before. Their 
approach stood in contrast to the limited contact the Board of Trade had with 
business when it administered Safeguarding.162 IDAC’s much more hands-on 
approach was fundamental to the fulfilment of their remit.
Later chapters will provide a view of how influential trade associations 
could be over government decision making at this time. This suggests that while 
their involvement was both useful and necessary to ID AC, they were not able to 
influence policy or decision-making substantially. The strength and unity of an 
association did matter as can be seen from the study of the BEA. Examination of 
the relationship between the BEA and ID AC will also shed light on whether a 
trade association with close links to the Committee had more influence than 
others.
What did the Trade Associations want from the tariff and ID AC?
Although the topic of how trade associations views towards protectionism 
developed has been well documented, their responses and activities, once the 
General Tariff was introduced, have received scant attention. An indication of
161 Blank Industry pp.7-8.
162 Marrison notes ‘Ashley[Percy] admitted that the Board of Trade had been unduly secretive 
about the operation of Part II, and had actively discouraged applications which made out sound 
prima facie cases’ Protection p.264
what might be expected may be gleaned from literature on the development of 
tariff structures in the US.
Much of the literature on the US tariffs uses the theory of ‘public goods’ to 
analyse the role and activities of pressure groups. In particular, the ‘free-rider’ 
problem is analysed. Writers argue that, as far as tariffs bestow non-exclusive 
benefits, they may be viewed as public goods. Pressure-groups were likely to 
increase their activities when the ‘free-rider’ problem associated with public 
goods was minimised. The application of this can be found in the work of Pincus, 
Baake and Ray, and Hayford and Pasurka.163 The literature finds that pressure
Pincus J.J. ‘Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs’, Journal of Political and 
Economic Planning. Vol 83 (1975), pp.757-778
Pincus argues that the US Tariff Act of 1824 reflected pressure-group successes. He argued that 
the more active a group the less the chance of a free-rider problem. Small homogenous, 
geographically concentrated groups would react more intensely to the expected effects of tariffs in 
attempting to influence legislation. However, in Congress (where majority support was necessary), 
it was a disadvantage to be identified as too local or narrow an interest.
Baack B.D. & Ray E.J. ‘The Political Economy of Tariff Policy; A Case Study of the United 
States’, Explorations in Economic History Vol 20 (1983) pp.73-93
The work of Baack and Ray develops a framework of analysis for assessing the structure of tariffs 
across US industries from 1870 to 1914. They argued that, if tariffs were applied without political 
influence, a number of industrial factors would determine the pattern of tariffs: the skill level, and 
capital-to-labour ratios of an industry, and the extent of further processing of goods. They found 
that tariffs were positively related to whether or not the industry produced liquor, tobacco 
(traditional revenue items) qr agricultural products, that tariffs were positively related to whether 
or not the industry produced consumer goods, and that there was a positive relationship between 
tariffs and heavy industry.
Hayford Marc & Pasurka Jnr Carl A. ‘The Political Economy of the Fordney-McCumber and 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts’, Explorations in Economic History Vol 29 (1992) pp.30-50 
The work of Hayford and Pasurka is of most relevance to the British case as the tariff Acts that 
they studied were more contemporaneous with the British tariff. They examine the Fordney- 
McCumber Tariff of 1922 and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. They investigate economic and 
political factors which partially explain the tariff structure imposed by the two acts and the 
changes in the tariff structure between 1922 and 1930.
Hayford & Pasurka determine the relative importance of two competing hypothesis to explain the 
passing of these Tariff Acts. One hypothesis argues that tariffs came about due to pressure-group 
politics, the alternative that Tariff Acts were passed due to party politics. Hayford and Pasurka
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groups could influence the structure of tariffs but also notes that, where a pressure 
group represented a very sectional interest, they were unlikely to have an impact 
because Congress could ignore it more easily. The works also suggest that 
pressure groups were likely to form where costs were minimised. They note that 
this is likely to be affected by factors such as geographical dispersion, implying 
that groups such as consumers would be unlikely to form effective pressure 
groups. Where tariffs are concerned, this suggests that tariffs were likely to be 
high on the products of consumer industries. Agricultural products were likely to 
be subject to high tariffs to protect domestic production. Skill levels and capital- 
labour ratios were also important. Notions of international comparative advantage 
were also considered, with the suggestion being that tariffs were likely to be high 
for those industries that had poor comparative advantage and were, as such, 
uncompetitive.
The problem of protection as a ‘public good’ would have influenced the 
behaviour of British Trade Associations in the years up to 1932. Prior to the 
introduction of the tariff, as Marrison points out,I64it was not economically 
rational for a manufacturer to participate in, still less to finance, a movement in 
which his individual contribution was unlikely to be critical and where the reward 
of protection would have been shared with free-riders. If it had been obtained then 
it would have been available to all.
The situation changed, though, once the tariff was introduced in 1932 and 
the free-rider problems were lessened. If a business chose to approach ID AC to 
request an additional duty, it was certain that the number of free-riders who could 
benefit would be limited. Should the Committee decide to raise the tariff, this 
would not be a wide-ranging increase but would be limited to specific products. It 
would be possible that some producers in a sector could reap benefits in this way. 
However, given that it was important for an application to the Committee to be as
concluded that ‘party politics’ might explain why legislation was introduced at certain times but it 
could not explain the structure of the tariff: this was down to pressure-group politics.
,64 Marrison Protection p. 135
representative of the industry as possible, the chances of this occurring were 
reduced so long as producers were willing to co-operate.165
The clear rewards to be gained from applying to the Committee - a higher 
level of protection and the lessening of the free-rider problem - meant that 
business interests were highly likely to participate in the process.
History and Functions of ID AC
‘This House has set up an independent body in order that the question of the rates of duties 
should be free from political pressure and that the body which should be responsible for the 
recommending should not be subject to the dictation of Ministers. Lobbying has been the 
curse of tariffs in other places and we do not want and we do not intend that we shall suffer 
in that way. We believe that we have ensured that result by the body which we have 
constituted, with its independent function’.166
Awareness of the activities of pressure groups and the potential for log-rolling 
that could come from unrestrained activities of tariff-seekers led the government to 
establish the IDAC. The decision to impose the general tariff was governments but, 
in order to escape from the responsibility of adjusting the structure, an independent 
body was created. As Ashley notes: ‘It was felt that Parliament, though a powerful 
instrument for policy control, was not suited to the work of a very detailed 
investigation in the formulation of a tariff reasonably adapted to the diversified 
conditions of British trade and industry’.167 More importantly, by creating the 
independent body, they hoped to take the ‘politics’ out of the tariff.
The Committee was, strictly speaking, an independent body: its board 
consisted of some civil servants but also private experts. However, more than half 
of its committee members were former civil servants and the administrative staff
165 In working together and in presenting a united front, an application was, in any case, more 
likely to be successful.
166 Neville Chamberlain, Hansard, Parl.Deb (Commons), 4th May 1932, 1134.
167 Percy Ashley, ‘An Experiment’, p.6.
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were all civil servants on secondment.168 The Committee’s expenses were to be 
met by the Treasury.169 ‘In form, therefore, the Committee was not entirely 
independent of the Government’.170
However, Hutchinson stressed that the Committee was independent of 
government in terms of its decision-making and pointed out, for instance, that the 
Committee would not receive representations from M Ps.171 This is similarly 
emphasised by Percy Ashley: ‘It is, I think proper to put on record in this place 
that from the time it came into being until the outbreak of the present war (when 
its functions were necessarily suspended) the Committee, alike in the conduct of 
its enquiries and in the framing of its recommendations, was entirely free of any 
kind of Government interference; its initiative and judgement were wholly 
unfettered except by the general objectives indicated in the Act. And its refusal 
from the first to entertain representations from persons or organisations other than 
those having immediate interest in matters before it made it equally free from any 
other kind of political pressure’.172
Hutchinson suggests that contact with both Government and Members of 
Parliament was only of the most formal nature. The tariff was the responsibility of 
the Treasury, with the Committee being established to advise the Treasury.
168 When a review of the staff working for the Committee is undertaken, it can clearly be seen that 
the Committee was, for all intents and purposes, a Government department. Members of staff were 
transferred in and out of IDAC from and to other departments. IDAC had the same grading 
structure as all other branches of the Civil Service and was accountable to the Treasury in the same 
way as other departments. The Treasury itself refers to the Committee as a department. All the 
staff of the Committee were, in the first instance, transferred from various departments of the Civil 
Service. When the Committee was disbanded at the outbreak of war, all its staff were transferred 
to the Ministry of Supply.
169 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.26
170 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.26 Later, Hutchinson notes: ‘It was still, however, a very small 
department in the higher ranks, and, while enjoying responsible and interesting work, it was 
beginning to feel the discomfort of having no natural line of promotion outside itself.
171 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.35
172 Percy Ashley ‘An Experiment’ pp.5-6
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Hutchinson suggests that, at a formal level, the only contact with government 
departments was, therefore, with the Treasury. He does note that other 
Departments would be consulted informally, in particular the Board of Trade and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, where interests might coincide. He notes that such 
arrangements were possible because the staff of the Committee had themselves 
been drawn from various departments. ‘It [the Committee] was alive to the 
importance of maintaining its full independence, and the recognition of this was 
shared by the departments themselves. In the course of enquiries information was 
obtained from departments, but care was exercised on both sides to avoid 
anything in the nature of guidance from Government circles either as to policy
17^generally or in relation to particular commodities.’
In his work, International Relations, Wurm questioned the level of 
independence of the Committee. Hutchinson’s review of the Committee’s 
operation makes no mention of unofficial contact with members of Government, 
and yet Wurm makes clear that such contacts were important.174 The IDAC was 
closely linked to both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the 
Board of Trade. Wurm also suggests that, as time went on, Runciman and 
Chamberlain increasingly influenced IDAC: ‘The Committee proved more than 
ready to respond favourably to ‘unofficial suggestions’. It rejected a number of 
requests for higher tariffs, for example on agricultural products, which would 
have created difficulties for the government’.175 Furthermore, Wurm noted that 
Neville Chamberlain repeatedly shielded IDAC from hostile critics in his attempts 
to show that its activities, and tariff policy in general were, was outside of the 
political arena. Wurm argues that Chamberlain was confident in this because he 
knew that the views of IDAC would coincide with his own.176
173 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.48
174 Wurm Clemens, Business, Politics and International Relations (Cambridge 1993) pp.68-69
l75Wurm International Relations p.69
176 Wurm International Relations p.68
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On a similar point, a NIESR study argued that the ‘formal’ independence 
of IDAC did not really matter so long as the Committee made the ‘correct’ 
decisions and did what the Government wanted:
It must be admitted that the machinery created for the purpose of adjusting tariff 
duties worked efficiently and smoothly. It was, however, wise to remember that 
the Committee, though nominally of a non-political character, was appointed by 
the National Government and that the same Government remained in power until 
after the outbreak of the present war. What would have happened if a 
Government in favour of Free Trade had come to power it was difficult to say, 
but it seems unlikely that the machinery could have functioned effectively if the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, as head of the Treasury, had been fundamentally 
opposed to the policy of the I.D.A.C. Although theoretically removed from the 
field of politics, tariffs were always likely to arise as a political issue, and in the 
event of a difference of opinion it seems probable that the Treasury and 
ultimately Parliament itself would have dictated policy and that the I.D.A.C. as 
then constituted would have been over-ruled and probably reformed.177
When the government announced the establishment o f the Committee it 
was said that it was independent yet clearly it was not: it was effectively a part of 
government. In modern day parlance, the Committee would be viewed as a 
“quango”.178 For this reason, the activities of the Committee cannot be 
disassociated from that of the government.
The Committee Members
The Chancellor of the Exchequer made the decision as to the membership 
of the Committee (see Appendix 2.1 for background to Committee members).179
177 The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Trade Regulations & 
Commercial Policy o f the United Kingdom (Cambridge 1943) p.40. This comment comes after an 
acknowledgement that the Treasury only ‘rubber-stamped’ the Committee’s orders.
178 Quango meaning ‘quasi-autonomous national government organisation’ rather than the more 
common ‘non-governmental organisation’.
179 The selection of the committee members was primarily the responsibility of Runciman and 
Chamberlain, they were not to have ‘embarrassing industrial connections; or a ‘political past’.
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Sir George May was appointed as Chairman: he had a business background in the 
field of insurance. He had been involved with managing the American Dollar 
Securities Committee during the First-World-War and had been a Director of the 
British Overseas Bank until 1931.180 Other members included Sir Sydney 
Chapman, who had worked at the Board of Trade since the war, most recently as 
Chief Economic Adviser to the government181 and Sir George Allan Powell, who 
had held various public positions during the war and had served on several 
government enquiries since the war. To support them, Percy Ashley was seconded 
from the Board of Trade where he had been involved in work on the Safeguarding 
Duties. Herbert Hutchinson had also worked at the Board of Trade, and was 
recruited as an Assistant Secretary. Sir Alfred Hurst was seconded from the 
Treasury to assist the Chairman in his decision-making.182 Three o f the six had 
been involved in the Economic Advisory Committee [EAC]: Herbert Hutchinson, 
who was involved in the Committee on the Cotton Industry in 1929; Sir George 
May, who was the Chairman for the Committee on National Expenditure in 1932; 
and Sir Sydney Chapman, who had worked on the Committee on Unemployment 
Benefits in 1930.183
The Economist, pro-free trade and anti-tariff, was highly critical of 
Chamberlain for the introduction of the Import Duties Act. As well as being 
critical of its introduction, they were also uncertain about the removal of 
responsibility for the tariff from Parliament. However, when they learnt of the
Wurm’s International Relations pp65-66 suggests that the appointments fell short of these 
requirements.
180 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.26
181 Chapman as Professor of Political Economy had published a body of works which addressed 
tariff questions amongst others. It is clear from these works, including his The History o f Trade 
between the United Kingdom and the United States (London, 1899) and his response to the Tariff 
Commission in regard to the Cotton industry, that he was a free trader. His economic theory can be 
found in his work Outlines o f Political Economy (London 1929) and reflects his indebtedness to 
Marshall.
182 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.27.
Hurst was appointed at the insistence of Sir George May to act as his adviser.
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appointment of IDAC Committee members, they considered these to be well 
advised. They noted in particular of Sir Sydney Chapman: ‘In recent years, in his 
capacity of Economic Advisor to the Government, he has represented this country 
on the Economic Committee of the League of Nations, which has endeavoured to 
organise collective agreements for the reduction of tariff barriers and the better 
organisation of international commerce’184.
At the same time they reported that they felt that the Committee had been 
given an impossible task. ‘We do not envy the Committee a thankless task; for it 
would tax the power of an archangel to reconcile all the conflicting interests 
involved or to devise a tariff that will stimulate exports, that will increase 
employment by keeping imports out, produce revenue by letting them in, and 
through modifications of its own level secure reductions of tariffs abroad’185.
They were also wary that the constitution of IDAC meant there would be little 
protection for the ‘public interest’.
The responsibilities of the Committee
The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the General Tariff Scheme in the 
House of Commons on 4th February 1932. In summary, he said the purpose of the 
tariff was:
• To correct the balance of payments by diminishing imports and stimulating 
exports;
• To raise revenues by measures which would not place an undue burden on any 
class of the community;
• By a system of moderate protection, scientifically applied, to transfer to our 
own fields and factories work done elsewhere, and thereby decrease 
unemployment;
183 Hutchinson Tariff-making pp.26-28
184 The Economist March 5, 1932. P.506
185 The Economist March 5, 1932. P.506
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•  By judicious use of the system of protection, to stimulate improvement in our 
methods of production and distribution;
• To use the protective system as a means of negotiation with foreign countries 
and as a safeguard against discrimination;
• To offer advantages to countries of the Empire in return to advantages given 
to us by them.
How IDAC was to work could only be seen from the guidance given in the 
Act. ‘The Act constituted it to give advice and assistance to the Treasury by 
means of recommendations, but did not provide for it to receive instructions from 
the Government’.186 IDAC were aware of the urgent need for protection for 
industry and were particularly conscious of the threat of ‘dumping’, especially 
from Germany and Belgium. Yet, at the same time, they knew that they were 
expected to consider in detail the merits of a tariff for particular industries. ‘The 
Committee decided that the only thing to do was to act first and enquire 
afterwards. If a sensible tariff structure could be devised from its own resources,
187this could be adjusted at leisure where necessary, with the full aid of enquiry.’ 
IDAC decided to apply one standard rate to most wholly manufactured goods. An 
intermediate rate (between the standard rate and the general ad valorem rate) was 
to apply to a number of products: while luxuries would attract a higher rate of 
duty.188 ‘Meantime applications for additional duties came flooding in from the 
different sections of industry, followed, as the weeks passed, by reminders and 
appeals’.189 Trade associations submitted many of these early applications.190 When 
the initial scheme was decided there was a series of informal meetings with the 
Federation of British Industries [FBI], Associated British Chambers of Commerce
186 Hutchinson Tariff-Making p.29
187 Hutchinson Tariff-Making p.30
188 The general rate was the 10% imposed under the Act, the standard rate was set at 20% with the 
intermediate rate of 15%. The higher rates of duty, for luxury goods and steel, ranged from 25% to 
33'/3%.
189 Hutchinson Tariff-Making p.32
190 During the first week of March 1932, applications were received from fourteen different trade 
associations.
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[ABCC], the National Union of Manufacturers [NUM], British Electrical and Allied 
Manufacturers Association [BEAMA] and National Federation of Iron and Steel 
Manufacturers [NFISM] to resolve any major problems at that stage.
IDAC completed the work in five weeks making their recommendations to 
the Treasury on 8th April 1932. The Treasury made an order (Cmd 4066) on 19th 
April and the duties came into force on 26th April.191 Over the next seven and a 
half years, IDAC worked on modifying the tariff. Generally, they waited 
forapproaches from business to make amendments to the tariff, then considered 
these requests and made their decisions.192 In this way, the Committee formulated 
the tariff, developing tariff policy in a largely piecemeal fashion through time.
The Committee had responsibilities for additional duties, the free list, 
drawback and special machinery licensing (see Appendix 2.2). Additional Duties 
were applied mainly to finished and semi-manufactured goods. Items on the Free 
List were largely raw materials193. Drawback was the method by which import 
duty could be reclaimed on items later re-exported. The machinery licensing 
scheme related to new machinery only being produced overseas upon which the 
Government did not want industry to have to pay duty.194 Under the machinery 
licensing scheme, an importer had to apply for a license for each individual 
consignment of machinery.195 Upon receipt, each application was referred by
191 Hutchinson Tariff-Making p.33
192 There are some examples of IDAC taking the lead and advertising particular goods for 
increased duties without receiving an application from the industry first but these are unusual.
193 This was a list of goods not to be subject to duty. It was a limited one including only a few 
foodstuffs and raw materials and included some printed matter such as books, newspapers and 
periodicals. The Committee made additions to the Free List over time. These were mostly lesser 
raw materials for industry that had been omitted from the original list. Most foodstuffs were 
covered by the Horticultural Products Act, but large proportions of foodstuffs came from the 
Commonwealth and as such were exempt from duty (they were subsequently covered by the 
Ottawa Agreements). IDAC was happy to accept the status quo with these products and focus their 
efforts on industrial products.
194 Decisions concerning which machines were eligible relied heavily on information that the trade 
associations could provide. In particular advice was sought from BEA, BEAMA and MTTA.
195 This was the case until the system was reviewed in 1936; after this, for ‘repeat’ imports, i.e., the 
same type of machine, the license would simply be granted by IDAC. From this time, the
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IDAC to the appropriate trade association for comment. The association would 
then confirm if the product, or similar, could be obtained in the country. Based on 
this information IDAC would either grant or refuse the license. Around a quarter 
of the imports of machinery each year came in free of duty under the scheme.196 
The machinery imported was, in the main: ‘high-class machinery for special 
purposes, machinery which by its very nature calls for the highest skill in its
197design and construction and which sells at a very high price per ton’.
The Committee was also consulted over the implications of international 
trade treaties, at the negotiating stage, regarding information on conflicts likely to 
arise because of agreements raised elsewhere. Additionally, they were involved in a 
number of ad hoc enquiries, such as the review of the Dyestuffs Act, the 
investigation of queries concerning the Ottawa Agreements, an enquiry into the Iron 
and Steel industry, and the monitoring of price movements. From 1936, they also 
became responsible for the licensing of goods to be used in scientific research. They 
also monitored the importation of goods for a purpose connected with the 
advancement of learning, art or the promotion of sport.198
The IDAC took on more functions than were originally laid down. It was 
called upon from time to time by the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the President 
of the Board of Trade to make special investigations. The Chancellor, in 1932, 
requested an investigation of the silk and artificial silk duties. The Committee 
conducted an enquiry into protection for the dyestuffs industry. It dealt with
responsibility was passed to the Associations to notify IDAC should production in these lines be 
commenced.
196 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.64.
197 Extract from an address by Mr. Bremner [Director], on January 11th, 1934 reported in the BEA 
Bulletin Volume XV 1934, February, pp.21-24.
198 Responsibility was passed to IDAC when the Key Industries duty came up for renewal. 
According to Ashley, ‘An Experiment’ p. 19, the number of applications made under this scheme 
were considerable, with about two-fifths of applications falling under the ‘scientific research’ 
category and being related largely to apparatus and preparations required for research in the 
medical field. A further two-fifths concerned the ‘advancement of learning’ and included special
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complaints arising out of the Ottawa Agreements.199 It acted in an advisory 
capacity when foreign trade treaties were being negotiated. And, in 1936, the 
Committee was requested by the Board of Trade to investigate the iron and steel 
industry.
How the Committee worked
Faced with the remit of producing a ‘scientific’ tariff, IDAC felt that they needed 
to:
• Consider the needs of all sectors of the economy, both producers and users;
• Provide a forum for all interested parties to air their views (as a system of 
arbitration, whereby users were given the opportunity to present their own 
side. If there were no opponents then the committee would assume that there 
were no problems);
• Weigh-up what was in the best-interests of any particular group and the likely 
affect on others;
• Use all available evidence to inform decision making;
• Take a ‘balanced’ view using ‘best judgement’;
•  Consider not only price effects but also quality of products;
• Enable British industry to become more competitive ( business needed to 
improve in order to face open market competition);
• Support and encourage the export trade.
In the case of Additional Duty applications, the Committee made decisions 
based on evidence received. Appendix 2.3 shows the details applicants were
cinematograph films, articles for various exhibitions, lecture lantern slides and special types of 
looms and weaving appliances for technical colleges.
199 Canadians, regarding imports of Russian timber into Britain, made one such complaint.
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required to submit. Similar information was required for applications for reduction 
of duty, additions or removals from the Free List, and for Drawback.
There were three divisions of the Committee, each dealing with different 
types of applications. The work was divided on a commodity-basis, the results of 
initial enquiries then being submitted to the full Committee. The first division dealt 
with iron and steel, machinery, non-ferrous metals, cutlery, hardware, implements 
and instruments. The second division dealt with cotton yams and manufactures, 
woollen and worsted yams and manufactures, silk yams and manufactures, other 
textile manufactures, paper and cardboard. The third division dealt with: food, 
pottery, glass and abrasives, electrical goods and apparatus, chemical, drugs, oils 
and colours (dyes), oils, fats and resins, rubber manufactures, vehicles and 
miscellaneous manufactured items.200
The approach adopted by the Committee saw each case proceeding in the 
following steps:
1. Application to be submitted in writing providing the details of the tariff 
change required and supplying evidence to support the case.
2. Application then sent to the appropriate division within IDAC for examination 
by the staff in light of statistical material and other relevant information
3. Applicants were asked (by letter or interview) to supply additional information 
and evidence as required.
4. The case was then passed to one of the three Committee Members who might 
also interview applicants or request additional information. Sir George May 
was responsible for Division I, Sir Sydney Chapman for Division II and Sir 
George Allan Powell for Division III. The Committee member would then 
present the application with his comments to the rest of the Committee.
200 PRO BT/10/110.
There is no evidence to suggest that this divisional split had more significance than for working 
practicalities. The divisions largely encompassed related industries. By focusing the work of the 
staff on a particular division, the staff were able to gain a deeper understanding of the industries 
and become more competent at handling the relevant statistical and qualitative data.
5. At this stage, the Committee decided whether a sufficient case had been made 
to warrant advertising. If so, the application was advertised in the Board of 
Trade Journal, the Daily press and appropriate trade periodicals; all interested 
parties were given a period within which to contact the Committee about the 
application.
6. Opponents would be provided with a summary o f the case (without sensitive 
commercial details) and asked to provide their own case and evidence. This, in 
turn, would be passed to applicants for comment.
7. The responsible Committee member might then feel in a position to present 
conclusions to the rest of the Committee for decision. The Committee member 
might still feel it necessary to invite the applicants, opponents or both to meet 
him, either separately or together; he might think it best for such hearings of 
the parties, separately or together, to be heard by the whole Committee.
8. The final stage was the submittal to the Committee o f a full review of the case 
and statement of conclusions. The Committee would then decide what 
recommendations to make to Treasury upon the case.
Considers ail evidence 
makes final decision
NO -
application is rejected 
decision is advertised
Committee Receives Application:
examines case and makes initial decision
NO-
rejected by the Committee 
and applicant is nob'fied
YES-
application approved 
Treasury notified and 
Order is prepared
YES-
details are advertised and date se t for 
opposition and support to be received
73
To sum up, once the Committee had initially approved an application it 
would be then advertised so that opponents could state their case and present 
evidence. Announcements of applications under consideration were made in the 
press for comment from the public and other interested parties. A final decision 
would then be made once these views could be reconciled. In some cases, the 
Committee would get opposing parties to negotiate amongst themselves and come
2fl1up with a compromise which the Committee would then generally recommend.
Analysis shows that, when applications were received, the Committee 
preferred that they were received from a representative body o f some kind. 'In 
accordance with the provisions of the Act, applications or counter-representation 
from individual concerns or persons were never ruled out, but efforts were 
continually made to secure that they should be put forward by representative bodies 
covering so far as possible all those concerned.'202 Often the information initially 
received from applicants was insufficient. Owing to the detailed nature of 
submissions required, the size and structure of an organisation may have affected 
how well and how quickly the relevant information could be put before the 
committee. 'The matters on which a trade association or group might have to gather 
information and answer questions in pursuing a case with the Committee were 
liable to extend over a wide field, not only of fact but o f policy in relation to prices, 
adequacy of capacity, efficiency, relations with its customers, exports, relations 
with its foreign competitors, and so forth.'203 Once all information was forthcoming, 
it would be compared with that already available from published or official sources 
(see Appendix 2.4 for details of some of the alternative sources of information 
ID AC used). Interviews would also be conducted with the applicants in order to 
produce a picture of the industry.
Efficiency of an industry was an important consideration, as was its pricing 
policy especially where the commodity was used in further manufacture by another
201 An example of this can be found in Committee Paper 58/1935 relating to an application for 
additional duty on locks.
202 Hutchinson Tariff-Making p.37.
203 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.77.
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industry. There were several reasons why the Committee would grant additional 
duties: where the quantity of low-priced imports was rising, in the case o f infant 
industries, or where an industry was re-equipping itself to meet demand at home or 
abroad, and, in some cases, to strengthen the position of British industry in 
negotiating international cartel agreements. Information concerning the extent of 
imports, their growth and their relation to home output was obtained largely from 
official trade returns provided to IDAC from H.M. Customs and Excise, and from 
the census of production supplied by the Board of Trade.204
The Treasury made the final policy-decision acting on the recommendations 
put forward by the Committee. However, it was normal practice for these 
recommendations to be accepted in toto.205 Recommendations of the Committee 
were not always a straightforward ‘yes or no’ to granting the additional duty: at 
times, a decision would effectively be deferred; there would be no outright refusal 
but an agreement to reconsider the position in x months time when the pattern of 
imports could again be examined. On other occasions there is evidence of additional 
duties being granted for a trial period.
Rarely were the recommendations of the Committee questioned by the 
Treasury: they were normally passed direct to formal orders. The Treasury Order 
then had to be voted upon in Parliament. In reality, the role o f the Treasury and 
MPs was little more than a ‘rubber-stamping’ exercise because they were 
provided with insufficient information to be able to question the Orders. It is 
apparent that MPs were not always entirely happy with this procedure: they would 
have liked more information so that they could have formed an independent 
opinion on the matters. However: ‘The Committee did not welcome anything 
which might tend to put the detailed discussion of particular tariff proposals back 
into the Parliamentary arena...’206. There were also practical difficulties in doing 
this because of the complexity of cases. As a result, the process was never
204 All of this information can be found within IDAC files
205 The Treasury, in any case, had limited powers it could not increase tariffs beyond that 
recommended by the Committee, nor could it set a tariff of less than 10 per cent without a 
recommendation from IDAC.
206 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.52
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significantly changed. ‘The Committee’s task was to examine and weigh 
information which was frequently partial and incomplete and often conflicting, 
obtained from various sources and by various methods, and not uncommonly 
incapable of statement in statistical form; and to form conclusions on the balance 
of evidence’.207
What the two sides wanted from the tariff
For the government, there were a number of gains to be made from
introducing the tariff. In the circumstances of the early 1930s, it was important for
balancing the budget. By discouraging imports, the trade balance would be
directly strengthened208 and the tariff raised tax revenue. Figures on the level of
imports of manufactures show a substantial decline following the introduction of
the tariff. Those products with the highest rate of duty saw a fall in the volume of
imports of nearly 50% between 1930 and 1934.209 However, it is not possible to
distinguish the effect of the tariff from the effects of the coincident devaluation
and depression. The tariff did, without doubt, contribute as a revenue earner. In
the financial years ending 1933, 1934 and 1935, it bought in £167, £179 and £185 
210millions respectively.
207 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.52
208 At the time, there was no discussion within government of the possible retaliatory effects on 
British exports.
209 Capie Depression and Protectionism p .]00, cites the 1937 work of H. Leak, a statistician at the 
Board of Trade, this showed the reduction in imports of dutiable manufactures in 1933. In 1933, 
the volume of imports relative to 1930 was 36% and 53% in 1934. Capie notes that unfortunately, 
the estimates were simply one year’s imports compared with another and that the reductions could 
be attributed to factors other than the tariff.
210 Figures are taken from the 8th Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom (1937). They show a 
significant increase on the average earnings from import duties in place prior to the introduction of 
the general tariff. These were in the region of £112 million a year between 1925 and 1931.
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The relative price-effect of the tariff should also have diverted expenditure 
towards domestic goods. The increased domestic demand, should through 
multiplier effects, have stimulated the recovery and reduced unemployment.
The introduction of the tariff was also an act of retaliation against an 
increasingly protectionist international environment. With a tariff in place, the 
government had a bargaining tool which enabled it to enter trade negotiations with 
other nations. Mutually beneficial bilateral trade treaties could be agreed -  a 
second best option when free trade was no longer viable. Britain in fact negotiated 
treaties with 16 other countries between 1932-1935.2,1 While these may not have 
altered patterns of trade in any significant direction, they were considered 
important at the time (sometimes more for diplomatic reasons than economic 
ones).
The tariff also provided government with the opportunity to bargain with 
industry, enabling intervention and promotion of industrial policy aims. At the 
outset, the Government’s ambitions in this direction were limited, focusing mainly 
on notions of coercing rationalisation, particularly in those industries where 
earlier attempts had failed. Chamberlain, on the eve of his introduction o f the 
Import Duties Bill, wrote that it:
‘does provide us with such a lever as has never been possessed before by any government 
for inducing or, if you like, forcing industry to set its house in order. I have in my mind 
particularly iron and steel, and cotton; and my belief in the advantages of protection was 
not so fanatical as to close my eyes to the vital importance of a thorough reorganisation of 
such industries as these, if they are even to keep their heads above water in the future’.212
IDAC went beyond this, seeing that they were in a position to manipulate industry 
to increase efficiency and competitiveness. ‘In considering applications for
211 The series of treaties began with the Ottawa Conference agreements in 1932. Agreements with 
Argentina, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Germany and Finland came in 1933. Agreements with 
France, Japan, Russia, Poland and the Baltic States followed in 1934. The final agreement was the 
Anglo-American treaty in November 1938. This followed four years of discussions. Attempts to 
negotiate with the US had not been made earlier because it was felt this would be pointless as the 
US government would not entertain decreasing its tariff whatever was offered.
A detailed analysis of the treaty negotiations can be found in Rooth Protectionism.
212 cited in, Beer British politics p.293
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increased protection the Committee felt bound before making recommendations to 
assure themselves that the industry seeking aid was reasonably efficient, that is, 
that the additional protection, if granted, would not be a mere cloak of
213incompetence.’
They believed that they had a responsibility to make the adjustment to the 
new economic conditions British industry faced as smoothly as possible, and saw 
a role for themselves in providing a stable framework within which industrialists 
could carry on their own work.
In the case of industry, what it wanted from tariff protection was more 
straightforward. It wanted a given level of protection. The concern was with 
effective rates: industry wanted to secure the highest possible levels on its own 
products and at the same time the lowest on its inputs.214 Industry also hoped for 
inertia, wanting to change as little as possible.
Sources and approach
The work of IDAC may be analysed as follows. Original documentation 
from the applicants is not held in the main IDAC files, however, within 
Committee Papers there are detailed summaries of each case put forward. The 
Committee Papers also carry other useful information: regular updates on the 
position of outstanding applications; updates on the administration of machinery 
licence applications;215 details of trade negotiations; record of meetings with, and 
copies of letters to, trade associations; trade figures; final reports to the Treasury, 
etc.
213 Percy Ashley ‘An Experiment’ p.24
2,4 There are exceptions to this but these, for obvious reasons, are likely to be rare.
215 Committee papers provide quarterly reviews of the administration of this scheme. Lists are 
provided detailing recommendations made over the previous three months. This includes 
applications allowed, applications refused, and the grounds of refusal. The major reason for 
refusals was that similar machines were available in Britain. The information needed to arrive at 
these decisions was obtained from the trade associations.
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An application appeared in more than one Committee Paper as it 
progresses. To follow any application through, therefore, it is necessary to trace 
all relevant Committee Papers. By doing this, the progress of an application from 
its receipt through to the Committee’s decision and subsequent recommendation 
to the Treasury can be followed via various stages including the advertising o f the 
case in the press and receiving notification of any opposition. The thesis analyses 
all applications to the IDAC for additional duty for all years 1932-39 at an 
aggregate level. A relational database has been created to record essential details 
of each application.
Of course, the motivation for requesting increased tariff rates on particular 
items, or adjustments to the Free-List, may not be straightforward. For example, 
there is evidence that applications were used as bargaining tools with international 
cartels.216 Clearly, other interests will have motivated applicants: there may have 
been a wish to encourage change within particular industrial sectors; the 
applications may have assisted with agreeing domestic cartels; and, where the 
desired outcome was an additional duty, the initial claim may have been set high in 
anticipation of negotiating with opposition. Such motivations will need to be 
explored.217 This may also produce evidence of collaboration amongst trade 
associations in submitting (or opposing) applications. Given the diversity of 
motivating forces, there were a range of satisfactory outcomes as far as the trade 
associations were concerned.
Before the in-depth analysis of applications was conducted, however, the 
decisions of the Committee were examined at a more general level. For the 
purposes of argument, applications were taken at ‘face value’, i.e., where a request 
was made for additional duty, it was assumed that this was the desired outcome. 
Decisions on applications were considered to identify whether any pattern emerged 
among refusals or recommendations. For example, applications from sectors of the
216The notion that the tariff facilitated international cartel arrangements has thus far been neglected 
in considering the contribution of the tariff for the recovery.
217 From the examination of both IDAC records and the records of selected Trade Associations, it 
should be possible to ascertain exactly how aware businessmen were of ‘effective rates’.
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economy considered important218 may have accounted for relatively more of those 
recommended by IDAC. The time from initial application to introduction of any 
change in duty rates was also be calculated. This is important as the speed of the 
process could have determined the extent of potential benefits.
It is important to consider the extent to which IDAC’s decisions reflect the 
changing economic environment and prevailing government policies. IDAC 
clearly was not oblivious to the government’s rationalisation programmes in the 
case of the iron and steel industry. Its influence and attitude towards other sectors 
should also be considered. The government’s Special Areas Development 
programme may also have influenced the Committee’s judgement of certain 
cases. As war approached, the committee’s criteria for approving applications 
may have altered. In particular, it may be observed that ‘vital’ industries received 
preferential treatment. The writings of ID AC will be used to draw out further 
inferences.
In conclusion, when considering the overall tariff structure, one might 
expect that tariffs were higher in the following circumstances:
1. In consumer goods industries. This would mirror the argument based on US 
tariff history, where consumer goods had high tariffs because consumers could 
not form an effective pressure group to lobby against their imposition;
2. In industries with large numbers of employees. This could be important 
because a large number of employees equated with a large number o f potential 
voters (this was found to be true in the US case but given the differing 
political systems seems less likely to be true for Britain);
3. In industries where the rate of unemployment was high. This may be to protect 
against further job losses and in the hope of recreating jobs;
4. In low-skilled industries. Following the US literature, this may occur because 
these sectors had least comparative advantage and as such had the most to 
gain from protection;
218 Strategically or because of levels of employment in the sector or infant industries arguments, 
for example.
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5. In industries with high capital to labour ratios. High tariffs may have been 
required in these industries, so that investment continued and technological 
advances were maintained;
6. In industries which either made a large contribution to National Income or to 
export earnings. These may be viewed as most important for the recovery of 
the economy;
7. In the staple industries, such as cotton textiles iron and steel, and ship­
building, which suffered from lack of competitiveness, but had traditionally 
been large employers (this relates to points 2, 3, and 6); and
8. In industries, predominantly located in Special Areas.
It would also be useful to examine those industries that never made 
applications for additional duty to IDAC. This may have occurred because an 
industry was not sufficiently organised to put forward a case, although evidence 
suggests that most sectors of the economy had representative trade associations. 
Alternatively, this may be because the industries did not need protection, or they 
believed the level of protection they were receiving was sufficient.219 Any attempt 
to do this, however, would be constrained by the availability of data. That said, 
the issue is examined for one industry: that of building.
219 If this was the case, it would be important to relate this to the issue of effective rates of 
protection and the contribution of the tariff to the recovery.
Hawke ‘United States Tariff’, found industries where legislative protection was of little 
significance relative to natural protection had low, or zero, rates of protection p.98.
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Chapter 3. Additional duty applications 1932-39: Data 
Analysis
Documents produced by the IDAC are the primary source for this research. 
Original documentation from applicants is not held in IDAC files. However, 
within Committee Papers there are detailed summaries of each case put forward. 
These Committee papers provide a step-by-step summary and analysis of each 
case. Any particular application will appear in more than one Committee paper as 
the case progresses.
To follow a case through it was necessary to link together a number o f papers 
over time. In all, this necessitated examining over 2,500 papers produced by the 
Committee during their seven years in operation. By doing this the progress of an 
application from its receipt through to the Committee’s decision and subsequent 
recommendation to the Treasury could be followed via various stages, including 
the advertising of the case in the press and receiving notification of any 
opposition.
Any committee paper may cover more than one application if for instance, they 
involve similar cases, or if they only cover brief updates on cases. The papers vary 
in length and complexity, reflecting the cases they cover. Some papers were very 
brief: where the applicant puts forward little evidence and/or where their case was 
weak, the Committee could quickly reject the application having given it only 
cursory attention. Most papers consist of between ten and thirty foolscap pages of 
notes whilst the most complex papers may be up to 300 pages in length.
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What is recorded in the Committee Papers?
The first paper for an application will usually provide the following details:
1. The change in the duty requested and details of the product for which the 
change was required
2. The name of the applicant(s)
3. Occasionally, some background details on the applicant and the state of the 
industry
4. The grounds upon which the application was being made
5. The Committee’s impression/view of the case at that early stage. This would 
often include comments on whether there were known using interests and if 
there are any political factors to be considered.
6. ‘Next Steps’.
6.1. Whether the applicant was required to provide more information 
immediately
6.2. Whether any third party needed to be consulted, this could either be an 
other government department (OGD) or a known opponent for instance
6.3. Whether the case was to be advertised
6.4. Whether the case was to be rejected immediately and the reasons for 
that decision.
Subsequent papers show the progress of the cases including details of any further 
information submitted by the applicant, the views of any opposition or support, 
and third party consultation. Finally, the Committee decision and the reasons for it 
were recorded.
From this wealth of material, basic information on all those applications submitted 
with requests for additional duty (and specific duty where this involves an 
increase in the level of protection) has been recorded. A relational database has 
been constructed containing information on all the additional duty applications 
made to IDAC. This database enables analysis of all the additional duty
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application decisions the Committee made between 1932 and 1939.220 Providing 
an informed picture of the reasoning behind IDAC decisions (and, whether this 
changed through time), also shedding light upon whether the Committee members 
abided by the criteria they had set down.
Details of the database
For each application made to the Committee, a record has been entered to the 
database of:
1. Application -  product name, date of first and last papers
2. Name of applicant(s)
3. Reason(s) for application
4. Name of opponent(s)
5. Name of supporter(s)
6. Three types of Committee decision -  Initial Rejection (i.e. those applications 
that were turned down by the Committee even before advertising because a 
sufficient case had not been presented), No (applications that were turned 
down by the Committee after advertising and further consideration), Yes 
(applications where the Committee agreed to raise the duty after the case had 
been advertised and considered in depth)
7. Reasons for the Committee decision
8. Committee member making the decision.
A series of codes was devised to record the data in a manageable way. Each 
applicant was allocated an alphanumeric code. These differed in format according 
to whether the applicant was a representative body (Trade Association or 
Chamber of Commerce), or an individual business. Appendix 3.1 provides an 
example of these221. Similar sets of codes were produced for both the opponents
220 A copy of the database and a report summarising the data for each application can be found on 
the accompanying CD-ROM.
221 Full details of all data can be viewed in the ‘Applicants’ table of the Database.
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and supporters of applications: examples of these can be found in Appendices 3.2 
and 3.3 respectively. Details of the product for which the additional protection 
was required were entered in full and each application given a unique identifier.222
The applicants’ reasons for applying for the duty fell into broadly similar grounds 
and a coded list of reasons (added to where necessary through time) was 
constructed to reflect this. The details of these reason codes are shown in 
Appendix 3.4. Most applicants gave a number of reasons for requesting the 
additional duty and separate codes were added for each reason mentioned.
Similarly, with the Committee’s decisions, it was found that these were also 
broadly similar and coded lists were also produced. A coded list for each type of 
decision, i.e. those initially rejected, those that were ‘No’ after advertising and 
those that were ‘Yes’ after advertising, was produced. These are shown in 
Appendix 3.5, Appendix 3.6 and Appendix 3.7 respectively.
222 The unique identifier was based upon the original Committee Paper Reference number. For 
technical reasons the year is shown first in the database, thus the details of Application reference 
ID. 36/161 would be found in Committee paper number 161/1936.
How many applications for additional duty were made to the 
Committee, and when?
Over the seven years, 1932-1939, IDAC considered 481 additional duty 
applications. The table and chart below show the number of additional duty 
applications received year on year.
Number of Additional Duty applications made each year
Year 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Number 88 84 72 73 69 56 17 22 481
Cumulative
percentage
18.3 35.8 50.7 65.9 80.2 91.9 95.4 100
Number of Additional duty applications by year 1932-1939
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As expected the Committee received a massive influx o f applications in the first 
year. This level o f applications was sustained in 1933, and only dropped by 
around 10% in 1934 and 1935. In 1936 and 1937 the number o f applications fell 
a little further and then applications dropped off significantly during 1938 and
86
1939. By the end o f 1934, the Committee had received a half of all the additional 
duty applications, and by the end of 1936 over 80% .223
The gradual fall-off in the number of applications may have occurred for a 
number of reasons. It seems natural that most applicants would try to get in 
quickly to secure any benefits as early was possible, thus explaining the large 
number of applications in the early years. Application levels may then have been 
sustained as more and more sectors were affected by the depression. Retaliatory 
action by other nations began to bite (for instance, currency devaluations, access 
to export markets being restricted and, the dumping of goods in Britain) would 
also have had an impact. Three reasons may explain the fall-off in applications 
from 1936. First, the economy was beginning to recover from the depression. 
Second, even more obviously, once those needing additional protection had 
received it fewer applications would be necessary. Finally, applicants may have 
been deterred from submitting applications, as they became aware of how difficult 
it was to win a case. This may have acted as a deterrent particularly as the process 
could be time consuming and therefore, costly. Instead, they may have devoted 
their energies to the pursuit of alternative forms of protection such as restrictive 
trade practices at home, and the negotiation of international cartel agreements224.
223 Quarterly data on the number of applications made do not show any particular seasonal 
variations. This is unsurprising, as there does not seem a reason to expect this.
The only products where seasonal applications were received tended to be on some horticultural 
products such as strawberries, and these were requests for temporary variations in the duty rates. 
These were most often dealt with separately by the Committee and procedures followed were not 
the same as for other additional duty applications. In most cases, these have not therefore been 
included in the database of applications.
224 For further details on this see Chapter 6.
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How many applications were successful?
In terms of the decisions made by the Committee, of the 481 applications, 189 
(39.3%) were turned down at the initial stage. Of the remainder, the Committee, 
following advertisement and further consideration, refused to grant additional 
duty in 138 (28.7%) of cases. In the remaining 154 (32%) cases, the applicants 
were successful in gaining additional duty after further consideration by the 
Committee. Overall, therefore, an applicant only had a one in three chance of 
persuading the Committee to increase the duty rates on its products.
The pattern of Committee decisions year on year is shown in Appendix 3.8. This 
shows that the earlier an application was made, the greater was the chance of 
success. In 1932 just over 45% of applicants had their request for an additional 
duty granted, this fell to around 39% in 1933, around 28% in 1934, and rose to 
around 41% in 1935. In 1936, only a quarter of decisions favoured the applicant 
and in subsequent years, there was even less success for applicants -  in 1937 as 
few as one in eight decisions went the way of the applicants. In the years 1937- 
1939, the proportion of successful applications did not rise above 18%. For those 
applications that were unsuccessful, in all years excepting 1932 and 1939225, they 
were more likely to be rejected at the initial stage rather than after advertising. In 
other words, in most instances the applicants were unable to present a sufficiently 
interesting case for the Committee to give it further consideration.
By the end of 1933, over 47% of all the applications that were to succeed had 
been made. This reached 60% by the end of 1934 and, by the end o f 1936, over 
90% of the successful applications had been made. From our detailed analysis of 
Committee Papers, it seems that the quality and strength (i.e. greatest need) of the 
applications must explain this, as there is no evidence to show that the 
Committee’s requirements became more stringent.
225 With regards the Figures for 1939, the high proportion of ‘no’ decisions is in part explained by 
the ending of the Committee’s activities due to war.
88
Time to make decisions
The length of time it took the Committee to process the additional duty requests 
may have been crucial for the industries concerned and have affected their ability 
to recover from the depression. Examination o f the time it took IDAC to make 
their decisions this brings to light how time consuming the process could be for 
applicants -  additional evidence of this is found when reviewing individual cases.
Calculations given here are based upon the dates o f the first and last Committee 
papers (recorded in the database as ‘Start date’ and ‘End date’). The first date is 
the date when the application details were initially noted and bought to the 
attention of the Committee. Most of the time the application was received earlier 
than this. However, as no original documentation from applicants survive it was 
not possible to get a more precise date. In some cases the time which elapsed 
between the applicant contacting the Committee and the appearance of that 
application in a Committee paper was considerable. However, the papers show 
that for the majority of cases the Committee action was more timely.
The date of the last paper was the date at which the Committee made its final 
decision and prepared its recommendation to the Treasury. This does not equate 
with the date that a Treasury Order was effected through Parliament, and does not 
reflect when the tariff would come into being. Any dates calculated here therefore, 
will be a minimum time and, could for a few cases, seriously underestimate the 
time taken from requesting an additional duty to receiving the benefit of a tariff 
increase.
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During the period 1932-39, it took the Committee on average 139 days or 20 
weeks to process an application. As can be seen from Column A of the following 
table, this varied considerably from year to year.
Table - Length of time it took IDAC to process applications for additional duty
All Applications Only applications which were advertised
COLUMN A COLUMN B
D a v s  -  a v e r a g e  in weeks D a y s  -  a v e r a g e  in weeks
1932 2 5 6  36.6 1932 3 0 5  43.6
1933 1 1 5  16.4 1933 2 0 1  28.7
1934 130 18.6 1934 2 3 9  34.1
1935 110 15.7 1935 2 0 5  29.3
1936 7 8  11.1 1936 1 8 7  26.7
1937 1 5 5  22.1 1937 3 9 6  56.6
1938 1 8 1  25.9 1938 3 0 8  44.0
1939 9 1  13.0 1939 111 15.9
1 1 1 6  1 5 9 .4 1 9 5 2  2 7 8 . 9
overall overall
average 1 3 9  19.9 average 2 4 4  34.9
1932-39 1932-39
Number o f  weeks to process additional duty applications (Col.B)
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Initially, the process was very slow. In 1932, it took around 256 days or 37 weeks 
for IDAC to arrive at their decision. This lengthy process may have arisen because 
o f the sheer weight and volume of applications; because IDAC had relatively few
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staff226; those staff and the members of IDAC lacked experience and, at least 
initially, IDAC may have been more insistent about the exact nature of the 
information they required.227
Having had the chance to clear any backlog of applications in 1933 the average 
processing time fell considerably to around 115 days or I 6 V2 weeks. The 
processing time only significantly rose again in 1937 and 1938, where 
applications took an average of 22 and 26 weeks respectively to process. At this 
time, IDAC staff were spending an increased amount of time on their other duties, 
such as the operation of the Machinery Licensing Scheme.228
An alternative way to consider the processing time is to exclude all those 
applications that were immediately refused ( ‘Initial rejections’). In these cases the 
decision was immediate, i.e. start date and end date are identical. To consider only 
applications where applicants were kept waiting for decisions, the applications 
where the number of days taken to process was greater than zero were further 
analysed. The results of this analysis are shown in Column B of the table and 
graphically in the chart.
Having excluded those cases that were initially rejected, the average time to 
process an application 1932-39 was 244 days or 35 weeks, i.e., an applicant would 
have to wait around eight months before they discovered whether their application 
was successful. This lengthy process may have diminished any positive effects of 
gaining the additional protection. It may also have deterred applicants and/or 
encouraged business to look toward alternative solutions.
226 The numbers of IDAC staff were gradually increased
227 It is not obvious that this was the case as IDAC’s approach was rigorous throughout the seven 
years. However, it is possible that the Committee learnt from the very early cases that some 
information was unlikely to be forthcoming and in later cases were willing to accept alternatives.
228 This coincides with the BEA withdrawing some of their assistance on the scheme to IDAC and 
the Committee then having to divert some of its own manpower to the schemes administration. 
Further details of this can be found in Chapter 5.
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Again as with the processing time of all additional duty applications the process 
time varied year on year. The processing of applications was slowest in the years 
1932, 1937 and 1938 at around 44 weeks, 57 weeks and 44 weeks respectively.229 
This length of process, in 1937 having to wait over 12 months for the 
Committee’s decisions, has to raise questions about the efficacy of the tariff. What 
happened to those industries whilst they awaited the additional protection they 
averred they so desperately needed? That said, the Committee was determined to 
examine cases thoroughly and it is clear that those applicants with the strongest 
overall cases230 did get their applications dealt with the most swiftly.
Who were the applicants?
The additional duty applications made to IDAC involved around 598 different 
applicants some collaborating to make joint applications. O f these applicants 350 
were representative trade bodies and the remaining 248 were individual 
businesses. The applicants came from all parts of UK industry and made 
applications for additional duty on individual products rather than on the output of 
an industry or sector as a whole. Therefore, for instance, the UK textile industry 
did not make an application for additional duty on all textile goods. Instead 
branches o f the industry made their own applications to the Committee for 
increased duty on specific items produced by them, for example, separate 
applications were made on carpets and rugs, handkerchiefs, gloves, blankets, 
stockings and fabric. This was necessary because the Committee required detailed 
information about the nature of the import competition that the applicants faced.
In addition, because items needed to be easily identifiable to Customs Officers 
who had to administer the tariff on a day to day basis.
229 Again, the processing time in 1939 is affected by the cessation of the Committee’s activities at 
the outbreak of War.
230 With the most pressing needed, or the most to be gained by being protected, those with little or 
no opposition and those able to present a robust and coherent case backed up by evidence.
92
Did it matter whether applications came from Trade Associations or 
individual firms?
It might be expected that applications that came from organised trade bodies, such 
as Trade Associations, Chambers of Commerce etc., would be more successful 
than those that came from ‘unrepresentative’ firms and businesses. Firstly, IDAC 
clearly publicised that they preferred to receive applications from ‘Representative 
Bodies’. Secondly, the cost of submitting an application (particularly in terms of 
time needed to gather and collate information) could have placed organised bodies 
in a stronger position. They may also have had more experience in dealing and 
negotiating with government departments, and been practised and skilled at 
lobbying. An application with a large number of applicants (whether 
representative bodies or not) might also have been considered more favourably by 
the Committee.
Considering this latter point first, the following table shows how frequently 
groups of applicants submitted applications.231 The table also shows the decisions 
reached according to the number of applicants.232
As can be seen, for the majority of applications there was only a single applicant. 
This was true in 312, or 65%, of the 481 cases submitted to the Committee. A 
further 76 cases (16%) had only two applicants, and 40 cases (8%) had three 
applicants. Only 11 % of applications were made by more than three applicants.
231 These could be a combination of Trade Associations, Trade Associations and individual firms, 
and groups of individual firms.
232 In the following tables the abbreviation IREJ is used as a heading for those applications which 
were initially rejected, i.e. refused immediately.
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Decisions reached according to the num ber of applicants (regardless of type)
No. of 
applicants
IREJ
No. of
cases
NO 
No. of
cases
%
FAILURE
YES  
No. of
cases
%
SUCCESS
TOTAL 
No. of
cases
1 140 90 73.7 82 26.3 312
64.9%
2 24 16 52.6 36 47.4 76
15.8%
3 11 11 55.0 18 45.0 40
8.3%
4 8 5 68.4 6 31.6 19
4.0%
5+ 6 16 64.7 12 35.3 34
7.1%
ALL 189 138 68.0 154 32.0 481
Looking at the applications that were successful (Yes decisions) it seems that 
having two or three applicants improved the chances of success compared to a 
single applicant submission.233 The success rate falls again, though, with more 
than three applicants.234
The number of applications received both from associations and individuals 
remained steady throughout the first five years o f IDAC’s operation. Neither 
seems to have been put off from applying for additional duties by any previous 
record o f success or failure. Although it seems that applications involving 
individuals rather than associations were more likely to be rejected at the initial 
stage overall, this does not follow through into the overall success rates. Indeed, 
applications involving individual applicants were slightly more likely to be 
approved than those submitted involving associations (35% as against 33%).
233 T h i s  c o u l d  b e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  w o r k  i n v o l v e d  o r  b e c a u s e  t h e y  w e r e  m o r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  U K  
p r o d u c e r s .
234 P o s s i b l y ,  b e c a u s e  t o o  m a n y  a p p l i c a n t s  m a d e  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o v e r l y  c o m p l e x  o r  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t  
e n t i r e l y  a g r e e  o n  t h e i r  n e e d s .
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Applications involving trade associations were roughly double the number of 
those involving individual firms. In some cases however trade associations and 
individual firms jointly submitted the applications. The next table, therefore, treats 
these joint applications as if associations submitted them so that a comparison can 
be made with those that only involved individual firms.
Breakdown o f decisions by applicant type (treating those submitted jointly, 
by associations and firms together, as if  by Associations)
IREJ
% for 
app type NO
% for 
app type YES
% for 
app type Total
Association 120 34.6% 113 32.6% 114 32.9% 347
Individual 69 51.5% 25 18.7% 40 29.9% 134
Total 189 138 154 481
Analysis of all the applications does not show a significant difference in the 
success or failure rates of applications submitted by trade associations vs. firms. 
Applications submitted by individual firms were more likely to be rejected at the 
initial stage than those involving associations were. This supports both the notion 
that the Committee favoured applications by representative bodies and that the 
difficulty of putting forward a satisfactory case may have handicapped individual 
firms. Firms may have been less adept at meeting the Committee’s initial 
information requirements and may have lacked experienced in arguing their case. 
However, beyond the initial stage, those applications made involving associations 
were not significantly more successful (succeeding in 33% of cases rather than 
30%).
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Did the applicants who submitted more than one application become 
more successful?
A number of applicants were involved in the submission of more than one 
application. Some submitted two applications and a few applicants submitted 
several applications. These included the Association of British Chemical 
Manufacturers [ABCM] who was involved in the submission of twenty-two 
separate applications for additional duties (many of these were submitted on 
behalf of particular sectional interests within the association). The FBI was 
involved in twelve separate applications. The Quarry Manufacturers Association 
were also involved in eleven, the Indian Rubber Manufacturers’ Association in 
nine, the NUM in thirteen, the Paper Makers’ Association in five, the Tariff 
Committee of the Carpet industry in six, the Timber Trade Federation in fourteen, 
and the United Tanners’ Federation in five. Bodies representing agricultural and 
horticultural interests were also prolific applicants: the Ulster Farmers Union 
being involved in five applications; the National Farmers Union of Scotland 
[NFUsc] in twelve; and NFU in thirty-three cases. The most prolific of the 
individual applicants was Imperial Chemical Industries [ICI] who were involved 
in eight separate applications for additional duty.
Examination of the applications submitted by these applicants does not show that 
they were especially successful, or that they learnt from their previous 
applications and dealings with IDAC.235 The case of the ABCM who submitted 
twenty-two separate applications and was successful in eight of them will be 
briefly examined here236.
235 The FBI and the NUM, being umbrella organisations, were involved in cases for heterogeneous 
products and direct comparisons cannot therefore, be drawn with the other associations detailed 
here that represented single industries. However, given that these umbrella organisations were 
hoping to act in the best interests of their members it is still disappointing that they did not seem to 
benefit from a close understanding of the Committee’s methods.
236 The Association of British Chemical Manufacturers submitted the twenty-two applications on 
behalf of particular sectional interests within the association.
96
The table below shows when the applications were submitted and details the final 
decision given in each case.
Year Initial
Rejections
No Yes Total
1932 1 2 3
1933 1 3 4
1934
1935
1
3 1 1
1
5
1936 1 3 1 5
1937 1 2 3
1938 1 1
Total 7 7 8 22
This shows that the ABCM were successful in 36% of their applications. This is 
slightly higher than the 33% success rate achieved in applications submitted by 
associations overall. This was possibly because the Association had the resources 
enabling them to present a robust case to the Committee. Five o f the eight 
successes relate to applications submitted in 1932 and 1933 where they are 
successful in five out o f eight applications made (62.5%). Between 1934 and 1938 
the remaining fifteen applications were submitted with only three being successful 
(20%). This does not suggest that their successes came because they had learnt 
what the committee wanted to see or how best to present a case.
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What reasons were given for needing the additional duty? And, did 
the reasons change over time?
Next, we move on to an analysis of the reasons why the applicants said that they 
needed the additional protection.237 Appendix 3.4 shows that there were around 
forty-one different reasons given by applicants for them needing the additional 
protection. Some of these reasons were of a very general kind, such as that 
overseas producers had lower labour costs and could therefore supply products 
more cheaply.238 Other very general reasons included the claim that imports were 
continuing to rise in spite of the tariff (database reason code 22) or that the 
devaluation of foreign currencies had affected price competitiveness (database 
reason code 5). Other reasons given were much more specific to the application 
and the applicant’s own circumstances. These include reasons such as that the 
industry was new or important (database reason code 12) and that with additional 
protection the industry could be improved and developed (database reason code 
29). The applicants would usually give several reasons why they felt the needed 
(or deserved) the extra protection. The combinations of reasons given were 
specific to each application.239
Some reasons cited by applicants had very specific time-horizons. For example, in 
1933 a number of applications were made where the applicants were applying for 
an additional duty because protection under ‘Safeguarding’ was due to come to an 
end at the end of that year [database reason code 41]. However, the database
237 As explained previously, the reasons cited by applicants fell into a number of broad categories 
and these were given reason codes as shown in the Appendix 3.4.
238 The lower labour costs could come about for a number of reasons including that wages were 
lower, that there were different working patterns including hours worked or shift working, or that 
labour regulations were less bureaucratic elsewhere.
239 This was another reason for the Committee to treat each case on its merits, as no two 
applications were alike.
Details of the reasons given for any application can be found in either the database or the report 
summarising all applications.
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shows these were the exception and generally similar reasons were given year 
after year by applicants. This suggests that the problems faced by industries 
remained more or less the same across the period. Additionally, it suggests that 
there was no process of learning by doing for the applicants, i.e., they did not 
learn what would lead to a successful outcome and present their case 
accordingly.240
Throughout the period 1932-39, the main reasons given by applicants, in rank 
order, were:
1. Dumping by overseas competitors;
2. Overseas competitors were selling at lower prices, although the applicants 
could give no reason for this occurring;
3. Overseas competitors were subject to lower labour costs and could therefore 
sell their products more cheaply;
4. The current tariff was ineffective at stemming imports as shown by rising 
import penetration;
5. A plea regarding the levels of unemployment in the industry, or a claim 
regarding employment creation.
Between them, these accounted for almost 42% of all reasons cited by applicants 
during the life of the Committee.
The next five most commonly used reasons to support an additional duty 
application were that:
6. the industry was working at low cost and/or that it was efficient and/or that it 
was modem;
7. overseas competitors had lower material (input) costs and could therefore sell 
their products more cheaply;
240 When IDAC gave their decisions to the applicants, they were quite explicit about the reasons 
why they were either approving or refusing an application. The public announcements of their 
decisions carried less information but even so, they should have given some indication to 
applicants of IDAC’s point of view.
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8. the industry was new and required infant-industry protection;
9. the industry was under-utilising its existing capacity and production could be 
expanded if additional protection were given;
10. overseas competitors were subsidised by foreign governments.
These five reasons accounted for a further 22% of all reasons given.
An examination of reasons the applicants most frequently gave in each individual 
year 1932-39 showed little variation from the overall pattern of the seven years.
Were certain reasons more likely to convince the committee to 
approve the request for additional duty?
Taking all of the reason codes together, it is possible to identify, for all cases, 
where a particular reason was given whether or not the application was ultimately 
successful. For instance, of the 106 times lower labour costs overseas is cited, the 
application was initially rejected in 36 (34%) cases. In cases that were advertised, 
they were refused on 36 occasions (34%), and were a success in the remaining 34 
(32%) of cases. A similar analysis could be performed for any of the reasons 
given by applicants.
However, for the reasons that were infrequently given by applicants there can be 
little gained from an analysis of these types of results. For example, only a single 
application was made because of the end of safeguarding (code 41): it was 
successful, with an additional duty being granted, but no wider inferences can be 
drawn from this unique event.
It is worth examining those reasons that were cited more frequently to establish if 
any patterns arose. To summarise, if we consider the reasons which were used the 
most by applicants in the years 1932 through to 1939, the following pattern 
emerges. The following table shows the ten most frequently used reasons over the
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IV2-year period and the relative success and failure rates of applications where 
those reasons were cited.
The fact that these were used most regularly does not suggest that industry had 
learnt that these were the most likely reasons to earn them their additional duty. 
Most could not be argued to be particularly successful. Exceptionally, where the 
applicants’ stated that they were already working at low cost and were efficient 
and/or modem, the success rate was high. This was also true of the cases where 
the applicants claimed that they represented a new industry.
Reasons used most frequently by applicants 1932-39, and the associated decision
Reason Reason Initial rej/ Yes %
Code No %
4 Dumping 61.10 38.69
TOP 23 Lower Prices - reason unspecified 73.50 26.50
FIVE 1 Lower labour costs overseas 67.92 32.08
22 Import penetration increasing in spite of existing tariff 71.28 28.72
15 Employment/unemployment position of the industry 66.67 33.33
top five % 67.88 32.12
27 Industry is already low cost, efficient/modem 56.45 43.55
TOP 2 Lower material (input) costs overseas 71.70 28.30
TEN 12 New' / important industry 54.72 45.28
14 Under-utilisation of existing capacity 66.67 33.33
3 Overseas companies subsidised by foreign governments 64.00 36.00
top ten % 62.45 37.55
It is necessary to broaden the analysis slightly and look at other reasons given by 
applicants. O f the reasons that were used by applicants on more than twenty-five 
(5.2%) occasions the most ‘successful’ applications appear to be those where the
applicant cited reasons relating to:
• ‘new/important industry’ (45%)
• ‘ability to improve and develop with increased protection’ (44%)
• ‘industry working at low cost and was efficient/modem’ (44%) and,
•  ‘The applicants promising not to pass on price increases’ (43%).
It seems the Committee was swayed by arguments relating to industrial efficiency. 
These could be either in terms of the existing structure and organisation, or 
through promises to make improvements under the protection of the tariff. This 
was hardly surprising given the preoccupation, in both government and business 
circles, with ideas of rationalisation and reorganisation. Equally, ‘new’ industries 
were also viewed favourably by the Committee. Protection in these circumstances 
would have fitted within the established doctrine on ‘infant-industry’ protection. 
These issues are addressed in more detail in Chapter 6.
There are other reasons which we might have expected to be more successful. 
Given the Committee’s positive view of cartels, it is surprising that, where an 
applicant stated the additional duty would assist cartel negotiations, this did not 
automatically lead to a positive outcome. Chapter 6 will also examine why these 
cases do not appear to have been particularly successful.
The Committee, given the economic and political climate, also might have been 
expected to favour claims made regarding under-utilisation of capacity and claims 
regarding employment in the industry: yet this was not the case at all. The specific 
mention of industrial location in a ‘special area’ also does not seem to have any 
positive influence over the Committee. This reason was given on six occasions: 
only once did the applicant receive the additional duty as requested.
Which reasons were less convincing?
The reasons that least likely to convince the Committee that additional 
protection was warranted include: the industry was facing lower prices (with the 
reason unspecified) - 74% of cases were refused; devaluation of foreign currencies 
affecting price competitiveness - 73% refused; lower material input costs overseas 
- 72% refused; and import penetration rising in spite of the existing tariff - 71 % 
refused. This shows that IDAC did not intend Britain to become self-sufficient
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through a virtual prohibition of imports: industry suffering from price-competition 
was not sufficient reason for the Committee to grant additional protection.
The least successful cases that were rejected at the initial stage were those giving 
the following reasons (again, where that reason was used on more than 25 
occasions):
‘Devaluation of foreign currencies ... ‘ (48%)
‘Inferior quality o f overseas product’ (47%)
‘Overseas companies subsidised ... ‘ (40%)
‘Ability to meet home demand’ (37%).
The least successful applications where a ‘N o’ decision was reached following 
advertisement (again where they are cited on more than 25 occasions) were: 
‘Lower material input costs overseas’ (40%)
‘Vital industry (national security)4 (40%)
‘Under-utilisation ... ‘ (39%)
‘Em ploym ent... position of industry’ (36%).
Looking at the reasons that were more frequently associated with the applicant not 
receiving the additional duty, it is not immediately apparent why some of them 
should not have been favoured. Detailed examination of Committee papers shows, 
in fact, that with the ‘initial rejections’, it was often simply that the Committee did 
not believe that the problem was one of significant magnitude. Alternatively, there 
was insufficient evidence to support the applicants’ case. Lack o f substantive 
evidence often affected the advertised applications also. A more detailed analysis 
of the Committee’s stated reasons for their decisions will be made however, in 
order to understand fully their motivations.
Who opposed additional duty applications?
One of the main purposes of the Committee advertising their consideration of an 
application for additional duty was to enable any person(s) opposing the request to
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make their position known. In some cases, the Committee knew even before 
advertising that some applications would prompt opposition, often from the using 
interests.241 In many other cases, however, they did not have sufficient experience 
or knowledge o f the industry to be able to judge this. It was therefore necessary to
242provide this opportunity.
The following table records the number of advertised cases where opposition was 
notified to, and registered by, the Committee.
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1932-39
Cases
Opposed 28 31 22 27 17 9 3 4 141
% of all
cases 32% 37% 31% 37% 25% 16% 18% 18% 29%
Of the 292 additional duty applications that progressed to advertisement 48.3% 
were opposed. Most opposition was received in response to applications that had 
been made in the first four years. This result was to be expected, as it was the 
period in which the majority of applications were received and advertised. A 
further reason for the high initial levels of opposition was an enthusiasm and 
impetus for taking action in the early stages of the Committee’s operations. As 
time went on and more industries were already in receipt of higher protection the 
applications became of increasingly marginal interest.
241 In some cases where the Committee decided to reject the application before advertising (i.e. 
initial rejection) they had already received notice of opposition. These were cases where opponents 
had ‘heard’ of the application being made and their details have been fully recorded in the 
database.
242 The majority of opposition came from trade associations. The Committee registered 437 
notifications of opposition, 276 (63%) of these came from representative bodies.
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How successful were opponents in persuading the Committee to
refuse applications for additional duty?
A number of additional duty applications were refused by the Committee 
members because of the strength of the opposition against them. However, the 
opposition rate of success overall was not that high. O f the 141 cases where 
opposition was received following advertisement only fifty-three (38%) o f the 
applications were refused. In the remaining eighty-eight (62%) cases the 
application for additional duty was approved despite the opposition.
Number of 
opponents
No
Number of 
cases
Yes
Number of
cases
Total
Number of
cases
No
Percentage
cases
Yes
Percentage
cases
Total
Percentage
cases
1 13 31 44 30% 70% 100%
2 17 15 32 53% 47% 100%
3 9 12 21 43% 57% 100%
4 6 11 17 35% 65% 100%
5+ 8 19 27 30% 70% 100%
53 88 141 38% 62% 100%
The volume of opposition received against an application also did not have much 
bearing on the Com mittee’s decisions. The committee refused only 30% even 
when there were five or more opponents.
Evidence from Committee papers suggests that not all opposition was treated 
equally. For instance, at one extreme, opposition received from the Parliamentary 
Committee of the Co-operative Congress [PCCC] was disregarded. This was 
because the reason for their opposition was politically motivated and not because 
of the particulars of an application. The PCCC were opposed to tariffs in principal 
and took as many opportunities as possible to object to applications for additional
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duty.243 The Committee also tended to ignore opposition when it was received 
from import agents. In other cases, whilst opposition was noted in the Committee 
papers, the Committee did not consider opposition serious where the opponents 
did not provide adequate arguments (or evidence) against the additional duty 
applications.
Some cases of opposition merited more serious consideration particularly where 
using industries were concerned or where opposition came from other members of 
the applicant industry (therefore the application was not wholly representative). In 
these cases, ID AC sometimes consulted with the opponents directly and in others, 
ID AC instructed the applicants and the opponents to negotiate amongst 
themselves before coming back to the committee to report the results of their 
discussions. Necessarily, these cases took a considerable length of time.
The strength of the opposition was specifically used by the Committee as a reason 
for rejecting an application in only twenty-five cases. As noted earlier, there were 
fifty-three applications that were refused where opposition had been registered. 
Thus, in the remaining 28 cases, the opposition was not a significant factor in the 
Committee’s decision. The opposition may however, have contributed to the 
Committee’s overall view of the application.
243 The PCCC wrote to the Committee opposing thirty-six applications for additional duty. Of 
these, twenty-five cases received additional duty and the Committee refused the other eleven 
cases.
As well as the PCCC there were a number of trade associations who opposed multiple 
applications, but no other body is so prolific in their opposition. The Allied Association of 
Bleachers, Dyers, Printers and Finishers opposed thirteen applications (8 of which were refused -  
61 %), the Chemical and Dyestuff Traders Association opposed seven (5 of which were refused -  
71%), as did the Boot and Shoe Manufacturers Federation (4 of which were refused -  57%) and 
the Wholesale Textile Association (3 of which were refused -  43%).
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Who supported the applications for additional duty?
Advertisement of additional duty applications by the Committee provided the 
opportunity for anyone to register their support of a request as well as for anyone 
to register their opposition. Examination of the Committee papers shows that 
support was much less forthcoming than opposition: hardly surprising, as those 
most affected were likely to be involved with the application if they were in 
agreement with it. Those not directly involved were unlikely to respond so long as 
they did not oppose the application.
In the years 1932-1939, the Committee only received notice of support in forty- 
nine cases (10%). Twenty-nine of the cases of support were in response to 
applications submitted in the first two years; support dwindled thereafter. Early 
support probably came because of the ‘novelty’ of the system and because of its 
attendant publicity and high profile. The fall off in support occurred as interested 
parties chose to become more directly involved in applications.
In the forty-nine cases where supporters contacted the Committee following the 
advertisement of the application, fourteen of them were turned down and thirty- 
five were approved. It would seem from this that where support was registered 
this improved chances of the application being successful, with 67% of these 
cases being given a ‘Yes’ decision. It is difficult to draw strong conclusions from 
this however, because of the small number of occurrences. Additionally, detailed 
examination of the papers shows that the Committee rarely followed up the views 
of supporters: most often, these simply registered the basic argument. It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that support influenced the Committee’s decisions.244
244 The exception to this was where the support actually came from the using interest but this was 
rare, happening in only three cases where the Committee approved an additional duty request.
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The Committees decisions
Decisions by individual Committee members
An initial approach to the analysis of decisions made by IDAC during its 
operation is to consider who was responsible for them. The Committee members 
all had different backgrounds, different training, skills and knowledge and, 
perhaps, therefore, viewpoints. While the manner in which the committee was to 
operate, and the requirements of applicants for additional duty, were jointly 
decided, this does not necessarily mean that all the Committee members practised 
in the same way. Analysis of the decisions reached by each member suggests that 
they did adopt the same procedures and approach, and that this is an indication of 
how rigorous they tried to make their decision making.
It is not obvious from the analysis o f decisions by Committee members that any 
individual had a separate agenda or different way of approaching their decision 
making. The reasons that they gave for refusing or approving applications often 
coincided. Where decisions are rarely used, it seems it was because they fitted the 
specific cases rather than because a committee member had a particular approach 
or viewpoint.
It should be remembered that the Committee had a set of requirements that were 
to be met by applicants.245 In many of the Committee’s decisions, there was an 
implicit assumption that if the case did not meet the initial criteria then it would 
fail. An examination of the Committee decisions, those where the requests for 
additional duty were refused and those where additional duty was recommended, 
will now be conducted.246
245 For full details of these see Chapter 2
246 As previously explained a series of codes were developed in order to categorise the reasons 
cited by the Committee for making its decisions. These were used to show the Committee’s 
reasoning and as an explanation of each decision, they reached. A separate series of codes were
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Why did the Committee refuse applications?
The immediate refusals (initial rejections)
Of all the 481 requests for additional duty the Committee received, 189 (39.3%) 
were rejected at the outset. The Committee used thirty-one different reasons for 
making these outright rejections. These included some where very little 
consideration or thought was needed because the applicant did not put forward 
any grounds upon which the Committee could consider the case, to more complex 
cases where an application might have jeopardised a cartel or trade agreement.
Examination of the database shows that the reason most commonly given by the 
Committee for the immediate rejection of an application was that levels of imports 
were too small. This was used on forty-six separate occasions (or in a little over 
24% of all initial rejection cases). The Committee did have discussions on the 
point of what level of imports was considered to be large enough to pose a 
sufficient threat to home industries. Committee papers suggest they considered 
that imports of up to 10% of the home market were acceptable as a rule of 
thumb.247 This was a fairly straightforward decision for the Committee to make: 
either imports were significant or they were not. There are examples of cases, 
though, where the Committee was uncertain on this point. For instance, if there 
had been a sudden surge in the level of imports but the Committee was uncertain 
that it would be sustained. Similarly, in cases where the level of imports had been 
steadily rising and/or where other factors might additionally weigh in the 
applicants’ favour. In these cases, the Committee on occasion, would notify the
established for each of the three types of decision. The codes for the Initial Rejections are shown 
in Appendix 3.5, those for ‘No’ decisions are in Appendix 3.6, and those for ‘Yes’ decisions can 
be found in Appendix 3.7.
247 Chapter 5 shows that the British Engineers Association were certainly led to believe by the 
Committee that 90% market share was a reasonable proportion of home production, and that with 
such high market share little additional protection was likely to be afforded.
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applicant that, while the case was rejected at present, should the level of imports 
continue to rise or be sustained then the application would be reconsidered. In 
certain cases, the Committee also endeavoured to monitor the growth in imports 
themselves. This was a rare occurrence however, because o f the Committee’s 
workload.
The other most commonly used reasons include: the application was from too 
small an industry (21% of cases); there was insufficient evidence of foreign 
competition (21% of cases); and the committee did not believe an increase in the 
tariff would have the desired effect (20% of cases). An industry was considered 
too small where output was limited, e.g., where a single small firm was the only 
UK producer. Part of the reason for refusing these claims was that the Committee 
did not want to encourage applications for additional duty on very specific items 
when they could be covered more generally by the tariff. The reason of 
‘insufficient evidence’ would often be used where the applicant failed to provide 
any evidence on foreign competition. The Committee gave the reason that the 
industry could not benefit from an increased tariff for a variety o f reasons. 
Commonly, this was used because the tariff increase needed to combat low priced 
imports would be extremely high. Alternatively because the British producer 
simply was not producing as high a quality product as the competition and their 
product was also more expensive.
A number of reasons are only given once or twice in the whole period of IDAC’s 
operation and obviously, therefore, relate to very specific cases. Reasons for their 
decision to immediately reject an application for additional duty which were only 
used once by the Committee include:
• That the home market was already protected (IR14) was used in 1935. This 
particular reason was used in rejecting an application for additional duty on 
Ammonium Chloride. A  cartel agreement existed between ICI, the main 
producers of Ammonium Chloride, and German manufacturers. Consequently,
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the Committee did not believe there could be any benefit from increasing the 
tariff.248
• That the competition was not on price but quality grounds (IR15) was used on 
one occasion in 1935. This related to an application for additional duty on Tin 
Hurricane Lanterns. The Committee rejected this application because the 
imported lamps were of a superior quality to those being produced by the 
applicants. As like was not being compared with like, the tariff would not, 
therefore, have had the desired effect. The Committee did not feel that they 
should support an inferior product when consumers could buy something of a 
higher quality from overseas.
•  That additional protection for the industry would have little impact on 
employment (IR23) was used once in 1935. This was the case in a bid for 
additional duty on Flat Wooden Ice Cream Spoons. The Committee was able 
to reject this with very little consideration. The output of the applicant firm 
was steadily rising (IR18) and the Committee felt there would be little impact 
on employment (IR23) as this product involved only a small part of the 
company’s output.
• The explanation that the loss of sales for the applicants was due to a fall-off in 
exports and not due to increased imports (ER25) was used in 1936 in a request 
for additional protection on Dental burs.249 The applicants claimed they were 
suffering because of German dumping that had come about because the 
German companies were being subsidised by their government. The 
Committee could find no evidence of the dumping or of increasing imports. 
Instead, they found that the company was suffering more from a loss of its 
export market. This, they felt, they could not help and so the application was 
immediately rejected.
• That the Committee did not want to encourage excess production (IR26) was 
used in 1936 in the case of vegetables. The Committee consulted with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Scottish Office and determined that the NFU 
did not have a case. The view of the other government departments (OGDs)
248 Details of other cases involving ICI and cartels are provided in Chapter 6
249 Specialist drills
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was that agriculture did deserve some protection. However, since the country 
was now virtually self-supporting, the industry did not get additional 
protection as this might have encouraged over-production.
• The reasons that the prevalent low prices the applicants complained of were as 
a result of internal competition and not due to foreign competition (IR30) was 
used only in 1937. This was used in rejecting an application for additional 
duty on Hemp Lines and Tow Yams. In investigating the industry’s case, the 
Committee found little evidence of the price competition from foreign 
competitors. The Belgian industry was the major competitor at the time and 
the Committee found that they had not increased their share of the market. 
Indeed, the UK manufacturers had increased their own share. Low prices 
prevailed because of domestic competition and not competition from imports. 
Consequently, the Committee rejected the application.
Decisions, which were given on only two occasions, include:
• The home industry was already operating at full capacity (IR10) was used in 
1933 and again in 1937. These were cases of Tinsel Mitts or Glove Scourers 
and, Transparent Cellulose Wrapping, respectively.
• Action would jeopardise a cartel/trade agreement (IR28) used in 1934 and in 
1937. These cases were for additional duty on Packeted Dates and Men ’s 
Fancy Hose. The issue of cartels will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6.
• National security would not be adversely affected without the additional 
protection (IR29) was used in 1937 and in 1938. These cases were for 
additional duty on Hemp Lines and Tow Yams (this is the same case as that 
recorded above for IR30) and for Wood Split Pulleys.
• The applicants agreed to withdraw part of the application/narrow definition 
(IR31) cropped up twice in 1932. Cases were for additional duty on 
Handkerchiefs and Made-Up Goods fo r  Household Purposes — the same 
applicants submitted these at once. Since the products were distinct, however, 
the Committee treated them as two separate applications.
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The cases refused by the Committee after advertising and in-depth 
consideration
As noted earlier, 138 (28.7%) applications resulted in the Committee refusing the 
request ( ‘No’ decisions) following in-depth consideration and after the case had 
been advertised. The Committee gave thirty-two different reasons when 
explaining why they had refused these applications for additional duty (see 
Appendix 3.6). Many of the reasons were similar to those given when the 
Committee rejected the applications at the initial stage, the main difference being 
that the initial cases were stronger and worthy of further consideration. It was only 
with this additional consideration that the Committee was able to form its view.
Examination of the database shows that the most common reason for refusal given 
by the Committee was that levels of imports were small in relation to the share of 
the home market. The Committee gave this reason on 29 separate occasions, or in 
a little over 21 % of the cases that were turned down by the Committee. Other 
frequently used reasons include: strong opposition to the application used in 25 
(18%) cases; and the tariff appeared to be working satisfactorily in 22 (16%) of 
cases. Most of the decisions given by the Committee were used continuously 
throughout the seven years from 1932-1939.
As with the initial rejection decisions, some of the reasons given ( ‘No’ codes) for 
refusing an application after it had been advertised were used infrequently by the 
Committee. Reasons given for refusing applications that were only used once 
include that:
• That the home industry was already operating at full capacity was used in 
1935 in giving the decision on application number 34/135. This was an 
application for additional duty on Felt Hats submitted by a group of five trade 
associations.250 As further grounds for refusal the applicants were advised by 
Sir Allan Powell [AP] that the level of imports were too low (code N 1).
250 The group of five included: the British Felt Hat Manufacturers’ Federation: Hat Section - 
London Chamber of Commerce; London Millinery Manufacturers’ Association; South of England 
Hat Manufacturers’ Federation; and, the Wholesale Textile Association.
M3
• Refusal to negotiate with a cartel was used by the Committee on a single 
occasion in 1937. Allen Athole G. (Stockholm) Ltd., for additional duty on 
Barium Chloride used it in turning down the application for additional duty 
(Ref. 36/118) made251. Other reasons given to this applicant for the 
committee’s refusal were codes N8 ‘Strong opposition to the application’, and 
‘Worries that the home consumer would be adversely affected by home 
monopoly/price fixing’ (N13).
• That the home industry was already protected in other senses was used by the 
Committee in refusing an application for additional duty on Electrical 
Exploders fo r  Shot-Firing in M ines’ (ref. 32/315). The committee also felt that 
the level of imports the industry faced was too small (N 1).
• The Committee, when turning down an application from the British Keg and 
Drum Manufacturers’ Association (Ref. 33/99), stated that the request might 
lead to a proliferation of demand from similar interests. They did not want to 
widen the scope of the tariff. The Association was also told that the 
application was unsuccessful because there was insufficient evidence of the 
foreign competition they claimed.
• That the applicants were unrepresentative of the industry was used as a reason 
by the Committee to the Association of Master Print Cutters Print Block and, 
the Roller and Stamp Cutters' Society (Ref. 34/313). These had jointly made 
an application requesting additional protection for Surface Relief Blocks and 
Rollers fo r  Printing Textiles etc. The Committee also felt that increasing the 
tariff would be ineffective (N5).
Reasons given by the committee that were used on only two occasions include:
• The reason that the item was covered by another Act (N7) was used in 
rejecting the applications 32/301 Pile Fabrics, 34/160b Cork slabs, and pipe 
sections.
• That additional protection would have insignificant impact on employment in 
the industry (N15) was used in the case of 32/301 Pile fabrics and 34/121 
Briar pipes and bowls. ‘Employment/Unemployment position of the industry’ 
(Reason code 15) had been advanced as justification for their additional duty
251 Further details of this case can be found in Chapter 6.
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application by the applicants in 32/301. However, the applicants in 34/121 had 
not specifically cited this reason.
• That there was insufficient evidence of dumping (N19) was used as a reason 
for rejecting the application for additional duty on Asbestos Cement Products 
(Ref.33/461) and on Opal Glass Bottles and Jars. In the latter case, the only 
reason that the applicants had given the committee in support of their request 
for additional duty was that of ‘Dumping’ (Reason code 4).
In some cases, the Committee felt that their actions were restricted because of 
existing trade treaties or agreements and gave this as their reason for refusing an 
application (N6). These treaties and agreements generally overrode any tariff 
activity by the partner countries. The Committee gave this reason on only five 
occasions during the seven years of its operation, which suggests that the 
constraint was not significant.252 In only two cases this was the sole reason given 
by the Committee for rejecting the application. These were:
• Application ref. 32/362 -  a request for additional duty on Pressed Iron and 
Steel Hinges. The committee held that these items were covered by the 
International Iron and Steel cartel;
• Application ref. 32/162b -  a request for additional duty on Wood and Timber 
-  Boxboards. In this particular case, the products were affected by the Ottawa 
agreements.
In the other three cases, there were additional reasons why the committee felt that 
the request for additional duty should be refused.253
The decision recorded in the database as ‘no decision reached’ (N30) only 
occurred in 1939 and appears for 13 cases. These 13 cases were all those where 
the Committee had not reached a final decision on the applications at the time of 
outbreak of war. The industries did not therefore gain the benefit of the additional 
protection they wanted at any stage.
252 Some applicants would not have submitted an application because their products were 
explicitly covered in agreements.
253 These were application reference numbers 32/162c. 33/333, and 36/58.
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Other reasons for refusing applications given by the Committee will be considered 
in more depth in Chapter 6 where the committee’s attitudes towards certain 
policies and intervention in the economy are examined. These include reasons 
relating to the level of efficiency of industry, the ability of industry to meet home 
demand, the impact on the consumer, and those that suggest there were issues 
associated with cartels and monopolies.
Why did some applications succeed?
The Committee granted additional duty on 154 or 32% of the applications that 
they received. In the majority of cases this decision was reached following 
advertising thorough examination of the case put forward and in certain cases 
after extensive consultation with interested parties including other government 
departments [OGDs]. In agreeing to the imposition of additional duty, the 
committee used 33 basic reasons for explaining their decision. The codes 
allocated to these reasons are recorded in Appendix 3.7.
The Committee would often grant the additional duty requested where applicants 
were able to provide evidence that they were suffering from ‘dumping’, this was 
equally true if the applicants could show that the existing duty rates had not 
stemmed imports. The committee also favoured applications where they were 
happy that the tariff would not lead to increased prices affecting consumers. These 
reasons were given in over 20% of successful cases. As with the ‘initial rejection’ 
and the ‘no’ decisions the majority of the reasons for approving applications were 
used repeatedly in almost all of the years 1932-39.
Reasons infrequently given by the Committee when granting the additional duty 
included:
• That it was because of a trade treaty revision;
• That it would assist with international cartel negotiations or it was because of 
the breakdown of an international cartel;
• That the re-organisation of the industry was to be pursued as a condition of 
getting the additional duty.
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Of those that were used infrequently, ‘Trade Treaty Revision’, was used in only 
one case in 1933. The Committee made reference to this because when they first 
were considering the application and advertising it they were concerned that it 
might conflict with the negotiation of a Trade Treaty with Canada. By the time of 
reaching their decision however, they were happy that this was not the case. This 
was an application from a group of trade associations representing farming 
interests for an additional duty on Oat Products, ref.33/150. They had requested 
the additional protection because overseas farmers were being subsidised by their 
governments and this meant that prices were generally lower.254
The reason that protection was given to assist with international cartel 
negotiations was used on only two occasions, as was that of helping following the 
breakdown of international cartel. These cases will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter 6 when the issue of the Committee’s attitude toward and promotion of 
cartels is considered. Cases where decisions relate to other aspects of the economy 
such as improving the efficiency of industry modernisation and technological 
improvements will also be examined in more depth later in Chapter 6.
The Committee used three reasons on only three times. These were where the re­
organisation of the industry was to be pursued (as a condition imposed by the 
Committee), where the application had the support of the using industry, and to 
prevent UK assembly of goods avoiding the tariff. Those cases where decision to 
grant the additional duty was subject to reorganisation of the industry will be 
covered in more detail later in Chapter 6. The cases where the applicants had the 
support of the using industry included:
• Ref. 32/162g Wood and Timber,
• Ref. 35/131 Wooden Hoops fo r  Staves',
254 This application also gave rise to one of the two uses of reason code ‘factory in special area’. 
The Committee also used this reason when they agreed to grant additional protection on Plywood 
application Ref. 39/5.
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•  Ref. 35/214 Manufactured Curled Hair.
Cases where the Committee wanted to prevent the UK assembly of goods include:
• 33/362c Typewriter Parts’,
• 33/374 Metal spools fo r  Typewriter,
•  34/80 Parts o f  Micrometers and Measuring Instruments.
Overall, the Committee clearly had strong views, and worked to strict guidelines, 
on the eligibility for higher rates of protection. If they were not convinced that a 
case met their criteria, there seems little that business could do to convince them 
otherwise. They certainly would not agree to tariff increases simply because 
foreign competitors were able to sell at lower prices. The Committee were 
concerned with the share of the home market held by domestic producers, but 
believed a certain level of competition was necessary to encourage progress. 
Wherever possible, the Committee was keen to promote efficiency of industry.
Conclusions
From the database, it is possible to address a number of basic questions on the 
nature of the additional duty applications made to IDAC. It can be shown what 
happened to each case. A picture has been drawn of when applications were made, 
who the applicants were, and why they required additional protection. It is also 
possible to tell who opposed or supported applications, and when and how the 
Committee reached their decisions.
Analysis of the database has shown that of all the additional duty applications 
made to the Committee between 1932 and 1939 only around one-third led to the 
tariffs being raised. The Committee immediately refused almost a third of the 
applications received, in many cases this was because the applicants were unable 
to present a convincing story, backed up with evidence, to the Committee.
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Since applications were made for additional duties on specific products rather 
than on output of sectors or entire industries it is not possible to draw inferences 
from the aggregate data to theories on what sectors might be expected to secure 
higher tariffs.
A significant difference in the success or failure of applications whether submitted 
by a Trade Association or submitted by firms has not been established. However, 
those submitted by firms alone were more likely to be refused immediately by the 
Committee. This suggests two possibilities. Firstly, that IDAC considered them 
less representative or too marginal to be worth addressing. Secondly, that the 
firms had been unable, for whatever reason (time or cost for example) to present 
sufficient evidence and information for IDAC’s purposes.
Submitting more than one application for additional duty did not, on the whole, 
lead to success. This suggests that the applicants did not learn by doing, that they 
were not favoured by IDAC in any way, and that each case was treated on 
individual merit.
The reasons why the applicants claimed to need the additional protection did not 
substantially change during the seven years 1932-39, suggesting that the problems 
they faced did not fundamentally change. Rising imports in spite of the existing 
tariff, the impact o f lower labour costs overseas, the employment position of the 
domestic industry and ‘dumping’ were repeatedly mentioned by applicants. This 
also suggests that applicants did not learn that certain reasons would perhaps gain 
them favour with IDAC. Nor were the reasons most commonly given the ones 
most likely to convince IDAC that a tariff was needed.
Cases that were likely to convince the committee were ones involving new 
industries, where the industry was modem and efficient or technically advance, or 
where they were willing to make improvements. On the other hand, the 
Committee would not support ‘lame ducks’: price competition alone was rarely a 
sufficient reason for the Committee to grant additional duty. It is apparent from 
the analysis of the aggregate data that no one reason would carry sufficient weight 
for the Committee to approve an additional tariff.
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IDAC received opposition to get a balanced view of applications so that they 
could address the needs of using industries. Most of the opposition received was 
made against the early applications. However, less than a third of those 
applications the committee advertised were opposed. Opposition was not always 
effective but it could be. Even in cases where the Committee decided to grant an 
additional duty, the level was often moderated to compensate for users’ needs. 
The process of advertising cases also enabled interested parties to write to the 
Committee in support of applications but this rarely occurred.
Although the process of reviewing applications for additional duty was a lengthy 
one the Committee was determined to keep it. Their approach was systematic and 
they hoped their careful deliberations would help them to achieve the goal o f a 
‘scientific’ tariff. That there were no signs of bias in the decisions taken by 
individual members also points to their approach being systematic.
Subsequent work examines selected cases in greater depth to provide deeper 
understanding and insight into the motivations of both the applicants and the 
Committee. In particular, cases where decisions relate to wider economic policy 
issues such as improving the efficiency of industry, modernisation and 
technological improvements and cartels will be examined in more depth during 
discussions of the Committee’s wider role in the economy.
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Chapter 4. IDAC and the Building industry.
As an insight into the work and motivations of IDAC the selection of the 
building industry for a case study is not an obvious choice given that the industry, 
by its very nature, could not be subject to foreign competition. Yet, there are a 
number of reasons for its selection here. The very fact that it is an oddity is itself 
relevant. It gives the opportunity to ascertain how IDAC responded to the needs of 
an industry that could not itself benefit from protection. Other industries may have 
qualified on this basis but there were additional reasons why building was 
important. As has been well document elsewhere255, it was a prominent industry 
during the 1930s important in accounting for large output and employment. It 
recovered early from the depression and may have been a vital stimulus for 
recovery in other sectors. In this respect the possible negative effects of the tariff 
on the industry have also received attention256. Further, it is of particular interest 
because o f the government’s policy on house building during the inter-war years.
It sheds light on how cognisant IDAC were of this other area of concern to 
government. IDAC were clearly aware of its importance to government both 
politically and economically. Politically because of the governments commitment 
to improve the housing conditions of the nation. Economically because of the 
wealth it created both in terms of output and employment and the growth in both 
of these.
255 Aldcroft D.H. The European Economy 1914-1990 third edition (London 1993), Bellman ‘The 
Building Trades’ p.407 in British Association for the Advancement of Science, Economic Science 
and Statistic Section Eds. Britain in Recovery (London, 1938), Benham F. Great Britain Under 
Protection (New York, 1941), Capie Depression and Protectionism, Richardson Recovery in 
Britain, et al
256 Capie for example Depression and Protectionism
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The industry was important at this time for it’s contribution to output and 
employment.257 Building and contracting accounted for around 6% of gross output 
in 1930 and 1935.258 The sector was responsible for around 6.4% of all 
employment in 1930 and 6.9% in 1935.259 Growth in the sector was also 
significant both in terms of output and employment. Figures in Appendix 4.1 
show that output grew by 11.1% and employment by 10.7% in this period. This 
compares with an average output growth across all trades of around 6% and 
average employment growth of a little over 2%.
The sector, especially house building, has been given credit for playing a 
part in the recovery from the depression.260 The degree to which it led to recovery 
may be argued, but it generally appears in the list o f contributors. As 
Eichengreen notes: ‘Given the source of stimulus, it is not surprising that interest- 
rate-sensitive categories of spending led the recovery. Prominent among these 
were residential construction and consumer durables’262. He further notes that 
‘House building stabilised in 1931-2, coincident with the initiation of recovery, 
even while other forms of fixed investment were continuing to fall. The increase 
in house building accounted for 17 per cent of the increase in GDP between 1932 
and 1934. It stimulated output and employment in other sectors through its 
backward linkages to firms producing bricks, tiles, pipes and other construction
257 Capie, Tariffs and Growth: Some illustrations from the world economy J850-1940 
(Manchester, 1994) p.81 notes that it was the biggest sector of all, almost twice the size of the next 
largest, iron and steel manufacturing.
258 In 1930 the sector accounted for 5.77% and in 1935 6.06%, see Board of Trade 5th Census of 
Production, (1935).
259 These figures are taken from the 5th Census of Production (1935) and are supported by data in 
the Ministry of Labour Gazette which suggest average employment in the 1930s was around 7% of 
all insured workers.
260 This was argued around the time by Bellman ‘The Building Trades’ and more recently by 
Richardson Economic Recovery amongst others
261 Forrest Capie Depression and Protectionism', Richardson Economic Recovery; B. Eichengreen 
‘The inter-war economy in a European mirror’ in Floud & McCloskey eds The Economic History 
o f Britain since J700: Volume 2 1860-1939 (second edition Cambridge 1994) pp.291-319; Mark 
Thomas ‘The Macroeconomics of the inter-war years’ in Floud & McCloskey eds The Economic 
History o f Britain since 1700: Volume 2 1860-1939 (second edition Cambridge 1994) pp.320-358
262 Eichengreen, ‘European mirror’ p.310
materials. House building and associated trades accounted for 30 per cent of the 
increase in employment in the first three years of recovery’.
Mark Thomas also argued that the most striking aspect of investment in 
the early thirties was the housing boom. ‘Expenditure on the construction of 
dwellings rose by almost 50 per cent between 1932 and 1934. Housing starts were 
at the very forefront of recovery -  building activity rose from November 1932, 
more or less coincident with the beginnings of the economy wide upturn. Housing 
accounted for 17 per cent of the increase in GDP in 1932-34 (it was 3 per cent of 
GDP in 1932)’.264
It was also important for recovery because of its linkages to other sectors 
which experienced significant growth on the back of the demand for housing. The 
most obvious of these being the sector providing the industry with it’s raw 
materials, i.e. ‘Clay and Building Materials Manufacturers’. This sector accounted 
for over 2% of output and 3% of employment during the period. It also achieved 
high levels of output growth (18.3% and 11.1% respectively, see Appendix 4.1).
Bellman, noting the impact of the housing boom on its materials industry, 
stated: ‘it is noteworthy that brick, tile, pipe, etc., manufacturers experienced a 
sudden increase in demand (either anticipatory or actual) in the earlier part of 
1933, for the percentage unemployed fell sharply from an average of over 22 per 
cent for 1932 (and higher figures in the early months of 1933) to 15 per cent for 
June of that year; and the figures remained around this lower level for the rest of 
the year, with a fall to still lower levels in the middle of 1934. The figures for 
sawmilling, machined woodwork, etc., show a similar, if less pronounced 
trend’.265
A further sector to benefit was the consumer durables industry, especially 
the sale o f domestic appliances and furnishings. The first ‘Building Survey ’ of 
January 1935 makes reference to the value of retail sales in Great Britain in the
263 Eichengreen ‘European mirror’ p.310
264 Mark Thomas ‘The Macroeconomics of the inter-war years’ p.350
265 Bellman ‘The Building Trades’ p.407
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previous year noting: ‘the direct influence of building development is further 
indicated by the fact that the greatest increase in any category was in the 
furnishings departments, for which an increase of 7.2 per cent over the 
corresponding period a year ago was recorded’.266
The industry is also of interest because of the government’s wish to foster 
house building during the inter-war period. The extent, to which this influenced 
IDAC’s approach, if at all, will be examined. It is not immediately apparent what 
role IDAC could play in supporting government policy by assisting the industry. 
Indeed, IDAC’s treatment of it (because of their responsibility for the tariff) has 
since been argued to have been harmful, hindering this industry’s progress and 
dampening the effects it could have on recovery from the depression. This is 
largely because while the industry itself could not have its output protected the 
materials used as inputs to the industry were protected.267
An examination of the construction industry will address wider issues 
about the motivations of IDAC. Such as, the extent to which they concerned 
themselves with the interests of using industries as well as producers. They 
needed to consider whether a duty would have a seriously adverse effect on 
employment, and growth and demand, in any other industry using the commodity 
in production. Evidence suggests that the Committee took their responsibility to 
industries and consumers of goods under the 1932 Act seriously.
While the industry did face rising material input costs I will argue that the 
tariff did not alter them significantly. The costs of materials rose more slowly than 
other inputs (both land and labour). In any case, the aggregate price rises did not
266 ‘Building Survey’ First edition, January 1935, p.10. The reference is made to statistics 
published by the Bank of England. The value of all retail sales was 4.2 per cent above the previous 
year.
267 These arguments are put forward most notably by Capie in his work Depression and 
Protectionism.
A calculation of a weighted tariff for the building industry based on the tariff in force in 1935 and 
the importance of products used by the building industry according to the Board of Trade is at 
Appendix 4.2.
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dampen activity in the industry.268 Further, I will argue that IDAC were well 
aware of the possible problems for the industry and took this into account when 
making decisions that were likely to affect it. This however, was not confined to 
the building industry but one they adopted wherever possible. In doing so, the 
Committee acted responsibly using their best judgement to assess the evidence 
available to them.
I will begin by examining a number of additional duty applications before 
the committee that were likely to impact upon the industry. In doing this, I will 
consider the committee approach to, and understanding of, the needs of this using 
industry. I will look at when and why the industry contacted IDAC and consider 
whether it was likely to be satisfied with the outcome in these instances. I will 
also provide details of the industry’s activities and performance during the 1930s 
and argue the industry was not hindered by the tariff. Indeed, the fact that the 
industry could not itself have protection, whilst the suppliers of building materials 
did, was irrelevant given the prevalent supply and demand conditions.
What was the Committee’s approach?
Under the Safeguarding of Industries Act, 1921, the Board of Trade 
considered applications for protective duty. If the Board of Trade found that a 
prima facie case had been made out they would refer the matter to a Committee of 
enquiry. ‘This committee was also charged to consider what effect imposing a 
duty might have on any other industry using the commodity as material, and 
whether the complainant industry was being carried on with reasonable efficiency
268 Government encouraged Local Authority house building and house building for private sale 
remained buoyant partly because of the wider availability of mortgages and the relatively low 
mortgage interest rates. Details of mortgage rates and monthly cost of housing can be found in 
Appendix 4.3. Bellman ‘The Building trades’ p.426 noted that considerable increases in output 
coincided with successive reductions in the building society mortgage rate. He also noted that 
increased competition amongst the building societies also led them to make advances over longer 
number of years, again making mortgages more affordable.
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and economy’.269 IDAC followed the same approach as the Board of Trade had 
done in the 1920s. Hutchinson makes reference to this: ‘To sum up, the 
experience of these enquiries was of value in providing guidance on methods of 
investigation, questions to be asked, and the reactions of human nature’.270 IDAC 
were able to take a similar approach but their remit was wider and they had 
additional ambitions.
In discussing how meetings with applicants were conducted Hutchinson 
notes: ‘the stress was on meeting those concerned and discussing difficulties with 
them in the light of a knowledge of the industry and its conditions, and in the light 
of the interests of users of its products. In these discussions the questions of 
efficiency of the industry and of its price policy were kept to the fore, the latter 
particularly where the commodity was used in further manufacture by another 
industry.’271
As noted earlier, the industry was important during the 1930s for its 
contribution to both output and employment. It recovered early from the 
depression and may have been acted as an important stimulus for recovery in 
other sectors. It was also important because of the government’s policy towards 
house building. IDAC were well aware of this and while understanding that they 
were not in a position to affect the development of the industry recognised the 
impact the tariff on the industries inputs could have.
Although the building industry could not benefit from tariff protection it 
was not the case that its interests were of little import to the Committee. Cases 
that IDAC recognised could impact upon the industry reflect their approach to 
additional duty applications more generally, where they always endeavoured to 
balance the needs of the producing interests with those of the users. An 
examination of such applications shows how they considered cases and the factors 
that they took into account when arriving at their decisions. This included the
269 Hutchinson Tariff-making pp. 14-15
270 Hutchinson Tariff-making p. 17
271 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.38
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examination of relevant statistical data and consultation with other bodies. What 
becomes clear is that, just because the industry could not itself be protected the 
Committee members did not ignore its needs.
The Committee tried to ensure that the building industry was considered 
although contact with representatives of the industry was limited. There was no 
reason for the kind of relationship that the engineering industry, discussed in 
Chapter 5, had with the Committee to develop. The Committee did not need to use 
the industry’s knowledge to assist it in its work, nor to bring about change in the 
sector272. From the industry’s point of view, the Committee had little to offer 
them. It could not approach IDAC to ask for additional protection. In any case, the 
industry did not have a strong, single, representative body co-ordinating its 
activities. This is confirmed by a comment made in the first edition of The Survey, 
published, for and by the industry, in January 1935: ‘The Survey may be regarded 
as a milestone on the road to comprehensive organisation of perhaps the most 
diverse and in some ways the most complex industry in the country. Its very
complexity is its greatest handicap in its efforts to reach the full benefits of
11%organised co-ordination’.
This did not mean however, that there was no contact between IDAC and 
the construction industry. Individual sectors of the trade particularly adversely 
affected by certain additional duty applications did voice their dissatisfaction to 
the Committee. This occurred rarely though, so it would appear that the 
construction industry were not on the whole unhappy with the position they were 
in. Nor did it mean that the interests of the sector failed to be represented. IDAC 
were at great pains to ascertain how applications might affect the trade. Where the 
trade itself did not approach them, IDAC saw fit to consult the Ministry of Health 
who acted as the ‘guardians of the industry’s interests.
272 This was unnecessary in the case of the Building industry as it was not subject to external 
competition and the Ministry of Health was, in any case, already closely involved with the 
industry and monitoring its progress. The Ministry of Health had responsibility for the 
governments house building policy and programme throughout the inter-war years.
273 The Building Industries Survey. Vol. 1. No. I.. Special Quarterly Issue, January 1935, p.3
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The Committee view
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Committee were held responsible for the 
introduction of a ‘scientific ta riff . To them, this meant, amongst other things, 
considering the needs of all sectors of the economy, both producers and users. 
They needed to weigh-up what was in the ‘best interests’ of any particular group 
and assess the extent to which this affected others. Ultimately they sought to 
achieve a ‘balance’ of interests. The Committee not only considered the price 
effect on users but also the quality and quantity of home supplies available. IDAC 
were especially thorough when considering any applications that might affect the 
building industry because of its importance to the government. They endeavoured 
to establish what was in the best interests of the consumer even where the 
consumers had raised no objections to tariff proposals.
Over the seven years, 1932-39, a number of additional duty applications 
was submitted to IDAC where their decision could have affected the construction 
industry. These included applications for additional duty on: sheet and plate glass, 
bricks, builder’s woodwork, roofing tiles, electrical accessories, wall and hearth 
tiles.274 In a number of these cases the Committee, in reaching their decision, 
explicitly examined the cost of material inputs for house building. In many of 
these, IDAC sought the advice of the Ministry of Health and its Building Prices 
Committee. In most cases the increased cost of materials likely to arise as a result 
o f raising the tariff was considered to be insignificant both by the Ministry and 
IDAC. In other cases IDAC considered whether home produced items were of a 
satisfactory nature, quality and quantity, to meet the needs of the house builders.
274 The database references for all of these cases are: 32/59 doors and other builders woodwork, 
90/32b Bricks, 32/162a wood and timber softwoods, 32/130b nails and staples, 32/162d wooden 
blocks for electrical fittings, 32/162g hardwood flooring strips and blocks, 32/162h wooden 
sanitary seats, 33/121 cast iron baths, 33/135 paper and board, 33/289 hardwood flooring and 
blocks, 34/138 wooden doors, 34/384 slates for roofing, 34/448 brass and copper tubes, 35/287 
electrical accessories, 35/318 glazed hearth and wall tiles, 36/3 bricks, 36/60a wooden blocks for 
electrical fittings, 36/84a and pottery and clay products, 36/217 planed or dressed softwoods, 
39/41 wooden blocks for electrical fittings, 39/78 sheet glass.
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In making their initial recommendations, when the tariff was introduced in 
March 1932, the Committee at once showed their awareness of and interest in the 
building industry.275 In arriving at the 10% additional duty on bricks and 
refractory goods the Committee noted:
‘As regards bricks, the importation (202.8 million in 1930) is very small in relation 
to production (4,066 millions in 1924) and is mostly to districts where freight by sea 
from continental ports is very much cheaper than freight from manufacturing centres 
in England; on the other hand, bricks are of course very important material for 
house-building’ . 276
This shows the Committee were not overly concerned about the impact of the 
tariff on bricks despite this being a major input to the industry. They were 
unconcerned because imported bricks were insignificant in relation to home 
produced bricks; they were only imported to regions where home delivery costs 
would be substantial and c.i.f. imports were therefore cheaper.
The announcement of this 10 per cent., ad valorem duty did not satisfy the 
brick manufacturers however, and was quickly followed in June 1932 by an 
application, from the National Federation of Clay Industries, for an additional 
duty of 2 3 V3 per cent.277 The Committee would not entertain this application 
because they believed that a certain levels of imports were healthy for an industry. 
As they record: ‘It is evident from the trade returns that, since the general ad 
valorem duty was imposed, importations of bricks have dropped considerably and 
forms now a very small proportion of the trade. Although the standard of 
efficiency prevailing in the home industry may be quite satisfactory and prices of 
British bricks are, on the whole, not unreasonable, there is always the risk that, 
under cover of a high protective tariff, the consumer may be exploited under a 
price fixing scheme. In this connection I am given to understand that the 
maintenance of a certain volume of importation is regarded as essential in the 
interests of housing. An increase of duty which would probably be prohibitive and 
might prevent the necessary internal competition is not recommended’.278
275 PRO BT/10/1 Committee Paper 18/1932
276 Imported bricks in 1930 represent less than 5% of British production of bricks in 1924
277 PRO BT/10/2 Committee Paper 90/1932, this would take the total duty up to 33 V3 per cent ad 
valorem.
278 PRO BT/10/2 Committee Paper 90/1932
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Importantly, this shows that IDAC would not impose a prohibitive tariff because: 
(a) they had a strong belief in the importance of competition (both internal279 and 
external) to foster developments and growth in industry, (b) they would not risk 
the possible damaging effects on the house building industry.
The Committee showed similar awareness of the building industries needs 
when in March 1932 they set the initial rate o f duty for glass:
‘The [Manufacturers’] Association have asked for a duty of Vgd. per square foot on 
plate and sheet glass (which would be something over 2 0 % ad valorem) and higher 
duties on plate glass, polished and silvered.... In view of the importance of plate 
and sheet glass as a building material... there seems no reason for a duty higher 
than 15%’.280
In this case, the Committee tried to take a balanced approach, weighing up the 
demands of the producers against the needs of the building industry and coming- 
up with a compromise tariff rate. Both sides must have been content with this 
outcome as neither side approached IDAC for an alteration in the rate of duty.281 
The Committee continued taking this type of approach, trying to balance the 
needs of the home manufacturer with those of the users, during the course of the 
next seven years.
Where IDAC believed any price rises resulting from changing the tariff 
would be insignificant they were willing to raise duty rates. This was so in the 
case of an application for additional duty on wire nails made in 1932.282 The 
building trade283 wrote to IDAC opposing this application when they saw it 
advertised. However, it was estimated by the Committee that the use of ‘tariff 
free’ imported nails would only have saved the builder 10s 6d on a £500 house 
(around 0.1%). This sum was viewed by IDAC as insignificant and an additional
279 They were concerned to avoid the manufacturers having a home monopoly and using this 
position simply to raise their prices with price fixing agreements.
280 PRO BT/10/1 Committee Paper 18/1932
281 The glass industry did eventually make an application for an additional duty but not until 1939 
(Committee Paper 78/1939).
282 PRO BT/10/3 Committee Paper 120/1932
283 The wire nails application was opposed by the National Federation of Building Trades 
Employees and by a number of individual building firms.
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duty on nails was introduced.284 Similarly, an additional duty was granted in the 
case of an application for increased duty on brass and copper tubes285. This time, 
the application was not opposed by any representatives o f the building industry 
and information IDAC received from the Ministry of Health Building Prices 
Committee confirmed: ‘the contention of the applicants that the present 10 per 
cent, duty is ineffective in protecting the home industry, and that the use of British 
tubes for housing purposes will involve a negligible increase in the cost of 
building’.286
Aware that the general tariff had been imposed on the bulk of building 
materials it was not just the price of individual items that exercised the 
Committee’s mind. In later years, they became concerned with the cumulative 
price effect of tariffs on the cost of house building. This is reflected in their 
decision not to increase duty on planed softwoods. The granting o f additional duty 
in this case would have had the greatest impact on the house building industry. 
Whilst for most of its raw materials the industry used home supplies this was not 
the case with timber. Timber was the industry’s main import with very little being 
supplied domestically. While the duty rate was set at the relatively low rate of 
10% ad valorem this did not unduly affect the builders had it been increased 
however the impact would have been more significant. The Timber Trade 
Federation [TTF] in 1936 submitted the case requesting that the rate of duty be 
raised to 22.5% ad valorem287. The application was submitted at this time because 
a Trade Treaty with Sweden, which had conventionalised the duty on these 
products, was to be reviewed. The TTF advised IDAC that ‘if the whole of the 
additional duty were passed on to the consumer, the extra cost of the floorings
284 A specific duty was imposed on the wire nails in February 1933. The Committee having made 
their decision in the January of that year, but this was met by drop in Continental prices by the 
amount of the duty and so did nothing to stem the imports. IDAC would not impose a further duty 
and this led to the industry negotiating a price and quota agreement with the continental producers. 
IDAC would have had no further involvement in this issue. They saw cartels as a ‘second best’ to 
free trade, rather than a tariff which was at most a ‘third best’ solution. Additionally, the ultimate 
responsibility for monitoring building prices lay with the Ministry of Health and not IDAC.
285 PRO BT/10/12 Committee Paper 448/1934
286 PRO BT/10/13, Committee Paper 67/1935
287 The range of 22.5 to 30 per cent was set to cover different products.
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required for a Council House, say, would be less than £1’. 288 The Committee did 
not simply accept the applicant’s assurances on this and consulted the Ministry of 
Health as to their view. The amounts were disputed by the Ministry of Health who 
calculated that if all of the proposed duty were borne by the consumer this would 
lead to an increase of £1.7s.6d. per house.289
IDAC noted: ‘the Ministry of Health (Building Prices Committee) view 
the application with concern, starting from the general basis that any proposal 
which might have the effect of increasing the cost of housing at a time when the 
Government’s slum and overcrowding campaign is in full swing’.290 They further 
stated that they would only recommend the increase in the tariff if the home 
producers were willing to guarantee prices for the home users, and stressed the 
cumulative effects of the various duties upon the cost of house building. Other 
government departments also did not view the application favourably. The DSIR 
thought the industry was inefficient. The Forestry Commission doubted that there 
were sufficient home supplies to meet demand and the Foreign Office hoped that 
no increase would be made because they felt it would be harmful to relations with 
Sweden. The advice the committee received suggested on the one hand that a 
tariff would lead to an excessive price increase for the users. On the other, that the 
home industry could not in any case make adequate supplies (either quality or 
quantity). IDAC decided therefore that they would not agree to the requested 
increase in the duty.291
288 PRO BT/10/22, Committee Paper 101/1937
289 Bellman, ‘The Building Trades’, found that on a house selling for £600 to build, the total cost 
of all materials was £279 or around 62% of total costs (excluding profit). In relation to this an 
increase of around £1 per house seems relatively small. Ministry of Health figures show that in 
1936 the cost of building the more basic 3 bedroom non-parlour house was around £311, if 
material costs were approximately £62% this would be around £193. In this case, the possible cost 
increase is still less than 1 %.
290 PRO BT/10/22, Committee Paper 101/1937
291 Although, the case was weak and they were unwilling to increase the duty rate to 22.5% they 
decided that they would recommend an increase from the current 10% to 15% duty. Any such 
change though was subject to the Trade Treaty negotiations being conducted by the Board of 
Trade. They advised the Board of Trade that if the relevant part of the existing trade treaty were to
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The final case that exercised the Committee members’ minds regarding the 
price impact on the house builders was that of glass when in 1939 the 
manufacturers made a request for an additional duty.292 The request was made 
for an increase in the rate of duty on sheet glass. The applicants wanted the 
existing 15% ad valorem duty to be replaced with a specific duty of Vfcd. p e rlb' or 
15% whichever was higher. They argued that they needed the duty to be raised 
because of the breakdown of an international cartel and because the devaluation of 
the Belgian currency nullified the 15% duty. They also made the case that they 
were a modem and efficient industry operating at low cost and additionally they 
were located in a Special Area (further details on these aspects of the case are 
discussed in Chapter 6).
The Committee were particularly worried, by the possibility that an 
increased tariff might lead to price rises, because glass was an expensive element 
in house building. The total cost of glazing for an ordinary three-bedroom non­
parlour type house was then estimated at between 50s and 60s.293 This application 
was however less straightforward than were some, the Committee could not reject 
it out of hand. The applicants had a strong case as they were considered to be 
highly efficient. Consequently the Committee advertised the application and 
continued their examination of the applicants’ case. IDAC found that although 
there had been some recent price rises these were limited to certain regions only 
and that overall price remained lower than in 1930. The Committee viewed this 
application favourably and it seems likely that an additional duty would have been 
granted but a decision had not been made at the cessation of their activities in 
summer 1939.
Not only did IDAC consider the possible price effects on the building 
trade they also concerned themselves with the efficiency of home producers and
be modified than this new rate should be introduced, this did not happen however and the tariff 
remained conventionalised at 1 0 %.
292 PRO BT/10/29 Committee Paper 78/1939
293 In 1937 the average building cost of this type of house, according to the Ministry of Health, 
was £338 of which an estimated £210 would have been the cost of materials.
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the quantity and quality of home supplies. As far as the Committee were 
concerned if home supplies were not of a sufficient standard vis-a-vis imports, an 
application for additional duty could be refused on those grounds. One such case 
was that of glazed wall and hearth tiles. In 1935, the British Pottery 
Manufacturers Federation made an application for an additional duty on tiles.294 
Production of the industry had doubled since 1931 but market share had fallen, the 
applicants said that wherever possible they had lowered their prices. The tiles 
were already protected by a 30% duty but the industry argued that they needed 
specific duties equivalent to between 56 and 75% ad valorem (dependent on the 
exact product).
IDAC consulted both the Ministry of Health and the DSIR to enable their 
decision-making. They found that the demand for glazed tiles had increased 
considerably. This was in part because of rising volume of houses and also 
because of changes in fashion.295 At the same time though: ‘the character of the 
demand has to some extent changed, owing to the use of tiles in cheaper houses 
than formerly’.296 The building industry, despite its increased use of the tiles, did 
not oppose the application. Evidence obtained by IDAC suggested that the 
industry had become more efficient during the 1930s and this was supported by 
the DSIR.297 The Committee then looked for evidence that the industry had 
reduced its prices and were disappointed to find that despite the improved 
efficiency these, they felt, had not fallen significantly. Prices had indeed fallen 
over the previous four years but IDAC felt that these could have fallen further.298 
However, the Committee believed that prices would fall further because the trade 
had agreed to conduct further research and was committed to greater
294 The application number 318/1935 was made on behalf of the Federation’s Tile Section.
295 It was noted that between 1931 and 1935 the number of houses built had increase by 122%. The 
number of houses built in England and Wales by private enterprise without State assistance was 
said to have expanded from 128,728 in the year ending March 1931 to 286,050 in the year ending 
March 31, 1935.
296 PRO BT/10/16 Committee Paper 318/1935
297 Whilst the DSIR were highly critical of the pottery industry as a whole they viewed the tile 
section as one of the most efficient.
298 They found some evidence of price-fixing in the industry and thought this was the likely cause.
134
modernisation if they received additional protection.299 Consequently, the 
application was successful with the Committee raising the level o f specific duties 
on the tiles. In this case, the prospect of an increasingly competitive tile 
manufacturing industry for Britain was enough to outweigh any considerations of 
the impact on the house-building industry. This was particularly true as that 
industry had not taken the opportunity to air its views on the matter when the case 
had been advertised.
A similar justification had been given by IDAC when they decided, in 
1932, to raise the duty on wooden doors. During IDAC’s operation, two 
applications were submitted requesting additional duty on wooden doors. In 
considering these applications the Committee not only examined the question of 
prices for the building industry but also the type of product and the reliability of 
supply. The first was submitted in March 1932, and after investigation the 
Committee, in 1933, agreed to raise the duty on the wooden doors despite these 
being important to the building trade. In making their recommendation to the 
Treasury the Committee noted that: T rior to the War most doors used in this 
country were of home manufacture, but the greatly increased building activity of 
post-war years and the standardisation of door sizes resulted in considerable 
imports of mass-produced goods. Mass production plants are now in operation in 
this country and a considerable productive capacity, which can be readily 
extended is available. ... We are satisfied that an increase of duty such as we have 
suggested will not have an appreciable impact upon the cost of house building’.300 
The Committee accepted that the British industry could not compete on price, as 
they faced higher costs both for raw materials and for labour, with their main US 
competitors where mass production methods were already well established. A
299 After the application was advertised, the Committee did not receive any significant opposition 
to it. Their only concern remained that of whether the industry could raise efficiency still further. 
As a result of discussions the industry agreed to establish a research association and arranged for 
the manufactures to provide finance of £10,000 per year for it. The DSIR, when notified by IDAC, 
were happy with this arrangement and were grateful for IDAC’s intervention without which they 
believed nothing would have been done.
3°° p r o  BT/10/6 Committee Paper 202/1933, 12.5.33. The majority of the imported doors came in 
from the United States.
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‘Buy British’ campaign had enabled the home industry to begin to modernise and 
mass production plants had been set-up. The Committee were keen to support 
these developments and stated that they were satisfied that the mass-production 
plants could, behind the protective tariff, increase production and derive 
economies of scale. They also felt that the developments would bring the cost of 
doors down in the medium-term and were unconcerned about the short-term 
impact upon the building industry.301
In the next application for increased duty on wooden doors, made in 1934, 
rising costs for the building trade were again not an issue for the Committee they 
were more concerned with the development of the home door manufacturing 
industry. They felt that the low prices of American doors were hampering the 
development of the home industry. Hutchinson notes: ‘In the case of doors the 
protection proved ineffective, imports from America continued to rise while little 
progress was made with mass production at home’.302 In arriving at their decision 
to grant the tariff IDAC noted:
‘On a review of the whole case as placed before us, 1 propose that the minimum 
specific duty of 2s. per door be increased to 2s.6d. The ad valorem incidence of 
such a duty would be 40 - 50 per cent. On American doors and about 30 per cent. On 
Swedish doors (taking as the base the average declared Customs values). This 
would be abnormally high in relation to the general level of protection afforded to 
most manufactured goods and to builders’ woodwork in particular where the rate is 
15 per cent. But the great bulk of the imports are from the U.S.A. and we are a good 
market to that country for a great deal of our raw material which our duties cannot 
therefore affect, and, indeed, the American trade with this country during the first 
nine months of 1934 has shown a remarkable steadiness. But it is not so much a 
question of cutting down imports as of getting a larger share of an increased demand 
for producers in this country. Relatively, of course, doors are a small matter. We 
can make them quite economically ourselves and production can be readily 
expanded.
We have been informed that the Minister of Health is very much concerned in the 
matter of supplies and prices of building materials because of Government policy in 
relation to housing and slum clearance, but we gather that the question of supplies 
rather than prices is more particularly engaging his attention. In any event the effect
301 PRO BT/10/6 Committee Paper 188/1933
302 Hutchinson Tariff Making p. 100
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on building costs of such an increase as is here proposed would be negligible - 
perhaps 5s. per house’ .303
In a further case, concerning an application for additional duty on 
electrical accessories,304 the Committee members sought information from Local 
Housing Authorities not just on the comparative price of British and Foreign 
products but also on their quality. IDAC were provided with copies of reports 
from a number of housing authorities to inform their decision-making. These 
reports provided a very mixed picture: ‘Some of these reports, e.g., from 
Manchester and Newcastle-on-Tyne, were to the effect that foreign accessories 
were not being used for the reason that British-made goods can successfully 
compete as regards price. In the report from Birmingham, prices were quoted 
which were stated to apply equally to British and foreign articles, and the quality 
of the latter was said to compare favourably with that of the British articles. From 
Leicester, on the other hand, it was reported that in regard to a number of articles 
covered by the application, e.g., adaptors, bells and buzzers, ceiling roses and 
connectors, the foreign prices were from 15 to 3 3 V3 per cent, lower than the 
British, while in regard to other areas there was either no foreign competition 
(e.g., connecting boxes and bases and fuse distribution boards) or the foreign 
articles (e.g., time switches) were equal in price to the British.’305
The shortage of home supplies rather than price issues were more of a 
concern for some products. This is true of brick supplies by 1936.306 The National 
Federation of Clay Industries submitted their second application for an additional 
duty on bricks arguing that because of lower labour costs overseas and the recent 
Belgian devaluation the industry had faced rising imports. This had been 
particularly noticeable in 1934 and 1935. However, IDAC recorded: ‘We have 
been informed by the Ministry of Health, who have been consulted in the matter,
303 PRO BT/10/12, Committee Paper 432/1934
304 PRO BT/10/16 Committee Paper 287/1935 Electrical Accessories
305 PRO BT/10/16 Committee Paper 287/1935
306 An application for the free listing of roofing tiles made in December 1934 used the argument 
that there were inadequate supplies of British tiles for house building. The Ministry of Health 
refuted this however, advising IDAC that the British industry was able to supply the home market. 
The Committee consequently, turned down the application.
that the increased imports of these years may be largely explained by a shortage of 
home-made bricks, owing to a private enterprise building boom which caught the 
home brick manufacturers unawares’.307 Imports for 1935 were estimated at 250 
million bricks compared to a home production estimated at 6,088 millions (4%). 
Most of this competition was felt by the brick makers in the South East. The 
Committee considered that the imports were negligible in relation to home 
supplies and were not therefore prepared to alter the tariff just to benefit the 
manufacturers in one particular region.
When did the building industry contact IDAC?
‘It is the effective protection rate that shows by how much the value-added in an 
industry can exceed the value-added in the absence of protection. Since there was an 
awareness of this concept in the business world at the time, an examination of the 
effective tariff structure aids an understanding of the working of business groups in 
their pursuit of tariff legislation. ’308
There is clear evidence amongst applications to IDAC that supports this 
view that businessmen were aware of effective protection.309 This being so, it is 
logical that the building trade would have protested vociferously at the tariff, and
310changes in it, that would significantly affect the price of their material inputs.
Yet, there are few cases of opposition from the building trade. This is possibly 
because they had nothing to complain about overall as prices o f their raw 
materials fell in spite of the tariff.
307 PRO BT/10/17 Committee Paper 3/1936
308 Capie Depression and Protectionism p. 139
309 From examination of Committee papers it can be seen that applicants discuss rising input costs 
generally and in a few cases, specifically mention the impact of the tariff on their inputs
310 Of course, it could have been that they thought it would not make any difference.
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The building trade rarely objected to additional duty applications affecting their 
trade.311 Where they did, this was not in those cases in which they would most 
obviously have had an interest, nor in the cases in which they were likely to have 
the most impact. They objected to applications for additional duty on:
• Wire nails (130/32b),
• Cast iron baths (33/121), and
• Paper and Board (33/135).
In the first case objections were raised because of the volume of wire nails 
used in building a house and over concerns about rising costs as British nails were 
in any case more expensive than imported nails. However, as noted earlier, IDAC 
did not consider these sufficient grounds for refusing the application. In the case 
of the cast iron baths opposition was received from the National Federation of 
Building Trade Employers, the London Housebuilders’ Association, and four 
importers. The building trades feared that an increased duty would result in a 
scarcity of supplies and in price exploitation by the home producer. The importers 
argued that the present duty had already substantially reduced imports. 
Subsequently, a cartel agreement was reached and the application was 
withdrawn.312 IDAC therefore had no further involvement and did nothing to 
confirm the prices the building industry was to face. Supplies were guaranteed for 
the building industry even if prices were not. In the final case, the application was 
successful despite considerable opposition. In the main, IDAC agreed to raise the 
tariff to bring the product in-line with similar items. Additionally, the Committee 
felt there was some justification for a higher tariff because they believed the 
applicants would be able to improve performance with the benefit of additional 
tariff protection. Opponents had suggested that the home industry was inefficient 
but IDAC believed that it had shown progress since tariffs were first introduced 
and so agreed to an increase from 10% ad valorem to 20%.
311 Apart from the complaint regarding cement, they do not make any formal requests for the rates 
of duty on their inputs to be reduced.
312 Further details of the cartel negotiations are covered in Chapter 6 .
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In most cases where an increase in the tariff could affect the building trade the 
Committee were never approached by the industry and it could, therefore, be 
assumed that they had little complaint with IDAC. The only occasion where the 
building industry might have felt aggrieved at IDAC, for their inaction, was in 
relation to cement.313 This did not relate to an additional duty application 
however. In later years, the cost of cement was something that concerned the 
building trade sufficiently for them to approach IDAC for assistance. In 1938 
IDAC received a letter of complaint from the National Federation of Building 
Trades Employers regarding recent cement price increases they were experiencing 
and contract terms enforced by the Cement Makers’ Federation.314 The letter 
asked for an investigation into the industry and for the removal of both the import 
duty on cement and the specification of British produced cement in governmental 
building contracts. IDAC consulted the Ministry of Health and found they had 
experienced problems getting information from the Cement Makers’ Federation. 
IDAC noted: ‘the industry is a close monopoly and there seem to be prima facie 
grounds for an enquiry by someone into the relation between its cost and price.’ 
IDAC did not feel however, that it was necessarily there responsibility to do this, 
instead they turned their attention to what most certainly did concern them and 
that was the tariff. IDAC decided to investigate the industry further and found that 
a cartel agreement had been reached in March 1937 between the British cement 
makers and the principal European suppliers. The cartel established price and
OjC
quota restrictions in all of the principal European markets. The Committee 
believed that consumers might be being charged excessively. However, they 
noted: ‘A detailed investigation might or might not prove the increases to be 
warranted, but in view of the international agreement the removal of the duty 
would not be of any help to the consumers’.316 The cement manufacturers 
supported the Committee’s belief that the reduction or the removal of the duty on
313 No complaint about IDAC over this issue appears in the trades’ own journal, The Survey. It 
seems likely that the industry would have been more disappointed in the Ministry of Health for not 
exercising any control of the cement makers’ prices.
314 PRO BT/10/25 Committee Paper 37/1938 the letter was also sent to the Building Prices 
Committee at the Ministry of Health
315 The International Cement Export Conference was set to run for a period of 5 years from 1/3/37.
316 PRO BT/10/25 Committee Paper 47/1938
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cement would have no effect on reducing prices for the domestic users. When the 
Committee approached them, they said that they had no objections to possible 
free-listing.317 Because the Committee therefore, felt that any change to the tariff 
would be ineffective they did not take any further action. The Committee did 
write back to the National Federation, sending a copy to the Secretary of the Inter 
Departmental Committee on Building Material Prices, notifying them that they 
were unable to Act in this case.318
Overall then, we see the Committee behaving responsibly and acting as far as 
possible to ensure a fair outcome that would not have a detrimental effect upon 
the building industry. They were rarely contacted by the building industry but 
attempts were made to take account of its interests.319 The Committee did not only
317 The Committee paper also notes that the Committee had only previously recommended free- 
listing if the products were essential materials of industry. They felt that this would not be a 
genuine case for free listing. There is also a note to the effect that the loss to the Exchequer of free 
listing would be about £23,000 a year for the next four years. This highlights the diversity of the 
necessary considerations.
318 In 1930 250,000 tonnes of cement were imported, this was on a small scale in relation to home 
consumption of around 6  million tonnes - figures taken from the Board of Trade Survey o f 
International Cartels and Internal Cartels 1944-1946.
The Board of Trade Survey o f cartels also records that in early 1939 several questions were put in 
the House of Commons regarding the price of cement. The concern was raised that through the 
monopoly powers the industry was charging excessive price. The President of the Board of Trade 
answered these questions replying that there had been a rise in prices, but not an abnormal one. 
The Cement Maker’s Federation had explained that one of the chief factors in the rise was the 
increased cost of coal. Following IDAC’s decision not to act, the Inter-departmental Committee 
took the matter up with the Cement Makers Federation. They produced figures to show that the 
increase in their costs ranged from 3/3 to 4/4.5 per ton, or even more in some cases -  against price 
rises of only 3/- in 1938, pi 63. The Committee accepted the figures as genuine but recommended 
that the Federation make some reduction in price in view of the economies being realised through 
the increased utilisation of cement-making capacity. The final outcome was that in June 1939 the 
Federation agreed to reduce the price of cement by 1/- per ton.
319 Although, tariff changes are bought to the attention of the sector through it’s journal, The 
Survey, there are never any complaints made about them or their effects. This is contrary to the 
journals attitude to the Ministry of Health, and the government writ large, who it criticises for 
placing upward pressure on prices through their insistence on buying particular materials and 
particular contract requirements.
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focus on price considerations. Where they could they also tried to aid the industry 
by trying to ensure that the quality and reliability o f British supplies were o f a 
high standard. Some additional duty applications were approved because any 
price increases were considered negligible; others were refused in part because of 
the likely cost implications. Where the tariff was not considered the underlying 
cause of price rises no action was taken.
Whenever possible the Committee endeavoured not to harm the building 
industry. However, it was not treated any more favourably than other using 
industries were because of its political importance. Where applicants for 
additional duty presented strong and convincing cases they were still awarded the 
higher tariff protection they needed. The domestic glass manufacturing industry 
would have been one such case. Despite sheet glass being a large input to house 
building the additional duty would have been granted because IDAC believed that 
they could have a materially positive impact on the development and progress of 
glass manufacturing.
The Committee did not face external pressures regarding the effect of the tariff 
on the building industry. Not only did the industry, on the whole, not oppose 
applications nor did the industry’s press criticise IDAC’s activities. The ‘Building 
Survey’ reported all tariff changes that were relevant to the sector yet it never 
criticised any tariff increases. This lack of concern reinforces the notion that the 
industry did not feel unduly affected by the tariff. The Committee did not attempt 
to calculate the elasticity of demand for housing. Nor was this was specifically 
discussed, but they clearly believed that the small rise in prices resulting from the 
tariff would not slow or halt the boom in house building.
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Building industry performance
We may use the analysis of the building industry in the Economist to 
examine data available to the IDAC. This tells us the nature of the information 
available to IDAC as well as to the wider business community.320 The Economist 
was, at that time, very pro free trade. Therefore, we would expect that any view 
that the building industry was suffering because o f the General Tariff would be 
reported in its pages.
In 1935, the Economist ran a number of articles on the housing boom. In its first 
article, October 26, 1935, it was noted: ‘There is an increasing consensus of 
opinion that the remarkable expansion of building activity during the past three 
years has been a major factor -  indeed, the major factor in British economic 
recovery’.321 There was no clear perception that the General tariff, which had been 
in operation for three and a half years, had started to squeeze this important sector 
of the economy. The Economist, being the arm of the press where free traders had 
their most effective outlet, it seems unlikely that they would have fought shy of 
damning the tariffs  effects. The journal usually criticised the tariff and IDAC at 
every possible opportunity. In the case of building material tariffs although they 
remained critical because of free-trade principles, they did not criticise these 
particularly, because they were not in a position to show that they had had a 
negative effect on the industry.
In the article, an attempt was made to analyse the cause of the house 
building boom. It was argued that it came about largely as a result of an 
unfulfilled demand. ‘Cheap’ money had some impact on the ability to buy new 
housing, as did falling food and clothing prices with improvements in the standard 
of living, but primarily it was because there had been an insufficient supply of 
housing. The Economist, therefore, predicted that activity in house building would 
diminish as excess demand became satiated. Until that time, the rate of building
320 It is important to use data that was produced at the time to understand the basis upon which 
IDAC formed their judgements and made their decisions.
321 The Economist, October 26, 1935. ‘The Housing B oom -1’ p.795
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activity was unlikely to fade for any reason. Just as the Economist was in a 
position to make these observations so were the members o f IDAC.
The Building activity index constructed by the Economist shows 
performance o f the sector in the early part of the decade. This shows that activity 
in the industry began to rise from January 1933 and continued to grow thereafter.
Econom ist Building Activity Index (July 1930 =100)
165
155
145
125
105
In a further article, the next month, The Economist noted that between 
1929 and 1933 falling costs (despite the introduction o f the tariff) had helped to 
stimulate the trade. An index was constructed of the building costs for the industry 
to enable an analysis o f price changes. Wage rates were considered as were a 
sample of building materials. Finally, wages and materials were given a 50:50 
weighting based on observations made of the industry in both 1924 and 1930 (see 
table below).322 It was reported: ‘Though building costs already show a slight
322 Bellman suggested that based on a selling price of £600 that land and gross profit amounted to 
around 25% of the total (£150) and the rest being spent on materials and labour. Of this around 
62% was for materials (£279) and 38 per cent on labour (£171). ‘The Building Trades’ p.407 
If these proportions are applied to the cost indices then the combined cost index does not differ 
significantly from the figures calculated by the Economist using the 50:50 split.
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upward tendency, following recent increases in wages, it is unlikely that changing
costs will perceptibly influence the volume of building in the immediate
_
future’. The inference being that increased wages were more significant than 
raw material costs.
Index o f  Building Costs (1935 = 100)
Wages M aterials Combined
Dec-29 109.6 115.3 112.4
Dec-32 101.8 102.8 102.3
Dec-33 99.6 100 99.8
Dec-34 99.6 99.2 99.4
Dec-35 102.2 101 101.6
Aug-35 102.2 99.7 100.9
Dec-35 102.2 101 101.6
Aug-36 104.2 100.3 103.7
Index of Building costs (1935=100)
- a —  Wages 
«  - - Materials 
- • —  Combined
108
106
104
102
100
Dec-29 Dec-32 Dec-33 Dec-34 Aug-35 Dec-35 Aug-36
324
323 The Economist, November 2, 1935. ’The Housing Boom -  II’ p.844
324 The Economist, September 5, 1936 ‘Trend of Building Costs’ p.430
The index of wages is based on those in London and Manchester and includes those of masons, 
bricklayers, carpenters and joiners, plasterers, slaters, plumbers, painters and labourers. The index 
of materials is based on London quotations for stone, bricks, wood, tiles, joists and girders, lead, 
paint and glass. The article notes that the Board of Trade’s index of the price of Building materials,
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Building costs were found to be lowest in early 1935. Subsequently, the 
index tended to gradually increase, partly as a result of rising wages and partly as 
a result of rising material costs. The indices show that it was rising wages bills, 
rather than increased material costs, that put pressure on overall costs for the 
industry. However, both wages and materials remained below pre-depression 
levels, and it was noted that: ‘such a slight rise in costs as has occurred, however, 
was quite unlikely in itself to endanger the progress o f the building boom’.
In 1936, The Economist again considered the path of the housing boom 
and its ‘remarkable vitality’. They remained concerned though about demand 
falling off and the impact this would have on the economy as a whole.325 By the 
September, it was suggested that the housing boom had peaked but that new 
construction of workshops and factories had taken off.326 In particular, private 
house building had begun to fall but this had been offset by the combined increase 
in municipal house-building and commercial building.327
In July 1937, they note that building activity had been maintained at a high 
level and that no marked decline was expected in the near future. It was only in 
August 1937 that doubts were seriously expressed about the maintenance of high 
levels of activity for the sector. ‘While there is no sign of early recession, the 
maintenance o f operations on the present scale is problematical in view of recent 
movements in the plan figures. ... Although these figures do not take account of 
Government work, and may be open to qualification on other grounds, it appears 
unlikely that Government building will be sufficient to ensure the maintenance of 
the present level of activity after a comparatively short time has elapsed’.328
which is available only for a few years, moved closely with the Economist index over the 12 
months to August 1936.
325 The Economist, July 25, 1936. Trade Supplement No.l58_ p.5
326 The Economist, September 5, 1936. ‘Trend o f Building costs’ p.430
327 The Economist, September 26, 1936. p.551
328 The Economist August 28, 1937 p. 10
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Certainly up to this point, there is no great cause for concern about the 
industry’s fortunes, and its concerns about demand proved to be too pessimistic. 
At the same time though, it was noted that the industry was facing constraints 
because o f labour shortages, especially shortages of bricklayers and other skilled 
workers. The Economist report for September 1937 is similar but adds that the 
industry is then experiencing difficulty in obtaining supplies of some essential 
materials.329 A fall in the level of activity had not occurred by December 1937.
In making their judgements about the construction industry IDAC had 
access to a variety of statistical information as well as that published in the press 
of the day. Information on all industries was regularly published in Board of 
Trade Journals and IDAC had first hand access to this information. One 
particularly useful figure would have been the data on the number of building 
plans approved each year by the local authorities.
Plans approved bv 146 local authorities in GB estimated costs (1930 = 100)
1930 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Dwelling houses 100 165.4 148.8 167.7 160.5 144.6 128.3
Other buildings 100 104.2 93.3 128.9 150.7 155.5 135
While, these could not guarantee future levels of production, or even 
accurate forecasting they would have reinforced beliefs about the sustainability of 
demand for construction. The table and chart below show the number of houses 
actually built in each year 1930 through to 1936. The apparent, continual growth 
would have encouraged IDAC in their belief that the industry was doing well.
329 Although the report does not specify which materials it is certainly likely that the industry 
would have experienced shortages in supply of iron and steel products as did all other using 
industries by this time (see next chapter on Engineering industry).
Housing Output (England and W ales)
Year ended
30th Sept Private Enterprise Local Authorites Total INDEX
1930 109682 52017 161699 100
1931 131656 63288 194944 121
1932 133486 68490 201976 125
1933 169100 49213 218313 135
1934 260327 53342 313669 194
1935 275299 43345 318644 197
1936 274654 64874 339528 210
Data from: Sir Harold Bellman, the Building Trades p.399 Table I
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From the beginning of 1934, the Board of Trade also published data on 
levels o f production in the economy, i.e. industrial output. Again, IDAC had early 
access to the data and used it to inform their decision-making. The chart below 
shows quarterly production indices for the building sector and ‘all industry’.
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As the chart shows there was a fall off in building activity from March 
1938 but this began to rise again the following year. Both the economy as a 
whole, and the building industry, production was above 1930 levels throughout 
the period. For building however, its performance was relatively better than for all 
sectors and this was the case through to March 1939. Such data would not have 
given IDAC any indication that its activities were hampering the sector. Building 
activity was strong, as they expected.
As well as the data reported in the Economist, the Board o f Trade 
published its own price indices to which IDAC had access. This data shown in 
Appendix 4.4 (Wholesale prices/prices) show that until 1937, the prices of 
building materials were lower than in 1930. This was in spite of the introduction 
of the tariff. The chart as well as showing the trend o f building material prices 
also shows the indices of wholesales prices for all ‘industrial materials’ and ‘all 
articles’ over the same period. This shows that although the prices of building 
materials were lower than in 1930 they were more buoyant in the first part of the 
decade than industrial products, or all articles. This could be because of the tariff 
effects, both increasing the cost of imports to the industry and allowing home 
producers to increase their own prices by the amount of the tariff. However,
similar effects would be as likely to put pressure on prices in the other sectors too. 
It seems more likely, therefore, that the boom in demand for the building 
materials (and for some items shortages of supplies) bolstered prices. From 1936 
when some of the demand pressures on construction were relieved and other 
sectors are themselves recovering the pattern is reversed.
The second Chart [Building Material Price Chart -  wholesale prices by 
month Appendix 4.5] shows the index of prices by month from January 1932 
through to April 1939. This shows that prices began to rise steadily from March 
through to October 1935. They then stabilised until the summer of 1936 when 
they again began to increase at a faster rate.
Other information available to the Committee came from the Ministry of 
Health. As we have seen, IDAC consulted the Ministry on specific applications 
that affected the building trades. More general information was available as well. 
Whilst it may seem that IDAC simply relied on the Ministry’s word about 
possible price concerns of the industry, they themselves had access to the 
information on the price o f houses. For instance, The Seventeenth Annual Report 
of the Ministry of Health330 in 1935-36 reported that the average price of a house 
was £310 compared with £299 in the previous years.331 In discussing the reason 
for the price rises the Ministry noted: ‘Rates o f wages have advanced. The prices 
of some materials have risen though some have been reduced. Where increase of 
cost has occurred, no doubt a contributory factor has been the competition from 
private enterprise and public building works. The costs of house-building in there 
various aspects are kept under continuos scrutiny in the department’.332 The 
availability of data on building costs enabled IDAC to make their own judgements 
in this regard.
As well as the Ministry scrutinising changes in building costs, in this 
report, they also refer to the type and affordability of housing being constructed.
330 Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 5287
331 This is the average building price of all non-parlour dwellings.
332 Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 5287, p.84
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‘The large proportion of houses of low rateable value is an indication that the 
extensive activity of private enterprise has been of substantial benefit to members 
of the working classes. While most of the houses are for sale it is well known that 
the financial facilities are now so widely available enable persons of quite limited 
resources to purchase their houses.’333
‘The beneficial effect upon employment resulting from the great volume 
of house building in the last three years needs no emphasis. Unemployment in the 
building industry fell between March 1933 (before the activity of private 
enterprise began to expand to its present dimensions) and March 1936, from 27.2 
per cent, to 14.8 per cent., although the number of insured workpeople increased 
by 120,000: the increase in the number of men at work was over 200,000. House 
building has played a major part in producing this result as is evident from the fact 
that during 1935, for example, dwelling-houses represented more than two-thirds 
of the estimated value of buildings for which plans were approved in 146 large 
towns which made returns to the Ministry of Labour.’334
Further information on house building could be found in a speech made by 
the Minister of Health, Sir Kingsley Wood, in the house to the Supply Committee 
on 8th June 1937.335 He opened: ‘I am glad to say we have had another successful 
house-building year, and if  there is a housebuilding boom it dies hard. In fact the 
latest figures suggest much life and vigour, and apart from houses built there are 
continual demands for other kinds of buildings like factories and workshops’.336 
This view prevalent within government would strengthen Committee opinion on 
the robustness of the sector. At no time would they have considered that the 
industry needed their particular assistance or special consideration.
In discussing costs, the Minister noted: ‘The largest single item in the rise 
in the cost of material used for ordinary cottages is due to the increased price of 
timber, a material of course, in regard to which we are dependent on world
333 Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 5287, p.82
334 Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 5287, p84
335 Hansard, 8 th of June 1937 (Supply Committee)
336 Hansard, 8 th of June 1937 (Supply Committee)col.l612
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supplies and world prices. It should also be said that the prices of bricks and 
cement have generally remained steady . . . \ 337
House building costs had shown a significant increase in the twelve 
months to March 1937 and the Minister discussed this issue. He noted that in the 
quarter to March 1936 the average price of a non-parlour house with three- 
bedrooms had been £311 and this had risen to £338 by March 1937 -  i.e. a 8.7% 
price increase over the twelve months. The Minister blamed the rise in material 
costs for most of this. However, the information he provided showed that the £27 
price rise was made up of:
Increased price of materials £8 = 29.6%
Increased price of labour £3 =11.1%
Increases, other (land and profits?) £16 = 59.3%.338
Sir Kingsley Wood noted: ‘I suppose it must be said that the balance of the 
increase can only be assigned to excessive pressure on the industry and the 
uncertainty as to the ready availability of skilled labour and certain kinds of 
materials, but I emphasise again that any rise in the cost of building are a matter 
of concern , . . ’.339 The Minister noted that the building prices committee had 
investigated price changes in a number of cases, he also noted that the industry 
was experiencing difficulties, in certain cases, in securing sufficient skilled 
labour.340
The available information on the industry, provided by Government and 
non-Govemment data, suggests that the actions of IDAC and the imposition of a 
tariff on building materials did little to dampen its activities in the period. Prices 
did rise during the period but the price rise of materials put less pressure on the 
industry than the rising cost of labour. If anything were to dampen its activities it 
would be supply constraints, at certain times shortages of particular materials, and
337 Hansard 8 th of June 1937 (Supply Committee)col.l618-1619
338 Hansard 8 th of June 1937 (Supply Committee)col.l619
339 Hansard 8 th of June 1937 (Supply Committee)col.l619
340 Hansard 8 th of June 1937 (Supply Committee)col.l619
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more crucially shortages o f skilled labour. Where IDAC made the judgement that 
the building industry would not be harmed by slight price increases these were 
sound. If IDAC is to be criticised at all it might be argued that they gave undue 
attention to the needs of an industry that actually relied very little on imported 
materials. And they showed unnecessary concern over price rises for an industry 
where demand was so strong it seems likely they could have passed on any price 
rises to the final consumer. However, that this would not have been in-line with 
overall government policy, concerned to provide better-standard more affordable 
housing, and that they applied similar standards to the consideration of tariffs 
affecting other industries are reason enough to justify their actions.
Conclusions
IDAC did not need to contact the building industry yet they did not simply 
ignore the industry as they could have done. They were conscientious in their 
efforts to balance the needs of all using industries against those of producers in 
their bid to produce a scientific tariff.
In examining each of the additional duty applications relating to products 
that could be used by the building trade IDAC considered the using industries 
needs. In many cases this was achieved by consulting the Ministry of Health the 
department of government which had lead responsibility for monitoring the 
conditions of the industry.
Rarely did the building industry contact IDAC to oppose the applications 
that the Committee advertised they had under consideration. This led IDAC to 
believe that their actions were not harmful to the industry. The data on the trade 
and output of the building industry that IDAC were in a position to monitor also 
gave them no cause for concern. That the Economist, perhaps IDAC’s most 
vociferous critic in the press, could find no cause for complaints about the tariffs 
impact on the building trade must also have bolstered their belief that they were 
getting the balance right.
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Chapter 5. The IDAC and the British Engineers Association 
[BEA].
The British Engineers’ Association, without any pretence whatever, can fairly
lay claim to having played its appropriate active part in bringing about the
change in the fiscal policy of this country; by the publication and utterance of
facts, views and arguments, by participation in the deliberations of other
industrial bodies and committees; by communications addressed to successive
Governments and by evidence written and oral given to successive Government
341committees of enquiry into the safeguarding of the Iron and Steel industry.
The case of the engineering industry is useful to illustrate how Trade 
Associations worked with government at the time, and to consider which side was 
able to exercise power and gain the most from any developing relationship. The 
focus in this chapter will be on the relationship that developed between the IDAC 
and the BEA. This trade association was selected for study because it had (with 
the possible exception of the Iron and Steel Association) more contact with IDAC 
than any other trade body.
The tariff history of the engineering industry is an important area of study 
because its activities were important in the inter-war period.342 Mechanical 
engineering formed one o f the largest capital goods industries, accounting for 
about 6 per cent of manufacturing output and about 9 per cent of manufacturing
341 BEA Bulletin Vol. 13 No.3. April 1932 pp.46-47.
342 Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuildings’ share of Value Added in Manufacturing, amounted 
to 11.5% in 1924, and 11.8% in 1937. Matthews, R. C. O., Feinstein, C. H., & Odling-Smee, J.C. 
British Economic Growth 1856-1973 (Oxford, 1982), p.239.
Data in Appendix 4.1 also showed that the sector was important both in terms of output and 
employment in the 1930s. In both 1930 and 1935 the sector was responsible for almost 14% of 
total output (output growth was slightly stronger than for all trades at around 7% between 1930 
and 1935. Growth rates may have been dampened by the inclusion of shipbuilding in the sectoral 
analysis). The sector was also important as a large employer, employing around 15% of persons 
employed in both 1930 and 1935.
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employment.343 The industry was highly diversified, with many small firms344, 
and a complex product range. Consequently, there were several trade associations 
aiming to pursue the interests of the industry and no single trade association was 
wholly representative.345
The British Engineers Association [BEA] was founded in 1912 by ‘twenty 
prominent engineering firms’346. It’s membership expanded thereafter but 
continued to represent the larger firms of the industry. This bias was noted by the 
BEA in 1932: ‘from the point of view of capital assets and number of employees, 
the BEA is a much more important body than when considered in terms of 
number of firms, but while the fact must not be lost sight of that its membership 
contains a very considerable proportion of the pick of the engineering firms, the 
BEA could not claim to represent the whole o f the engineering industry in regard 
to tariffs without the knowledge and consent of some of the people outside it 
whose interests might be materially affected.’347 However, the BEA was viewed 
by the IDAC as representative of the interests of the makers of all the following 
types of machinery: agricultural and dairy; battery making; textile; glass making; 
electric lamp and valve-making; chemical and soap-making; packaging and 
labelling; paper and board-making; printers machinery; foundry machinery; wire- 
working and wire-winding; testing machinery; presses; tobacco, cigar and 
cigarette-making; sterilizing and food preparation; brush-making; matchmaking; 
and, deep oil well machinery.348
343 Gourvish T.R. ‘Mechanical Engineering’, in Buxton N.K. & Aldcroft D.H. eds., British 
Industry Between the Wars. (London, 1979), p. 129.
344 Gourvish ‘Mechanical Engineering’ p.129 notes that in 1935, over 85% of establishments with 
over 1 0  persons had a work force of less than 2 0 0 .
345 These included: the British Engineers Association; British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers 
Association; Machine Tools Trade Association; Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders; 
Steel Works Plant Association; Agricultural Engineers Association; Association of British 
Manufacturers of Printers’ Machinery; British Chemical Plant Manufacturers Association; British 
Empire Sugar Machinery Manufacturers Association, and the Loom Makers’ Association.
346 PEP Industrial trade associations p.9.
347 BEA Council Minutes, January 14th, 1932.
348 These were the classes of machinery which the BEA were called upon to advise IDAC in the 
operation of the Machinery Licensing Scheme.
155
From an examination of the archives o f the BEA, it is clear that the 
association was involved with a number of government departments during the 
1930s. As well as communicating directly with the Prime Minister, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and the President of the Board o f Trade, the association was 
involved with the Treasury, Board of Trade (BoT), Mines Department, Export 
Credits Guarantee Department, Department of Overseas Trade, and Ministry of 
Transport. The BEA also quickly established contact with the IDAC. It was one of 
the trade associations approached by IDAC in the early days of its work to discuss 
the tariff proposals. It continued to have a close relationship, particularly 
regarding the machinery licensing system.
In examining the BEA, it will be important to consider the applicability of 
the theoretical views on Trade Association and Government relations discussed in 
earlier chapters. The BEA is a particularly good case as the contact it had with 
IDAC was quite exceptional.349 The nature of the contact between the BEA and 
IDAC can be assessed to judge how formal this was, whether it became more 
formalised through the period, and to establish whether a process of bargaining 
and negotiation developed.
Corporatist notions of preferential status for certain groups are examined. 
From this viewpoint, the BEA would be expected to gain from any preferential 
status with IDAC compared to other associations where contact was more limited. 
Alternatively, benefits to the government department can be assessed, as can the 
extent to which the association became an instrument of IDAC policy. Other 
points are also reviewed. For instance, how well organised and representative of 
the engineering industry the BEA was, and how this influenced IDAC’s 
consideration of them. The level of integration of the industry and its strength of 
organisation is vital in determining the limits of the BEA influence.
US tariff literature suggests that this industry would be expected to have 
secured high tariffs because it was an important employer350 and because it
349 It had more contact than any other trade association excluding the National Federation of Iron 
and Steel Manufacturers (NFISM), subsequently the British Iron and Steel Federation (BISF).
350 In 1937, there were some 12,327,000 insured persons in employment in industry and services, 
of which 614,000 (4.98%) were employed in ‘General Engineering’, the figure for ‘All 
Engineering’ was substantially higher at 1,977,000 (16%). - Ministry of Labour Gazette, cited in
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employed a high capital to labour ratio.351 The work of Capie considers factors 
important in shaping the British tariff structure at this time.352 This suggests the 
engineering industry would have had a high tariff because it was not highly 
concentrated in size terms and, the industry was moderately regionally 
concentrated. Yet the industry did not secure high tariff rates. An understanding of 
why this was the case emerges from this study. It is also possible to uncover how 
aware the industry was of effective rates of protection and the extent to which it 
believed that protection assisted the recovery of the industry from depression.
The continuing relationship.
A review of Trade Association attitudes towards the tariff shows that the 
BEA had a long history of supporting protection. Before the Import Duties Act 
was introduced, the association began its own consideration of how such a system 
might be operated. The view that an independent tariff board should be 
established was put forward.353 The system they favoured did not differ 
significantly from that which was eventually introduced. The Association was 
quick to offer their assistance to the government in the development and operation 
of the tariff and they actively sought involvement/participation in administering 
the system. They had long considered the tariff needs of the industry and should 
have been well prepared to work with IDAC. They would have been in a position 
to make a strong case for the tariff that the industry wanted.
British Association, Section F: Economic Science & Statistics Research Committee, Britain in 
Recovery (London, 1938)
351 Pincus ‘Pressure Groups’; Baack & Ray ‘Political Economy’; Hayford & Pasurka ‘Fordney- 
McCumber’; and, Hawke ‘United States Tariff.
352 Capie Depression and Protectionism
353 Sir Gilbert Vyle, Council Member, suggested the institution of an independent Import Control 
Board of some 7 or 8  paid experts to be appointed by Parliament to consider, advise or make 
recommendations or, better still, to be delegated with full powers to act in accordance with their 
judgement as and when necessary in the interests of a particular industry. BEA Council Minutes, 
Special meeting, November 19th, 1931.
Something similar had also been one of the FBI recommendations in its Fiscal Policy Report.
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In November 1931, a special meeting of the BEA Council was called to 
consider what procedure should be followed about giving information to the 
Government concerning the tariff. The meeting was not to discuss whether the 
tariff was or was not necessary. It was taken as read that the majority of 
membership considered that a tariff was needed, just as they had done in both 
1923 and in 1930.354 Part of the discussion revolved around how to approach 
government with their views. The decision was made that the best approach 
would be via government departments, and in particular through the Board of 
Trade [BoT]. ‘Mr Bremner [BEA Director] said that the B.E.A. fortunately, had a 
locus standi with the Board of Trade, and he was sure that any appeal from the 
B.E.A. would be sympathetically received.’355
On the 23rd of November 1931, a letter was sent to the President of the 
Board of Trade noting: ‘The services of the Association were freely and willingly 
placed at the disposal of the President of the Board of Trade in the task that now 
lay ahead in regard to tariffs and other matters affecting the engineering industry, 
of which the BEA was the representative organisation’.356 One Council Member, 
Mr. Louis Smith, MP., held the opinion that ‘the BEA should get into close and 
constant contact with the BoT by conversations with officials and by following 
step by step the road from abnormal importations to a permanent ta riff .357
Soon after the IDAC was established, the Committee held meetings with a 
number of Trade Associations, of which the BEA was one, to elicit their opinions. 
The BEA President informed his Council that ‘on the 23rd o f March, at the 
invitation of Sir George May, the Chairman of IDAC, he and the Director had had 
a private interview with the IDAC for the purpose of an exchange of views on 
tariff matters, in the course of which some confidential information had been
354 BEA Council Minutes, Special meeting, November 19th, 1931.
The BEA Bulletin Vol. 13. No.3., April 1932 p.47, notes that in 1923 81.8% of members were in 
favour of protection, in 1930 a similar survey found, of those replying, 96% were in favour of 
protection.
355 BEA Council Minutes Special meeting, November 19th, 1931.
In the case of this industry the Depression is not the cause of calls for protection.
356 BEA Council Minutes December 10th, 1931.
357 BEA Council Minutes December 10th, 1931.
By this stage it was taken for granted by the industry that a permanent tariff would be introduced.
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given to them regarding the intentions of the Committee in respect of tariffs on 
certain commodities and also in respect of the products of the engineering 
industry’.358 From this point, forward the BEA was continuously in contact with 
the IDAC. A record of meetings with IDAC is shown in Appendix 5.1 (other 
types of contact were frequent: memoranda, telephone calls and informal meetings 
which were not formally recorded).
At the request of Percy Ashley of IDAC, Mr Bremner again visited the 
Committee on the 30th of March 1932. At the meeting, IDAC made it clear that 
they were concerned at the likely difficulties of dealing with the products of the 
engineering industry, especially those under the heading “machinery” in the BoT 
annual returns. The IDAC needed advice so they could decide what to do with this 
class of goods after the initial emergency tariff - so an additional duty on top of 
the 10% could be introduced. At Percy Ashley’s request, Mr Bremner agreed to 
prepare a draft report on the views of the industry.
Problems in determining a suitable tariff for the engineering industry were 
not new. The Tariff Commission, established by Joseph Chamberlain in 1904, 
experienced considerable difficulties in arriving at an appropriate tariff for the 
engineering industry. The major problem was that the industry was far from 
uniform or unified.359 In 1906, the Tariff Commission found the attempt to collate 
information on the industry extremely difficult: ‘The questionnaires had revealed 
“something like 500 groups of Engineering products in regard to which Foreign 
importation, and dumping, is [sic] complained o f ... and [discovered] that most of 
these groups impinge on different industries, and that the Engineering industry is 
not one industry, but is really a large group of industries’” .360 The completion of 
industrial reports was complex, but that of the engineering industry proved 
particularly difficult. It was found to be impossible to order the data: the 
classification of engineering products adopted in official sources were found to be 
useless, both for drafting a tariff and for ascertaining the state of trade and the 
extent of foreign competition.361
358 BEA Council Minutes April 14th, 1932.
359 Marrison Protection p.70
360 Tariff Commission Minute, 23 May 1907, cited in Marrison Protection pp.194-195
361 Marrison Protection p. 195
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In a memorandum dated 5th April 1932, the BEA began to provide 
guidance for the Committee on how to develop a tariff system for machinery. At 
this stage, a list was provided of 2,200 products of the British engineering and 
allied trades.362 In the BEA Bulletin of April 1932, the difficulties associated with 
establishing a satisfactory tariff for the industry were noted: ‘it would be 
impossible to examine in detail the varied produce of engineering industry, even 
when reasonably grouped in classes with the object of determining different 
suitable and effective rates of import duties to be applied to them’.363 Machinery 
had 100 sub-divisions in the Import and Export Lists produced. Even this was not 
sufficiently delineated: the “all other sorts” class of machinery accounted for 27% 
of total machinery imports in 1930.364
The BEA was keen to ensure the industry gained a large protective tariff to 
stimulate new developments within the industry. T h e  present flat rate revenue 
duty of 10% is insufficient to afford any effective protection and provide the 
stimulus required to stir our machinery manufacturing industry into new life’.365 
Mr. Bremner, therefore, went on to request a rate of duty o f 33!/3%: ‘It is realised 
that, in some cases, a duty of 33V3% will not provide fully effective protection to 
the home manufacture on the present price basis, but on the other hand there is 
good reason to believe that it will seldom be excessive’.366
Mr. Bremner, in his report to IDAC, suggested that special rules should be 
applied to machine tools and certain types of textile machinery. For these items, a 
scheme similar to that eventually introduced for all types of machinery was 
proposed. It was argued these should receive special treatment because many of 
them were unlikely to be manufactured in the country for some time. The 
suggestion followed that upon proof that articles could not be obtained in Britain
362 BT/10/59 Memorandum, dated 5th of April 1932, from Mr. D. Bremner Director of the BEA. 
The full statistical appendices were not retained by IDAC as they were regarded as too bulky, nor 
do the documents survive in the archives of the BEA.
The contents of this memo are also reported in, BEA Bulletin Vol. 13. No.3., April, 1932. pp48-49
363 BEA Bulletin Vol. 13. No.3., April, 1932. p.48
364 BEA Bulletin Vol. 13. No.3., April, 1932. p.48
According to Hutchinson [p. 19] the Government, in the House of Commons, had described the 
initial rate of duty as primarily for revenue purposes.
365 PRO BT/10/59 Memo dated 5th April, 1932, from Mr. D. Bremner.
366 PRO BT/10/59 Memo dated 5th April, 1932, from Mr. D. Bremner.
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the items should be imported duty-free so that the user was not penalised for 
importing a necessary article. It was felt that adjudication of such cases should fall 
to the appropriate trade association. It is interesting here that the BEA did not 
suggest the same kind of exemptions for other types of machinery which their 
own members might want to produce in the future but were currently also 
unavailable in Britain.
The report, together with statistical information, was discussed with Percy 
Ashley on the 6th of April 1932. As a result of this discussion, Mr. Bremner told 
his Council that, whilst he was unable to give precise information, he thought that 
British engineering manufacturers would get a tariff which was satisfactory to 
them and he understood that the recommendations of the Advisory Committee 
would be made known in the near future.367 ‘It was not quite as much as the BEA 
had hoped for, but he thought that, all things being considered, this protective duty 
should encourage manufactures to go forward.’368
This early contact was of a formal nature. It was ‘direct’ with the 
appropriate government department, rather than through informal processes such 
as lobbying. The Association was willing to work for/with IDAC because this was 
considered the most expeditious way to further its goals. Regarding the tariff it 
was believed that in advising IDAC there would be benefits: ‘Mr. Ayton thought 
that the BEA had good reason to congratulate itself on the fact that the assistance 
which it had given was acknowledged in the report of the Import Duties Advisory 
Committee recently presented in the House of Commons, and that it was the only 
trade association mentioned therein. He thought it might be very useful in the 
recruitment of new members if this report could be published in the next Bulletin 
and extra copies printed and used for recruiting purposes’.369
The Association sought an industry wide duty of 33'/3%. The IDAC, in 
fact, introduced a tariff in line with that given to other industries.370 IDAC
367 BEA Council Minutes April 14th, 1932.
368 BEA Council Minutes April 14th, 1932.
369 BEA Council Minutes April 14th, 1932.
370 The tariff, as it related to the engineering industry, fell under Class III, Group VI, Schedule I. 
The following ad valorem rates of duty were introduced:
Agricultural Machinery total duty of 15%
All other machinery, and parts thereof total duty of 20%
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profited from involving the Association in the decision-making process because, 
through consultation, it was effectively granted the approval of the industry for 
the tariff awarded despite this being lower than that requested by the industry. The 
BEA, at a later stage, noted that:
In view of the existing McKenna Duties of 33' / 3 % on Motor Vehicles and Parts 
thereof and of the duty of 33 V3 % now imposed on Iron and Steel, there is much 
to be said for our own application for an equal rate of duty on “Machinery,” but 
having regard to the special circumstances and difficulties with which the 
Advisory Committee were confronted and which are frankly stated in their 
Report it is doubtful whether more harm than good might not be done by voicing 
any feeling of disappointment or dissatisfaction at the present time. Our own 
opinion is that, by so doing, we should run a risk of alienating public sympathy.
There might be a tendency to say that there is no satisfying these manufacturers, 
who now have the benefits of a 2 0 % duty and the additional protection of a 2 0 % 
depreciation in the gold value of the £-advantages which they had no prospect of 
a year ago-and yet are not content to await the finer adjustments of the tariff, 
which will be made within the next twelve months in the light of closer 
investigation and actual experience.371
Contact on the issue of the engineering tariff subsides at this stage. The topic of 
the tariff itself did not come under discussion again until 1934. The two 
organisations shortly come into contact again, however, upon the subject of the 
Machinery Licensing Scheme.
The IDAC, the BEA, and the Machinery Licensing Scheme.
The majority of contact between the BEA and the IDAC arose through the 
operation of the Machinery Licensing Scheme. The close relationship that 
developed between the two organisations can clearly be seen to have been a benefit 
to both. The BEA attempted to use the ‘special relationship’ to attract new 
members: something which was of vital importance in the years of depressed trade.
Ball bearings, etc., total duty of 33'/3%.
371 BEA Bulletin Vol. 13. No.3. April 1932, page 46. MSS.267/4/1/12
It is not clear why the BEA were concerned about public opinion, given that protection is generally 
thought to have been accepted by this time.
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It was thought: ‘that the Association might now be in a position to do very valuable 
work as a protagonist for the industry’.372 It benefited from what may be termed 
“insider-information”: information which it subsequently passed on to its members. 
IDAC, for its part gained from the expertise the BEA provided; similar 
arrangements were also held with the BEAMA and the MTTA.373 It was the BEA 
and the two other associations, which determined, in the first instance, whether the 
machinery in question was procurable in Britain. This greatly reduced the workload 
of the IDAC.
When the Committee began the work on the Machinery Licensing Scheme, 
they held a conference with the BEA, BEAMA and MTTA to discuss how a system 
of consultation with the industry might work.374 A day earlier, a Memorandum was 
sent to IDAC outlining proposals for the scheme: a copy of which can be found in 
Appendix 5.2. As a result of the meeting, it was decided that each trade association 
should have distinct areas of responsibility upon which they would be consulted. In 
practice, this meant that, in the majority of cases it was to be the BEA who IDAC
372 BEA Council Meeting, March 13th, 1930. This comment refers to applications which could be 
put forward under the Safeguarding Act, but applies equally well to those under the Import Duties 
Act. The Association did not discuss the issue of ‘free-riders’; additional duties gained as a result 
of their work could not have been restricted to protect members alone. There is little evidence to 
suggest that these activities did attract new members. As noted, in Chapter 6 , even the work on the 
Machinery Licensing Scheme was unsuccessful in this respect.
373 The process was to be beneficial to the trade associations as well as to IDAC. The following letter 
shows that IDAC are willing to enhance the reputations of the associations [BT/10/59, part 3]:
25th March 1933, letter to MTTA 
Dear Mr. Weight,
It has occurred to me that in communicating with British manufacturers of 
machinery whose names have been furnished to us by your Association, it might be of value if we 
said that we were advised of their names by the MTTA, and, if you are agreeable, we will do this. 
Yours sincerely,
R. Herbert.
The IDAC file suggests that similar arrangements were to be made with the other trade 
associations involved, i.e. the BEA and BEAMA. This is noted in a BEA Council Meeting of 10th 
November 1932; IDAC, it was said, had promised to specifically refer to the BEA as their source 
of information in their communications with applicants and manufacturers.
374 BT/10/59 the meeting is held on 20.5.32
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would consult.375 The Machine Importers Association (MIA) also offered its 
assistance to IDAC, but this was refused on the grounds that the Association, by its 
very nature, would be biased in favour of encouraging machinery imports under 
license.376
Early comments of the association suggest that they would want full 
protection to allow import substitution to progress: ‘There can be no doubt that 
the balance of advantage will lie with the protection, stimulation and progressive 
development of machinery manufacture in this country’.377 However, it was later 
acknowledged that: ‘we cannot expect to be completely self-sufficient and 
independent so far as machinery is concerned’.378 This recognised the ability to 
design and construct machinery at commercial prices in many countries. Much of 
what Gourvish writes on the machine tool trade may be used as an explanation of 
why the BEA were willing to accept the licensing scheme in principle. He notes 
that the diverse nature of demand encouraged the persistence of small firms, 
which tended to follow conservative methods.379 Specialist machinery was also 
more likely to be made in countries that had larger markets, such as the USA and 
Germany. The domestic market may have been too small and too fragmented to 
sustain competitiveness. The size of British businesses did not compare 
unfavourably to those of the American industry however. However, small size 
may have retarded the ability to conduct research and apply new technologies to 
production processes.380 The first report of the Committee also sheds some light 
on this issue noting that: ‘while there were few classes of machinery of any 
magnitude that were not made in the United Kingdom in substantial quantity, the
375 BT/10/59 It was concluded that: Machine Tools and Wood-Working Machinery were to be dealt 
with by MTTA; Electric Furnace and Cable Making Machinery to be dealt with by BEAMA; all
other types of machinery to be dealt with by BEA. The BEA, at a later stage, asked if they could also
deal with Cable Making Machinery, but was informed by IDAC that it was happy with the 
arrangement with BEAMA.
376 BT/10/59
377 BEA BulleUn, Vol 13 no.3. April 1932 p.49.
378 BEA Bulletin, Vol 14 no.7. Nov-Dee 1933 p. 129.
379 Gourvish ‘Mechanical Engineering’ p. 141.
380 Gourvish ‘Mechanical Engineering’ pp. 141-146.
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imports comprised very specialised kinds not produced there, for some of which, 
indeed, the world demand was easily met by one factory’.381
‘Licensing individual consignments of imports was by no means a new 
idea, and had indeed been adopted in the United Kingdom to meet the dyestuffs 
problem since 1920’.382 Application forms would be passed from IDAC, through 
the Board of Trade, to the Treasury, sending one copy to the importer and one copy 
to Customs. First, however, it was necessary to establish if the machinery in 
question was manufactured in Britain. This was the work performed by the trade 
association(s). IDAC supplied details of the types of machines for which licence 
applications had been received; the BEA would then ascertain the position of home 
manufacturing and inform IDAC of their results. ‘If a British manufacturer claimed 
to be able to supply similar machinery, the Committee enquired further, with the 
advice of technical officers of the Board of Trade. Since scientific problems were 
sometimes involved, contact was maintained with the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research, and schedules o f applications allowed and refused were 
sent to them’.383
When the scheme began, the Committee believed that they would, in time, 
be able to prepare more detailed schedules, either of machinery to be subject to 
additional duty or of machinery to be exempt or even possibly placed on the Free 
List. This never proved possible, however. The number of applications the 
Committee received for machinery licences considerably exceeded expectations 
and the workload involved for the trade association expanded rapidly.384 Details 
of the year-by-year number of applications for licences and the number granted 
are shown in Appendix 5.3. This shows that the number of applications rose every
381 Hutchinson, Tariff-making, p.63.
382 Hutchinson, Tariff-Making_p.63
383 Hutchinson, Tariff-Making p.64
384 In a letter dated 13th Sept. 1932, the BEA noted that, up to 10th of September 1932,952 
applications had been referred to them. Action had been taken on 943 of these and work had been 
completed in 581 cases.
A letter from the Treasury, dated 16th September 1937, suggested that, in June 1932, they 
had expected the system to yield 5 or 6  licences a day; by the time of writing, it was noted that the 
volume was 4 times as great.
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year: by 1937 almost as many applications were made in the first six months as 
had been made in the year to February 1933.
The course of the relationship did not always run smoothly, however. A 
meeting between IDAC and Mr. Bremner on the 22nd March 1933 was 
acrimonious. Mr. Bremner complained about cases where the trade association had 
advised that machines were procurable in the country but IDAC nevertheless issued 
licenses. The Committee defended their case suggesting that additional evidence 
was available to them.385 This was the main cause of disagreement at the meeting, 
culminating in the trade association threatening parliamentary action against the 
Committee: ‘There was, [Bremner] he said, so much feeling in the Association that 
they contemplated asking Parliament to amend the Act to restrict the Committee’s 
functions to the remission only of the additional duty on machinery: indeed, many 
members wished the Association to go farther than this and to urge the Parliament 
to repeal the Section entirely’.386 This suggests that where the association was not 
entirely happy with a government department, they were still prepared to use 
‘informal’ methods to apply pressure.
The Committee, in response, came out fighting. Their disappointment at the 
attitude of the BEA was noted. Percy Ashley stated, ‘The Committee hoped that the 
BEA’s part would become increasingly important, but if the procedure resulted in a 
burden to them, which they now disliked, he would wish to review the whole 
situation’.387 Mr Ashley also pointed out to Mr. Bremner that, if the scheme were to 
be withdrawn, it was likely that machinery importers would insist that the rate of 
duty on all classes of machinery be reduced, leading to even more imports of 
machinery. Before this discussion it had been suggested that the Chairman of IDAC 
would like to address the members of the BEA on the subject of machinery 
licensing, something which Mr. Bremner welcomed. It was stated that the Chairman 
would not now, in the circumstances, want to attend a BEA Luncheon if the BEA 
had lost interest in the operation of the system and intended parliamentary action. 
Mr. Bremner then retracted many of his comments, arguing that he had been 
misconstrued. In these ways IDAC exerted pressure to convince the association, not
385 This was often the case because IDAC found that there were quality, or slight specification 
differences in the types of machinery, they therefore supported the case of the importers.
386 g j / jo / 5 9  “Notes of A Discussion with Mr. Bremner on 22nd March, 1933.”
387 BT/10/59 “Notes of A Discussion with Mr. Bremner on 22nd March, 1933.”
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only of the validity of the system, but also to continue to work on the Committee’s 
behalf.
Criticism of the scheme remained within the membership of the BEA. At 
various times it was suggested by members that the BEA should push for IDAC to 
scrap the exemption scheme. On a number of occasions concern was expressed that 
IDAC issued licenses where quick delivery could not be guaranteed and not just 
when machines were not procurable in Britain. IDAC were quick to defend 
themselves against such complaints and made clear that in the early years of the 
scheme, this was certainly not the case.388 In November 1933, Mr. Bremner 
reported he had had a recent interview with Percy Ashley, who said he had made a 
recent examination of the scheme during the whole period of operation of the Act 
and found that, in respect of licences granted for free import, no allegation had 
been made by any party whatsoever to the effect that the machinery in question 
was procurable in the UK of UK manufacture in 85% of the cases.389
At this time Mr Bremner informed Percy Ashley that there was a growing 
restiveness amongst the machinery manufacturers in regarding exemptions. There 
were a number of manufacturers who had said that, so long as exemption licences 
were granted, they were not prepared to undertake the very large amount of effort 
and the serious financial risks involved in initiating a new line of manufacture. 
Percy Ashley had reminded Mr. Bremner: ‘At the present time there was a 
relatively high duty of 20%, and in ordinary fairness to the purchaser and user 
exemption licences were granted if the desired machine were unobtainable in this 
country, but if exemption licences were entirely abolished then there would have 
to be a much lower rate of duty than the 20% at present in force. He therefore 
advised manufacturers to have due regard to this when considering their attitude 
towards exemptions’.390 Percy Ashley also said he would be very glad if the BEA 
would compile evidence in respect of half a dozen cases where manufacturers had 
actually said they were prepared to initiate a new line of manufacture if the
388 It was only in the later years, under the pressures of rearmament, that ‘delivery time’ became a 
criteria upon which licences might be issued.
389 BEA Council Minutes 14th November, 1933.
390 BEA Council Minutes 14th November, 1933.
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exemption condition were removed.391 The BEA was unable to respond to this, 
however.
The attitude changed somewhat after this, becoming more moderate. On the 
25th January 1934, a further meeting was held between the BEA and the IDAC to 
discuss the workings of the Committee.392 Regarding machinery licensing: ‘The 
representatives of the Association stated that their members were well satisfied with 
the administration of the licensing system for machinery. There was a feeling on the 
part of a considerable number of their members that the remission of duty was 
wrong in principle and that, alternatively, if it was to be made it should be limited to 
the additional duty. There was cumulative evidence that, the fact that, machines 
were admitted free of duty until they were produced in this country had a deterrent 
psychological effect on members who might be considering putting down plant. On 
the other hand, the Association admitted that the licensing system was furnishing 
information otherwise unavailable as to gaps in British production which might be 
economically filled. They were endeavouring to induce British manufacturers to 
take up the manufacture of machines not hitherto made here, and they felt that as 
time went on this would take place to a growing extent.’393
In time, the process of determining eligibility for licensing was refined. The 
number of applications made rose steadily through the period and without 
adaptation the process would have become too unwieldy. In later years, the BEA 
withdrew, to an extent, from the process. The work was time-consuming and the 
BEA decided that the benefits no longer outweighed the costs. The BEA had spent 
£600 per annum, in the first four years, on work regarding: IDAC and had not 
benefited as much as they had hoped through increased membership. By the 
summer of 1936, the BEA wanted to move onto new work on foreign tariffs and 
exchanges, which would mean a switch in funding. It was, therefore, decided that 
the matter would be discussed with IDAC and a meeting was subsequently 
arranged.394
391 BEA Council Minutes 14th November, 1933.
392 PRO BT/10/31 Signed Minutes. Similar meetings were held with the AoBCC, the FBI, the NUM, 
the ABCM and the League of Industry during January 1934.
393 PRO BT/10/31 paper no. 128, 25/1/34.
394 BEA Council Minutes 11th June, 1936.
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At the meeting with IDAC, it was suggested that, to cut down the work of 
the BEA, only new types of machinery licenses would be referred to them. In the 
case of regular machine imports, IDAC would leave it to the BEA, or the 
manufacturer, to notify them should production be started in the UK. It was 
suggested that the Committee could now do much of the work itself, and that the 
BEA would be happy to be consulted in exceptional cases.395 Following this, 
officers of IDAC went to the offices of the BEA on 8th June 1936 to ask the advice 
of the man who had been doing this work.
Following the meeting with IDAC: ‘In reply to the Chairman’s question as 
to whether Sir Percy Ashley had agreed to the suggested discontinuation of this 
work, the Director said that naturally a Government Department would not be 
pleased at the possible loss of such valuable gratuitous services, which were fully 
appreciated, but in view of the friendly relations between the BEA and the IDAC 
Sir Percy had recognised that it would be expecting a great deal to ask the 
Association to continue spending money on this scale indefinitely’.396 There was 
some concern expressed that the association might lose prestige, and favour, with 
the Committee.397 According to the Director: ‘Its value to the prestige of the 
association had to be very largely measured by its effects on the efforts to recruit 
new members, and approximately only twelve new members in the last four years
-JQ Q
could be attributed to contacts with these firms through the work of IDAC’.
The President of the BEA, at a Council Meeting on 9th July 1936, suggested 
that the Council should revise its attitude to the IDAC to the extent that, while it 
would be quite easy for the IDAC to do the ordinary rank-and-file work, the BEA 
should continue to be at the service of the IDAC to advise on special applications, 
and that the division of the work should be agreed by the Director and Sir Percy 
Ashley.399 The new arrangement was confirmed in writing in a letter from the BEA 
dated 28th July 1936. Once the renewed procedure has been agreed between IDAC
395 Minutes of meeting with Mr Bremner on 3.6.36 (dated 5.6.36)
396 BEA Council Minutes 11th June, 1936.
397 BEA Council Minutes 11th June, 1936.
398 BEA Council Minutes 11 th June, 1936.
399 BEA Council Minutes 9th July, 1936.
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and the BEA, it was estimated that the workload of the BEA would be cut by 
25%.400
The value of the associations’ work for IDAC became clear at the time 
when the BEA decide to reduce their involvement in the scheme. ‘In addition to 
saving us a considerable amount of work, one substantial advantage of the present 
system is that criticism of the amount of machinery licensed is to a large extent 
vitiated by the fact that we have consulted an advisory Association covering 
practically the whole of the industry* 401
Given the close contact established between IDAC and the BEA over the 
issue of machinery licensing and the benefits accruing to IDAC402, it could be 
expected that the BEA were in a favoured position in regard to other issues it 
pursued with the Committee. This can be considered by examining the case of the 
BEA’s own additional duty requirements and the influence the BEA had on the iron 
and steel and other tariffs.
The Engineering Industries Tariff
At a meeting with the BEA in February 1934, IDAC expressed the opinion that 
they had expected to receive claims for additional duties from some sectors of the 
industry. They thought that the devaluation of the dollar, the subsidisation of 
German export trade and evidence of price cutting campaigns amongst some 
Continental manufacturers would have prompted applications.403 Consequently,
400 BEA Council Minutes 10th Sept., 1936.
401 BT/10/50, part 5. internal memo dated 24.5.36. This discusses how the Committee would proceed 
if the BEA withdrew their assistance. Listed are some alternative associations which might have been 
consulted for specialist products; they also thought that they had gained sufficient knowledge in 
certain areas but recognised they would probably have had to employ extra staff to deal with the 
work. It was also pointed out that the BEA might have lost members if they withdrew from the 
arrangement.
402 The BEA undertook a time consuming, and costly, job for IDAC. It also conferred approval on 
the system.
403 BEA Council Minutes 8 th February 1934.
An earlier case of IDAC taking a proactive role exists when in 1933 the Committee prompted an 
investigation into the need for an additional duty. The scope of this was much more limited
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perhaps, additional duties were discussed for the first time by the BEA at the next 
Council meeting held on 8th of February 1934.404 The Council discussed whether 
applications should be made for individual types of machinery or for machinery in 
toto. Mr Bremner advised that the latter would be better because he believed this 
would be preferred by IDAC because many different rates would be difficult to 
administer. Further, if one group of manufacturers got an increase in duty this 
would lead to other applications.405
It was not until November 1934, nine months after initial talks, that the 
matter of additional duty on machinery was again discussed. Mr Louis Smith, of 
the BEA, said that there was a good case for an increased duty on machinery. He 
reminded the meeting that a long time would elapse before any new order could 
come into operation, even if an application were granted, and suggested that an 
early start should be made to prepare a case for submission to the IDAC. ‘He 
thought that the present time would appear to be opportune as certain sections of 
the Iron and Steel industry were now asking for increased duties, and a point in 
favour of the engineering industry would be that, while the finished machinery 
was subject to a duty of only 20%, there were many classes of semi-finished 
material on which the duty was higher than 20% ’.406
In the December 1934 Council meeting it was noted that Mr Bremner 
would shortly meet Percy Ashley to discuss an application for increased duties. At 
this meeting, the Council decided it would be wise for Mr. Bremner to obtain the 
views of as many as possible of the leading machinery manufacturers on the 
effectiveness of the present rate of duty on imported machinery. They would also 
try to get the MTTA to put in the application with them: ‘it having been thought 
that the co-operation of the two bodies would strengthen the position of the BEA 
vis-a-vis the Government in making its application.’407 A short article would also 
be put in the next issue of the BEA bulletin, stating a few of the leading points
though, relating as it did to “Dental, Surgical, Medical and Veterinary Instruments and 
Appliances”. The result, in this case, was that the rate of duty was increased from 10 to 20 per 
cent.
404 By this time many additional duty applications had been made by other industries.
405 BEA Council Minutes 8 th February, 1934.
406 BEA Council Minutes 15th November, 1934.
407 BEA Council Minutes 13th December, 1934.
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and, inviting members to write to the Association if they had any definite views 
on the subject.408
Mr. Bremner met Percy Ashley on 17th December and discussed the 
proposed application for additional duty on all types of machinery. Percy Ashley 
had been relieved to hear the BEA proposed a general application. The Committee 
had felt embarrassed by one or two of sections of the machinery industry 
approaching them individually: ‘The IDAC would naturally prefer to have one 
collective representative case submitted by a representative association, and he 
had gathered that the Committee would await the action of the Council of the 
BEA in this respect.... Sir Percy Ashley had agreed that the interests of the 
importing user were sufficiently guarded by the provisions for controlled 
exemptions, which simplified the position and would help us when the time came 
for the application to be considered.’409
In February of 1935, M r Bremner informed the Council that no progress 
on the tariff question had been possible because of the lack of financial 
resources.410 In March 1935, it had become apparent the MTTA would not be able 
to support the BEA’s application, in the main because of the diversity of its 
membership which included machinery importers.411 In April, an application still 
had not been submitted. Mr. Bremner had not had time to compile all the 
necessary information. He noted that the increased duties for iron and steel should 
enhance their case when it was submitted.412 The Association understood effective 
rates of protection and they wanted to use the fact that the duties were rising on 
their own inputs in their request for additional protection, it should have been a 
powerful argument.
Mr. Bremner subsequently discussed the proposed additional duty 
application with Sir Alfred Hurst. At the meeting, it emerged that the Association 
was faced with a number of difficulties in view of its comparatively small
408 BEA Council Minutes 13th December, 1934.
409 BEA Council Minutes 10th January, 1935.
410 BEA Council Minutes 14th February, 1935.
411 BEA Council Minutes 14th March, 1935.
412 BEA Council Minutes 11th April, 1935.
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membership, the existence of various sectional engineering associations413, and 
the fact that the IDAC would need to be satisfied that a willing buyer would not 
only be able to obtain in this country the machine that he wanted without having 
to pay excessive prices, but also to obtain delivery in a time approximating to that 
in which he could get the machine from abroad 4,4 It was agreed that it was not 
practical to devise a graded tariff: at best, a flat rate increase of duty from the 
present 20% to 33 73% could be expected. The Council decided that: ‘When the 
application had been presented he, (Mr Bremner) would seek an opportunity of 
addressing a meeting of interested Members of Parliament on the subject, so that 
when the matter came up for discussion they would speak with a full knowledge 
of the facts’ 415
Concern over whether IDAC would view them as representative enough of 
the industry remained. In discussing their application it was noted:
The situation was somewhat complicated by the existence of various sectional 
trade associations, of which the Steel Works Plant Association was one, but Mr.
Bremner pointed out that his investigations had shown that the B.E.A. does, in 
fact, represent well over 50% of the different classes of machinery imported and 
could, therefore, speak with considerable authority. The B.E.A. was undoubtedly 
the organisation most competent to deal with a general application for increased 
duties on imported machinery; moreover, they had been in touch with the 
I.D.A.C. since the Import Duties Act had come into operation, by reason of the 
fact that they had been, and were still, the official advisers to the I.D.A.C., on 
applications for exemptions from duty of imported machinery.416
In a meeting with IDAC, on 31st December 1935, the following statement 
emerged: ‘... for the lack of an engineering trade association with a larger and
4l3Sir Alfred Hurst had eventually agreed to accepting an application from the BEA as being
representative of the industry
BEA Council Minutes 13th June, 1935.
414 BEA Council Minutes 13th June, 1935
415 BEA Council Minutes 13th June, 1935
This was regarded as a valuable measure which could be taken to back-up the formal procedure, 
although IDAC had made it clear that they were not receptive to demands from MPs.
416 BEA Council Minutes 12th December, 1935.
It is evident from this comment that the BEA did have expectations of receiving preferential 
treatment from IDAC.
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more varied membership than that of the BEA, it is probable that the IDAC will 
accept and give consideration to an application from the BEA for a general 
increase in the duties on machinery, though regret was expressed that the 
engineering industry had not thought fit to coagulate more than it had done, but 
had preferred to maintain in existence a considerable number of bodies which in 
many respects do not cooperate, and this is a source of embarrassment to the 
Government Departments and to the IDAC’.417 IDAC were concerned that should 
a general application be made it would lead to the emergence of many sectional 
interests. This meant that they would not be able to consider the application all 
together but in a sectionalised way. Each specialist trade association would have 
to be consulted and their approval sought. ‘Therefore, it was quite apparent that, at 
the minimum, about two years must elapse before the increased duties, if granted, 
could be imposed’ 418 In light of this, the Council discussed whether, like with the 
Steel Works Plant Association, it would be better if sectional applications were 
made to IDAC.419
The Steel Works Plant Association had decided they wanted to make their 
own separate application to IDAC for additional duty on Steel Works Plant. They 
had proceeded with the application alone because they had already started this 
action and spent some time on it, because they felt their industry had its own 
peculiar conditions, and because they regarded their case as of great urgency 
owing to the fact that the iron and steel industry was spending considerable sums 
of money on new equipment which could not go on indefinitely.420
A few years earlier it had been reported that when a case had been 
prepared for an application for increased duty on imported Grain Milling 
Machinery, the grain-milling machinery makers had been of the opinion that there
417 BEA Council Minutes 9th January, 1936.
418 BEA Council Minutes 9th January, 1936.
4,9 BEA Council Minutes 9th January, 1936.
420 This sectional application succeeded in gaining an additional duty for the industry. The issues 
raised in this case show that simple discussions of effective rates could fail to take account of 
positive linkages between industries. Although the iron and steel industry had a higher rate of 
protection than that afforded to the products of this association, i.e., they received a negative rate 
of protection, it was the knock-on effect of protection of the iron and steel industry which had 
boosted demand for Steel Works Plant.
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was a strong case for an increased duty. However, on discussing the matter with 
M r Bremner who had had a special interview on the subject with the appropriate 
official at the IDAC, ‘they had come to the conclusion that it might be better to 
drop the application for the time being, more especially in view of the fact that the 
Council of the BEA had it in mind to put in an application for an increase in duty 
on all classes of machinery’.421 The Council, having discussed these cases, 
decided that sectional applications were less desirable than a general application 
and continued with their original policy.
In a subsequent conversation with IDAC, Percy Ashley had agreed that: 
‘the best way to meet the difficulties which would beset the application would be 
to confront the sectional organisations with a draft application and request them to 
be in readiness to rebut any objections which might emanate from interested 
parties in their section of the industry’ 422 At the Council Meeting of March 1936 
it was, therefore, decided that an application for additional duty up to 33*/3% 
should be immediately submitted, some two years after this was originally 
proposed.
In May 1936, the application was still not ready for submission, needing to 
be updated for the 1934 trade figures 423 ‘The figures given in the report for 1934 
show that in 1934 no less than 86.5% of the UK machinery requirements were 
met by home machinery production, leaving a balance of only 13.5% to be 
accounted for by imports’ 424 The IDAC representatives had made it clear that 
they were more concerned with import penetration and changes in the market 
share of imports than in the levels of imports perse. Imports had been rising, but 
so had home consumption.
All this necessitated a shift in the emphasis of the BEA argument, because it had 
already been stated that, in the opinion of the Council of the BEA, anything like 
1 0 0 % self-supplying capacity would be undesirable, and if such were the case
421 BEA Council Minutes 13th September 1934.
422 BEA Council Minutes 13lh February 1936. The organisations it was thought necessary to 
consult included: Agricultural Engineers Association; Association of British Manufacturers of 
Printers’ Machinery; British Chemical Plant Manufacturers Association; BEAMA; British Empire 
Sugar Machinery Manufacturers Association; Loom Makers’ Association; MTTA; and Steel 
Works Plant Association.
423 BEA Council Minutes 14th May 1936.
424 BEA Council Minutes 14th May 1936.
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British manufacturers might be cut off from the benefit of the results of the 
application of brains and skills abroad, which helped to keep them up to date in 
the export markets of the world. Therefore, the point had been reached when the 
IDAC would ask what was considered to be a reasonable home production. It 
would be difficult to say anything more than 90%,... Therefore, the BEA was 
about to ask for an increase of 13,1/3% in the rate of duty to raise it to 33,1/3% 
in order to increase our total output of machinery by 2.7% .425
In June 1936, an application still had not been submitted and, because of 
the complexities, Mr. Bremner stated he was no longer prepared to take the sole 
responsibility for submitting the application. Consequently, a small Committee 
was set up to deal with the matter.426 In November 1936, it was finally decided 
that no application for additional duty on machinery would be made. The position 
at that time was even more unfavourable than that which had existed a few 
months before. More and more machinery exemptions were being granted 
because machines could not be supplied in Britain within a reasonable time. 
Whilst machinery could be obtained from abroad in three or four months in 
Britain this would take twelve to eighteen months. ‘Deliveries had broken down 
very largely under the stress of the Defence Program added to the recovery of the 
ordinary manufacturing prosperity of this country.’427
In November 1936, ‘He [the Director] stated it would be impossible to
make application for the further protection of individual classes o f machinery,
first of all owing to the fact that machinery must be taken as a whole, and 
secondly owing to the tremendous opposition which would be raised by other 
sections of the industry which had not received the added protection. His advice, 
therefore, was that in view of the figures he had quoted, the present time would be 
inopportune to put forward an application which would receive very little 
consideration, having regard to the pressure of events and the machinery 
requirements of this country.’ 428
The Director had a further meeting with Percy Ashley on the 2nd of March 1937.
425 BEA Council Minutes 14th May, 1936.
426 BEA Council Minutes 11th June, 1936.
427 BEA Council Minutes 12th November, 1936.
428 BEA Council Minutes 12th November, 1936.
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The net result of the somewhat long discussion had been that, when they went 
through the different categories of machinery and studied the value of the 
imports and then related them not only to the production figure but the sectional 
figures which were also published in the 1934 Census, it was found that there 
were really no good and sufficient grounds for representing to HM Government, 
or asking the IDAC to recommend that the import duty on machinery should be 
increased. Furthermore, on account of the relationship between imports and 
production of machinery section by section, it was suggested to him that it 
would be inadvisable to put forward an application in favour of increased 
protection on any particular class or classes, having regard to the fact that it had 
been concluded that discrimination was out of the question.429
Hence the BEA failed to secure an additional duty on its products for a 
variety of reasons. The BEA had felt that it would need to unite with the MTTA if 
it were to stand a good chance of convincing IDAC to introduce the tariff but they 
could not convince the MTTA to work with them. The policy of submitting a 
‘general’ application, which the Council decided to adopt, was costly. They chose 
to do this because they believed it was what IDAC expected and was more likely 
to get IDAC approval than many separate applications.430 However, it was 
virtually impossible to derive a single rate of duty for all types of machinery. In 
the long-term it determined that no formal application for additional duty was 
submitted. The attitude of IDAC was also unhelpful. As far as the operation of the 
machinery licensing system went, IDAC were keen to view the BEA as 
representative of the engineering industry. When it came to the additional duty 
application it was a different story, however: IDAC made it clear that, in this case, 
they would only reluctantly afford the BEA this status.
The slowness of the BEA’s actions also proved significant. In attempting 
to provide the IDAC with a very solid case the BEA lost valuable time: other
429 BEA Council Minutes 1 Ith March, 1937.
430 IDAC had agreed that it should be one general application for the industry. This was despite the 
Committee members knowing of the complexities of the industry. From IDAC’s discussions, it 
seems likely that they wanted to avoid the alternative which was separate applications on hundreds 
of product lines rather than because they were actively trying to deter the industry. After all, they 
had raised the issue in the first place.
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industries were less conscientious. Had the BEA not been so closely involved 
with the IDAC, the application may not have received such painstaking attention. 
By the time the BEA was ready to submit an application, the best time to submit it 
had passed. The recovery of the industry was well established, and their case was 
weakened by the strength of the rearmament boom and the industry’s inability to 
meet home demand. The BEA managed to talk themselves out of making an 
application, rather than putting one before the Committee formally and awaiting 
their consideration. Thus the application was only discussed informally with two 
members of the Committee, Percy Ashley and Alfred Hurst, and was not heard by 
the Committee as a whole.
Protection of the Iron and Steel Industry, and Iron and Steel Pricing
The protection of the iron and steel industry warrants attention in this study of the 
IDAC, because the engineering industry represented a large consuming interest of 
iron and steel products. Under the Import Duties Act, April 1932, most products 
o f the iron and steel industry were subject to ad valorem duties of 33'/3%. Import 
duties were increased in March 1935 to 50% to place the industry in a more 
favourable bargaining position with the International Steel Cartel. The Cartel 
negotiations were concluded in August 1935 and a quota system agreed upon.431 
Duties on quota imports were reduced to 20% from November 1936; duties on
A’xy * . 1  .
non-quota imports were to return to 33 /3%.
The Cartel agreement was drawn up at a time when British supply 
exceeded demand and the quotas agreed upon were therefore low. Under the 
rearmament boom, beginning in the autumn of 1936, demand began to outstrip 
supply. The quotas were increased but, between September 1936 and the summer 
of 1937, the other Cartel countries could not meet the demand either because they
431 The quota system was controlled by the BISF through a system of licensing of individual 
consignments.
432 Non-quota imports were those imports coming from countries which did not belong to the 
Cartel, the main country being the US. Imports from non-cartel countries were limited to 100% of 
the 1934 level.
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were faced with similar demand conditions at home.433 This led to a boom in 
domestic prices. From summer 1937 other Cartel countries were able to increase 
supply. The following table details the percentage of iron and steel imports 
received from the Cartel countries434:
Month av. 1936 Month av. 1937 January 1938 March 1938 June 1938
71% 57% 62% 60% 40%
Before the introduction of the Cartel, imports from cartel countries averaged 
between 60 and 70% of total iron and steel imports 435 In March 1937, the tariff 
on quota imports was reduced further to 10%436. However, because the proportion 
of non-quota imports was rising, consuming interests were unable to reap the full 
benefits of the fall in duty rates.437 Prices of steel products rose greatly, especially 
during 1936 and 1937, although imports may have retarded the price boom to an 
extent. However: ‘When consumption was falling during 1938 prices of steel were 
maintained at the boom levels while other prices were falling, and this can be 
largely attributed to the monopoly power which control of imports gave to the 
British Steel Industry’.438
In the early years of the tariff the engineering industry was willing to 
support the protection of the iron and steel industry. The support of the industry 
stemmed from before the passing of the Import Duties Act of 1932. The BEA 
decided that they would support the iron and steel industry if they applied for 
protection under Safeguarding. This was regardless of the likely impact on the
433 The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Trade Regulations & 
Commercial Policy o f the United Kingdom (Cambridge, 1943) p. 148
434 NIESR Trade Regulations p. 149, extract from table.
435 NIESR Trade Regulations p. 148
436 Hutchinson Tariff-Making p. 144 argues that the prices being quoted by other cartel countries 
increased significantly. The tariff was reduced to stabilise prices in Britain.
437 The rates, for both quota and non-quota imports, were temporarily reduced further in June 1937 
(to 2Vi% and 12*/2% respectively) in an attempt to meet the necessary demand. In March 1938, 
quota import duties were increased to 10% and specific duties were introduced for non-quota 
imports.
438 NIESR Trade Regulations p. 149.
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cost of its own material inputs. The BEA believed that once protection was 
awarded to iron and steel it would force the government to widen tariff coverage 
and, in fact, it would introduce a general tariff.439 The BEA felt that this was the 
most likely route by which they could get protection for their own industry. This 
feeling was strong enough that, at a meeting of the Industrial Group of Members 
of Parliament in the House of Commons, the support of the engineering industry 
was expressed.440
However, by 1934 unease was being felt at the extent of protection being 
granted to the industry. In June 1934 an application for additional duty on iron 
and steel bars, rods, angles, etc., was advertised by the IDAC in the Board of 
Trade Journal. The application was discussed at a BEA Council Meeting. 
Although greatly concerned because these were the raw materials of the 
engineering industry, the BEA took no action. The Association did not write in 
opposition to the application, believing that it was better to ‘leave it to the IDAC 
to decide what was a desirable and suitable application’.441
Another year on and the BEA began to express considerable concern at the 
increases in duty on iron and steel products because guarantees that prices would 
not rise were not met.442 In this regard, the President felt that IDAC should be 
informed of their opinion that: ‘while they were in sympathy with any steps taken 
by another industry to regain a reasonable amount of prosperity, any increase 
which would raise the price of iron and steel to the consumer would be strongly 
resented’ .443
The engineering industry had attempted, on several occasions since the 
introduction of the tariff, to negotiate with the British Iron and Steel Federation 
(BISF)444 for a ‘rebate’ scheme on steel purchased and used in manufacture for 
export. An agreement had not been reached and it was felt that: ‘The time had 
now arrived, however, when the engineering industry could no longer maintain an
439 BEA Council Minutes Special meeting, November 19th, 1931.
440 BEA Council Minutes 10th December 1931.
441 BEA Council Minutes 14th June 1934.
442 The matter is discussed in depth at Council Meetings in March, April and May 1935.
443 BEA Council Minutes 14th March 1935.
444 Before June 1934, the negotiations had been with the National Federation of Iron and Steel 
Manufacturers (NFISM).
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attitude of “benevolent neutrality” in the face of the very great reliefs which had 
come to the iron and steel industry and the demands now being made for still 
further increased duties. It would now be quite unthinkable,..., that the iron and 
steel industry should be allowed any further to handicap the machinery export 
trade which was in just as dire straits as ever the iron and steel industry had been 
in ’.445 It was decided that Mr. Bremner should prepare a case for the protection of 
the engineering industry against a rise in material costs in the event of another 
additional duty being granted to the iron and steel industry.446 ‘The President cited 
a case of his own experience of an attempt by a firm of steel merchants to increase 
their charges by 25% on a repeat order in anticipation [sic] of a rise in the price of 
steel owing to the increased duties’. 447
A meeting was arranged between the Director and Sir Alfred Hurst of 
IDAC. Mr. Bremner reminded Sir Alfred that the BEA had thus far supported the 
safeguarding and protection of the Iron and Steel Industry based on definite 
assurances that the engineering industry need not fear excessive steel prices.448 
‘Sir Alfred had made it quite clear that he and his Committee sympathetically 
recognised the interests of the engineering industry as a large consumer of iron 
and steel, and its value as a contributor to British Export Trade, and that they were 
conscious of the weight of their responsibility that no encouragement would be 
given to use the increased protection merely to increase prices and swell the 
profits of the iron and steel industry’.449 At Sir Alfred’s request, Mr. Bremner 
agreed to collate information in respect of steel prices. 450
The matter of rising prices was discussed, in 1936, with the BISF. The 
BEA were informed that detailed investigations were conducted by the Federation 
into price increases, and results of these investigations were then passed on to 
IDAC from time to time. The IDAC advised Departments purchasing war 
materials of the reason for rises in the price of steel, whether it was fair and 
reasonable and whether it was unavoidable. Without IDAC approval, price rises
445 BEA Council Minutes 14th March 1935.
446 BEA Council Minutes 14th March 1935.
447 BEA Council Minutes 11th April 1935.
448 BEA Council Minutes 11th April 1935.
449 BEA Council Minutes 11th April 1935.
450 BEA Council Minutes 11th April 1935.
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were not accepted by the government departments.451 This procedure was then 
verified by Sir Alfred H urst452
A letter was sent to IDAC, on the 24th of November 1936, stating the 
BEA’s views on the iron and steel industry. Subsequently, IDAC invited the BEA 
to give oral evidence on ‘Iron and steel prices and allied questions’, a meeting 
taking place on 2nd February, 1937 453 IDAC were of the opinion that rising 
prices had been justified by increased costs for the steel works: ‘Lord May, had 
assured then that no price increases had taken place since the imposition of the 
tariff without the cognisance of the IDAC who, furthermore, had been allowed to 
send competent chartered accounts to the different works involved in any 
proposed increases for the purpose of investigating costs and submitting a report 
to the IDAC ...’ 454 The BEA remained concerned because this meant consumers 
of steel had no idea of the likely extent or limit of price increases 455
Sir Alfred Hurst suggested that engineering firms should just put up their 
prices. Mr. Reavell had pointed out that ‘this was a thing which manufacturing 
engineers with some sense of economics were disinclined to do - although some 
had been forced to increase prices - and they did not view with equanimity the 
idea of taking part in a vicious spiral of continually raising prices to compensate 
increased costs, with results which, in the interests of the nation, should be 
avoided’.456
451 BEA Council Minutes 9th April 1936.
According to Tolliday, Business, Banking and Politics p.319, it emerged that IDAC did not review 
the accounts of individual firms but relied on the cost investigations of the BSIF’s accountant. In 
1938 IDAC began to employ their own accountant, he found that estimated costs had always been 
“conjectural”.
452 BEA Council Minutes 11th June 1936.
453 BEA Council Minutes 11th February 1937.
This was conducted as part of IDAC’s investigation of the Iron and Steel Industry begun in 1936 
at the request of the President of the Board of Trade.
454BEA Council Minutes 11th February 1937
The BEA were not entirely happy with this, however, noting that some of the largest steel 
producers were also colliery owners and, therefore, to a large extent controlled their own cost 
increases. Whilst IDAC were certifying the increase steel prices they were doing nothing to certify 
the increased costs of the inputs to the steel industry.
455BEA Council Minutes 11th February, 1937
456BEA Council Minutes 11th February, 1937
At the meeting, the BEA requested a rebate system for steel used in the 
manufacture of exports but, disappointingly, no further progress was made on this 
issue.457 The engineering industry had instead come under attack from IDAC: the 
organisation and efficiency of the industry had been questioned by the Committee. 
The BEA’s views on these matters was brought out in a letter sent to the IDAC on 
8 th February, shown at Appendix 5.4. In discussion, at the Council Meeting,
Louis Smith argued that the BEA should keep in closer contact with the IDAC on 
these issues: ‘He rather felt that if the BEA were to prosecute its claims on this 
point more frequently, the IDAC would become more au fa it with the difficulties 
of the engineering industry, and they would be more in sympathy with engineers 
when dealing with claims from other industries which vitally affected the 
engineering industry.’ 458
‘So that Members of Council should not feel that the meeting had been a 
disappointment entirely, the Director said he was convinced that considerable 
good had been done by the discussion with the IDAC in that they had been able to 
present to their minds certain features of the position from the consumers’ point of 
view, which the Committee might not otherwise have seen in their proper 
relationship and perspective’.459
The attitude of the IDAC to the BEA’s argument is best summed up by 
Hutchinson, where it appears that the case of the engineering industry was not 
taken particularly seriously: ‘The response to the public invitation did not reveal 
any strong antagonism from outside to the developments that had taken place in 
the industry. Consumers such as the British Engineers Association viewed with 
satisfaction its recovery and growth, with the caveat of some apprehension that its
457BEA Council Minutes 11th February, 1937
Having been unable to negotiate such a system direct with BISF, the BEA hoped this could be 
introduced under the direction of IDAC.
458BEA Council Minutes 11th February, 1937
459BEA Council Minutes 11th February, 1937
These comments suggest a lack of awareness of how IDAC operated. Although, IDAC did try to 
consider interests of ‘other parties’ when examining additional duty applications, ultimately they 
had to rely on opposition being lodged officially.
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strength should put them at a disadvantage, and a doubt, natural to buyers, 
whether its prices were not too high’.460
Until 1936, IDAC had been optimistic that price levels would be reduced 
as the iron and steel industry was reorganised. The position altered in 1937 with 
the changed supply and demand conditions. These forced the more inefficient 
British plants back into service, thereby increasing costs.461 Prices were high, but 
the case o f the BEA either was not made forcefully enough, or the industry was 
regarded as less vital than iron and steel. The IDAC, after all, had an additional 
responsibility for the iron and steel industry. The engineering industry was 
booming in the late thirties regardless of the prices of its raw materials. 
Furthermore, given the industry’s inability to meet home demands under 
rearmament, argument along the lines of high-pricing impairing export 
competitiveness lost much of its weight.
The tariff and the recovery of the engineering industry
In its Bulletin, the Association provided information to its members, both on its 
own activities and on economic factors affecting the engineering trade. Each year 
the ‘Statistics and Economic Intelligence Section’ reviewed the state of the 
economy and considered the industry’s prospects. From an examination of these 
reviews it is possible to ascertain the industry’s views on recovery.
The review of the year ending December 1933 notes: ‘The year witnessed 
a progressive recovery in industry and trade generally, and to this the engineering 
industry was no exception.... The prospects for engineering industry next year are 
distinctly encouraging, although there is still a vast amount of lost ground to be 
recovered’.462 Continued signs of recovery were noted throughout 1934. Statistics 
o f employment in the industry are used as an important indicator of this. It was 
noted that most of the improvement was in the home market rather than in the
460 Hutchinson Tariff-Making p. 146
461 Tolliday Business, Banking and Politics p.313.
462 BEA Bulletin Volume XV 1934, January 1934 No.l. page 12.
At this stage the recovery should be seen as essentially an home recovery. Exports of machinery 
had only begun a very slow recovery during 1933.
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export trade of the industry .463 From July 1935 the export sector also began to 
recover. At the same time, however, a “disturbing tendency” for the imports of 
machinery to have risen in spite of the tariff was noted 464 This became a recurring 
theme, the rise of imported machinery into the country being regularly bought to 
the attention of the industry through these reports. In the October 1935 issue, it 
was noted that, in the first three-quarters of the year, exports had expanded (equal 
to 72.1% of the corresponding value in 1930), but that imports also continued to 
increase (equal to about two-thirds the 1930 value) 465
In October 1935, the report of the section had a more gloomy tone about 
future prospects: ‘Although since our last issue international complications have 
become more acute, there is as yet no definite indication of deleterious effect on 
our industry and commerce. It is to be feared, however, that adverse developments 
may retard and even prevent the economic progress which had been expected 
right up to the end of the year.’466 Despite this, October and November were both 
good months for the industry with order books being in their best position since 
the beginning of the depression. In the annual review of 1935, the steady recovery 
was noted with anticipation that progress would continue throughout 1936.
From the summer of 1936, the impact of the re-armament programme 
began to be felt: home production increased, exports fell, and imports rose. ‘In 
most directions the engineering industry is now operating at or near full capacity; 
and it has become clear that, as the Government’s requirements increase, the 
satisfaction of normal demand, and particularly of export trade, may be 
subordinated, a situation not altogether without its dangers.’467 From this point, 
the high levels of demand facing the industry remained until the outbreak of war 
in September 1939 468
463 BEA Bulletin Volume XV 1934, May-June 1934, No.4. p71.
464 BEA Bulletin Volume XV 1934, May-June 1934, No.4. p71.
They were still lower than pre-tariff levels though.
465 BEA Bulletin Volume XVI 1935, October 1935, pi 18.
466 BEA Bulletin Volume XVI 1935, October 1935, page 118.
467 BEA Bulletin Volume XVIII 1937, Feb.-March 1937, page 32.
468 This rise in home demand coincided, unfortunately, with the BEA’s consideration of an 
additional duty application and, as discussed, in part explained why the application was never 
formally submitted.
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The engineering industry was one of those industries which recovered 
relatively early from the depression in Britain. The recovery progressed at a 
steady pace from 1933.469 Beginning in the domestic market by 1935 it had 
progressed to the export sector. The contribution of the tariff to the recovery is 
uncertain, especially given the rising trend of machinery imports which were, in 
later years, exacerbated by the rearmament programme. The opinion of the 
industry itself can be gauged, however, from comments made during BEA 
Council meetings and from reports to the membership. These show that the 
industry perceived the tariff as being vital to the recovery, even though in later 
years the tariff level was insufficient to prevent high levels of machinery
47 0importations.
At the BEA President’s Luncheon Address in October 1935, his views on 
the recovery are expressed: ‘As you all know, looking at the matter broadly, our 
home trade has grown, largely due to the application of duties on machinery, and 
also due to duties on many other articles, including the primary products o f iron 
and steel, and the increased turnover which these manufacturers are obtaining has, 
in turn, increased their requirements for all classes of machinery which our 
member firms manufacture. ’471 The President also suggests that the recovery had 
arisen in part from the reorganisation of the industry, but it mainly resulted from 
improved conditions stimulated by tariff protection.
In March-April 1936 edition of the Bulletin, extracts from the Import 
Duties Act Inquiry (1933) report, just published, were provided for the 
information of members. Highlighted is the extent to which the engineering 
industry was able to extend its coverage of the home market. The article notes:
469 E. Allen, ‘The Engineering Trades’ in British Association eds. Britain in Recovery, argues that, 
based on trends in unemployment figures, the recovery was well underway in all branches of the 
engineering trade by 1934.
G. C. Allen, in British Industries and their Organization (London, 1951) p. 127, notes that the 
index of production by 1934 had returned to the pre-depression levels and from then on the 
advance was rapid. Between 1934 and 1937 output rose by 45%.
470 Given the exceptional demand conditions, machinery imports would have continued whatever 
the tariff-level set.
471 BEA Bulletin Volume XVI 1935, October 1935, p. 106.
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‘These definite increases in the proportions of the home market supplied by our 
own production are all the more satisfactory as having been achieved in a year of 
depression and very restricted activity, but they certainly could not have been 
achieved without the assistance of the tariff in checking imports.’472
Conclusion
The BEA had been established for twenty years by the time the General 
Tariff was introduced in 1932. While it did not represent the whole of the 
engineering sector, it was the largest trade association and it represented a 
diversity of interests. IDAC recognised the importance o f this association early on 
and consulted it upon the initial tariff introduction. The Association had a long 
history of supporting protection and had considered how a tariff might be 
introduced and operated. In the initial discussions with IDAC it hoped that the 
engineering industry would be granted a duty of 33 V3 % on all products but in 
this it was to be disappointed. Yet, because the association had been involved in 
this discussion process from the outset, they felt that not only did they have to 
accept the duty given but that they needed to ‘sell’ the outcome as positive to their 
membership. The IDAC thereby received tacit approval for the level of tariff it 
granted.
The BEA had established credentials as an organisation with experience of 
working with government. It swiftly became apparent that IDAC would need to 
call upon the knowledge and expertise of the BEA in to operate its machinery 
licensing scheme successfully. Under the machinery licensing scheme, the BEA 
performed work which otherwise would have been left to the IDAC. It thus 
reduced the manpower requirements of the Committee. By involving the trade 
association, the Committee also received an implied endorsement of the system. 
The BEA, despite being uncomfortable with the system, gained from enhanced 
knowledge o f gaps in British production, allowing the introduction of new lines of 
production. This helped to modernise the industry and assisted with its recovery.
472 BEA Bulletin Volume XVII 1936, March-April 1936, p.36.
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Given its involvement in the machinery licensing scheme if any trade 
association was in a position to influence IDAC and gain favours, it was the BEA. 
Yet it appears that the close involvement of the BEA with IDAC did not confer 
privileges to the association in other areas. The BEA did not receive more 
favourable treatment than other trade association as a result of a ‘corporatist’ style 
relationship with the IDAC. Conversely, it seems that, far from strengthening the 
BEA’s position, the intimate knowledge IDAC was able to gain of the 
organisation worked against it. The BEA was unable to extract from IDAC any 
additional protection when it was needed. For the association, it was unfortunate 
that when considering the machinery licensing system, they were accepted as 
representative of the industry but, in the case of the additional duty application 
they were criticised for not being representative enough. This stands in stark 
contrast to the iron and steel industry which, through a strong trade association, 
gained all it wanted from IDAC without having to make any real concessions.
Nor was the BEA granted special favours when the association made 
complaints about the pricing and the tariffs of the iron and steel industry.473 The 
discussions between BEA and IDAC on iron and steel pricing show that they were 
aware of effective rates of protection. It is clear that the industry sought to ensure 
that the tariff on outputs compensated for tariffs on inputs, although quantitative 
estimates of effective rates were not calculated. In considering the engineering 
industry, IDAC remained aware that it was an important ‘using’ industry of the 
products of the iron and steel industry that were, on the whole, subject to the 
highest rates of duty. IDAC monitored rising iron and steel prices but felt that 
they were all justified. Unlike the building industry, the engineering industry was 
not in the position to pass on costs to customers. Therefore, its profits were 
squeezed by the increasing costs of its inputs. IDAC seems to have been 
unsympathetic in this regard. However, like building, the industry was facing 
booming demand and its real problem was that it could not supply enough to meet 
demand.
473 Of course, the ‘sponsoring’ role the IDAC had with the iron and steel industry makes this issue 
more complicated.
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While the BEA was an important and large industry, its diversity acted 
against it. The BEA was a fragmented and disjointed organisation mirroring its 
wide and disparate membership and their heterogeneous interests. Consequently, 
it was indecisive and decided too late to apply for additional protection. The 
Committee with its close working knowledge of the Trade Association was well 
placed to criticise the Association for its weak organisation. The BEA did not 
receive additional tariff protection when it believed this was necessary. Nor, in its 
opinion, were the prices of its raw materials controlled adequately by IDAC. Yet 
the industry still perceived the tariff as being valuable in assisting its recovery. As 
with other industries, the tariff may have benefited the industry insofar as it 
encouraged investment and by providing an element of certainty in what were 
uncertain times.
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Chapter 6: IDAC and the wider policy environment
This part of the thesis will examine the role of IDAC and wider policy 
issues. This shows that IDAC’s interests were wide ranging and were not limited 
to the implementation and administration of the General tariff. The Committee 
was pro-active in their support of other government policy objectives and worked 
co-operatively with other government departments. To put this aspect of the 
Committee’s work into context a brief history of government’s involvement with, 
and intervention in, industry in the decade and a half before the Committee began 
their work will be provided before moving on to the study of IDAC’s own 
activities.
After the First World War, the government sought to take some direction 
over the economy. Recognising that the transitional period from war to peacetime 
production could be a painful one, and seeing the dire need for change and 
modernisation in some of the nation’s larger industries. Spurred on by its close 
liaison with business, through the trade associations, during wartime, the 
government aimed, in the early post-war period, to reorganise and rationalise 
industry. This was at first to be co-ordinated through the operation of the Ministry 
of Reconstruction. The achievements o f this body were strictly limited however 
the level of co-operation exhibited by business during the war was no longer so 
strong, and the urgency for change dwindled with the ensuing post-war boom .474
Throughout the 1920s the government did continue, by various means, to 
pursue the goal of rationalisation of industry. Rationalisation as applied to 
industry had two major components. First, questions of industrial structure 
particularly concerned the size of firms and integration so that economies of scale 
could be achieved. Second, this concerned the internal organisation of firms, and 
in particular their management techniques 475 Terms ‘rationalisation’ and 
‘reorganisation’ were synonymous, although neither had a clear definition
474 See Kirby & Rose ‘Competitive Failure’ pp. 20-39
475 Tomlinson J. Government and the enterprise since 1900: the changing problem o f efficiency. 
(Oxford, 1994) p. 105
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contemporaries used the terms in many different ways.476 Lucas, notes: ‘In fact, 
the process of reorganization has taken so many direction and has been so little 
crystallised that it is hardly correct to dignify it all as a coherent movement’ 477 
The process of rationalisation varied from industry to industry. In the case of the 
steel industry, Tolliday suggests: ‘The term was often used imprecisely, but it 
generally implied reorganising the industry through amalgamations which would 
eliminate excess capacity, concentrate production, and realize economies of scale 
and best-practice methods’.478
In most instances reorganisation was left to the industry itself, the 
government only participated when industry was incapable or unwilling to a c t479 
Attempts were made to encourage the voluntary re-organisation of a number of 
key industries, in particular the coal mines, the iron and steel industry, and the 
cotton industry, all with little success. Indirectly, the rationalisation of the cotton 
and the iron and steel industry was pursued by the government under the aegis of 
the Bank of England and its Bankers Industrial Development Corporation (BIDC) 
and Securities Management Trust (SMT) 480 The literature on the subject shows 
that these activities were only partially successful.481
The view held by government that many industries still required 
significant modernisation meant that the desire for rationalisation, in some form, 
did not significantly alter throughout the inter-war period. The governments of the 
1930s were in favour of industrial ‘self-regulation’. It was believed that through 
the trade associations, industries would reorganise themselves and direct
476 As Leslie Hannah points out, ‘Rationalization’ lacked any precise meaning. To some, it just 
meant horizontal amalgamation, others saw a wider meaning which included the application of 
scientific methods. There were calls for experimentation in new forms of industrial organisation 
within firms, and for mergers of companies.
Hannah Leslie The Rise o f the Corporate Economy (2nd Ed) (London 1983) pp.29-30
477 Lucas A.F. Industrial Reconstruction and the Control o f Competition. (London, 1937) pp.26-27
478 Tolliday S. ‘Steel and Rationalization Policies, 1918-1950’, in Elbaum & Lazonick eds. The 
Decline o f the British Economy: an institutional perspective (Oxford, 1986), p.82
479 Lucas, Industrial Reconstruction, p.27
480 The Bank of England was willing to take on the role in part because it fears that the alternative 
will be for the Government to nationalise the cotton industry, something to which the directors of 
the Bank are strongly opposed.
481 see Tolliday Business, Banking and Politics
191
government intervention would be unnecessary. The associations were, in many 
cases, responsible for the introduction of restrictive practices or cartels. Again, 
Lucas notes: ‘Not only has cooperative action in general become an integral part 
of the reorganization programme it has been utilized expressly to suppress 
competition’.482 Governments traditionally had mixed views on such 
arrangements. Early anti-trust action by the government was half-hearted though. 
The report of the Committee on Trusts, and the ensuing enquiries under the 
Profiteering Act (1919), were hardly more than a sop to labour unrest 483 Whilst, 
wishing to diffuse possible labour unrest, equally important claims could be made 
for the business side whose confidence needed to be maintained to ensure the 
revival of British business 484 However, cartelisation came to be intimately linked 
with notions of improved industrial organisation 485 As was the case with Iron and 
Steel,486 it was believed that rationalisation would emerge out of the protective 
framework of a cartel. Later legislation was, therefore, more supportive of these 
types of activities.
‘Government reports on aspects of industrial combination and organisation 
gave a clear green light to rationalisation and cartelisation. Most significant was 
the report of the Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade of 1929, which not 
only saw no case for immediate legislation to restrain possible abuses resulting 
from combines, but urged further rationalisation by industrialists’.487 Cartels 
gained the seal of approval because they were closely associated with 
rationalisation. Reflecting this, in 1935, the government introduced an Industrial 
Reorganisation (Enabling) Bill. This would have given statutory powers to the 
majority of producers in an industry to coerce any recalcitrant minority into 
accepting plans for reorganisation.488 Also in the 1935 Finance Act the
482 Lucas, Industrial Reconstruction, p.29.
483 Mercer Competitive order p.44-45. Work under the Profiteering Act went ahead in 1919 and 
1920, but the Act was allowed to lapse in 1921.
484 Mercer Competitive order p.45
485 This in part stemmed from a report by the Ministry of Reconstruction’s Committee on 
Commercial and Industrial Policy. See, Mercer Competitive order p.47
486 Wurm International Relations p.74
487 Mercer Competitive order p.48
488 Winch, ‘A Managed Economy?’ p.63
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Government stated: ‘if a scheme of organisation covering the majority of an 
industry had been certified by the Board of Trade as being of assistance in 
reducing excess capacity, contributions to it might be deducted from income for 
tax purposes’ 489The courts also tended to support such restrictive practices.490
Other examples exist of the government directly influencing the 
development path of certain industries, such as the Shipping Assistance Act of 
1935. Early protective measures, the maintenance of the McKenna Duties (1915), 
the Dyestuffs Act (1920) and Safeguarding of Industries (1921), also promoted 
the development of selective industries in the economy. Industry was not the only 
area of the economy subject to increasing government control. A number of 
marketing and re-organisation boards were introduced controlling the agricultural 
sector of the economy 491 In 1930, the Coal Mines Act introduced a compulsory 
cartel scheme for the industry 492 Checkland argues, through this Act, the 
government opted to enforce rationalisation and market regulation. It introduced 
production quotas and a regulated schedule of prices. Amalgamation schemes 
were also to be carried through under the Act.493 The government also intervened 
directly in 1936 with the Cotton Industry Reorganisation Act.
Governments also established research committees to examine the state of 
the economy. In 1919 Lloyd George set-up the National Industrial Conference494, 
in 1924 the Labour Government proposed a Committee o f Economic Inquiry and 
the Conservative government established a Committee of Civil Research495. In 
1929, Ramsay MacDonald established the Economic Advisory Council (EAC). It 
was against this background and in this environment that IDAC were to conduct 
their work.
489 PEP Industrial Trade Associations p.29
490 Mercer Competitive order p.48
491 Agricultural Credits Act 1923; Agricultural Wages Regulation Act, 1924; Wheat Act, 1932; 
Agricultural Marketing Acts 1931 and 1933; Milk Marketing Board 1933; Bacon and Pig Board 
1933-34; Potato Marketing Board 1933; Sugar Industry Reorganisation Act 1935.
492 Pollard S. The Development o f the British Economy (London 1983) p. 106
493 Checkland S., British public policy 1776-1939 p.317
494 This was concerned with labour employer relations
495 This concerned science and industry.
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IDAC and wider policy issues
‘Protection provided the government with a bargaining weapon in its relations 
with industrialists which it attempted to use to induce them to undertake measures 
of reorganisation’.496
The involvement of IDAC in the rationalisation of the iron and steel 
industry is well known and well documented.497 Less is known however, 
concerning other interventionist activities o f IDAC. These include rationalisation 
and reorganisation of other industries, the promotion of business organisations 
(trade associations and cartels), promotion of research and development, 
technology transfers and new product development. Examination of IDAC papers 
allows an exploration of their activities in these areas.
Apart from rationalisation of iron and steel, IDAC involved themselves 
with other industries. In the case of iron and steel, IDAC grants the concession of 
the tariff having received certain assurances from the industry. However, 
agreement by business was ‘theoretical’, and, as is well known, the industry was 
able to avoid meeting their side of the bargain. Nevertheless, in the case of other 
industries, these may have had to reorganise (even if only on a small scale) before 
a tariff was introduced 498 IDAC promoted the government’s rationalisation 
program by directly making the granting of additional duties conditional upon 
some reorganisation of the industry concerned 499
496 Winch, ‘A Managed Economy?’ p.59
497 See for instance the work of Tolliday ‘Tariffs and Steel’ and Wurm International Relations. 
The relationship between this industry and the government provides a good example of “capture”. 
Involvement of government generally, and IDAC more specifically, is regarded as a failure. The 
rationalisation of the industry is pursued to no avail whilst the industry is successful in getting 
additional protection. Tolliday shows that the Iron and Steel industry was able to resist pressure 
and only limited reorganisation took place, but the government could hardly take away the 
protection because of high levels of unemployment already being experienced.
498 The industries where IDAC specifically relate granting of additional duty to rationalisation are: 
Agriculture (and especially horticulture), iron and steel, cutlery, cotton, women’s boot and shoe 
industry, the leather glove industry, the hemp industry, and the keg and drum industry.
499 Unlike the case of the steel industry, some industries are asked to ‘put their house in order’ 
before they get increased tariff protection. One example of this is the cutlery industry. IDAC
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IDAC also sought to encourage innovation and improved efficiency within 
industry. They became closely involved with other government departments in a 
bid to bring British industry up to the standards of their overseas competitors. 
IDAC tied in granting additional duty with the levels of efficiency and research 
and development in an industry. A ‘research-criteria’ was not introduced in a 
formal sense into the Committee’s consideration of applications. However, it did 
take into account the views of other government departments, especially those of 
the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), when considering 
applications for additional duty. Examples can also be found where requests for 
free listing were turned down because IDAC were trying to encourage the home 
production of particular items. Like other departments and the government itself, 
IDAC was greatly concerned with industrial efficiency and the question of 
efficiency was explicitly considered in reviewing all applications. In rewarding 
the ‘efficient’ by recommending applications and refusing the ‘inefficient’, IDAC 
pushed through policy: to improve efficiency, using a carrot and stick approach.500
IDAC’s interest in industrial performance was not limited to the extensiveness of 
research and development provisions; they had a much wider ranging interest in 
industrial efficiency. IDAC in aiming to introduce a scientific tariff focused 
closely on industrial performance. They were of like mind with the government, 
in that, they believed British industry needed to improve in order to be prepared to 
face free market competition once more. They were in an unprecedented position 
to either help or coerce industries to achieve this.
IDAC did not have a fixed opinion about how industry should improve but 
considered'a number of approaches. For some industries, failure of marketing was 
considered a problem and this is taken account of when the Committee made their 
decisions about applications. For industries where other government departments
refused to grant an additional duty for a period of five years. If at the end of the time the industry 
had rationalised and reorganised then IDAC would grant them the extra protection they wanted.
500 The governments steer was to improve the competitive strength of British industry. IDAC 
chose to address this by considering efficiency and research capability and took forward policy in 
this direction.
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had a specific interest, i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture’s responsibility for 
marketing schemes, any action was largely left to the responsible Department.
In other areas of government policy, such as the ‘Special Areas’ and 
unemployment, IDAC were less likely to become involved. IDAC did not believe 
that such policies were in their purview and they therefore did not take a proactive 
approach. These issues were important to the government but they did not 
essentially have a bearing on the efficiency of British industries. IDAC believed 
that employment problems would be resolved once industry revived itself. This 
was certainly the case in the high growth sectors such as engineering and building, 
both of which during this period suffered from a lack o f skilled labour. The 
Committee discussed the employment position of an industry or area in those 
cases where it was drawn to their attention. But, as noted earlier [see chapter 3] 
they were not considered sufficient reason, in themselves, to sway the 
Committee’s decisions one way or another.
Re-organisation/rationalisation
The Committee’s approach towards industry vis-k-vis industrial reorganisation 
and in respect of efficiency and technical standards is complex. On the one hand, 
it is apparent from their discussions that they held strong views about the 
necessity for many industries to reorganise, to modernise and to invest in research 
and development. Yet, at the same time, they were wary of using their powers to 
enforce such activities or to become too closely involved in the processes.
IDAC were clearly aware of the powers they held in this respect and knew that 
actions they took in this direction would have government backing.501 
Chamberlain on the eve of his introduction of the Import Duties Bill wrote that it: 
‘does provide us with such a lever as has never been possessed before by any 
government for inducing or, if you like, forcing industry to set its house in order.
1 have in my mind particularly iron and steel, and cotton; and my belief in the
501 A file exists of newspaper cuttings on the topic, along with a copy of the PEP booklet 
“Industrial Self-Government”.
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advantages of protection was not so fanatical as to close my eyes to the vital 
importance of a thorough reorganisation of such industries as these, if they are 
even to keep their heads above water in the future’.502 
The minutes of one of the Committee’s earliest meetings note: ‘The Committee are 
alive to the fact that in some industries the re-establishment of an industry upon a 
satisfactory basis may be dependent quite as much on its proper reorganisation and 
equipment as on the degree of protection to be accorded, and it was to be 
anticipated that this consideration will be in their minds in their subsequent 
proceedings’.503
The close connection between IDAC and the Iron and Steel industry was detailed 
in the work of both Tolliday and W urm .504 They make clear that IDAC in 
agreeing to additional protection for the industry attempted to further this policy 
objective of the government. Hutchinson notes that IDAC sought unofficially 
approval from the Chancellor of the Exchequer concerning its approach to the 
industry. This was forthcoming.505 In 1936, the committee produced a report on 
the state of the industry for the Board of Trade. In response to this, the President 
o f the Board of Trade informed the Committee that the Government thought it 
essential that the Committee should continue to ‘oversee’ the industry on its 
behalf.506
IDAC attempted to enforce rationalisation o f the industry. In April 1932 
tariff levels on iron and steel products were increased to between 15 and 3 3 !/3%, 
but for a limited time only. ‘The time-limit, abolished in June 1934, was intended 
as a means of putting pressure on the industry to rationalise and to work out a 
reorganisation plan and secure its acceptance by its members’.507 Tolliday shows 
that the Iron and Steel Industry was able to resist these pressures and only limited 
reorganisation took place. Once the tariff was introduced no reorganisation of the 
industry took place, but the protection could hardly be removed because of the
502 cited in, Beer British politics p.293
503 PRO BT/10/1 Committee Paper 46. Draft article on the recommendations, 20.4.32.
504 Tolliday ‘Tariffs and Steel’, Wurm, International Relations.
505 Hutchinson Tariff-making p. 147
506 Hutchinson Tariff-making p. 147
507 Wurm International Relations p.56
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high levels of unemployment already being experienced and the importance of the 
industry to the nation. The National Government developed a relationship with the 
BISF, so that it acted as an intermediary between them and the industry. The 
argument goes as follows: ‘These slowly developing underlying changes were 
laying the basis for a new relationship between government and industrialists 
during and after the war. Government was slowly permeating and being 
permeated by the industrial milieu with which it had for so long been 
unfamiliar’.508 IDAC did not recommend additional duties merely on economic 
grounds, declaring: ‘the maintenance of a prosperous iron and steel industry in the 
highest degree of efficiency was essential to the economic progress of the country, 
while from the point of view of national security it must still be regarded as 
vital’.509
Thereafter, the Committee tended to draw back from close involvement in any re­
organisation/rationalisation planning by applicant industries. The Committee’s 
enforced involvement in the re-organisation of the Iron and Steel Industry, a 
responsibility placed upon them by the Government, had more than a little impact 
upon this. The involvement of IDAC here, as detailed above, had limited results.
It was also time consuming making the Committee wary of such close 
involvement with others. In any case, they held the general view that where re­
organisation or rationalisation was necessary the industry itself was always best 
positioned to identify what changes were appropriate.
Whenever possible though IDAC sought to promote and encourage such 
changes. In twenty-three cases, an additional duty was granted because additional 
protection would lead to improvements. This was either through the 
reorganisation of the industry or because the industry would be able to capture 
economies of scale or because it would allow the industry to make technical 
and/or scientific advances.510
508 Tolliday Tariffs and Steel’ p.74
509 Wurm International Relations p.60
510 This is 23 out of 154 successful applications, or around 15%.
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As far as ID AC were concerned a successful outcome could take a variety 
of forms.511 Co-operative organisation of an otherwise dis-aggregated industry 
was considered by ID AC to be vital. They believed change and progress in an 
industry was best coming from within and was most likely to be forthcoming 
through some form of institutional body established by that industry.
Ideally though the Committee would have liked to have seen their 
assistance having more profound and direct effects. If appropriate in individual 
cases, ID AC would have liked to have seen the closure of idle and inefficient 
plants and the amalgamation and integration (horizontal or vertical) of plants and 
firms to enable production on a large-scale and foster economies of scale. In 
addition, they hoped to see the introduction of new methods of production and the 
introduction of effective marketing systems.
Some of these issues were bought to light in the case of the Cotton Weft 
Pile producers.512 An exceptionally high rate of duty was granted for a temporary 
period to the end of 1937, on the understanding that the industry would be 
improved. In making their decision, the Committee reviewed the existing
C | 1
organisation within the industry, which was poor. The industry had recognised 
in the late 1920s that it needed to reorganise and plans had been mooted for a 
vertical combine. In 1930, the manufacturers went to the Governments Chief 
Industrial Adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, for assistance. Discussions took place 
among manufacturers, merchants and dyers but without success. IDAC, being 
aware of this, tried to spark this process off again and therefore decided to grant 
the additional duty for a fixed period only. Informal talks were held with the 
applicants to prompt them into action.
511 In the case of the Iron and Steel industry, they saw the establishment of a national trade body as 
an end in itself, and in this at least there was a successful outcome.
512 An application for additional duty was made in March 1936 by the Cotton Weft Pile Industry
513 ‘The Lancashire industry -  which directly employs some 1,700 operatives -  is at present in a 
state of great uncertainty, and in the circumstances 1 am of the opinion that an increased duty on 
cut pile velveteen, whether further processed or not, should be imposed at the earliest possible 
date’. Further, they noted: i t  is clear that the weft pile industry is organised in a way which is 
unsuited to present conditions, and is handicapped by the existence of a large quantity of idle 
plant. Attempts were made some years ago to effect a reorganisation, but came to nothing’.
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When, some months after taking the decision, the Committee re-examined 
the industry they noted: ‘It is evident that, as we anticipated, the path of 
reorganisation is not likely to be smooth, and will only be entered upon with 
reluctance by the various parties ... It is clearly, however, those concerned in the 
industry, and not we, who should formulate any scheme of reorganisation. . . ’.514 
However, the Committee followed this up by writing to the newly established 
Velveteen Duties Committee to express their opinion of the industry and suggest 
they would like to be kept informed of plans and progress (see copy letter in 
Appendix 6 .1)515.
At further review was undertaken in 1937, when the Committee found that 
the industry had been organised into four sectional associations. Each of these 
associations had delegates on the newly formed ‘Velvet Council Association’, 
which had been established to direct industrial policy .516 The Committee found 
that re-organisation thus far had led to an ‘improved spirit’ in the trade. They 
believed the industry especially the weaving section where voluntary price 
agreements had been reached had taken their advice to heart. The Committee 
concluded: ‘Altogether, the present position of the velvet industry as a whole must
ctn
be very much better than it was before the Committee intervened in its affairs’. 
Consequently, the Committee felt that they could not withdraw the high rate of 
duty without undoing the good already done and therefore recommend a further 
extension of the duty for 12 months. At this stage, the Committee considers this a 
successful outcome.
In 1938, the Velvet Council again requested a further continuation of the 
duty for two years from 31/12/38. By this time however, IDAC found the new 
voluntary organisation o f the industry had begun to crumble under increased
514 PRO BT/10/20 Committee paper 248/1936 page 2
515 No threats were made in the letter to alter duty rates or in any way force the reorganisation, it 
was more a note of encouragement.
516 In June 1937, the Committee was informed that the industry was working more co-operatively. 
It was establishing, in stages, close sectional organisations and they formed a central body to co­
ordinate policy. The cutting and dyeing sections of the industry were already well organised, and 
the weaving section was willing to join an association that would have the power to control prices, 
output and quality.
517 PRO BT/10/24 Committee paper 246/1937 page 6
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external pressure. Consequently, this meant that progress towards reorganisation 
had faltered. They advised the Velvet Council that they would need to provide 
more evidence on how re-organisation was progressing. The report back from the 
Velvet Council was, overall, unsatisfactory from IDAC’s point of view. With the 
industry in a worse position than it had been twelve months before. However, the 
Committee agreed to a further twelve-month extension of the duty as they felt that 
there would be no possibility o f re-organisation otherwise.
In early 1939 the Committee asked for detailed evidence of reorganisation 
if the duty was to be extended again. A case was eventually submitted in August, 
it showed little development in the industry, but claimed that continuance o f the 
duty was essential in order that they could progress. Hutchinson noted: ‘A little 
inconsistently it was also claimed that the weft-pile industry could not be expected 
to embark upon the reorganisation that was conceded to be necessary unless 
assured of a very high rate of import duty on a permanent basis. At this point in 
the story, the war intervened’.518
This case clearly has similarities with that of the Iron and Steel industry. 
IDAC gave the additional duty in good faith to allow the industry to re-organise, 
and while the initial signs were promising the developments prove not to be 
sustainable. Yet, IDAC did not feel in a position to withdraw the extra protection. 
They were ‘hostages to fortune’. Believing that they must continue the protection 
if there was to be any chance o f the industry improving yet they were powerless to 
instigate any real change.
In the case of the Scissor industry519 an additional duty was granted in 
order for the industry to reorganise its production methods. The applicants 
claimed that under Safeguarding Duty (1926-30, duty rate 3 3 V3%) and Abnormal 
Importations Duty they had made attempts to reorganise and modernise. IDAC
518 Hutchinson Tariff-making pp. 129-130
519 PRO BT/10/2 paper 131/1932.
The application was considered, by the Committee, alongside an application for increased duty on 
cutlery. The cutlery application was refused, largely because an international agreement covering 
stainless steel meant that there was little foreign competition. The Committee also believed that in 
reorganising scissor production a reorganisation of the cutlery industry would be promoted and 
this would increase its competitiveness.
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viewed the extent of reorganisation as disappointing and remained critical of the 
industry structure: ‘The system pursued, however, is still one of local competitive 
individualism, and even the more enterprising manufacturers are unwilling to 
merge their identity in a joint venture for securing economies of a large scale 
output on mass production lines’ .520 However, they were willing to grant the 
additional duty because:
‘Although the response to the Committee’s efforts at securing a greater measure of co­
operation on the part of the Sheffield manufacturers for a policy of joint mass production 
which would aim not only at recovering the control of the home market but also at 
building up a strong export trade, is somewhat disappointing, it is considered that the 
potentialities of development of the cheap scissors industry are so great, that it would be 
unwise to withhold the encouragement of an increase in the additional duty from those 
individual firms which are, in fact, pursuing a progressive policy on the traditional and 
more restricted lines of the single unit system. The presence in Sheffield of a newly 
arrived German firm of scissors manufacturers, who are now engaged in installing a 
complete equipment of up-to-date German machinery, should have a stimulating 
influence upon this progressive tendency.,521
The additional protection is given to stimulate a new line of production, but at the 
same time the Committee welcome the recent foreign direct investment by a 
German firm as a stimulus to the development of the home industry. IDAC noted: 
‘In order to give the industry a sufficient degree of assurance to undertake the 
necessary reorganization of its methods of production we desire to state that, 
subject to the adequate development of the industry and to the pursuance o f a 
strongly competitive policy, we do not contemplate recommending any alteration 
in the rates of duty now proposed for a period of five years’.522 The Committee 
hoped that by giving the industry certainty on the tariff position this would 
provide the necessary stimulus and confidence to invest in new production.
Other examples of applications where problems with the organisation of 
the industry were noted are shown in Appendix 6.2. For some of these, IDAC 
noted on record that the industries were simply poorly organised. There were also
520PRO BT/10/02 Committee Paper 131/1932 pages 2-3
521PRO BT/10/02 Committee Paper 131/1932 pages 2-3
522 PRO BT/10/01 Committee Paper 182/1932, Draft Recommendation to the Treasury, 5/8/32
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many other cases where rationalisation or reorganisation was discussed in 
Committee even if not specifically cited as a deciding factor by IDAC. This was 
the case in a number of applications from the agriculture and horticulture trades. 
For this sector, the main problems related to poor marketing methods and systems. 
When, in 1932, the Committee considered what action to take upon expiry of the 
Horticultural Products Act [HPAct] these problems were acknowledged by both 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Farmers Union of England and 
Wales [NFU]. They argued that there was much room for improvement to raise 
productivity in the industry. It was felt that high rates of duty had allowed this 
process to begin, with the current rates of duty having given home producers 
encouragement to enlarge their operations.523 At the time of the review, it was too 
early for firm conclusions to be drawn on the effectiveness of the existing rates. 
However, it was agreed that duties equivalent to those in force under the HPAct 
would be introduced by IDAC. These rates were to be subject to review after two 
years. IDAC while giving the industry the opportunity to increase productivity 
behind the tariff wall were keen to safeguard the interests of the consumer. In 
making their recommendation they stated: ‘Committee will recommend 
immediate removal should prospects of home production fall short of what may 
be properly expected in quality, quantity, and price, but otherwise does not intend 
to recommend alteration before autumn 1934’.524 When the case was reviewed in 
August 1934 this led to further increases in duty for some vegetables. The 
Committee noted: ‘General review shows consensus of evidence as to rise in 
production and advance in marketing methods, and no suggestion that prices 
affected to detriment of consumers’.
In all of these cases, IDAC would grant additional protection as a ‘carrot’ 
to enable industry to reorganise behind the shield of the tariff. On the whole, it 
must be said, IDAC were repeatedly disappointed by the lack of progress of 
British industry in reorganising or placing themselves on a more competitive 
footing. Despite this the Committee did not give up but persisted in their attempts
523 PRO BT/10/01 Committee Paper 32/1932
524 Additional Duty Order 5.32 Cmd. 4145, July 1932 Horticultural Products (see Hutchinson 
Tariff-making p201)
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to encourage change within industries. The rationalisation programme was also 
promoted by IDAC through more subtle means. The methods included the 
promotion of trade associations; by assisting in the formation of cartel 
arrangements, both domestic and international; by encouraging efficiency of 
industry; and, through inducing manufacturers to introduce new lines of 
production.
Encouragement of Business Organisations
Increased collusion within industry, through formation of Trade 
Associations and cartels, was seen as a way that business could get out of the 
depression. Government saw these as ‘positive’ institutions that would encourage 
knowledge sharing. They could also co-ordinate their production and marketing 
efforts thereby improving efficiency. It was believed that, in this way, Britain’s 
international competitive position would be improved.525
Growth of Trade Associations
For the Government, there were a number of benefits from the promotion 
of trade associations. The associations had proved to be of significant assistance 
to government departments in both the planning and practical application of 
Government policies as they affected industry. The associations were linked with 
the formation of trading agreements that controlled price and/or quality. In some 
cases they encouraged collaborative research, and/or prevented wasteful 
duplication of efforts in this direction. The potential use of trade associations in 
the re-organisation of industry was regarded as significant.
The way in which the Committee set up the procedures for making 
applications encouraged the formation of business organisations. IDAC quickly
525 Instead they helped to prolong the life of inefficient firms and restricted new entrants to the 
market.
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made known that it preferred to deal with ‘representative bodies’ rather than 
individual concerns:
... applications should be entertained as a rule only when made by representative 
associations or groups formed ad hoc - except where individual concerns are solely 
or predominantly concerned: subject to that exception, individual applicants 
should be advised to endeavour to get any other concerns affected to co-operate 
with them to (at any rate) such an extent as will satisfy the Committee that the 
application has a substantial measure of support. It should be made clear that 
unless that was the case the application will not be allowed.’526 
They did not entirely succeed, in that applications for additional duty were still 
made by individual firms. However, as was noted in Chapter 3 there was a 
tendency for firms to come together to make applications even if they were not 
formally made by Trade Associations. There is also clear evidence on 
communication between trade Associations prior to submission of applications. 
From records, it can be seen that applicant associations have elicited the support 
of other trade associations before submitting their applications. This proves 
particularly helpful as far as IDAC are concerned, especially in cases when the 
supporting association represents the consuming interests.527
Members of the Committee also gave addresses on such matters. At a BEA 
luncheon, Percy Ashley made the following address: ‘... Firstly, I wish to express 
the thanks of my Committee, the Import Duties Advisory Committee, and my 
Department, and our very high appreciation of the ready, constant wise help and 
advice we have had from your D irector.... With the approval of various 
Presidents of the Board of Trade, I have been, for a good many years preaching 
wherever I had the opportunity, the advantage, indeed the necessity, o f having 
thoroughly comprehensive, responsible and representative trade Associations. 
They can be of immense value to the trades and to the Government and 
Government Departments.’528
526 PRO BT/10/1 Committee Paper 40/1932. IDAC future procedure - Memorandum by the 
Secretary, Sir Percy Ashley, 9.4.32.
527 One example of this was found in the BEA supporting the Iron and Steel industry applications 
for additional duty. Others exist such as the applications for additional duty on: Rubber footwear 
(committee paper 79/1932); and, Ceramic transfers (committee paper 133/1932).
528 MSS 267/4/1/14 BEA Bulletin Volume XV 1934, February pp.21-25.
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The actions of the Committee may have stimulated the growth in both scope and 
coverage of associations, i.e., expansion of existing associations and formation of 
new associations. Expansion of membership is difficult to document, however. 
There are no records in IDAC archives, and information gained from trade 
associations would not in any case establish a direct causal link. The 
introduction of protection and the possibilities for negotiating with IDAC may 
have provided renewed justification for the costs of membership.530
529 There are comments on the impact of IDAC on membership of the BEA but this relates more 
specifically to the special relationship that develops between the BEA and the IDAC over the 
operation of the machinery licensing scheme. Even here there is little direct evidence that IDAC 
led to increased membership (see Chapter 5 on the engineering industry).
This was generally the case, but the involvement of the IDAC in the formation of the B1SF has 
been clearly documented. See Wurm, International Relations, and Tolliday, ‘Steel and 
Rationalization’.
530 If, anything, it seems more likely that the effect would have been to have halted declining 
membership. It was clear from examination of both BEA and the BEAM A archives that from 1929 
the associations are struggling financially. The problem arose due to bankruptcies amongst their 
membership, and by businessmen choosing not to renew their membership because they felt they 
could no longer justify the expenditure given financial constraints. These pressures did however, 
ease somewhat from 1933.
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Formation of Cartels
The Import Duties Advisory Committee was at one with opinion generally in the 
conviction that the first need of the economy was a degree of assurance and 
stability. Nor did the Committee hold this view in relation to import duties only.
It equally favoured what are nowadays condemned as restrictive trade practices, 
both internally and externally, ,..531
‘There was little doubt that the number of schemes entailing state 
encouragement of industrial combination increased after 1931, and that protection 
and the Import Duties Advisory Council were useful in support of them ’.532 As 
Mercer notes: ‘The IDAC supposedly independent of government but in fact 
closely allied to Treasury policy through its method of appointment and financing, 
did not simply acquiesce in British involvement in international cartelisation, it 
saw involvement as a positive policy to combat foreign competition by less 
aggressive means than tariffs’.533
The Committee saw that domestic cartels could perform an important 
function in making domestic industry more competitive.534 They saw internal 
cartels as efficacious in getting industry to rid itself of ‘dead-wood’ and focus on 
greater productive efficiency. They also saw an important role for cartels in 
organising marketing more effectively. This perspective of the Committees can be 
gleaned from the writings of Sir Sydney Chapman:
‘Immediate gains may be reaped from centralized management on both the industrial and 
commercial sides of a business. On the industrial side economies are speedily effected by 
shutting down antiquated or badly situated works, or by enlarging others and adding 
thereby to internal specialization, or by specializing the several works. The same 
improvements might be brought about eventually under competition, but only in a far-away
531 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.69
532 Winch ‘Managed Economy?’ p.60
533 Mercer Competitive order p.50
534 Although this view now seems difficult to comprehend it was not unusual at the time and was 
taken for granted by the Committee members.
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future. On the commercial side, the trust, as with the kartel which has a central sales 
association, corrects the overlapping of arrangements for selling.535 
Hutchinson supports this: ‘The Committee was not so naive as to suppose that 
assurance and stability would cause industries or firms to become efficient, but 
held that they were necessary to create conditions in which reform became 
practicable.’536
International cartels had an equally important role to play and there is 
evidence that the Committee encouraged both domestic and international 
agreements. Hutchinson noted: 'In a number of instances an increased duty was 
recommended to strengthen the hands of the British industry in negotiating with a 
Continental cartel, whose members were already well protected in their own home 
markets.’537 Leith-Ross also noted the value of international cartels in 1936. In a 
budget report on the ‘Expansion of Exports’ he argued that a helpful approach 
would be to promote industrial agreements with competitors, including those in 
Germany and Japan. He stated: ‘The Iron and Steel cartel has shown the way and 
every effort should be made, as opportunity occurs, to negotiate similar 
agreements between other industries’538. In this way, he argued, cut-throat 
competition could be avoided.
IDAC viewed these as positive institutions that would encourage 
knowledge sharing. They also saw them both crucial for the self-government of 
industry fundamentally believing that it was important for industry to develop its 
own solutions to problems it faced. The organisations were viewed favourably 
because they could also co-ordinate their production and marketing efforts thereby
535 Sydney Chapman Outlines o f Political Economy Second edition (London, 1929)p. 144
536 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.69
537 Hutchinson Tariff-making p.44
538 PRO BT/10/20 Committee Paper 274/1936 ‘Budget ‘Report re expansion of exports” . Sir 
F.W.Leith-Ross (27/11/36) prepared this detailed report for submission to the President of the 
Board of Trade. The paper provided a detailed analysis of exports; covered the effects of economic 
revival in the domestic market and the effects of re-armament. It went on to make 
recommendations on how exports could be promoted, including this recommendation on forming 
international cartel agreements. This was a follow-up paper to one written earlier the same month 
on the Balance of Payments.
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improving efficiency. It was believed that in this way Britain’s international 
competitive position would be improved.
The Annual Report of the Committee for year ending February 1937, notes 
a number of cartel and trade agreements negotiated as a result of the Committee’s 
work. ‘In a number of cases besides iron and steel, agreements have been 
concluded between British producers and those in foreign countries in connexion 
with, and usually as an alternative to, proposals for increasing the rates of duty. 
These agreements provide for quantitative limitation of imports into this country, 
frequently accompanied with an arrangement as to prices and sometimes also for 
the division of outside markets. In certain cases the position of the consumer has 
been safeguarded by a declaration as to prices on the part of the British 
manufacturers.’539
The cases that the Committee came across where a cartel was involved in 
some way will be examined from three perspectives. The first, it could be argued 
where IDAC actively supported or even promoted cartelisation (including cases 
where applications were refused because an applicant refused to negotiate with a 
cartel).540 Second, those cases where an additional duty was granted because the 
industry making the application was suffering from problems associated with 
cartels. In addition, thirdly, we will examine the opinions of IDAC more 
generally, i.e. in cases where there is evidence of cartel activities such as price- 
rings and price fixing.
Of all the 481 applications made to the Committee there were only sixteen 
cases where issues connected with cartels were given as an explicit reason why 
the applicant was requesting the additional duty. In nine of these cases, the 
applicants requested the additional duty to ‘assist them with cartel negotiations’.
539 PRO BT/10/84, Annual Report 1937, paragraph 22 p.15.
540 These cases also need to be considered from the angle of what the applicants wanted. In some 
cases, it is apparent that the applicants only applied for protection to enhance the prospects of 
successful negotiations with international cartels -  with the support of IDAC they had a greater 
bargaining tool. It will also be considered how successful an applicants attempts to gain additional 
protection were when they needed to resist IDAC pressure for them to negotiate with a cartel.
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In eight cases the applicants were requesting additional protection because of the 
breakdown of an international cartel and the increased competition that 
resulted.541 Summary details of these applications can be found in Appendix 6.3.
Examination of these sixteen cases shows that in only seven cases did the 
applicants receive an additional duty, the other nine cases were rejected at some 
stage in the process. This could lead to the conclusion that the Committee did not 
particularly favour cartels, but this conclusion would be incorrect. It needs to be 
remembered that in some cases the application will not have led to the granting of 
an additional duty precisely because the applicants were successful in their cartel 
negotiations. A more detailed analysis of a number of cases is required to 
understand IDAC’s position.
In a number of cases, an additional duty was not granted because a tariff 
agreement was reached obviating the need for any extra protection. Details of 
these applications are shown in Appendix 6.4 below.
In one such case, the Committee, in July 1934, received an application for 
additional duty on nitrogenous fertilisers. This was submitted jointly by the 
Sulphate of Ammonia Association and Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., (ICI)542. 
The application was requested to ‘assist with cartel negotiations’ and did not lead 
to the imposition of an additional duty. Following advertisement, the applicant 
withdrew the application because a cartel agreement had successfully been 
reached.543 In considering this application however, the Committee discussed 
‘points of principle’ in approaching cases of this type.
The primary object of the application, according to the applicants, was to 
strengthen their hands in their negotiations with the Continental and Chilean
541 One applicant used both of these arguments to support their case for additional duty. Only two 
applications for additional duty were granted on the grounds that this would assist with cartel 
negotiations. These were the application for additional duty on Nitrogenous fertilisers (Application 
reference 35/46), and that for additional duty on Aluminium foils (Application Reference 33/423). 
Two applications for additional duty were approved because of the breakdown of an international 
cartel. These were applications in respect of Wood screws (Application Reference 32/85), 
Condensed milk, and other milk products (Application Reference 36/99).
542 Application reference 34/278
543 There were two applications made relating to nitrogenous fertilisers, in both the applicants 
requested the additional duty to ‘assist them with cartel negotiations’. The first application did not 
lead to an increase in the tariff, the second did.
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producers. The applicants requested a specific duty equivalent to 250% ad 
valorem .544 The Committee in its preliminary discussions of this case noted that 
the synthetic nitrogen industry ‘represents one of the great advances of chemical 
industry; it has been taken up (largely under pressure of war conditions) in a 
number of countries on a very large scale, with the result that the world capacity 
of production enormously exceeds potential consumption for some very 
considerable time to come.’545 The industry was already attempting to operate 
under a cartel agreement. This had been in operation since 1930 but was not 
working particularly well. The applicants were expecting the agreement to end 
when they would ‘come under attack from continental manufacturers’.546 At the 
same time, they were willing to enter into price undertakings with consuming 
interests.
The Committee noted that the British producers were facing unfair 
competition: ‘In every case the Continental producers have had their home 
markets secured to them, by a prohibition of importation except under licence; 
should they attack the insufficiently protected United Kingdom market the British 
producers cannot retaliate by attacking the home markets of the Continental 
makers’.547 They could import at not much above the cost of raw materials.
‘The application is not only an important one in itself but its presentation 
at this time raises a substantial question of principle’.548 The Committee was faced 
with a dilemma because the industry is not suffering from import competition at 
the time of making the application.
‘The condition hitherto required by the Committee to be fulfilled in order to establish a 
prima facie case, i.e., evidence as to the actual existence of serious competition, is not 
fulfilled in this case, and consequently if that principle be adhered to the application must 
be rejected, at least for the time being. But in all the circumstances the Committee may be
544 They had wanted a total prohibition of imports except under licence, but IDAC said the 
government was unlikely to pass legislation for this, especially as the predicted collapse of the 
cartel agreement not yet happened.
545 PRO BT/10/11 Paper 278/1934
546 PRO BT/10/11 paper 278/1934
547 PRO BT/10/11 paper 278/1934
548 PRO BT/10/11 Paper 278/1934
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disposed to give such assistance as they can to the British producers in their efforts to bring 
about the continuance and strengthening of the international agreement.’549
The Committee, on these grounds, agreed to advertise the application. This 
established a principle and determined their approach in other similar cases.
Percy Ashley noted: ‘The Committee authorised me to inform Imperial 
Chemical Industries that they would be prepared to advertise the application at an 
appropriate time, and after advertisement to come to an early decision. I have no 
knowledge as to how that intimation was used in the course of the negotiations 
which were then taking place, or if it was used at all, but before the end of July an 
Agreement between the European interests and the Chilean producers was 
initialled.’550 With the success of the negotiations, the additional tariff protection 
was no longer necessary.551
A further case was an application for additional duty on Cast Iron 
Porcelain and Enamelled Baths submitted by the British Bath Manufacturers 
Association in March 1933.552 They asked for the duty of 15% to be raised to 
3 3 */3%. The applicants argued they needed the additional protection because of 
the end of safeguarding and because import penetration was rising in spite of the
549 PRO BT/10/11 Paper 278/1934
550 PRO BT/10/11 Paper 338/1934
551 There was a second application for an additional duty on nitrogenous fertilisers, which did lead, 
to an increase in the tariff. The British Sulphate of Amonia Federation, Ltd., and ICI Ltd., again 
submitted the application, made in 1935. The main object, as before, was helping them with 
renewed international cartel negotiations as the Chile cartel was to be renegotiated at the end of 
June 1935. IDAC expected opposition from the NFU but the applicants had already consulted 
them. The applicants had agreed not to increase prices during the seasons 34/35, 35/36,36/37, 
without the consent of the NFU. Unless there occurred increases in the cost of labour and/or raw 
materials, when no price increases would be put into effect without receiving approval of the 
Committee.
Because of this, the Committee decided to advertise the application immediately. When 
no opposition came to the application the Committee decided to grant the additional duty. They 
felt that the granting of the duty would assist the industry in the cartel negotiations, it was a 
strategic industry and the applicants had reached price agreements with the using interests thus it 
was deserving of their assistance.
552 Application reference 33/121
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tariff. At this stage, the applicants did not raise the subject of cartels although one 
existed in the domestic market.
Strong opposition to the application was sent from the building trade to the 
Committee following advertisement.553 When reviewing the evidence from both 
sides, the Committee found the situation for the industry had changed rapidly 
since submission of the application with the break-up of a price-fixing agreement 
between the bath manufacturers in Britain. The cost of British baths on the home 
market had fallen substantially and had become cheaper than German imports 
against which the main complaint was directed. The boom in the building trade 
had then led to the price of baths increasing again. Consequently, an agreement 
was reached between the British and German manufacturers to a quota system 
(both having recognised the damaging effects of price competition).554 The 
applicants then withdrew this application.
In May 1935, a second application was made in respect of Cast Iron 
Porcelain and Enamelled Baths555. An additional duty o f 50% was requested 
because the applicants were then experiencing problems with the international 
cartel. The applicants stated that the application was made with a view to 
strengthening their hands for the negotiation of a new agreement with the German 
bath manufacturers. They argued that the agreement, under which the 
International Bath Association had been working since September 1933, had not 
proved satisfactory. This was owing to evasion by importers (who were agents for 
a German manufacturer) of the clauses relating to prices and quotas. The 
Committee agreed to advertise the application but only to help with the cartel 
negotiations556. The Committee duly advertised that they had the application
553 As noted in Chapter 4 this is one of the few occasions when the building trade did contact 
IDAC to register their opposition to an application.
554 It appears in this case that lower prices through increased domestic competition, along with the 
proposed tariff protection encouraged the German manufacturers to negotiate with the British 
firms. In this case, though it had not been IDAC’s intention at the outset to promote a cartel 
agreement this is the result. They regard it as a very satisfactory conclusion.
555 The British Bath Manufacturers Association [BBMA] again submitted this application, 
reference 35/146.
556 The Committee would not have been willing to introduce such a high tariff had the cartel 
negotiations been successful.
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under consideration. This caused some immediate problems with German 
manufacturers and their import agents.
‘The following morning, before it appeared, the Chairman of the 
International Bath Association, who had made the formal application on behalf of 
the British Bath Manufacturers’ Association, telephoned to say that he had seen 
the German manufacturers in Berlin; that they were perturbed at the application 
for higher duties, and had immediately undertaken to meet the demands of the 
B.B.M.A, to regulate and control more closely the supply o f German baths 
through importers in this country; and that they were most anxious that the 
application should not be given publicity in view of the explanations which would 
be demanded by their Government from them ’.557
The Committee subsequently arranged a meeting with M r Donald of the 
International Bath Association. ‘He agreed that the Germans had been thoroughly 
frightened by the application and that he had secured agreement to all his 
demands. He indicated that as soon as the new agreement was completed the 
application would be withdrawn. This case was a good illustration of the effect on 
the continental psychology of our action in regard to the iron and steel duties’.558 
Advertising the case had led to the conclusion of an agreement. The applicants 
were able to reach an agreement with the German manufactures and the 
application was withdrawn in writing. As with the earlier application, this did not 
lead to the granting of an additional duty because cartel negotiations were 
successful in obviating the need for additional protection.559
557 PRO BT/10/15, Committee Paper 182/1935 pi.
558 PRO BT/10/15, Committee Paper 182/1935
559 An interesting case that was not recorded, by IDAC, as an application for additional duty was a 
submission made by IC1 in 1936.1CI asked for additional duties on a number of alkali products of 
which they accounted for around 90% of home production. They asked for a specific duty of £3 
per ton (approximately 65% ad valorem) on Sodium Carbonate (Soda Ash); £6 per ton 
(approximately 48%) on Caustic Soda (Sodium hydroxide); and, £5 per ton (approximately 45%) 
on Bicarbonate of Soda. These commodities had widespread industrial use in glass, textile, soap, 
chemical and paper trades. Some 90% of world trade was controlled by international agreements, 
which reserved home markets and regulated exports. 1CI had approached the Committee at this 
time because there were problems with the Anglo-US cartel agreement that was up for renewal, 
and this was the sole reason for the application. The committee advised ICI that this would not be 
formally treated as an additional duty application and would not be advertised. Instead, they
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A further case where additional protection became unnecessary because of 
a cartel agreement was that of an application in respect of Celluloid in sheets, rods 
and tubes.560 This was submitted in June 1936 by The Association of British 
Chemical Manufacturers [ABCM], on behalf of British Xylonite Co., Ltd.,. 
Reasons given for needing the tariff increase were that the home industry was 
already working at low cost (i.e. efficiently) yet despite this the foreign goods 
(mainly Japanese) were still priced lower. Additionally, the applicants promised 
that if the additional duty were granted they would not pass on price increases to 
the consumer because of their monopoly powers. At this stage, there was no 
suggestion of a cartel agreement. The Committee advertised this case on the 24 
June 1936. Consequently, of this the Committee were approached by the Japanese 
Commercial Counsellor proposing a trade agreement be negotiated.561 An 
agreement was eventually reached between the UK producers, the Japanese and 
the Germans for voluntary restriction of imports. The applicants then withdrew 
the application in April 1937. In this instance, the unexpected result was not 
simply to enable negotiations with an existing cartel but provoked the 
establishment of a new agreement.
A final case worth mentioning briefly is that of an application for 
additional duty on sodium phosphates submitted by The Association of British 
Chemical Manufacturers [ABCM] on behalf of three members in June 1935562. 
IDAC were particularly proactive in this case. They made a point of talking to 
international, as well as domestic, firms in order to promote an agreement. This 
was a second request for additional duty on the product but the applicants 
complained of German dumping preventing the expansion of home production.
provided ICI with a letter acknowledging the application for use in the negotiations. The 
Committee did not refer to the matter again, nor did ICI come back to them, so it can be assumed 
that the tactic worked successfully. The details appear in Committee Paper 102/1936, PRO 
BT/10/18
560 Application reference 36/125
561 The Counsellor approached the Board of Trade and they passed on the information to IDAC.
562 Application reference 35/164. The three companies were Brotherton & Co., Ltd., Holliday L.B. 
& Co., Ltd., and Wilkinson J.B.
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The Committee was not prepared to make a decision at the time, choosing to wait 
for six months until new UK plant was bought into operation. Later in the year the 
Committee decided to advertise this case. After receiving opposition from a 
number of sources, the Committee decided to investigate the matter further. Trade 
negotiations had been taking place with the main German firm: ‘In these 
circumstances, and in view of the desirability of obviating, if possible, very high 
duties on quasi raw materials, we discussed the matter with both parties,... we 
succeeded in reopening negotiations between them . . . \ 563 The agreement between 
the German and English firm was made for a period of twelve months from 
1/10/36 and was reached largely because of the Committee’s intervention.
A number of other cases show that IDAC did not view favourably 
applicants who were unwilling to negotiate with international cartels or who by 
their actions were likely to place at risk existing cartel agreements.
There was also only one case where an application for additional duty was 
rejected at the initial stage because the action would jeopardise a cartel agreement. 
In 1937, The Windsor Hosiery Company Limited applied for an additional duty 
on men’s fancy half hose564. This company was the only substantial UK producer 
and had complained to the Committee of low priced Japanese socks. The 
Committee, however, knew that negotiations for limiting Japanese imports had 
been proceeding since 1934 between the Association of Importers of Japanese 
Knitwear and the National Federation of hosiery Manufacturers’ Association. 
IDAC were aware, through the Board of Trade that an agreement had been 
reached between these two associations but not yet signed. The Committee 
believed that, if  advertised, this application might jeopardise the success of the 
agreement and felt that the applicants themselves were likely to gain substantially 
from the agreement. The Committee therefore, rejected the application.565 This 
episode supports Hutchinson’s belief that IDAC saw ‘agreement’ as preferable to 
tariffs.
563 PRO BT/10/20 Committee Paper 261/1936 p.3
564 Application reference 37/73
565 The applicants in making their case only gave the one reason “lower prices” (reason code 23), 
when the Committee in turn gave it’s decision the only reason was “Action would jeopardise 
cartel” (decision identifier IR28).
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One applicant was persuaded by IDAC to withdraw its application for 
additional duty, which the Committee believed, threatened an agreement. The 
application for additional duty on Sodium Chlorate was submitted by the ABCM, 
on behalf of Staveley Coal and Iron Co Ltd, in September 1936.566 Sodium 
Chlorate had received protection of 10% in 1932, with this level being formalised 
under the Anglo-Swedish Trade Agreement. This Trade Agreement was due for 
revision and the applicants had taken the opportunity to put forward their case 
requesting a specific duty o f 8s pew cwt. (between 33 V3 and 40 per cent ad 
valorem). The company were erecting a plant to begin UK production and: ‘The 
application is made ... against the intensive Continental price cutting and 
dumping which invariably arise when the manufacture of a product is initiated in 
this country . . . \ 567 The applicants also stated that they would guarantee that 
prices would not increase above those prevailing. The Committee did not believe 
this was a convincing case. There was no evidence of price-cutting, although they 
noted that a price war seemed to exist amongst foreign producers already. They 
decided to advertise the case bearing in mind the re-negotiations of the Swedish 
Trade Treaty. The case was discussed again in April 1937. It was noted that 
attempts had been made to widen an international cartel and that an agreement had 
been reached. This agreement would collapse if the levels of duty were increased, 
despite this the applicants at first argued that they still wished to proceed. After 
further discussion with IDAC, they took the decision to withdraw their 
application.
There was also one case where an application was refused following 
advertisement because the applicants would not negotiate with a cartel. This 
decision was reached in respect of an application for additional duty on Barium 
Chloride made by Allen Athole G. (Stockholm) Ltd., in June 1936.568 They were
566 Application reference 36/204
567 PRO BT/10/19 Committee Paper 204/1936 p2.
568 The application reference is 36/118. This company had originally approached the Committee in 
1933 but they could provide no information and were told by the committee what info they would 
need to submit before the case was considered. The Committee did not hear from them again until 
May 1935 and the fully detailed case was not submitted until April 1936. This is a very good 
example of how difficult presenting a case could be for some applicants.
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the only manufacturers of the commercial grade product in the UK and this was a 
new industry, which had begun production in 1930. Allen Athole was a small firm 
with ten employees and was not a member o f the Association of British Chemical 
Manufacturers [ABCM]. At the time of making the application, Barium Chloride 
was protected by the 10% general tariff. They requested a specific duty of £5 per 
ton, which the Committee estimated to be the equivalent of 60-70% ad valorem. 
The company argued that the additional duty was needed because of foreign price- 
cutting and because they felt that they could extend their production behind a 
protective barrier, and that, this would lead to economies of scale.
The case was advertised by the Committee in June 1936 but was not dealt 
with again until December 1937. The intervening time had been taken up with 
cartel negotiations. The company had been approached by the Continental Cartel 
in March 1936 but from the first, it had been reluctant to negotiate. The 
Committee felt that the latest in a series of offers made by this cartel seemed 
reasonable and that Allen’s own demands were, in turn, unreasonable. 
Consequently, the Committee decided not to grant the additional duty. This 
decision was taken despite the Committee earlier noting a number of reasons in 
favour of the applicant’s claim .569 The Committee was not prepared to grant the 
additional duty because they felt that the solution to the company’s problems lay 
in their own hands and yet they refused to take the necessary action .570
Despite IDAC’s evident support for cartel agreements as recorded in these 
cases they did not fail to act in industry’s favour where they saw negative impact 
of cartels or where cartels simply could not be negotiated. The Committee also 
strove to ensure that the benefits of cartelisation (rationalisation, reorganisation,
569 The Committee, despite the extremely high level of tariff requested, had been happy to 
advertise the case for a number of reasons. They were aware that the company could not then meet 
all home demand, but knew that the company had been carrying out research and had installed new 
plant and machinery. It was also noted: “These works were acquired under the hammer a few years 
ago and their continued operation confers some small benefit on the “Special Area” of the North 
East.” PRO BT/10/18 Committee Paper 118/1936 page 6.
570 The application was also refused because there had been strong opposition and ironically, given 
that most cartels fixed prices, because the Committee was concerned that the home consumer 
might by harmed by high pricing because of what was a home monopoly.
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marketing, etc) where not outweighed by negative effects such as price fixing and 
the exercise of monopoly powers.
In 1936, the Committee received an application for additional duty on 
condensed milk and other milk products.571 The UK manufacturers, on the 
suggestion of the Board of Trade, in January 1935 had approached the Dutch 
manufacturers of these products to agree prices and quotas. Negotiations had 
however, proved unsuccessful and the British interests were suffering from import 
competition. The Committee did not advertise this case but made the decision 
directly having consulted affected interests. The consuming industries572 only 
objected to the application if it meant an increase in their raw material costs. The 
Distributing interests were anxious only to ensure price stability in the range of 
goods that were for direct supply to consumers. The applicants were willing to 
agree set prices with these bodies. The Committee therefore assessed which items 
needed the additional duty, base on evidence of levels of imports, and agreed to 
raise duties in accordance with the applicants’ requests.573 In this case, despite the 
best efforts of the home industry to establish a cartel they were unsuccessful. 
Faced with evidence of the competition the industry faced IDAC therefore 
expedited increased duties for them.
IDAC also responded rapidly to help the home industry when the Shoe 
Rivet manufacturers Association applied for an additional duty on nails.574 In 
response to a previous increase in additional duty, a Belgian syndicate, IWECO, 
had reduced prices to compensate exactly for the increase.
571 PRO BT/10/18, Committee Paper 99/1936, the applicants were the Amalgamated Master 
Dairymen, the National Federation of Creamery Proprietors, the National Federation of 
Dairymen’s Associations, and the NFU.
572 The Manufacturing Confectioners’ Alliance and the Bakery and Allied Traders were consulted 
by IDAC.
This was generally the case but, as chapter 5 on the engineering industry showed, was not always 
true.
573 There were only two items where an additional duty was not agreed to. The first was ‘Block 
Milk’ where there was no import competition. The second was ‘Cream’ where again the present 
duty appeared to be working effectively.
574 PRO BT/10/9 114/1934, (Application reference 34/114)
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i t  appears clear that the present Continental prices of nails for this country can show no 
profit to the Continental manufacturer and in some cases must involve actual loss, and that 
they represent a deliberate attempt to retain a footing in this market at all costs, as a matter 
of policy. ...
It is clearly unsatisfactory that the Committee’s efforts to afford reasonable protection to 
an important British industry should be deliberately and immediately frustrated in this way, 
and there appears to be a clear justification for recommending a further increase in the 
duties to restore the position which the Committee intended to produce ...’
The Committee therefore decided to consult other sections of the industry with a 
view to immediately increasing specific rates. This, rather than advertising in 
order to save time.
Price-fixing and monopolies
While the Committee were willing to support and encourage cartel agreements 
this did not mean they were unconcerned by monopoly powers. As part of their 
remit they remained keen to ensure that consuming interests, both business and 
public alike, did not suffer as a result of monopoly pricing. In considering many 
applications for additional duty questions were raised, often by those opposing 
applications, about possible price-fixing or monopoly powers. These claims were 
not always substantiated or were not always considered to be serious by IDAC. 
Appendix 6.5 records some of the cases where concerns were raised.
As noted above in the discussion on cartels the Committee turned down some 
applications for additional duties because they had concerns about monopoly 
pricing. This was so in respect of ten applications for additional duty which the 
Committee had advertised (for further details see Appendix 6 .6).575 Some 
applications were rejected even without advertising because IDAC had concerns.
575 These were all cases that were refused by the Committee after they had been advertised. 
Evidence found of price fixing in a number of other cases is shown at Appendix 6.5.
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In considering an application for additional duty on Linoleum and cork 
carpet576 the Committee noted: ‘The application is in effect a request for an 
increase in duty in order that the British manufacturers, who act in close 
association may retain a complete monopoly of the home market without any 
effort on their part’. Unsurprisingly, in this case the Committee had no sympathy 
for the applicants and the request was rejected without the application being 
advertised. IDAC rejected the application because of their concerns about the 
home monopoly/price fixing (and the belief that the industry would benefit from 
competition) and because in any case the industry was small.
In other cases, before agreeing to grant additional duties the Committee 
required assurances from the applicants regarding their future prices.577 One case 
where the applicants gave price assurances was in an application for additional 
duty on wood screws. 578 The application submitted in June 1932 requested an 
increase in the duty from 20 to 50 per cent ad valorem. Until the end of 1931 the 
applicants had been party to an international cartel which had controlled the 
distribution of wood screws. The cartel had broken down however. The 
Committee noted: ‘The application, therefore, is not for a measure of temporary 
high protection in order to enable a depressed industry to re-organise itself on a 
more efficient basis. The case put forward is that a tariff is necessary to enable the 
industry to realise the full advantage of its efficiency. It is claimed that the 
potential output capacity would provide for the whole o f the existing home 
consumption and, in addition, enable a very considerable extension of export trade 
to be made. The applicants are prepared to give an undertaking that the price to 
the home consumer will not be raised. On the contrary, they think that the
576 PRO BT/10/28 Committee Paper 26/1939
577 The Committee did not have legal powers to regulate prices once the tariff was granted 
however. Hutchinson notes that the Treasury Solicitor advised them that their Statute did not grant 
them powers to settle disputes between manufacturers and consumers -  Tariff-Making p.73
578 Application reference 32/85
The applicants were Messrs. Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd., the British Screw Company Ltd., 
and Messrs Henry Cox Screw Company Ltd., who claimed to represent all screw makers in the 
country.
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reduction in producing costs which they would derive from a larger turnover 
would enable them to reduce their home prices.’579
‘The imposition of a higher tariff in this case would not appear to be 
attended with any serious disadvantages to set off against the advantages of 
increased employment and increased export trade. The only home interests 
adversely affected would be those of the importer and retail seller, and any injury 
to the latter could not be considerable. It is recommended, therefore, that the 
application should be advertised.’580
When making their final recommendation to the Treasury the committee 
noted: ‘We fully recognise the objections which may be raised to the grant o f a 
high degree of protection to an industry which is under unified control in this 
country and we propose to watch the interests of the home consumer’.581
Another such case was in the application for additional duty on condensed 
milk and other milk products. We noted earlier the applicants by giving price 
assurances were able to satisfy consumers and IDAC that rising prices would not 
affect the users and they were granted the additional duties they needed. Other 
products where price undertakings were given when applications for additional 
duty were made, include: Linseed oil; Sodium Nitrate; Copper Wares; Spectacle 
frames; Boot and Shoe laces; Superphosphates; Nitrogenous fertilisers; and Fabric 
of woven paper yarn.582
In some cases, the Committee was contacted with requests that they 
investigate price-rings. The case of the Cement industry has already been noted in 
chapter 4. In this instance there was nothing the Committee could do. In a further 
example, in April 1936, the Committee was approached by a number of large 
concerns to investigate a ‘price-ring’ in pencils.583 The concerns had asked for
tenders from abroad due to the price-ring that existed in the UK. ‘In July, 1935,
the import duty on these pencils meanwhile having increased from 20  per cent to
579 PRO BT/10/02 Committee Paper 85/1932
580 PRO BT/10/02 Committee Paper 85/1932
581 PRO BT/10/03 Committee Paper 182/1932
582 PRO BT/10/17 Committee Paper 14/1936
583 These included the London Chamber of Commerce. PRO BT/10/18 Committee paper 78/1936
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over 40 per cent., tenders were again invited. All offers received from British 
manufacturers were again identical, and were 28 and 35 per cent respectively 
above the foreign offers, despite the doubling of the duty.’ The committee 
considered whether prices were reasonable and found that members o f the price 
ring had not pushed up prices as a result of additional protection, prices had in fact 
stayed the same.584
ED AC were not only keen to mitigate the effect of cartels on prices but 
wished to monitor price changes more widely. In its first Report the Committee 
stated that it would in its recommendations endeavour to deal with any attempts to 
exploit the consumer, either industrial or private, under cover of the protection to 
be afforded by the Act. This is why, from autumn 1933, the Committee attempted 
to track the movement of prices on a number of products (see Appendix 6.7 for 
full details of what the Committee proposed and the products they planned to 
monitor). On the subject of this monitoring Hutchinson notes: T h e  aim as 
expressed was to cover sufficient ground to warrant the statement at any time that 
the effect of the tariff on prices was being kept under constant review -  though in 
fact what was done would hardly have justified such a claim, if the question had 
ever been raised’.585 The Committee’s work in this direction was limited for 
reasons of practicality. Prices were collected quarterly either from Trade 
Associations of from a number of producers.586 The Committee found it was not 
always easy to get comparable or representative data and the process, even for a 
relatively small list of items, was time consuming. To have extended the review 
would have not been practicable, and after all, it was not what the Committee was 
there to do.
584 The price-ring members took the opportunity to ask for additional duty but the committee felt 
that they were making reasonable profits and there was no call for any further action at that time.
585 Hutchinson Tariff Making p.70
586 Hutchinson notes that the information was supplied voluntarily and that the Committee did not 
need to exercise its powers to force disclosure. Tariff Making p.71
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The data that the Committee collected did however allay any fears they had that 
the tariff would lead to general price rises587. A summary o f the position up to the 
end of 1937 is shown in Appendix 6 .8 . Again Hutchinson notes: ‘Any serious or 
widespread complaint of exploitation, either of industrial or private customers, 
continued to be conspicuously absent, but the collection of the returns from the 
same list of articles, with additions from time to time, was persevered with, and an 
Annual report rendered to the Committee of the results, up to the autumn of 
1938’.588
Efficiency through research and innovation
The technological lag of British industry, which was observed during the 
First World War, had led the government to create the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (DSIR) in 1916. The DSIR, along with industrial research 
associations, was partially funded by government. It was established to foster 
industrial research, and to facilitate a more innovative approach to technology. 
Although the importance of these institutions may be exaggerated,589 the 
governments concern with technology in industry did not dwindle. Encouraging 
the development of new techniques and the modernisation of existing plant 
remained a priority throughout the inter-war period. ID AC showed a similar 
interest in encouraging research. As discussed earlier, IDAC were keen to 
promote Research and Development and technical efficiency within industry. 
They saw these developments as vital for future success and a return to 
competitiveness of British industry.
At various stages, other arms of government formally contacted IDAC 
with concerns on industrial research. In July 1932 the Committee was approached
587 PRO BT/l 0/16 Committee Paper 306/35, in December 1935 it was recorded that apart from 
Linseed oil there had been little change in the general level of prices since the Committee had 
increased rates of duty.
588 Hutchinson Tariff Making p.71
589 See, Edgerton DEH & Horrocks SM, ‘British industrial research and development before 
1945’, Economic History Review. XLVI1, 2(1994), pp.215-217
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by the Chairman of the Industrial Grants Committee, who was anxious to assist the 
Committee on questions relating to the efficiency of particular industries as 
evidenced by research associations.590 In autumn 1932, the Committee received a 
deputation from the Research Grants Committee. This was ‘...to  discuss the 
suggestion that in connection with applications for increased duties an endeavour 
should be made to encourage the development of effective research associations in 
industries’.591
The Committee was urged by the DSIR to make a consideration of 
industrial efficiency and research a pre-requisite o f granting any additional duties: 
‘representatives of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research suggested 
“when industries approach” the Committee “for the imposition or the continuance 
o f protective duties, regard should be paid to the steps taken by them to promote 
efficiency by the encouragement o f research ...’.592 The Committee though was 
reluctant to go so far. ‘This being the position, it remains to consider what the 
Import Duties Advisory Committee can take to stimulate the movement for which 
the Research Department stands. It is I think, impossible for the Committee to lay 
down the proposition that a condition precedent to the recommendation of 
additional duties for any industry shall be the making by that industry of adequate 
provision for research. The main determining considerations must be economic. 
But the efficiency of the industry - both present and future - is a material 
consideration; and it would, I think, be quite proper, in the examination of any 
application for increased duties, for the Committee (a) to enquire as to the extent 
to which the industry is efficient (in a broad sense), and research, as a contributory 
factor to such efficiency, is being carried on ...’593
The Committee tried to be as thorough in their approach as they were over 
other questions. Wherever possible, in considering the relative efficiency of 
industries, they would consult other government departments, such as the DSIR 
and Ministry of Agriculture [MinAg], as to the organisational efficiency and 
technical development of a particular sector. In some cases they employed a
590 PRO BT/l 0/30 No.43,26.7.32.
591 PRO BT/l 0/30, No.59,9.11.32.
592 PRO BT/l 0/04, Committee paper 338/32
593 PRO BT/l 0/04, Committee paper 338/32
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technical officer (Mr Morgan) who was given the task o f visiting the premises of 
applicants and then reporting back to the Committee on his findings.594 The 
information garnered from all of these sources was used to support the 
Committee’s decisions.
We can see that the Committee did not take a simplistic approach to their 
decision making. If they had been insistent when considering price changes, 
cartelisation etc, it seems likely that very few industries would have received 
additional duties. But additional duty applications were granted in twenty-four 
cases because IDAC considered the applicant industries to be well organised 
and/or efficient595. Details of these are shown in Appendix 6.9. In sixteen cases, 
applications were rejected because the applicant industry was viewed as 
inefficient (details are again noted in Appendix 6.9).596
One application where the industries’ poor research record influenced 
IDAC to reject the application for additional duty was the Boot and Shoe industry. 
In 1937, an application was made for an increase in the duty on women’s boots, 
shoes and slippers. The applicants claimed they were facing rising imports and 
especially needed protection against US goods. The US shoes were relatively 
expensive but of a much higher quality that British products. British consumers
594 PRO BT/l 0/23 Committee Paper 141/37, details one such series of visits. IDAC conduct their 
own detailed investigations in the case of Zinc Sheet producing firms. Mr Morgan, the technical 
officer, visited a number of firms involved in the processing of Zinc and his findings were reported 
back to the Committee. ‘The zinc rolling department of Messrs. Thomas Bolton was visited some 
months ago by the Committee’s Technical Officer (Mr Morgan) with a view to obtaining 
information as to the conditions under which the production of these sheets is carried on. In his 
report, Mr Morgan states that, in his opinion, the general conduct and efficiency of the department 
are very high and that the firm has obviously devoted itself to the production of the right quality 
article’. The firm was viewed to have gone to a great deal of trouble and incurred capital 
expenditure in setting up this specialised trade: ‘Zinc rolling, however, has been but recently 
developed in this country, and it is perhaps to be expected that technical difficulties would be 
encountered in the early stages and there is evidence that these are being overcome’.
595 This was 24 out of the total of 154, representing 15.6% of successful applications
596 as with reorganisation/rationalisation the matter of efficiency was discussed in many cases by 
IDAC where it was not specifically mentioned in their decision but it did form part of the process 
of assessing an application
were said to be increasingly demanding the higher quality goods and the British 
manufacturers needed to reorganise along US lines. They stated that this process 
had already begun but further capital investment was needed and it would take 
time to come on-stream. During this period, they required additional tariff 
protection. IDAC found that despite their claims, the industry still held around 
96% of the home market and already benefited from a relatively high duty rate of 
20% therefore they were disinclined to grant them the duty. IDAC also found that 
the industry had a poor research record and had been unwilling to work 
collaboratively in the past.597 The Committee were unconvinced that the 
reorganisation necessary, to enable competition with the US product, would take 
place if there was a higher tariff barrier and so the application was turned down.
Nor would IDAC grant an additional duty purely on the grounds that an 
applicant claimed that they were efficient and well organised. This is clear from 
their reaction to an application, made in 1934, by the British Plastic Moulding 
Trade Association.598 The Committee noted: ‘If the British plastic moulding 
industry is so well organised and so efficiently equipped as the applicants claim it 
to be, further improvements and economies should be possible without the 
artificial aid of additional protection'.599 They go on to add: ‘The applicants' plea 
for the exclusion of the competing plastic products from the British market, 
considered in relation to their claims regarding the home industry's efficiency of 
organisation and technique, is symptomatic of a very unsatisfactory attitude 
towards the question of protection’.600
597 PRO BT/10/22 Committee Paper 95/37 -  The DSIR had previously agreed with the industry 
that it would make an annual grant for research of £5,000 as long as at least £7,000 was found
annually by the Trade Association. The amount was successfully raised in 1935 but there was a
shortfall in 1936. The Trade Association said that they planned in future to obtain subs for a 
Research Fund on a levy basis even at the risk of losing members. The DSIR pointed out however, 
that the industry did not have a history of co-operative research.
598 The application, reference 34/13, was for an increase in the duty on Plastic materials and 
products made therefrom. The Committee rejected the application at the initial stage for several 
reasons.
599 PRO BT/l 0/9 Committee paper 13/1934, p. 18
600 PRO BT/10/9 Committee paper 13/1934, p.19
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In some instances however, IDAC seem to grant the additional duties as a 
reward for achievements so far. One example where the applicants are rewarded 
by IDAC for their efforts to improve is shown in the application for an additional 
duty on Steel Works Plant Rolling M ills.601 The Committee in reviewing this 
application noted: ‘While it appears to be true that a few years ago the British 
product did not possess the refinements and accuracy of the foreign machines for 
certain special purposes, the advances they have since made and the arrangements 
by which they are now able to utilise US and German (Leowy) experience in 
design make it very doubtful whether this charge now has any force’.602 In the 
four years prior to making the application the industry had spent substantial 
amount on re-equipment. The Committee finally noted: ‘While it is, perhaps, 
doubtful whether the applicants are even yet seeking efficiency in its broadest 
sense with all the energy and single-mindedness that could be desired, on the 
whole it is felt that sufficient progress has been made to justify the conclusion that 
the industry can now be given further protection without any danger of it leading 
to stagnation’.603 The applicants are effectively rewarded for their move towards 
modernisation, for innovation and technology transfer.
Two industries regarded favourably by IDAC, were Lithopone604 
production and the glass industry. In 1936, the British Chemical Manufacturers 
Association in submitting an application for additional duty on Lithopone argued 
for an additional duty to protect them against recent currency devaluations that 
had prompted rising imports. In reviewing the industry IDAC were impressed 
with developments made in the industry that had been achieved behind the 
existing tariff protection with consequent positive knock-on effects to consumers.
601 PRO BT/l0/26 Committee paper 125/1938, database application reference 38/125a
602 PRO BT/l0/26 Committee Paper 125/1938 p.4
603 PRO BT/l0/26 Committee Paper 125/1938 p.9
604 Lithopone is a white pigment (consisting of a mixture of zinc sulphide, zinc oxide and barium 
sulphate) used in making paints and linoleum.
This was a relatively new industry, which had managed to expand production, but Belgian 
devaluation had led to the rising imports.
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‘The development of the industry in consequence of the original protection has 
resulted, it is said, in substantial reductions in the price to the UK consumers’.605
The applicants pointed out to the Committee that they conducted research 
and were already modem and efficient. They also said that they would give price 
assurances to using industries. Their request was for either a specific duty o f £3.5s 
or 20% whichever was the greater. The Committee noted that: ‘this case seems to 
be an excellent example of benefits accruing to both producers and consumers as a 
result of protection for a particular commodity. Production has expanded, new 
plant has been installed, exports have grown, employment has increased and unit 
production costs have been substantially lowered (chiefly, it seem, as a result of 
the greater output) with the consequence that consumers have benefited by an 
appreciable reduction in price’.606
In deciding to grant the additional duty, it is clear that this carried weight 
with the Committee. As they note: ‘The British manufacturers clearly enjoy an 
excellent reputation in regard to price policy with consumers, only some of whom 
have opposed and that in an unimpressive m anner.... The manufacturers also 
enjoy a good reputation with the DSIR, and have clearly spared no effort to meet 
trade requirements.'607 The Committee try to take decisions in ‘the round’ 
considering not just R&D or efficiency but the impact on consumers.608
IDAC were also particularly impressed by the domestic glass industry. In 1933 an 
application was made for the free listing of Vitralite Glass Cycle Reflectors609, the 
duty rate on the product was 3 3 V3%. Free-listing was requested because red lenses 
of this type could not be produced in the UK. However, so confident were IDAC 
in the capabilities of the home industry that it contacted the British Scientific 
Instrument Research Association [BISRA] to enquire as to the possibilities of 
home manufacture. IDAC were advised that Pilkington’s had been carrying out 
experimental work, they had laid down plant, and it was expected that they would 
be able to begin production in the near future. The BISRA, therefore, expressed
605 PRO BT/l 0/20 Committee Paper 280/1936
606 PRO BT/l 0/20 Paper 280/1936
607 PRO BT/l 0/24 Committee Paper 232/1937, pp. 17-18
608 In this way, the tariff is as ‘scientific’ as they could make it.
609 PRO BT/l 0/8 Committee Paper 464/1933
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the hope that IDAC would encourage Pilkington’s by refusing the free-listing and 
this is what IDAC did .610
When the Sheet and Plate Glass manufacturers Association later came to 
make an application for additional duty on sheet glass the industry was again 
regarded favourably by IDAC .611 The applicants had a strong case as they were 
considered by IDAC to be highly efficient. The applicants asserted that the 
additional duty was essential to ensure that all existing plant could remain viable 
and be kept open. Established plants were in St. Helens and Queensborough and a 
new plant had been opened in Pontypool South Wales by arrangement with 
Special Areas Reconstruction Association [SARA]. Between these three plants it 
would be possible to supply all home demand and maintain exports. However, the 
output of the new works, in Pontypool, could only be sold if  imports were 
reduced. In 1938, they held a 54% share of the home market and had a substantial 
export trade.
On investigating the industry, IDAC found that there had been a large increase 
in production after 1932. This had been achieved through:
■ The deliberate restriction of uneconomic production in the early years;
■ Massive capital investment in new processes; and the acquisition by
Pilkingtons of the Queensborough works.
The applicants claimed to be the most progressive glass manufacturers in the 
world, with an exceptionally strong base of technical staff and significant 
investment in research and development. The DSIR fully supported all of these 
claims. From the evidence they gathered IDAC viewed them as ‘A model of 
efficiency’ (further details can be found in Appendix 6.10).612
610 PRO BT/l 0/17 Committee Paper 64/36 This is similar to actions with machinery manufacturing 
where IDAC are promoting new lines of production, this will be discussed in more detail later.
611 PRO BT/10/29 Committee Paper 78/39 -  a decision was not reached in this case by the 
outbreak of war but it seems likely from the tone of the Committee’s comments that an additional 
duty would have been granted.
612 As was noted in Chapter 4, despite sheet glass being an important input for the building trade it 
seems likely that the Committee would have approved the increased duty had time allowed. They
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New Industry and New Lines of Production.
In a number of cases, the Committee was willing to support applications 
for additional duty where the applicants represented a new industry in the UK, or 
where new lines of production were being introduced. There were a number of 
cases, where they believed it would help British firms to acquire a reputation and 
thus overcome the goodwill of the established overseas firms. In addition, where 
IDAC could see that overseas competitors had clear advantages, for example 
through the size of their home markets, they were willing to raise rates of duty.614
In the case of an application for additional duty on decolourising and 
activated carbons, the Committee considered there were two very important 
reasons for advertising. First, that this would be a new industry and second that 
the industry would be of strategic importance.
‘Other firms are seriously contemplating manufacture, and, apart from the 
stimulus which the imposition of an additional duty would provide, they will be 
encouraged to do so by the interest at present being taken in the subject by the 
Chemical Defence Research Department of the War Office.
The applicants stress the point that the whole of the raw materials used by 
the British producers is British, that labour accounts for a high percentage of the cost 
of manufacture, and that the application is supported by their consuming members.
The industry appears to be actually and potentially an important one, with both the 
means of and the opportunity for considerable expansion under the protection of a 
higher duty. In these circumstances, it is suggested that a prima facie case has been 
established, and that the application should be advertised.’615
were impressed by the existing condition of the industry and would have wanted to encourage its 
further development.
613 Not only did the introduction of the tariff encourage home producers to set-up new factories or 
establish new product lines it also encouraged foreign direct investment. The links have been noted 
in the work of Scott & Rooth in ‘Foreign-based enterprises’ pp. 495-515
614 This was particularly true with firms based in the US where the Committee argued that the 
industry had the benefit of such a large domestic market allowing firms to achieve economies 
through large scale and mass production techniques.
615 PRO BT/l0/4 Committee Paper 292/1932 Carbons decolourising and activated other than 
animal
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Subsequently the Committee recommended the additional duty.616
Other cases where the applicants made a point of claiming it was a new industry 
that needed protection or, that new lines of production were being introduced are 
detailed in Appendix 6.11. IDAC’s willingness to consider applications in order to 
stimulate new developments continued throughout the years of its operation617. In 
1935, it was a fundamental part of the Committee’s discussions in the case of an 
application relating to agricultural track-laying tractors618. In this case, it was 
noted that the British industry was ‘embryonic’. It was a post-war industry that 
had only made limited progress to that point. The main obstacle for this new 
industry was competition from US manufacturers. The IDAC noted, in the US, 
with the benefits of a large domestic market, mass production techniques were 
possible and hence costs of production were lower than in the UK. 'This is a new 
industry, faced with considerable difficulties in establishing itself in this country 
against American competition, and it felt that there is no room for a compromise 
with the United States in regard to a tariff and that any concession is likely to lead 
to the collapse of the British industry'. Additionally they noted that while the GB 
market was relatively small they expected the home industry could expand and
616 When announcing the reasons for their decision the Committee did not emphasise the new 
industry aspect but did focus on its strategic importance and the fact that it was considered 
efficient. Additionally there had been no opposition to the application.
617 In 1936, the Committee, at its own instigation, decided to conduct a review of miscellaneous 
wrought iron and steel products. They decided to consider increasing the duties on iron and steel 
products that were only subject to 10% duty. They had in mind to increase duties to 20% and 
contacted the home industry to assess the case. The products were decorative wrought ironwork 
and steel wool and shavings; this latter industry was new to the country. ‘The manufacture of steel 
wool on an appreciable scale commenced in this country two or three years ago ... this new 
industry has been established in this country at considerable cost, and that the amount of capital in 
the form of machinery, tools and experimental work invested by them is quite considerable. They 
say that an expansion of business is essential if their plants are to be worked on a commercial 
basis’. The home manufacturers held around 50% of the home market. After a full review of the 
case, IDAC decided that it was appropriate to raise the rate of duty on these products. They stated 
that the industry warranted the additional protection because it was a ‘new industry’, because there 
would be positive linkages to other industries and there was no opposition.
PRO BT/l 0/19 Committee Paper 128/36
618 PRO BT/l 0/16 Committee Paper 262/1935 Agricultural Track-Laying Tractors.
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bring down its own prices if the home market initially was protected and this 
enabled them to get a foothold. When later reviewing the case, the Committee 
wrote: ‘It seems clear now that allowing for the economy in running, the English 
machines are not far from being competitive with the American and that an 
increase of duty from 15 per cent to 3 3 V3 per c e n t... should put the British 
manufacturer on a reasonable basis of price’.619 Before making a decision the 
Committee first confirmed with the NFU that the users were satisfied with the 
quality and the range of models being produced by the British industry, they then 
decided to grant the additional duty.
The typewriter industry was another new industry to Britain that IDAC 
needed to consider when an application for additional duty was made in 1932. In 
discussing the application the Committee noted: ‘The English companies have 
shown commendable enterprise in combating the strong American companies.
The machines produced are reputed to be excellent in all respects, but they are 
confined to the ordinary type ... there are upwards of 1,500 parts to a typewriter, 
the production of which entails the installation of a great number of jigs and tools. 
It is clear, therefore, that the production in this country offers scope for much 
employment, and the industry is one which is worthy o f fostering, not only with a 
view to supplying the home market, but on account of the potential export trade, 
particularly to the Empire.*620
In 1936, a second application relating to typewriters and typewriter parts 
was submitted to the committee. An increasing volume of imports suggested to 
the Committee an increased consumption of all types of machines. This they felt 
was to be expected given the general improvements in trade but they noted with 
concern that the British manufacturers had not been able to share in this 
improvement. Following the previous increase in duty, US firms had reduced their 
prices to counteract it.
While the Committee felt that the British product was almost as high a 
quality as the equivalent US product, they found that the selling and service
6,9 PRO BT/10/18 Committee Paper 103/1936
620 PRO BT/l 0/9 Committee Paper 106/1934. In this case, the applicants were granted an 
additional duty on new typewriters.
621 PRO BT/10/18 Committee Paper 79/1936
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arrangements were considerably better for the US product. Hutchinson noted that: 
‘There was no evidence of any spirit of co-operation among the manufacturers, 
and I accordingly discussed the possibility of common or co-ordinated action on 
such matters as advertising, supplies to State-aided schools and to local 
authorities, the interchange of technical information, co-operation on service and 
selling, and a price or production quota arrangement’. Additionally, it was felt 
that ‘goodwill’ remained a significant problem for the British firms.
To assess this new application visits were conducted to the British 
factories. ‘In going round the factories Mr Archer and I [AWH] have been 
impressed by the vast number of operations necessary to produce a typewriter, 
and by the wide range of machinery and intricate organisation required to carry 
out on a mass production basis’.
In 1935, the companies were not in a position to expand their production 
but by 1936, they were. The contemplated production of the British manufacturers 
was then far in excess of home demand. A new factory had been opened which 
would enable the British industry to produce a new product in the mid-price 
range. It was noted that initially parts would be imported from Switzerland for 
further manufacture. This, it was said, would enable workers to be trained and the 
necessary plant for making parts to be installed over a six-month period.
The application was opposed, mainly by agents selling German and US 
products, and by representatives of the second-hand typewriter industry. Despite 
this, the Committee did decide to increase the rate o f duty on standard 
typewriters.622 The Committee felt: ‘The British manufacturers would, I think, 
definitely suffer in prestige if their application was wholly rejected, and having 
regard to the stage of development which has been reached, the case appears to be 
one to which a rate of 3 3 V3 per cent, is definitely appropriate.’623 The additional 
duty is awarded by IDAC because of the efforts and progress made in the 
industry, which they considered well organised and efficient. The additional 
protection was viewed as necessary because of rising imports and the need to 
overcome ‘goodwill’ of the overseas product.
622 In the case of portable and second-hand machines, the Committee turned down the request for 
additional duty.
623 PRO BT/l0/19 Committee Paper 144/1936
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Machinery Licensing
The scheme of machinery licensing provides the clearest example of 
deliberate intervention in the economy by IDAC. The purpose of the scheme was 
quite clear. It was to allow into the country essential items of equipment, which 
were unavailable in the home market. This was the only task which fell within 
IDAC’s purview, however, they took it upon themselves to use the system to the 
greater advantage of British industry. In time, IDAC acquired knowledge of 
machinery which was not produced at home and set about encouraging the home 
engineering industry to commence production. The Committee did this in a 
number of ways. Firstly, it provided information as to the machinery imported 
through the scheme624 on a regular basis to the trade associations (BEA, BEAMA, 
and MTTA). Who, it had been agreed, would disseminate this information to their 
members. Secondly, they contacted possible home manufacturers directly, and 
finally in cases that were more complex they encouraged the involvement of the 
DSIR. Hutchinson makes only a brief reference to this activity in his work, but it 
deserves more attention than this. The work was important in terms of expenditure 
of IDAC’s energies. In 1937 it was noted that 60 out of the total 146 staff, or 
some 41 per cent., were employed on the operation of the scheme.625
This was not a story of a failed attempt by IDAC to intervene in the 
economy, as with the re-organisation of the Iron and Steel Industry. The policy 
meets with success. There was evidence, within IDAC files, that new products 
came into production in Britain as a result of these activities. In some instances, 
overseas companies established manufacturing outlets in Britain, here the profits 
may have been returning overseas, but importantly employment was increased.626
624 This details machinery type, value, volume, etc.
625 PRO BT/l 0/84, Annual Report for 1937. Seventeen extra staff were employed in this year, 
most additions to the clerical and typing staff were to work on the machinery scheme. This 
coincides with the reduced involvement of the BEA in the operation of the scheme.
626 An example of this was the “Cincinnati” hydramatic milling machines. A couple of requests 
were made (one by Ford Motor Co. Ltd in Nov 1932 and one by Charles Churchill & Co., Ltd., in 
Dec 1932) for licences to import the machines. It was argued that these machines were different
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The policy evolved over time as a close relationship was established 
between the Committee and the industry. As early as 19.7.32 IDAC receives a 
request from the MTTA that they publish their decisions. At this stage IDAC 
responds negatively, suggesting that such publications would be the responsibility 
of the Treasury should they choose to do so. A letter was received from BEAMA, 
dated 26.9.32., also requesting information. BEAMA request information, to 
circulate to their members, on items for which IDAC were unable to find British 
manufacturers. The idea being to give members the opportunity to consider 
starting up new lines. IDAC responds by stating that this they feel was a quite 
reasonable request and something which the Committee already have under 
discussion. The next step taken by IDAC was to inform the MTTA, in a letter 
dated 11.10.32., that they may disclose to their members the details of items 
where the MTTA could not find British makers.627 BEAMA receives a similar 
notification on 16.12.32. The BEA asks the IDAC also to provide information on 
the number, and not just the type, of machines imported so those prospective 
manufacturers are better informed. This it was agreed would be supplied from
because they had hydraulic rather than the mechanical feed found on the British equivalents. The 
Committee’s technical officer examined both the Cincinnati and the British machines. He 
concluded, that while there were differences, in the majority of cases the British mechanically 
operated machines were fully satisfactory. Licences for the Cincinnati machines were not therefore 
approved. This subsequently led in 1933 to a proposal by the manufacturers of the Cincinnati 
machine to set-up a plant in the UK, and with the new plant being built in Birmingham the 
following year.
This issue received attention from Peter Scott and Tim Rooth, in ‘Foreign-based enterprises’. They 
noted that tariffs and other trade barriers acted as an important stimulus to foreign direct 
investment (FD1). This had been true for other nations during the nineteenth century and was true 
for Britain in the interwar period. The sectoral incidence of early British tariff acts, such as the 
McKenna duties, had proved a powerful inducement for foreign firms to establish production in 
Britain. The Abnormal Importations Act had stimulated FDI, and the Import Duties Act of 1932 
continued to do so. Between, May 1932 and April 1933, 252 firms set up in Britain. Employment 
in new foreign plants by the end of April 1933 had reached almost 11,000. There could also be 
important multiplier effects. FDI was also important for stimulating competition in the domestic 
market, and helped to diffuse technology and management techniques.
627 PRO BT/l 0/59, part 2.
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January 1933.628 It was not until a later stage, that information on all machinery 
imports was passed on to the three trade associations.
IDAC believed the British Engineering Industry to be weak and 
complacent. Consequently, the matter was not left there. They took an interest in 
how the trade associations passed on the information to their members. The 
Committee described as ‘a typical illustration of the gaps in British machinery 
production’, the case of factory garment making machinery. Sir Percy Ashley, 
discussed this matter directly with the Director of the BEA.629 The Director was 
asked how it was proposed to run a propaganda campaign to induce production in 
the country. The normal procedure of the association was to advertise in trade 
journals. Ashley suggested: ‘that as a first step his Association should seek 
conversations with the big users of such machinery; the probability was that it was 
highly inconvenient and expensive to them to obtain their machines from 
American sources and that they would be glad enough to co-operate in ensuring a 
source of supply in this country’. The BEA adopted this proposal.
The DSIR are not only keen for IDAC to involve themselves in these 
developments, but also to participate themselves, see Appendix 6.12. IDAC were 
willing to comply with the wishes of the DSIR on this matter. The Committee 
noted however, that in their experience: ‘the difficulties in manufacture here of the 
machinery for which licensed importation was granted, are rather of an economic 
than a scientific kind’.630
The intricate involvement of IDAC in encouraging British manufacture 
can be elicited from the internal memorandum detailed below:
... When two or more manufacturers show interest in the same machine the 
difficulty arises as to the necessity for disclosing to each of them the interest of 
the other. The experiment was tried in the case of dealing with packaging 
machinery, of getting all the interested manufacturers at the IDAC for a general 
discussion of the issues involved. The idea was that it might be possible for them
628 PRO BT/l 0/59, part 2.
629 The discussion took place at the offices of IDAC on 17th of November 1933.
630 PRO BT/l0/59, part 3. This forms part of ‘Notes on points for discussion with Mr. Bremner 
[Director of the BEA], at 3pm on 22 March, 33’.
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to reach some agreement amongst themselves as to sub-division of the work 
involved in producing machinery to displace that subject to importation. ...631 
This highlights how pro-active IDAC were in the matter.
In another internal memorandum concerning the encouragement of 
manufacture in the country it was noted:
We are now proceeding by way of making direct touch with individual 
manufacturers, who we may know, either by interviewing at the office or by 
visits of Mr. Morgan to the works, to have facilities at their works to handle 
some particular line which was at present being imported. For example, only 
yesterday a Staff Officer of the Division learned in conversation with a 
manufacturer that he could handle a particular kind of electrical tool which we 
had licensed in considerable numbers during the past eight or nine months. The 
manufacturer was made aware of the market and we shall maintain touch with 
him.632
The only concern that was noted about this procedure was that the Committee 
might be accused of favouring certain firms, but it was believed it was the only 
practical way that the work could be conducted. ‘In his travels through the country 
Mr. Morgan gains a first-hand knowledge of different works and can form a very 
shrewd judgement of what they can do. I propose to analyse the list of licences 
that have been granted, to sub-classify them so far as was possible, and to ensure 
at every opportunity that the information was placed in the quarters which are 
most likely to benefit from it.’633
These activities are successful. Appendix 6.13 provides a list of some of 
the items of machinery where production began as a direct result of IDAC’s 
involvement. The list was sent to the Director of the BEA on the 2nd December 
1933, and was said to be a few examples. Many others were said to be in the 
pipeline, but it was too early for them to be disclosed. Percy Ashley, comments: ‘I 
may add that it was our frequent practice to ask of an applicant user of machinery 
that he should allow facilities to British engineers whose names we have had from
631 PRO BT/10/59, part 3. Internal Memo dated 10th June 1933 Re: Production of Machinery not 
previously produced in UK.
632 PRO BT/10/59, part 3. Memorandum - “Notes on Points for Discussion with Mr. Bremner at 
3pm on 22 March, 33”.
633 PRO BT/10/59, part 3. Memorandum - “Notes on Points for Discussion with Mr. Bremner at 
3pm on 22 March, 33”.
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you to inspect the imported machine, and such facilities are nearly always readily 
given’ 634
Cases exist of machinery being imported under license solely for the 
purpose of copying by British manufacturers. In discussions with the BEA in 
November 1933, it was pointed out: ‘that in a great number of cases, particularly 
of copying foreign machines, plans were in an embryonic state and that it would 
clearly be undesirable to refer to such cases until something definite had 
emerged’.635 There are also examples of agreements being made, with foreign 
manufacturers, for machinery to be produced under license in this country. Details 
o f which may be found in Appendix 6.13. In this case, production was undertaken 
immediately without incurring expenses of design and product testing.
IDAC in supplying the information, and guaranteeing that licences would 
be refused once production commences in Britain, provided manufacturers with 
the incentive to invest. Their actions effectively overcame obstacles which 
otherwise existed in the market place. They brought together buyers and, 
prospective suppliers. They tried to ensure that effort was not duplicated. The 
licensing system, in the way IDAC chose to operate it, furnished information 
otherwise unavailable as to gaps in British production. Its actions were sufficient 
to induce manufacturers to incur the heavy expenditure and risk attending the 
initiation of a new branch of manufacture. The engineering industry was thus able 
to make up lost ground, especially in the manufacture of high-class machinery.
634 PRO BT/10/59, part 4.
635 PRO BT/10/59, part 4.
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Conclusion
Although, the official remit of the Committees was the tariff, it pursued industrial 
rationalisation and it encouraged of cartels (both domestic and international). 
Hence, IDAC took on a wider significance. The IDAC also involved itself in the 
encouragement of modernisation and development o f technology. This activity 
was particularly significant in terms of the recovery and the longer-term 
competitiveness of British industry. The engineering industry was able to improve 
its competitive position whilst protected. The industry introduced new lines of 
production, which it had hitherto been too risk averse to contemplate. The IDAC 
was able to significantly reduce the risk involved, and thereby stimulates the 
recovery of a vital industry. Such activities suggest, if we consider IDAC only for 
the tariffs that it introduced, its role is seriously understated.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
Business government relationships.
The task IDAC had been set was a mammoth one and one which without the 
assistance of industry it could not hope to achieve. Had the task been merely to 
introduce a general tariff there would not have been a need for such an institution. 
The need to make the tariff ‘scientific’ which should be adjusted to meet the 
various needs and circumstances of industry was what made the institution, and in 
turn its close involvement with industry, necessary.
IDAC could not hope, on its own, to make a robust decision on what level 
of protection any particular industry needed. Instead, it relied on industry to voice 
its needs. The Committee quickly established, and published, a system by which 
an industry could notify them of these needs.
The reliance of the Committee on industry did not end there. While the 
Committee had access to a variety of official statistics and data held by other 
government departments these were not sufficient. They needed more detailed 
information to be supplied by the applicants themselves. Much of this information 
was sensitive, such as price and production cost data. IDAC was not able to verify 
this from alternative sources so that they relied, in this respect, entirely on the 
information that was provided by applicants.
The Committee members were well aware of the risks associated with 
having to rely so heavily on the applicants themselves. To try to combat the risks 
involved the Committee approached the consideration of requests for changes to 
duty rates in the following way. First, they had an understanding themselves of 
why an industry might need or ‘deserve’ additional protection and they had 
established within the committee criteria to judge applications by. Second, they 
tried to gather as much information from elsewhere as possible. Not only did they 
use official data sources wherever possible they consulted other government 
departments that were likely to have a view or understanding of the industry 
concerned. Finally, there was the process of advertising any proposed change in 
the duty. This gave the opportunity for others, especially those who opposed
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applications, to present their own case and their own information. These sources 
could help the Committee to check the veracity of applicants’ claims.
There are only a few examples in the seven years the Committee operated 
of industry, as represented by trade associations, maintaining regular contact. 
Consequently, a continuing process of bargaining and negotiations did not 
develop to any great extent. For most trade associations, their contact with IDAC 
was a one-off. Most submitted only one application for additional duty, would 
have dealings with IDAC for the duration of the review process and then no more. 
Those who submitted more than one application did not, on the whole, benefit 
from having worked with IDAC before - as measured by the success of additional 
duty applications. They did not persuade IDAC to treat applications from them 
more favourably. Nor do they learn what IDAC wanted and how to deal with 
them more effectively. IDAC always published a brief outline of why it was 
granting additional duties yet there is no evidence that applicants changed their 
approach in response to this. The reasons for wanting additional duties remained 
similar throughout the seven-year period suggesting that the problems faced by 
industry did not fundamentally change. IDAC would therefore have been dealing 
with similar arguments throughout.
Each case put before IDAC was viewed on its own merit. The ABCM, 
who submitted several applications had a slightly higher than average success 
rate. This was more a reflection of them having sufficient resources to present a 
robust case, and additionally that they were representing members that in some 
way were efficient, modem, technically advanced or ‘new’ and possibly 
‘strategic’. There is no evidence that it was because they had developed a special 
relationship with the Committee.
Close and continuos relationships between EDAC and trade associations 
really developed in only two cases. These were the Iron and Steel industry trade 
association, NFISM, and the engineering trade association, the BEA. What 
emerged in each case was different. It was necessary for IDAC to become closely 
involved with the Iron and Steel Federation to conduct the review of the sector at 
the government’s request. The subsequent story of IDAC failing to secure any 
change of substance in the industry while at the same time giving the industry the 
highest possible levels o f protection is well known. This is an example of a 
heterogeneous industry (size and scale of firms, production techniques, products
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etc) that nevertheless was able to present a united front toward government. The 
Federation wanted to resist change and to resist interference from government and 
in this, it was successful. The iron and steel industry was well practised having 
resisted previous government attempts to bring about change in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. IDAC was not alone in failing to make them change.
The engineering industry, and in particular the BEA, became closely 
involved with IDAC to assist them in the operation of the machinery licensing 
scheme. IDAC needed the association’s expert knowledge to enable it to run the 
scheme effectively. In the way, that IDAC chose to run the scheme the BEA and 
its members were able to benefit from improved knowledge of British industry’s 
machinery requirements and technology transfers. It cannot be shown to have led 
to a sea change for engineering, nor can it be shown to have been vital to the 
ensuing recovery (it is not possible to distinguish the effects from those of the 
rearmament boom). However, it was crucial because IDAC successfully removed 
barriers to innovation and encouraged entrepreneurship. In this way the scheme 
contributed in a vital way to the future health of the engineering industry. Thus, 
both sides gained from the relationship.
The BEA had also hoped that, by assisting IDAC in this way, when they 
applied for additional duties their case would be viewed more favourably. This 
was not the case however, the good work they had done on the scheme did not 
help their application. If anything, it diminished their chances of success. Because 
IDAC had gained an intimate knowledge of how the industry, and the Trade 
Association, operated they saw the application as less credible. They knew that 
the industry was not only heterogeneous but also lacked any organisational unity. 
This made them more critical about the application for additional duties.
The example of the IDAC working with the BEA also shows that IDAC 
could benefit from the ‘transparency’ of the system it established for considering 
additional duties. When the Committee announced the initial rates of duty in 
1932, the BEA was disappointed. The rates of duty given to the industry were not 
as high as they had hoped. Because they had been involved in the initial process 
with the committee however, they did not feel in a position to complain. Instead, 
they felt that they needed to ‘sell’ the outcome as a positive one to their 
membership. Again, with the Trade Association involvement in the decision 
making and operation of the machinery licensing scheme IDAC was confident
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that this publicly appeared that they had secured the approval of the home 
industry. This thereby blunted any criticisms of the scheme. A similar story can be 
applied to the consideration of all the applications taken by IDAC. Because 
business was intimately involved in the process, it was more difficult for them to 
be critical, or argue, about the decisions that IDAC reached.
Why were certain sectors more likely to get the additional duties that 
they requested?
There is no direct relationship between successful applications for additional duty 
and the sectors or industries that theory predicts were likely to benefit from higher 
tariffs. This is because the additional duties were not made at the industry or 
sector level but were made for individual product lines. When IDAC made their 
initial decisions on the introduction of the tariff this was constructed on an 
industry basis using existing broad Customs classifications and different rates 
were thereby given to different sectors. Thereafter, this was not so much a concern 
of IDAC as they had a general understanding of the industry that put forward a 
particular application. However, beyond that, judgements would be taken based 
on the strength of the argument for a particular product line.
Theory suggests that amongst others, consumer industries would gain 
higher rates of tariff but IDAC’s concern with ‘using interests’ both business and 
private mitigated this. IDAC refused a number of additional duty applications 
because they were concerned over price effects. Moreover, the size of an industry 
only mattered to IDAC where they considered it was ‘too small’ to warrant 
individual treatment.
What did matter to the Committee was that applications were as 
representative as possible. This did not mean that they favoured applications 
submitted by formal institutions, such as Trade Associations, over others. 
Applications made by groups of firms that had come together for that purpose and 
who also represented the majority of UK production were equally successful. 
Applications made by individual firms tended to be turned down unless the firm 
was responsible for the majority of UK production and the product line was not 
insignificant.
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No particular trade association, or other body, received preferential 
treatment from IDAC. The quality of information and the strength of the argument 
presented counted more with the committee than who was making it. Conversely, 
if an application was poorly presented and lacked sufficient evidence (particularly 
where it could not clearly be established that their were problems caused by the 
level of imports) then it stood little chance of even getting to the stage where the 
Committee would advertise it.
The Committee did not stress the point but in examining cases, it is clear 
that they did have concerns regarding applications that related to strategic 
industries and strategic products. They were explicit in their defence of, and the 
necessity for, the high rates of protection given to the iron and steel industry 
because o f its position as a strategic industry. Similar concerns were shown 
toward other strategic industries such as the nitrogenous fertiliser producers, and 
the producers of de-colourising and activated carbons.
Although the Committee did not establish eligibility criteria that had to be 
met by applicants, there were certain key issues that concerned them. These 
included efficiency of the applicants and their willingness to change. Some 
industries were rewarded for being progressive whilst others received the 
additional duty requests to enable them to improve. Other cases that were likely to 
convince IDAC were ones that involved new industries or new lines of 
production. IDAC would not willingly support ‘lame ducks’ and would never act 
to prohibit imports entirely.
No one thing would convince the Committee that an additional duty was 
necessary. It was the weight of the argument in toto (taking account of wider 
issues) that would persuade them.
What did the Committee want to achieve?
The Committee strongly believed that British industry needed to take the 
opportunity afforded by protection to improve their performance and longer-term 
competitiveness. They felt that industry needed to raise its game for when it 
would again face open market competition.
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While they recognised that all was not well with home industry, they were 
not in a position to prescribe a cure. They took the view that the position of every 
industry was different with different problems and solutions. They therefore 
avoided taking a one-size fits all approach to considering applications that came 
before them.
Fundamentally, the Committee believed that industrialists themselves were 
best placed to both identify their problems and devise solutions. Businessmen had 
a much more intimate knowledge of their own industry than the Committee could 
ever hope to attain. Yet, they knew from recent history and previous government 
attempts to change industry, that industry was often unwilling or incapable of 
making changes. They therefore felt that they should use their position to try to 
stimulate positive developments and progress in industry.
In indicating that they preferred to hear representations from organised 
bodies, they hoped to stimulate co-operation within industries. If firms came 
together to submit a tariff application they might be more willing to discuss with 
one another what changes were needed and also work together to achieve them. 
This also goes a long way toward explaining the Committee’s attitude towards 
cartels.
The Committee supported domestic cartels because they shared the widely 
held view across government that these institutions were linked with 
rationalisation and reorganisation. They believed that cartels could be a force for 
the good, that they could foster knowledge sharing and best practice as well as 
promoting wider industrial change. They were institutions that brought together 
otherwise individualistic businessmen to co-operate. As with everything else 
though, the Committee tried to take a balance approached toward cartels. Whilst 
they favoured them they did not approve of monopoly price fixing as it affected 
consumers.
International cartels were equally favoured, the Committee believing that 
it was better for businessmen to find a solution to international trade competition 
rather than having a tariff imposed upon them. In this way, the cartels were 
believed to be more efficient that a tariff ever could be.
In turning down applications for additional duty because an industry was 
inefficient or poorly organised they were sending clear signals that the tariff was 
not there to protect the weak and unworthy. In awarding additional duties on
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grounds such as that industry was modem, efficient and well organised, or that the 
industry would improve with the assistance of additional protection, they hoped to 
encourage others to make moves in this direction.
In some cases, the actions of the Committee were stronger than simple 
‘signalling’ what it was that they approved of. As has been noted some duties 
were granted with conditions imposed. Even if the outcome was unsuccessful, i.e. 
significant change was not bought about, at least the Committee’s intent was 
clear. The committee pursued their ambitions more actively in other ways. They 
did not feel that they were in a position to use their powers to enforce chance. 
They could not force an industry to reorganise or rationalise but they could cajole. 
They could not force industry to conduct research, or introduce new techniques 
but they could encourage such developments.
IDAC recognised the role that they could play in providing the necessary 
conditions to encourage capital investment. Cheap money policy meant that 
business could afford to finance investment. Tariff policy, in the way that IDAC 
chose to implement it, meant that industry could be confident that they would get 
a return on their investment. For example, in the case of the scissor industry IDAC 
granted an additional duty for a period of five years to enable the industry to 
reorganisation its production methods with surety about the conditions it would be 
facing.
IDAC would award additional duties to help overcome obstacles. They 
provided certainty to facilitate investment and reorganisation and to encourage 
research and development within industry. They provided (infant industry) 
protection to encourage the introduction of new industry and new lines of 
production, and to overcome established goodwill and reputation held by foreign 
producers. With the machinery-licensing scheme the Committee provided 
information to overcome imperfect knowledge and guaranteed tariff protection if 
the British manufacturers produced new lines of machinery.
If the Committee were convinced that a home industry could become more 
competitive as a result of granting an additional duty, and at the same time there 
were no complaints voiced by using industries, then an additional duty would
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invariably be granted. IDAC believed that research into new products, new 
technology and the adoption of new production, distribution and marketing 
systems were all crucial for the revitalisation and progress of British industry. 
They therefore chose to encourage those that were already grasping the nettle. 
They would not prohibit imports believing that an element of competition was 
healthy for industry, this is noted in the cases of the British Plastic Moulding 
industry, the scissor industry and in linoleum and cork carpet production.
The Committee made mistakes along the way. Granting additional duties 
before change took place in industry being the most obvious example. However, 
this was a new way of working and the Committee did not have an example to 
follow.
The approach
To be scientific the tariff needed to take account of the needs of one 
industry, without harming using industries or consumers, and benefiting the 
national economy. In order to construct a ‘scientific’ tariff the Committee needed 
to understand the impact upon users, and the wider economy, o f any proposed 
changes. While the impact on the wider economy would always be difficult to 
assess, they were able to take a view on the impact on users. The views o f using 
interests were necessary for IDAC to take a balanced view of any application. 
Consequently the Committee set-up the system of publishing details of 
applications under consideration and allowing time for others to submit their 
views to them.
Opposition to an application could lead the Committee to decide that 
additional duties were not appropriate, or that a more moderate rate of additional 
duty could be given. Just as an applicant needed to provide evidence to support 
their case so would any opponents. This did not always need to be as robust as 
that requested from the applicants but it always provided the Committee with a 
countervailing view of what was happening. Less than a third of applications that 
the Committee advertised were actually opposed, suggesting that in the main
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industry was happy with the effective rates of protection that it benefited from. 
The system also enabled supporters to write in once an application had been 
advertised. This happened only rarely because those to whom an additional duty 
was likely to be important would already be involved.
The apparent lack of bias in the decisions made by each of the Committee 
Members supports the argument that they took a systematic approach to their 
decision making. They Committee members did not show that they had specific 
agendas or different approaches to examining cases. The individual member was 
responsible for presenting a case, findings and a proposed recommendation but 
the decision on what would be recommended to the Treasury was taken at full 
committee meetings.
Although the Committee’s approach to reviewing the additional duty 
applications was systematic, this did not mean that it was inflexible. When cases 
arose that required different treatment, the Committee was adaptive. This is 
highlighted in the case o f the nitrogen fertiliser application where they were faced 
with a new situation. They discussed what to do and then determined their 
approach and policy for similar cases that arose subsequently. The Committee 
always tried to take decisions in the round, balancing and weighing-up differing 
sides of the argument.
Problems with the approach?
The extent of the information that applicants needed to provide meant that 
the process could be time consuming. Though it was a time consuming process, 
this was because ID AC were determined to be thorough. The original duty rates, 
they were the first to acknowledge, had been pushed through in a hurry. It was 
always recognised that these would need to be modified. IDAC wanted to give 
each request for a modification careful consideration and be able to take the time 
to weigh up the pros and cons of a case as far as they could be ascertained. The 
‘Heads of Information to be Supplied’ performed two functions. First, it signalled 
to industry what the Committee wanted from them. Second, it helped the
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Committee apply a consistent approach to their review of each application that 
came before them.
The Committee could be criticised because the time it took them to make 
decisions might have been harmful to industry. With decisions, on average, taking 
about eight months industries might be struggling while they waited to hear the 
results of their application. This reflected the time needed for applicants to 
produce evidence, for IDAC to gather and consider evidence from other sources, 
for consultation and possibly negotiation with opposition, and then for the 
Committee to make its judgement. The Committee would have defended their 
actions and argued that it would not be appropriate to rush into decisions which 
might be still more harmful. The initial tariff was aimed at affording all sectors 
with some degree of protection at least. Modifications needed to consider much 
more. IDAC had to make decisions based on imperfect knowledge but they did 
the best that they could.
Scientific tariff and the Committee approach
The Committee’s approach to the building industry reflects the systematic 
method they adopted in their endeavours to introduce a scientific tariff. The 
building industry could not itself benefit from protection and its needs could 
easily have been overlooked. However, the Committee took seriously their remit 
to account for the needs of consumers. They therefore strove to protect the 
interests of what they knew was a very important industry (both politically and 
economically) as far as was possible. They also knew that the industry had 
important linkages to other sectors such as the building materials industry and 
consumer durables. Therefore, it was not simply about examining the needs of 
building alone but also considering the wider knock-on effects.
It might be argued that the only reason for IDAC efforts that were directed 
towards the building sector were because of their knowledge of the government 
house-building programme. Yet, equally it can be argued that it did not affect 
their approach. The thoroughness with which the Committee examined issues, its 
collation and use of available data and its consultation of interested parties 
mirrored its approach in all other cases.
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IDAC has been criticised for the tariff that affected the materials of this 
industry suggesting that it, necessarily, dampened activity in a sector which was 
vital to the recovery. Yet, IDAC on the whole seem unconcerned, but not unaware 
(as we can see from the discussions on brick and glass duties, for example) of the 
possible repercussions and impact of raising tariff rates on the materials. Their 
lack of concern can be justified. It was the case that while the price o f building 
materials rose, they did not rise by as much as did those o f other inputs (land, 
labour and profits). For much of the period, they also remained below 1932 levels. 
Additionally, rising house prices (if anything house building was constrained by 
labour supply shortages) did not stifle demand. As with all other cases, IDAC had 
to work under the, not unreasonable, assumption that if the using industries did 
not contact them regarding additional duty applications then they could have no 
objections to the proposals and therefore no problems with additional duties. In 
fact, representatives of the building trade rarely contacted ID AC. This gave the 
Committee the confidence that their approach was not harmful.
Their work with the building industry also shows that their concern for 
users was not limited to the price effects of the tariff. Taking a wider view they 
were also concerned with the quality of British products and the reliability of 
supplies. An example of their concern with the quality and reliability of British 
products was when the Committee consulted the users regarding Agricultural 
Track laying tractors. The Committee would not support industries that produced 
sub-standard products, nor would they try to prohibit the importation of products 
which were clearly of a superior quality. IDAC wanted home industry to be 
competitive but would not penalise users when they could only guarantee quality 
products from overseas. In any case, the committee believed that competition was 
necessary for home industry.
The case of the glass industry highlights how difficult IDAC’s task could 
be at times. While clearly aware that sheet glass was an important raw material for 
the building trade they had to try to balance this with the needs o f the glass 
producing industry. The Committee felt that, purely on its own merit, the glass 
industry should be granted additional protection. The industry was already 
modern, efficient and technically advanced yet with the benefit of additional 
protection it would be able to move up another gear and become even more 
competitive. This case was not resolved before the outbreak of War but it seems
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likely that the needs of the glass industry would have prevailed. On the one hand 
building did not appear to be constrained thus far by rising material prices, and on 
the other the glass industry epitomised what IDAC hoped to see elsewhere, it was 
a ‘flagship’ industry.
IDAC were justified in paying attention to an industry that it could not 
protect because their remit required them to consider the interests of all users. It 
was part of their systematic and consistent approach to all additional duty 
applications and took account of the implications of wider government policy. 
Yet, this also shows the limits to how far IDAC could hope to take their scientific 
approach. It was one thing to consider the impact on the immediate using industry 
but another to think of the wider implications for the national economy as a 
whole.
The fact that IDAC refused some applications for additional duties 
because of their concerns over pricing, and in others insisted on price-agreements 
being reached, also confirms their commitment to the remit of providing a 
scientific tariff. Their attempts to track the movement of prices of a number of 
products was an attempt to ensure that the consumer was not being exploited. 
Their work in this area served to allay fears that the tariff would lead to price 
increases.
How aware were IDAC of wider government policy aims, and how co- 
ordinated was policy across government?
The attitude of IDAC to the building industry not only reflects their desire 
to produce a scientific tariff it also shows their awareness of wider government 
policy. They were fully cognisant of the government’s house building policy and 
well aware of the limitations on what contribution they could make towards it. 
They chose to make what contributions they could in close liaison with the 
department of government that truly was responsible for this policy area, i.e. the 
Ministry of Health.
IDAC regularly sought the advice of the Ministry of Labour and its 
Building Prices Committee. It also consulted local housing authorities regarding
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the quality of British produced materials, the DSIR, the Forestry Commission (re 
timber) and the Foreign Office (re timber).
The discussions on cement prices show that IDAC were clear about their 
limited ability to effect change or policy for the industry when responsibility and 
power was clearly held by another government department. The Ministry of 
Health had powers to control Building materials prices and IDAC could do 
nothing to assist the building industry itself because of an international price 
agreement which neutralised any tariff action. This issue also shows that IDAC 
knew that the tariff could not always be used as a solution. Where foreign 
producers were able to counteract the tariff by reducing their prices, or where an 
international cartel agreement was in place, it rendered the tariff ineffectual.
The Committee remained aware of when and where other government 
departments had lead responsibility and therefore would be better placed to 
exercise power and control over policy and change. For example, while they are 
concerned with the issue of poor marketing by British businessmen this was not 
pursued in the case of Horticultural and Agricultural products. They consulted 
with the Ministry o f Agriculture on what and how duties could help the industry 
but they left it to the Ministry to act to improve the marketing position.
Where IDAC felt they could make little contribution to other areas of 
policy they are less concerned with the issue when examining applications for 
additional duties. The Committee recorded when applicants were located in 
Special Areas but they made no exceptions to the way in which they treated the 
cases and did not accord them preferential status over and above other 
applications. The application for additional duty on Barium Chloride shows this. 
The factories were located in a special area and the applicants made a big point of 
this when they wrote to the Committee. Nevertheless, on the balance of the 
evidence the Committee turned the application down.
Often, the Committee took note of the employment position of an industry. 
However, they believed this was an area where they could not make a direct 
contribution to policy. It was clear to the Committee that the impact of the tariff 
on employment could be many fold. Initially, the increased demand for British
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produced goods, and new work created through foreign direct investments made 
in response to the tariff, could have a positive effect on employment. Thereafter, 
the policies of IDAC (at least in the short-term) might have a negative impact on 
employment. If rationalisation or reorganisation of industry were to take place, to 
put the economy on a sound footing, this would entail the release of labour from 
areas with excess capacity and raise unemployment, at least in the short-term. 
Equally, if new methods of production and new labour saving technology were 
introduced into British business the impact on employment would again be 
negative. This was an area in which they felt unable to make a positive 
contribution. In the long-term they believed that placing industry on a sound 
footing would provide the solution through a natural correcting mechanism, and 
this was evidenced by the examples of the building and engineering industries.
The Committee clearly understood where IDAC sat in relation to other 
government departments and what and how they could contribute to wider 
government policy aims. This ensures that their actions are not inconsistent with 
policies being pursued elsewhere in government. They were equally sure about 
their own responsibilities and areas of control. While they were happy to consult 
with other government departments (seeking advice where necessary) they would 
not let others make their decisions for them. This is borne out by the example of 
IDAC refusing to make ‘research’ a requirement of additional duty applications as 
the DSIR requested. While IDAC were keen to see research undertaken they did 
not believe that such criteria was appropriate.
The way that IDAC worked, often in consultation with other government 
departments, and always aware of what they might be able to contribute to wider 
government policy indicates that government, at this time, was less fragmentary 
than has been previously suggested. In fact, IDAC was no mere administrator of 
the Tariff alone: it played a key role in the attempt to reorganise and revitalise a 
British industrial and manufacturing sector left behind by international 
competitors, depressed by the worldwide economic slump and struggling to come 
to terms with the end of global free-trade. In this, IDAC acted in accordance with 
its ‘scientific’ remit: namely, to act consistently, across this sector, to encourage 
and assist in the reorganisation of British business structures for the benefit of
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British capital, consumers and labour in the changed market conditions of the 
1930s.
The picture a study of IDAC in the wider policy environment gives is of a 
body not administering the tariff, but of using it to achieve certain ‘scientific’ ends 
in its remit: efficient industry, consumer protection and wider employment 
opportunities. Not all IDAC’s interventions were wholly successful. However, a 
clear, concerted goal is still evident: one that, in the context and preconceptions of 
its time, IDAC either achieved or was on the road to achieving. In this, IDAC 
was following not only its own line, but also stated government policy as it had 
evolved by the time Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the Exchequer and prime- 
mover in the National Government of the 1930s, brought forward in his Import 
Duties Bill. In its own terms, IDAC was a ‘scientific’ organisation that upheld 
these aims to which tariffs themselves were only a means to an end, and not 
always the favoured ones. In so doing, IDAC was a key plank in a government 
economic-policy platform going well beyond the simple implementation of the 
tariff.
This work supports the literature which argues that government 
intervention was increasing in the 1930s, and that intervention was effective at the 
time. IDAC chose to intervene and showed that intervention could be useful and 
successful. The Committee did not make the mistake of believing that it was best 
placed to identify and correct weaknesses in particular industries and companies. 
Instead, it intervened to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation by focusing 
attention on obstacles to higher productivity and where possible helping industry 
to overcome them. Their work clearly shows that government was very interested 
in industrial modernisation in the 1930s and aspired to intervene at a micro-level 
in the economy. The recognition by IDAC that government had a useful role to 
play in assisting industry by removing obstacles to change should have provided a 
vital lesson for future intervention.
*  *  *
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Appendix 1.1
History of Tariff Protection in the Twentieth Century 
Pre-war budget duties
•  Specific duties (up to the equivalent of 100% ad valorem)
• On alcohol, tobacco, sugar, coffee, cocoa, etc.,
McKenna duties 1915
• 33 V3 percent
• on luxuries -  motor cars, clocks and watches, musical instruments,
• Objective was ‘to maintain our foreign exchanges and to cut down 
expenditure on imported luxuries’ [House of Commons]. Played part as 
important revenue earners.
• renewed annually
• briefly repealed in 1924, reintroduced in 1925 (as a permanent feature) 
then ran through until 1938
Dyestuffs (Import Regulation) Act 1920
• Protection extended to cover a range of chemical products
• Prohibited import of certain synthetic and dyestuff products except under 
licence
Safeguarding of Industries Act 1921
• 3 3 V3 percent
• protection for ‘key’ industries
• 6,500 goods of ‘strategic importance’
•  enacted for 5 years, and in 1926 extended for 10 years
• from 1926 could apply for protection against unfair competition due to 
currency depreciation; subsidies, bounties, or other artificial 
advantages; or inferior conditions of employment
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Silk Duties 1925
• Specific and ad valorem (up to 33!/3 percent)
• Imposed for revenue purposes
•  On grounds of luxury -  artificial and natural silk, and their products
Hydrocarbon Oils Duty 1928
• Imposed for revenue purposes
Abnormal Importations (Customs Duties) Act 1931
• 50% ad valorem
• Stop extraordinarily imports prior to the introduction of a tariff and to 
strengthen the exchanges
• Imposed until 19th May 1932
Horticultural Products (Emergency Customs Duties) Act 1931
• Specific rates
• Stop extraordinarily imports prior to the introduction of a tariff and to 
strengthen the exchanges
• Imposed until 10th December 1932
Import Duties Act 1932
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Appendix 2.1
Committee Members 
Sir George May (Chairman)
• Business background -  insurance (Prudential Assurance Co.)
•  Manager of the American Dollar Securities Committee during WWI
• Director of the British Overseas Bank until 1931
• Chairmen of the Committee on National Expenditure (Economic Advisory 
Council), 1931-1932, (known as the May Report)
• EDUCATION -  Cranleigh
• Responsible for considering additional duty applications falling under 
Division I
Sir Sydney Chapman
• Lecturer in Economic and Political Science, Cardiff 1899-1901
•  Professor of Political Economy, Manchester University College, 1901 -1917
•  Dean of Faculty of Commerce and Administration, Manchester University 
College, 1904-1917
• Vice President Royal Statistical Society 1916
• Permanent Secretary Board of Trade, 1920-1927
• Chief Economic Adviser at the Board of Trade 1927-1932
• Committee on Unemployment Benefits (Economic Advisory Council), 1930
• EDUCATION -  Manchester Grammar School; Owen’s College Manchester; 
Trinity College Cambridge
• Responsible for considering additional duty applications falling under 
Division II
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Sir George Allan Powell
• Barrister-at-Law, Gray’s Inn
• Held various public positions during WWI (Chairmen of Food Council 1929- 
1932)
• Served on a number of government enquiries inter-war (Royal commission on 
Food Prices, 1924-1925; Night Baking Committee 1925)
• CBE as a result of his work in Refugee camp (Resident Officer in charge)
• Member of Committee on Key Industries Duties, 1935
• EDUCATION -  Bancroft’s School; King’s College, London.
• Responsible for considering additional duty applications falling under 
Division III
Percy Ashley (Secretary)
• Formerly Lecturer in History and Public Administration, LSE
• Joint Secretary, Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy, 1916-1917
• Assistant Secretary, Board of Trade 1918-1923
• Principal Assistant Secretary, Department of Industries and Manufactures, 
Board of Trade 1923-1932
• EDUCATION -  Lincoln College, Oxford
Herbert Hutchinson (Assistant Secretary)
• Assistant Secretary, Board of Trade
• Committee on the Cotton Industry (Economic Advisory Council), 1929
• EDUCATION -  St. Dunstan’s College; University College London
Sir Alfred Hurst (until 1936 only)
• On secondment from the Treasury (joined 1907)
• Secretary to Local Taxation Committee 1911-1914
• Member of Royal Commission on wheat Supplies 1921-1925
• Chairman of London Builders’ Conference from 1936
• EDUCATION -  Market Bosworth; Emmanuel College, Cambridge
• Assisted Sir George May with applications under Division I
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Appendix 2.2
Responsibilities o f  ID AC
•  Scientific Tariff
•  Additional Duties
• These were applied in to finished and semi-manufactured goods -  
ranged from 10 to 33.33%
• Free-listing
•  Largely raw materials and foodstuffs (list was expanded through time)
• Drawback
• Method by which import duty could be reclaimed on items later re­
exported
• Machinery Licensing Scheme
• To allow imports of new machinery only being produced overseas -  govt 
did not want industry to have to pay duty
• The importer applied for licence for individual consignments of machinery
• IDAC consulted with engineering trade associations to confirm that 
substitute machinery not produced in the UK
•  Around 25% of all machinery imports each year came in duty free under 
license
•  Licensing of consignments for research, learning, art and sport
• Advised the Foreign Office when Trade treaties where negotiated
•  Special Investigations
• Silk and artificial silk duties 1932
• Dyestuffs
• Iron and Steel Industry 1936
• Responsibility to deal with complaints arising out of the Ottawa Agreements
•  Also monitored price movements
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Appendix 2.3
Heads of Information eventually to be supplied so far as Possible By 
Bodies making Representations for Additional Duties.
Taken from: Sir Herbert Hutchinson Tariff Making, Appendix B
1. Name or Names of Association, Firms or Firm making the application.
2. Precise definition of the article or articles to which the application relates.
3. Rate or rates o f duties asked for by Applicants and reasons therefore.
4. (a) Volume of United Kingdom production (estimated if necessary) in 1930, 
and any data showing trend or production in recent years [The exact source of 
the statistics or basis of the estimates should be given.]
(b) Number of concerns engaged in production (1930 or 1931) and number of 
people employed (1930 or 1931).
(c) Estimated proportion of production represented by applicants [basis of 
estimate should be stated.]
(d) Estimated present productive capacity of United Kingdom manufacturers 
[basis o f estimate to be stated] and extent to which that production can be 
increased, with indications of any limiting factors.
(e) Probable effect of increased output on cost of production.
(f) Nature and sources of chief materials used, and proportion of their cost to 
value of finished product.
5. (a) Volume of imports for latest year or which data are available, and any data 
showing trend of importation in recent years.
(b) Countries from which the imports come.
(c) Nature of foreign competition, and any differences between foreign 
countries in this respect.
(Where the competition is in respect of price comparative British and 
foreign quotations -  where possible in both the United Kingdom and foreign 
markets -  should be given.)
6. Volume of exports, and countries to which directed.
7. Extent to which the commodities to which the application relates are used by 
other industries, and, if they are so used, nature of industries using them.
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8. (a) Particulars showing extent to which scientific research is conducted either 
co-operatively by the industry or by individual firms, and amount of annual 
expenditure thereupon.
(b) Number and types of persons having scientific qualifications employed in 
the industry.
(c) Information as to technical advances in methods of production made in 
recent years as a result of work within the industry.
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Appendix 2.4
Sources of Information used by IDAC other than from the applicants 
themselves
Other Government Departments
1. Board of Trade -  provided census data, data as printed in their journals (i.e. 
data on building plans approved by Local Authorities, and from 1934 data on 
levels of production across the economy and price indices).
2. Customs & Excise -  Import and Export Statistics, and consulted widely to 
help with definitions of articles for the Customs list and to discuss the 
practicalities of identifying separate product lines.
3. Treasury -  Financial reports and economic advice.
4. DSIR -  consulted regarding the research capabilities of specific industries, 
(also encouraged particular industries to work with the DSIR).
5. Foreign Office -  consulted regarding the effects of the tariff on various 
nations.
6. Ministry of Health -  main contact was with the Building Prices Committee 
(House price data and other general information relating to the building 
industry)
7. Forestry Commission -  consulted in relation to Timber trade applications
8. Ministry of Labour -  data on employment (especially in the Building industry)
9. Mines Department
10. Ministry of Defence
Other sources of information
1. Local Housing Authorities -  consulted in relation to the building industry, on 
quality, quantity and price of building materials
2. Technical Officer Visits -  ad hoc reports on specific industries to provide 
additional information to facilitate decisions
3. BEA, BEAMA, MTTA -  necessary information on machinery production, this 
enabled IDAC to operate the Machinery Licensing Scheme.
4. BEA -  collated information on Iron and Steel prices
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5. BISF and others -  price data, to enable IDAC to monitor the movement of 
prices.
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Appendix 3.1
Sample details of Applicants as recorded in database (full details can
be viewed in database on CD-ROM provided)
Applicant ID Applicant Description
a27 Association of Umbrella Rib Manufacturers
a28 Association of Vegetable Canners of Great Britain.
b5 Birmingham Chamber of Commerce on behalf of three firms
bl7 British Blow Lamp Makers’ Association
bl 8 British Brazil Nut Shellers’ Association
bl 9 British Bristle Trade Section of the London Chamber of
Commerce
b20 British Brush Manufacturers’ Association
co.2 1 small group of Ironwork firms
co.3 15 pipe manufacturers in association
co.4 19 small manufacturers’
co.5 2 Individual firms, manufacturers of blinds
co.8 3 manufacturers of stationers’ sundries
co.D7 Dunlop Rubber Co.,
co.El Eagle Pencil Co., Ltd
co.E2 Eclipse Peat Co.,
co.E3 Energen Foods Ltd.,
co.E4 Enfield Rolling Mills, Ltd.,
co.E5 English Stoneware Manufacturers
co.E6 English Textilose Manufacturing Co.,
co.E7 Evans William & Co., (Hereford and Devon) Ltd.,
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Appendix 3.2
Sample details of Opponents as recorded in database (full details can
be viewed in database on CD-ROM provided)
Opponent ID Opponent Description
Ass.l 20 county or district associations of wholesale or retail distributors
a2 Associated Book-Edge Gilders (London)
a3 Association of British Importers of Wall and Insulated Boards
a9 Association of Iron and Steel Stockholders
alO Association of Oriental Carpet Traders London
bl Bacon Development Board
b3 Belfast Chamber of Commerce
b4 Belfast Wholesale Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Association Ltd.,
bl Boot and Shoe Lace Importers’ Association
b20 British Plastics Federation
cl Co-operative Society
c2 Corset Trade Association
el Electrical Importers’ and Traders’ Association
e2 Employers’ Federation of Cane and Willow Workers Association
e4 Ethical Pharmaceutical Association
co.I3 Individual farmers
co.Ll Legge Brothers
co.L2 London firm of curers
co.L3 Lots of individual firms who are consumers of carbons
co.L4 Loughton Bag Manufacturing Co.,
co.Ml Marks & Spencer Ltd.,
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Appendix 3.3
Sample details of Supporters as recorded in database (full details
can be viewed in database on CD-ROM provided)
Supporter ID Supporter Description
co.T2 Thames Plywood Manufacturers Ltd.,
zl Employees in the Iron and Steel wire industry
z3 Individual manufacturers in the Iron and Steel wire industry
12a League of Industry - 8 branches
co.E2 Ever Ready (Co) GB
co.B7 Bosch company of Germany
f2 Fellmongers Association
s5 Skinners' Association of Scotland
f3 Federation of Hide, Gelatine and Glue manufacturers
a3 Amalgamated society of Leather Workers & kindred trades
NONE No support registered
gl Glasgow and West of Scotland Potato Trade Association
s6 South Lincolnshire Wholesale Potato Merchants’ 
Association
n7 National Association of Com and Agricultural Merchants 
(Scottish Council)
al Association of British Chemical Manufacturers
bl Bridgewater Incorporated Chamber of Commerce, Shipping 
and Agriculture
b2 British Aluminium Hollow-Ware Manufacturers’ Association
b3 British Chemical Plant Manufacturers’ Association
b4 British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers’ Association 
(BEAMA)
b5 British Federation of Master Printers
b6 British Pot and Pearl Barley Millers’ Association
fl Furniture Trades Association
hi Hosiery Manufacturers’ Section of the Leicester Chamber of 
Commerce
i2 Incorporated National Federation of Boot Trades’ 
Associations,
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Appendix 3.4 Reasons given by applicants
R eason A p p lica tio n  R eason  D escr ip tio n
ID
1 L ow er labour costs overseas [low er w ages, different work patterns including 
working hours/shift working, labour regulations, etc.,]
2 L ow er material (input) costs overseas
3 Overseas com panies subsidised by foreign governm ents
4 Dumping
5 Devaluation o f  foreign currencies affecting price com petitiveness
6 Com pliance with other GB A cts, increasing dom estic costs o f  production  
[e.g . M ines A ct, W heat A ct, etc.,]
7 Inferior quality o f  overseas product
8 O verseas firms setting up in Britain to avoid tax on the finished product 
(where raw materials are imported duty free)
9 Other countries tariffs are impeding trade (tariffs are diverting trade/restricting 
export markets)
10 Cartel negotiations
11 Vital industry (national security)
12 'New' /  important industry
13 Ability to m eet hom e demand
14 Under-utilisation o f  existing capacity
15 Em ploym ent/Unem ploym ent position o f  the industry
16 Extension o f  production, behind protective barrier, will lead to econom ies  
o f  scale and thereby to reduced prices for consum ers
17 Permit British brand to establish its 'reputation
18 Promise made not to pass on to the custom er any price increases via 
m onopoly pow ers
19 Uniformity o f  treatment with similar items
20 to circumvent a trade treaty
21 seasonal factors
22 import penetration increasing in spite o f  existing tariff
23 low er prices - reason unspecified
24 Breakdown o f  international cartel - increased com petition
25 C om petition with similar hom e product
26 Industry uses inputs from another GB industry which in turn would suffer
27 Industry is already working at low cost/is efficient/is modern
28 Problems related to the Irish Free State (loss o f  market)
29 Ability to im prove and develop industry with increased protection
30 Important export industry
31 E ffective protection - d iscuss tariff on inputs
32 Luxury good s
33 T o increase the internal price level o f  the goods
34 Benefits (through linkages) to other GB industry
35 Special Area
36 Uncertainty
37 Rising cost o f  raw materials
38 Sentim ental - GB made
39 T o prohibit all imports
40 worried that overseas com panies will set-up in Britain to avoid tariff
41 end o f  safeguarding
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Appendix 3.5
‘Initial Rejection’ (without advertising) database codes 
Initial
Rej ID Initial Rejection Description
IR1 Level of imports small
IR2 Insufficient evidence of foreign competition
IR3 Protective tariff in place appears to be working satisfactorily
IR4 Do not believe an increase in the tariff would have the desired effect
IR5 Application received from an individual
IR6 Application conflicts with existing Trade Treaty
IR7 Expectation of strong opposition to application
IR8 Home industry is considered to be inefficient
IR9 Home industry is not capable of meeting home demand - either in
terms of product quality or volume.
IR10 Home industry already operating at full capacity.
IR11 Administrative difficulties for Customs and Excise
IR12 Worries that home consumer will be adversely affected by home monopoly/ 
price fixing (belief that the industry will benefit from competition)
IR13 Competition cited, is actually for a differentiated product and therefore NOT 
competition, serving different customers.
IR14 home market already protected (in other sense)
IR15 competition not on price but on quality grounds
IR16 evidence unreliable/unsubstantiated
IR17 Advice of other government department
IR18 Home trade/production has risen
IR19 Too small an industry
IR20 Reconsideration of previous application - no change
IR21 Will increase costs of inputs to another industry
IR22 May lead to a proliferation or demands/requests from similar industries
IR23 Will have little impact on employment
IR24 Do not wish to make an exception to a wider class of goods
IR25 Loss of sales due to fall-off in exports and not due to increased imports
IR26 Do not want to encourage excess production
IR27 No grounds for consideration
IR28 Action would jeopardise Cartel/Trade Agreement
IR29 Will not affect National Security
IR30 Low price as a result of internal competition
IR31 Applicants agree to withdraw this part of the application/narrow definition
269
Appendix 3.6
‘No’ (after advertising) database codes
No ID Committee No Description
N1 Level of imports small - re: share of home market
N2 Imports in such small quantities that it is not considered important
enough to pursue 
N3 Insufficient evidence of foreign competition
N4 Protective tariff in place appears to be working satisfactorily
N5 Do not believe an increase in the tariff would have the desired effect
N6 Application conflicts with existing Trade Treaty
N7 Item is covered by other Law, e.g., McKenna Duties, and therefore, not
within the remit of the Committee.
N8 Strong opposition to application
N9 Home industry is considered to be inefficient
N10 Home industry is not capable of meeting home demand - either in terms
of product quality or, volume.
N i l  Home industry already operating at full capacity.
N12 Administrative difficulties for Customs and Excise
N13 Worries that home consumer will be adversely affected by home
monopoly/price fixing (belief that industry will benefit from competition) 
N14 Competition cited, is actually for a differentiated product and therefore
NOT competition, serving different customers.
N15 Would have insignificant impact on increasing employment
N16 Application withdrawn by applicant
N17 Imperial preference restricts action
N18 Input to another industry
N19 Insufficient evidence of dumping
N20 Home trade/production has increased
N21 Industry has a strong/improving export trade
N22 Evidence unreliable/insufficient
N23 Cartel agreement reached
N24 Refusal to negotiate with cartel
N25 Home industry already protected in other senses
N26 May lead to a proliferation of demand from similar interests/
do not want to widen the scope of the tariff 
N27 Too small an industry
N28 Advice of OGD
N29 Unrepresentative of industry
N30-N32 No decision for various reasons (lapsed, awaiting information,
outbreak of War)
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Appendix 3.7
‘Yes’ (approved after advertising) database codes
Yes ID Committee Yes Description
Y1 No opposition to the application
Y2 To bring uniformity of treatment with other similar items
(correct for omission in the initial Act)
Y3 To assist with international Cartel negotiations
Y4 New industry
Y5 Strategic industry
Y6 Re-organisation of the industry to be pursued
(as a condition imposed by the Committee)
Y7 Employment factors
Y8 Protection will allow economies of scale
Y9 Will allow scientific/technological advances
Y10 The current rate of duty has not stemmed imports 
Y l l  factory in'special area’
Y12 increased prices will not affect consuming interests 
Y13 unfair competition - government subsidies
Y14 Committee is satisfied the industry is well organised 
Y15 on advice of OGD
Y16 protection will promote improvements in the organisation of 
the industry 
Y17 dumping
Y18 efficient industry
Y19 accept applicant's claims
Y20 Price agreements reached with using interests
Y21 Home demand can be fully met
Y22 duty increased to protect cheapest end of market where current
rates are not effective 
Y23 Has the support of the using industry
Y24 Users do not oppose
Y25 Fear that the trade will otherwise disappear
Y26 Industry is facing rising input costs
Y27 Positive linkages to other industries
Y28 Trade treaty revision
Y29 To overcome foreign manufacturers 'goodwill'
Y30 To prevent UK assembly avoiding tariff on finished article 
Y31 Luxury item
Y32 Breakdown of International Cartel
271
Appendix 3.8
Decisions made each year
Number of decisions in each year
Initial
rejections
No Yes Total
1932 13 35 40 88
1933 33 18 33 84
1934 31 21 20 72
1935 30 13 30 73
1936 38 13 18 69
1937 34 15 7 56
1938 7 7 3 17
1939 3 16 3 22
189 138 154 481
Decisions made each year - percentage
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
0  Initial rejections □ N o d  Yes
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Appendix 4.1
Part A. Output and growth of output 1930-1935
- Taken from Board of Trade Fifth Census of Production
Trade
Group
1935
Gross
Output
£’000
% of total
1930
Gross
Output
£'000
% of total Growth
output
1930-1935
Factory trades: -
Iron & Steel 280585 7.87% 237912 7.06% 17.94%
Engineering, Shipbuilding 
& Vehicles
491,418 13.79% 460,391 13.66% 6.74%
Timber 78,670 2.21% 68,660 2.04% 14.58%
Clay and Building 
materials
84,935 2.38% 71,784 2.13% 18.32%
total - Factory trades 2,837,124 79.59% 2,676,558 79.41% 6.00%
Non-factory trades: -
Building and Contracting 215,957 6.06% 194,318 5.77% 11.14%
total - non-factory
trades 727,514 20.41% 693,958 20.59% 4.84%
Total - All Trades 3,564,638 100% 3,370,516| 100% 5.76%
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Appendix 4.1
Part B. Employment and growth of employment 1930-1935
- Taken from Board of Trade Fifth Census of Production
1935 1930
Trade
Group
Average % of total 
number 
of persons 
employed
Average % of total 
number 
of persons 
employed
Growth
employment
1930-1935
Factory trades: -
Iron & Steel 539,270 7.38% 494,328 6.92% 9.09%
Engineering, Shipbuilding 
& Vehicles
1,104,363 15.12% 1,073,488 15.03% 2.88%
Timber 194,894 2.67% 167,668 2.35% 16.24%
Clay and Building 
materials
249,438 3.41% 224,464 3.14% 11.13%
total - Factory trades 5,157,587 70.60% 4,875,333 68.27% 5.79%
Non-factory trades:-
Building and Contracting 502,278 6.88% 453,566 6.35% 10.74%
total - non-factory
trades 2,147,923 29.40% 2,265,781 31.73% -5.20%
Total - All Trades 7,305,510 100% 7,141,114 100% 2.30%
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Appendix 4.2 -
Weighted tariff for the buiiding industry in 1935
Product W eight
%
Tariff
%
Weighted
Tariff
Iron & Steel 18.75 33.33* 6.25
T im ber 12.5 15* 1.875
Bricks 12.5 20 2.5
Slates & tiles 6.25 15 0.938
Stone 6.25 15 0.938
C em ent, sand, etc. 12.5 20 2.5
Paint 18.75 20* 3.75
Glass 6.25 15 0.938
Lead & earthenw are 6.25 15 0.938
ALL PRODUCTS 100 20.627
The weighting for the products is based upon weightings adopted by the Board of 
Trade for their calculation of wholesale prices for the building industry. Their 
weighting was based on the relative importance of the products used in building 
work. (BTJ Vol. CXXXIV NO.1990 January 24, 1935)
This weighting therefore reflects use of materials by the building trade and not the 
use of imported materials by the trade. The major imported material for the trade 
was timber so the tariff on the industry’s raw material inputs is likely to have been 
nearer to a duty rate of 15%.
*Some of the iron and steel products used by the trade only carried a tariff of 
20%. The tariff on paint products ranged from 15 to 20% duty. On timber, a 
Treaty with Sweden where most imports came from covered the majority of 
timber products and the rate of duty was 10%, there were higher rates on some 
timber products that the building industry used however. The ‘weighted tariff 
calculated here would therefore be at the upper end of the scale.
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Appendix 4.3
Table 1 -  Housing output and mortgage interest rates, 1930 to 1936
Housing Rate
year Output of
Thousands interest
1930 110 6%
1931 132 6%
1932 133 6 and 5.5% From 1/9/32 = 5.5%
1933 169 5.5 and 5% From 1/6/33 = 5%
1934 260 5% From 10.4.35 = 4.5%
1935 275 5 and 4.5%
1936 275 4.5%
Table 2 -  Monthly repayments per £100, According to varying terms 
of years and rates of interest
Repayment
term
(years)
Monthly (Calandar) repayment per £100 Borrowed at: 
Percentage
6 5.5 5 4.5
s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d.
16 16 6 16 0 15 5 14 11
20 14 7 14 0 13 5 12 10
23 13 7 13 0 12 5 11 10
25 13 1 12 6 11 10 11 3
Tables from Sir Harold Bellman, ‘The Building Trades’ pages 426 and 427.
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Appendix 4.4
Wholesale prices
WHOLESALE PRICES.
INDEX NUMBERS, AVERAGE FOR THE YEAR 1930 = 100
BUILDING
MATERIALS
ALL ARTICLES INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS 
AND MANUFACTURES
JUNE
1930 100.1 100.9 101.1
1931 96.1 86.6 86.2
1932 94.1 83.1 80.8
1933 91.9 86.2 87.8
1934 92.3 87.9 89.8
1935 93.8 88.5 89.4
1936 96.1 92.6 94.3
1937 104.3 110.6 115.3
1938 103.7 100.7 101.3
1939 103.4 98.1 101.3
Wholesale prices
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1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
—♦ —Building materials - - *  - - All articles —a—  Industrial materials
The index figures for building materials include 16 items.
The index figures for industrial materials and manufactures include 132 items 
the index figures for all articles includes 200 items.
Details taken from the Board of Trade Journal (produced each July, 1935-1939).
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Chart of building material wholesale prices
Building material wholesale prices
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Appendix 5.1
Meetings between the BE A and ID AC
• 23.3.32 meeting, at invitation of Sir George May, to discuss initial
proposals for the operation of the Tariff.
•  30.3.32 further meeting at the request of Sir Percy Ashley.
• 6.4.32 further meeting with Sir Percy Ashley
• June 32 two meetings to discuss the machinery licensing scheme
• 10.11.32
• 9.3.33 Meeting with Sir Percy Ashley
• 11.33 Meeting with Sir Percy Ashley
• 17.11.33 Meeting with Sir Percy Ashley
• 2.34 meeting at IDAC re: machinery licensing
•  17.12.34 meeting with Sir Percy Ashley, to discuss additional duty
application
• 19.3.35 meeting with Sir Alfred Hurst, to discuss steel duties and steel
prices
• 31.12.35 meeting with Sir Percy Ashley, Sir Alfred Hurst, and Mr
Hutchinson to discuss additional duty application.
•  6.36 meeting with Sir Alfred Hurst, to discuss IDAC’s responsibility re:
monitoring of iron and steel prices.
• 15.1.37 evidence to IDAC, re: Iron and Steel inquiry
• 2.3.37 meeting with Sir Percy Ashley, Re: imports of machinery
•  June 38 meeting with J C Carr (IDAC Assistant Secretary) re: machinery 
licensing.
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Appendix 5.2
Memo 19.5.32 from BEA re: exemption of certain machinery
‘The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest how the necessary expert 
judgement and discriminative control might be exercised in giving administrative 
effect to Part I, Section 9 of the Finance B ill ...
It will be evident that detailed expert knowledge of the numerous branches 
of machinery manufacture and use will be required in making decisions,....
The range and variety of special technical and trade knowledge required 
could not be supplied by a departmental committee or by an extra departmental 
advisory committee of workable size.
Any such Committee would find it necessary from time to time to appeal 
to the engineering industry itself for information and advice. The most direct and 
effective way of doing this would be to approach the appropriate engineering 
trade organisations. In fact this would be the only proper course, because such a 
Committee could not with propriety take its information and advice from a 
number of selected firms ... In these circumstances, there would appear to be 
every advantage in the Advisory Committee having direct contact with the 
engineering industry through its organised bodies ... If the Import Duties Advisory 
Committee should think fit to adopt this policy, it would no doubt be found 
inconvenient and unsatisfactory to have to consult a number of different 
engineering trade organisations, or to take the responsibility of selecting 
themselves the trade association to be consulted on any particular subject.
It is, therefore, suggested that the quickest and smoothest working 
arrangement might be for the principal engineering trade associations to form a 
small joint standing committee ...
This Advisory Committee on Machinery would have at its command the 
services of the engineering trade associations and, through them access to the vast 
stock of varied expert trade and technical knowledge contained within the 
industry.
... we would suggest that the practical requirements be met in the first 
instance by the formation of a small advisory committee by the:-
British Engineers Association
British Electrical And Allied Manufacturers’ Association 
Machine Tools Trade Association 
etc.,
DABremner, Director.
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Appendix 5.3
Machinery Licences
Machinery Licenses
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937*
Number granted 3820 (55.8%) 4843 (66.7%) 5804 (70.6%) 6294 (64.1%) 4131 (62.3%)
Number refused 3021 2414 2417 3520 2498
Total Applications 6841 7257 8221 9814 6629
Index of total 
applications 1 0 0 106 1 2 0 144
*1937 figures are for the first six months only 
source: PRO BT/10/59
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Appendix 5.4
Letter to Percy Ashley, written on the 8th of February, 1937.
“ My dear Ashley,
While our impression of what transpired at our meeting with your 
Committee are fresh, I feel impelled to write you about one or two of the major 
points which arose during the discussion. But I wish first to express through you 
to your Committee our delegation’s appreciation of the patient and considerate 
hearing given to their evidence, some of which was unavoidably of a controversial 
nature.
We came not only to state our own case but also to learn what might either 
confirm, modify or refute it, and we are grateful to Lord May and his collegues 
for the valuable information given to assist us to exercise a sound judgement on 
the questions at issue.
Perhaps, however, I may be permitted to say frankly that we were a little 
surprised at the trend of our examination in its early stages. We felt that we were 
at once placed on the defensive by examination in regard to suggested defective 
organisation of the industry we represented.
It is broadly true that the mechanical engineering industry in common with 
others of the older and more individualistic industries, has yet some distance to go 
in the direction of perfecting its organisation and increasing its average efficiency. 
But within the engineering industry are some of the brightest examples of up to 
date technique and efficiency. The Census of Production for the year 1930 
showed that the engineering industry excluding motors, cycles and aircraft, had an 
output of £234.3 millions. The results of the 1935 Census are not yet available. In 
1936, our exports of machinery had a value of £41,183,000. and represented in 
value 9.4% of our total exports.
An industry producing and exporting on this scale cannot be regarded as 
effete, nor can its interests be unimportant to the national economy as a whole.
So far as the possibility of collective organisation and price control are 
concerned, a parallel cannot be drawn between the iron and steel industry and the 
general engineering industry, the diversity of the products of the latter being 
incomparably greater and the producers many fold more numerous.
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In any case, whatever may be the remediable shortcomings of the 
engineering industry, the possibility of betterment will certainly not be increased 
by an additional burden of raw material costs which cannot be passed on to the 
export markets, for our products.
Another point which I referred to in my evidence and now want to 
emphasise is that so long as iron and steel prices are increased in some proportion 
to increases in the prices of iron ore, scrap, coal, coke and fluxes, which prices are 
not under control, the rise in iron and steel prices which the consumers have to 
envisage is quite indeterminate. Authentic cost accounts can always be produced 
to show that the cost of production had increased owing to increased prices of raw 
materials. Furthermore, many of the bigger iron and steel manufacturers either 
own or control coal and/or iron ore and probably also fluxes, and they themselves 
can therefore decide or influence the prices of their own raw materials. In these 
circumstances, there is nothing to stop the rise of iron and steel prices, based on 
cost accounts, before serious injury has been done to the consumer and in the 
longer run to the iron and steel industry itself.
I need scarcely assure you that this letter is not written in a barren 
controversial spirit, but with the definite object o f assisting your Committee and 
yourself to comprehend more clearly some of the views and arguments which may 
have been imperfectly addressed when we had the honour of giving evidence 
before your Committee.
I am,
Yours sincerely,
D.A. Bremner, D irector.,636
636BEA Council Minutes 11th February, 1937
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Appendix 6.1
Letter sent to the Chairman of the Velvet Duties Committee, November 1936 
Sir,
I am directed by the Import Duties Advisory Committee to say that they 
learned with satisfaction from your letter of the 14th September of the good 
immediate results of an increased duty on cotton velvets. They were also glad to 
learn from you that your Committee had been commissioned by the trade as a 
whole to take up the matter of reorganisation of this section of the cotton industry, 
towards which several unsuccessful efforts have been made in the past, and to the 
necessity of which IDAC drew attention in their report to the Treasury 
recommending that for a period the increased duty should be imposed.
Lord May and his colleagues have been much impressed with the 
unsatisfactory position in which the cotton velvet industry as a whole, and each 
part of it, finds itself today, quite apart from any question of exceptionally low- 
priced foreign competition, and with the necessity that prompt and sufficient 
measures should be taken by those concerned for the recommendation is to be 
justified. It appears to them that much closer integration of the industry than 
exists at present is essential if it is to regain a sound and profitable position. The 
measures required must clearly be formulated and taken by those in the industry, 
and they are gratified that your Committee has so promptly been commissioned to 
proceed with the matter.
They would be glad to meet the Velvet Duties Committee in order to learn 
particulars of the scheme of reorganisation that has resulted from your 
committee’s deliberations, and I am to enquire whether it would be convenient for 
you and your colleagues to attend this office on the xxx December, at 3pm, for 
this purpose.
I am, Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
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Appendix 6.2
Cases where the committee discussed the organisation of the 
industry:
Committee Paper 280/33 - Dead poultry industry 
Committee Paper 171/37 - eggs in shell 
Committee Paper 40/37 - metal pot scourers 
Committee Paper 74/36 - typewriters 
Committee Paper 78/36 - milk products 
Committee Paper 159/37 - hydro-sulphites 
Committee Paper 245/37 - hemp line 
Committee Paper 17/39 - Leather glove industry
Appendix 6.3
Applications where issues with cartels were given as a specific 
reason for the application637
• Application Reference 32/130c Wire netting and wire mesh -  An additional 
duty was granted by the Committee in this case because there was no 
opposition to the application and because the current rate of duty had not 
stemmed imports;
• Application Reference 34/278 Nitrogenous fertilisers -  this application did not 
lead to the imposition of an additional duty. Following advertisement, the 
applicant withdrew the application because a cartel agreement had 
successfully been reached;
• Application Reference 35/146 Cast Iron porcelain enamelled baths -A s with 
34/278 Nitrogenous fertilisers this application did not lead to the granting of 
an additional duty because cartel negotiations were successful and the 
applicants withdrew the application;
• Application Reference 35/234 Sodium and potassium bicromates -  This 
application was successful with an additional duty being granted because the 
Committee accepted the applicants claims and the using industry did not 
oppose. In August 1935 the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers on 
behalf of three member firms made an application for additional duty on 
Sodium and Potassium Bichromate.638 These three firms had their own UK 
price agreement and were also part of an international convention with US,
637 Database applicant reason code identifier 10. The Application reference given here is that used 
as the application identifier in the database. It can also be used to identify the Committee paper 
where the application was first recorded. As noted in Chapter 3 above for technical reasons the 
year identifier is shown first in the database, thus application reference 36/161 would be found in 
committee paper 161/1936 for example.
638 Application reference 35/234
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Germany, France and Italy. Russian and Japanese firms were outside of this 
agreement. The convention was proving increasingly difficult to operate and 
the British industry was in a particularly weak position because unlike them 
the US and German firms had fully protected home markets. The industry was 
also facing rising competition from Russia. The Committee therefore, decides 
to advertise this application.
• The Committee next discusses this case in February 1936 by this time a new 
cartel agreement had been reached. However, the Committee notes that the 
cartel was coming under further pressure from Russian competition and 
decided to recommend the additional duty. The application had received 
opposition but none from the users.
• Application Reference 35/272 Spokes and nipples for pedal cycles -  This 
application did not lead to the imposition of an additional duty. The applicants 
were asked by the committee to provide additional information in support of 
their application, this was never forthcoming and the application was 
considered to be lapsed;
• Application Reference 35/46 Nitrogenous fertilisers -  This application led to 
the imposition of an additional duty by the Committee. They felt that the 
granting of the duty would assist the industry in international cartel 
negotiations, there was also no opposition to the application, it was a strategic 
industry and the applicants had reached price agreements with the using 
interests;
• Application Reference 36/161 Super-phosphate of lime -  The Committee 
immediately rejected this application because there was insufficient evidence 
of foreign competition. Additionally, IDAC expected to receive strong 
opposition to the application, they were worried that home consumers would 
be affected by price fixing, and they took advice from another government 
department;
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• Application Reference 36/272 Cased tubes. The committee reached no 
decision in this case; The Cased Tube Association submitted a request for 
additional duty in December 1936.639 The Association represented 8 firms in 
the industry who manufactured 80% of the domestic produce of cased tubes. 
The existing duty on the tubes was 20% and the applicants were requesting an 
increase to a specific duty of Vid. per foot. They made the application on the 
grounds that international competitors were dumping their products on the 
English market. Also, because they stated they were able to meet home 
demand and finally, to assist them with cartel negotiations. Additionally, they 
gave a price undertaking on the basis of which they had gained the support of 
the most important users. The majority of the competition came from 
Germany whose industry was accused o f dumping. IDAC suggested that the 
applicants should first try to reach agreement with the German industry. 
Negotiations were opened in January 1936, but by June a response from the 
Germans had not been forthcoming. The Board of Trade, on behalf of IDAC, 
contacted the German Ambassador who said that the German industry saw no 
benefits to themselves in reaching an agreement with the British 
manufacturers. The applicants were encouraged however, to continue to try to 
negotiate and progress in this case was kept under review by the Committee. 
At the end of July 1939, the Committee noted that they had not proceeded 
with any action in this case, in part because the level of imports fell after the 
application was submitted, and no doubt because the applicants themselves 
did not pursue the application with them.
• Application Reference 37/159 Hydro-sulphites -  This application was 
immediately rejected by the Committee because the levels of imports were 
small, the evidence the applicant provided was unreliable and home 
trade/production had increased.
639 Application reference 36/272
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Applications made where the applicants stated they needed 
additional protection because of the breakdown of a cartef40.
•  Application Reference 32/85 Wood screws -  this was a successful application 
with the additional duty being granted on the grounds that this would allow 
economies of scale, any increased prices would not affect consuming interests, 
the competition they faced was regarded as unfair because competitors 
benefited from government subsidies and because the international cartel had 
broken down641;
• Application Reference 35/146 Cast Iron porcelain enamelled baths -  see 
above;
• Application Reference 35/295 Metallic Capsules -  this application was 
successful. The Committee granting the additional duty because the applicants 
were suffering as a result of dumping, because any increased prices would not 
affect consuming interests and because the users did not oppose. In 1935 three 
British producers submitted an application for additional duty on metallic 
capsules642, requesting a specific duty of 5d per lb. on the capsules. The 
existence of a continental cartel regulating prices in their home markets was 
noted by IDAC. The British producers had been approached to join but the 
Continental producers had wanted a guaranteed third of the British market in 
exchange for price guarantees. The British manufacturers rejected this offer. 
The Committee noted that: ‘Since then competition has become intensified 
and the applicants seem convinced that the Continental manufacturers are 
definitely aiming at the destruction of the British industry’.643 The Committee 
in their deliberations also noted: ‘Detailed particulars are given in the
640 Database applicant reason code identifier 24.
641 In 1937, a provisional cartel agreement had been reached regulating the import of screws into 
the country and covering certain export markets. This led the Committee to consider whether a 
reduction in the rate of duty should be implemented. PRO BT/10/84
642 Application reference 35/295
643 PRO BT/10/16 Committee paper 295/1935 page 8
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application of technical advances in the industry and the steps taken to 
promote scientific research. ... There seems no reason to doubt that the 
manufacture of capsules in this country is efficiently conducted’. On these 
grounds the decision was taken to advertise the application. The application 
received some opposition but the Committee decided that this was not 
significant, largely because it was not the using interests that oppose but in the 
main import agents, and agree to the applicants request for the additional duty. 
They accept claims about the competition, about dumping and do not believe 
that consuming interests will be affected by price rises.
• Application Reference 35/73 Wrought iron and steel tubes and pipes -  was 
another successful application. In this case, the Committee approved the 
application because this was a new industry, users did not oppose and there 
existed positive linkages to other industries. In March 1935 a group of 
companies made an application for additional duty on wrought iron and steel 
tubes and pipes.644 The companies stated that they were responsible for 70% 
of UK production and that a Trade Association did not exist for the industry. 
They requested a duty of either £6 per ton or 50% ad valorem (whichever was 
higher). They asserted that the additional protection was needed because of the 
breakdown of the International Tube Cartel. Since then, the German industry 
had been given heavy export subsidies by their government. All of this 
intensified the competition
The Committee discussed this case with Customs who argued that the 
product could not be differentiated from other similar items that were covered by 
a Trade Treaty with Sweden. It was suggested therefore, that the applicants should 
try and reach an agreement with the Swedish industry. The industry managed to 
reach a provisional agreement; the Committee deferred making a decision. 
Eventually it was agreed that the Swedish Trade Treaty would be amended to 
assist the position of this industry.
‘With regard to the merits of the application, while the main countries, 
formerly in the Cartel, have mutually agreed to respect each other’s home markets
644 Messrs Stewarts & Lloyds, Ltd., and Tube Investments, Ltd., and associated firms made the 
application, reference 35/73.
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until 30th June next, to afford an opportunity for revision of tariff barriers, cut­
throat competition in the export markets has already com m enced.... A concerted 
attack on the British home market in the absence of further protection would be an 
obvious way of crippling our industry in the export market, and a clear case for 
higher protection appears to be established.’645
•  Application Reference 36/99 Condensed milk, milk powder and certain other 
milk products -  an additional duty was granted in this case because increased 
prices would not affect consuming interests, because the applicants were 
suffering as a result of dumping, the applicants were capable of meeting home 
demand and because of the breakdown of the international cartel;
•  Application Reference 37/52 Potassium and sodium ferro-cyanides -  This 
application was rejected by the committee following advertisement because 
the home industry was considered to be inefficient and they were also 
concerned that the home consumer would be affected by monopoly pricing;
•  Application Reference 39/69 Mechanical lighter flints -  a decision had not 
been made by the Committee at the end of it’s operation; In May 1939 the 
British Flint and Cerium Manufacturers Ltd submitted an application for 
increased duty on lighter flints.646 They requested a specific duty on the flints 
of 20s per lb. The firm were the sole UK manufacturers of flints, and their 
case was supported by the Mines Department who were anxious that there 
should be a British source of supply. There were a number of reasons why the 
applicant requested the additional duty, one of which was that the international 
cartel, of which they had been a member, had broken down and they would be 
faced with increased competition. The application was advertised but the 
Committee made no decision by the outbreak of war.
645 PRO BT/10/14 Committee paper 139/1935 p3
646 Application reference 39/69
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Application Reference 39/78 Sheet Glass -  As with mechanical lighter flints, 
the Committee had not reached a decision in this case by July 1939 when its 
work ended.
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Appendix 6.4
Applications for additional duty where the tariff increase became 
unnecessary when international cartel agreements were reached.
• Application Reference 33/121 Cast Iron Porcelain and Enamelled Baths 
submitted by the British Bath Manufacturers Association in March 1933. 
Agreement was reached with German manufacturers;
• Application Reference 34/209 Steel bars, rods, angles, strip etc., submitted by 
the National Association for Rolled and Re-rolled Steel Products in May 1934
• Application Reference 34/278 Nitrogenous fertilisers submitted jointly by the 
Sulphate of Ammonia Association and Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., 
(ICI) in July 1934. Agreement reached with Chilean producers and the 
Continental Cartel;
•  Application Reference 35/146 a second application in respect of Cast Iron 
Porcelain and Enamelled Baths submitted by the British Bath Manufacturers 
Association in May 1935;
• Application Reference 35/164 Di-sodium and Tri-sodium Phosphate 
submitted by the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, on behalf 
Brotherton & Co., Ltd., Holliday L.B. & Co., Ltd., and Wilkinson J.B. in June 
1935. Agreement reached with German manufacturers. Negotiations had 
broken down before the application was submitted, but contact was re­
established and an agreement reached, the application was then withdrawn.
• Application Reference 35/210 Ice cream freezer and carrying cans submitted 
by two companies, TF & IM Braime Ltd., and Joseph Sankey & Sons. 
Following advertising of this application, Danish producers opened 
negotiations upon the conclusion of which the application was withdrawn.
• Application Reference 36/125 Celluloid in the form of sheets, rods, and tubes, 
submitted by the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, on behalf of 
British Xylonite Co., Ltd., in June 1936. The agreement was reached with 
German and Japanese producers.
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• Application Reference 36/255 Potassium Permanganate submitted by the 
Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, on behalf o f Boots Pure Drug 
Co., in November 1936.
• Application Reference 37/165 Hand Hair Clippers submitted by an individual 
firm, Burman & Sons, in July 1937; and
• Application Reference 38/14 Mattress Chain and Hooks submitted jointly by 
the Jack Chain Association and an individual firm, Armistead & Grimshaw, in 
January 1938.
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Appendix 6.5
Cases where there is evidence of price-fixing and/or monopoly 
concerns:
• Committee Paper 90/32 IDAC were concerned were concerned that if they 
increased the tariff on bricks then home users could suffer through price fixing
• Committee Paper 170/33 concerns were expressed about a monopoly in the 
glass light industry, this concerned a restriction on the supply of light bulbs to 
firms that were not members of the trade association, The Electric Lamp 
Manufacturers Association
• Committee Paper 170/34 there were allegations of a cartel in the home 
Vacuum salt industry operating to fix prices
• Committee Paper 77/36 application for additional duty on Sticky flycatchers 
made by the two British manufacturers who have a price agreement. The 
Committee without advertising immediately rejected this application because 
they considered that the industry was too small and imports were also small.
• Committee Paper 78/36 Pencils -  the Committee were asked to investigate 
price-fixing in the industry.
• Committee Paper 84/36 Pottery and other clay products -  this records that the 
British Pottery Manufacturer’s Confederation had a price agreement on sinks 
(sinks account for 80% of the home production). Additionally prices were 
fixed for member firms in the case of earthenware.
• Committee Paper 128/37 ‘Scheme for the regulation o f prices of artificial silk 
hose’ - The National Federation of Hosiery Manufacturers’ Association had 
drawn up a scheme for price-fixing within their industry and this was 
submitted to IDAC for comment. The Committee felt that they could not 
express approval of the scheme because it appeared to be a scheme completely 
prohibiting production by independent manufacturers (i.e. non-members of the 
Association). The Committee felt that the monopoly position the Association 
was proposing was unacceptable.
• Committee Paper 232/37 although the application for additional duty on 
Lithopone was successful opponents to the application had expressed concern 
about monopoly powers.
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•  Committee Paper 138/38 Lactose was one of the products whose prices were 
monitored by the Committee. In this paper, the Committee noted: ‘A 
commercial process of the manufacture of lactose was devised with the aid of 
public money some years ago to enable cheese factories to get rid of an 
embarrassing effluent, and with the aid of the duty recommended by the 
Committee the commercial production has been successfully established by 
the U.D.C. The virtual exclusion of competition had enabled the price to be 
raised to a point at which very high profits are being made’.
•  Committee Paper 26/39 Linoleum and cork carpet -  see main body of chapter
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Appendix 6.6
Applications refused because the Committee had concerns about 
monopoly pricing.
• 32/72b Fabric gloves The joint applicants were National Association of
Fabric Glove Manufacturers of GB and Joint Industrial Council of the Glove- 
making Industry
•  32/91 Superphosphate and compound fertiliser - Fertiliser Manufacturers’
Association Ltd
• 32/253 Fish - The application was submitted by the British Trawlers’
Federation
•  33/189 Strawberries - National Farmers Union of England and Wales
•  33/237 Semi-manufactured forms of copper, brass, nickel and alloys
containing these metals -  submitted by the Joint Committee of the Brass,
Copper and Nickel Silver Industries
•  34/121 Briar pipes and bowls - 15 pipe manufacturers in association
• 34/202a Canned and bottled fruit and vegetables - Association of Vegetable
Canners of Great Britain.
• 36/118 Barium chloride - Allen Athole G. (Stockholm) Ltd.,
•  37/52 Potassium and sodium ferro-cyanides -  application made by
ABCM on behalf of 3 firms
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Appendix 6.7
Extract from: IDAC Second Annual Report, March 1st 1933 - February 
28th 1934647
M ovement of Prices
14. In the course of their recommendations in a number of cases the 
Committee have stated that they intended to keep watch over the prices of a 
number of commodities forming the object of protection. In pursuance of this 
intention, arrangements were made for a systematic review of the prices of a 
number of commodities, and this is now part of the regular service of the Statistics 
and Information Section. The goods selected for this purpose at the outset are 
goods of kinds (a) which are now subject to duties higher than the standard 20 per 
cent, ad valorem, (b) which are more or less standardised and (c) which are 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly products or otherwise subject to regulation of prices 
in one way or another, and particulars are now being obtained at regular intervals 
respecting the following:- yeast; tomatoes; potatoes; glue; gelatine and osseine; 
lactose (sugar of milk); bleached cotton linters; aluminium hydrate and aluminium 
sulphate; linseed oil; rubber footwear; razor blades; scissors; wire; wire nails and 
wire netting. Other goods will be added to the list as occasion may require. It 
should be added that, although the Committee have statutory power to obtain this 
information, they have preferred to obtain it by the voluntary co-operation of 
associations or large firms representative of the industries concerned and it should 
be placed on record that in every case the co-operation desired has been readily 
forthcoming, in many cases to a greater extent than what was required for the 
immediate purposes of ascertaining the trend of prices.
647 PRO BT/10/81
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Appendix 6.8
Movement in Prices at the end of 1937648
The Committee noted that there was a general upward trend in prices. This they 
found was due to rising labour and raw material costs.
On individual items the committee recorded the following positions:
Increased prices on Wood screws, artificial teeth, linseed oil, lactose, aluminium 
hydrate, hide gelatine, bone gelatine, glue, di-sodium 
phosphate, lead acetate, photographic paper and woven 
paper fabric.
Little change to prices on Scissors, safety razor blades and blanks, yeast, aluminium 
sulphate, and tri-sodium phosphate.
No change in prices Slide fasteners, rubber footwear, sodium nitrate, and rice 
starch.
Seasonal changes on Tomatoes.
648 PRO BT/lO/24 Committee paper 251/37
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Appendix 6.9
Part A. cases where the additional duty was granted because the 
applicants were well organised and/or efficient
A pplica tion Item  descrip tio n
R eference
32/162f W ood and tim ber - cooperage m aterials
32/162g W ood and tim ber - hardw ood flooring
32/292 Carbons de-colouring and activated, other than anim al
32/59 Doors, and other builders woodw ork
32/72a Leather gloves
32/79 Rubber footw ear
33/290 Dental goods - artificial teeth
34/138 Doors (wooden)
34/234a Bifurcated rivets o f iron or steel
34/234b Tubular rivets o f iron or steel
34/325 Spectacle fram es
34/414 Fibre insulated staples
35/162 Box and willow calf leather
35/193 Spring beard hosiery needles
35/262 A gricultural track laying tractors
35/318 Glazed wall and hearth tiles
36/13e Aprons and overalls m ade wholly or partly o f rubber
36/214 Hand sewing needles
36/280 Lithopone
36/79a Typew riters - Standard
37/169a Cycle bells and parts
37/205a Steel works plant - rolling m ills
37/40 M etal pot scourers and wire m esh used in their m anufacture
37/45 Celluloid dolls and rattles
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Appendix 6.9
Part B. cases that were rejected because the industry was viewed as 
inefficient by the Committee
Application Item  description
Reference
Initial Rejections
34/443 Brass wire
36/199 Capped earthenware pots
35/98 Fabric Gloves
37/222a Granite setts and kerbs
34/433 Transparent Cellulose wrapping
38/183 Wood split pulleys
No after advertising
32/162a Wood and timber - softwoods
33/95 Dead poultry (excluding turkeys, and guinea fowl) and eggs
38/185 Skin Wool
34/202a Canned and bottled fruit and vegetables
32/162c Wood and timber - hardwoods (including logs)
35/143 Pencil strips
35/314 Dressed and dyed rabbit skins
36/217 Planed or dressed softwoods, boxboards, wood flour
37/52 Potassium and sodium ferrocyanides
32/72b Fabric gloves
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Appendix 6.10
REPORT ON THE SHEET GLASS INDUSTRY
‘The British sheet and plate glass manufacturers claim to be regarded as the most 
progressive glass manufacturers in the world. They are said to keep in close touch 
with manufacturing developments in Europe and America. As better methods of 
production become available, less up to date methods are abandoned. As regards 
both sheet and plate glass they say they have scrapped large and expensive glass 
plants long before they had become worn out, e.g., in a large sheet glass 
manufacturing unit built in 1926 for the cylinder process at cost of £200,000, 
plant which cost £110,000 was wholly destroyed and the remaining £90,000 of 
capital outlay was adapted at an additional cost of £100,000 for the flat drawn 
process. £450,000 is said to have been spent during the last ten years on new plant 
for sheet glass production, apart from £130,000 on the new factory at Pontypool.
In their chief factory at St. Helens, the applicants use, under licence, the 
American Pittsburg process which they claim to have improved. The 
Queensborough Works is equipped for production by the Fourcault process, the 
cost of conversion for the Pittsburg process not being regarded as justified by the 
difference in the quality of the product. The applicants are satisfied that the 
Pittsburg process produces the best glass.
It is claimed that a strong technical staff has always been employed by the 
British manufacturers. The present technical organisation of Pilkington Brothers 
includes a department of technical development, working in conjunction with a 
research department. The budgeted expenditure for the next twelve months on 
research and technical development apart from capital expenditure is £40,000.
The applicants give substantial financial support to the Society of Glass 
Technology, and co-operate with the British Scientific Research Association, the 
British Standards Institute and the Building Research Station. It may be added that 
the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, who have been consulted on 
this aspect of the case, agree that the representations made by Messrs. Pilkington 
in regard to their attitude towards research and application of up to date scientific 
methods in the production of their products are well founded. They say there is no
302
doubt that the firm have shown a lively interest in the importance of science to 
their manufactures. So far as the scientific side of the application is concerned the 
Department is in a position to endorse the contentions of the applicants.649
649 Committee Paper 78/39, PRO BT/10/29 pp.27-28
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Appendix 6.11
Applications where applicants claimed that theirs was either a new 
industry needing additional protection or that new lines of 
production were being introduced.
• 189/34 Bent wire goods
• 278/34 Nitrogenous fertiliser industry
• 74/35 Spectacle frames
• 198/35 fabric in the piece - application in part advertised because new industry
• 212/35 proposed new chemical plant
• 225/35 Paper dress shirt fronts - production began in April 1935
• 280/35 cotton carpets
• 163/36 Toilet Tweezers - new plant installed in 1934 and production 
commenced in 1935
• 182/36 Pen and pocketknives - new industry to Sheffield. £16,000 invested in 
new plant.
• 204/36 new plant to be erected to produce Sodium Chlorate
• 255/36 Boots to establish a new plant to produce potassium permanganate - 
new plant to be erected in Nottingham at a cost of £50,000, expected to 
employ 25-30
• 267/36 Gaboon Mahogany Plywood - new plant planned - to be located in
Jarrow. Intended to use mass-production techniques. The applicants stress the
Special Area impact. Will employ about 250 people, 80% of them men. Sales
to shipbuilding industry guaranteed.
• 45/37 Celluloid dolls - new industry with large scale capital outlay
• 155/37 Trailer Caravans - new industry - competition from the US where large 
market allows lower pricing
• 58/38 40 Ruti Silk Looms and Ancillary Machinery - details application 
submitted, part refusal, appeal by applicant, and eventually agree to licence. 
Take into account the establishment of a new industry in areas where have 
employment problems.
•  79/38 Track-laying tractors
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•  120/38 New Steel Works - Jarrow
• 16/39 Proposal to set-up new factory to produce rubber can-seals.
• 49/39 Women’s stockings.
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Appendix 6.12
DSIR Meeting Minutes
After a meeting with officers of the DSIR, the following Minutes are reported:
‘At the meeting in December last with Messrs. Hetherington and Evans 
representing the DSIR it was suggested:
a) That it might be a good plan if arrangements were made for representatives of 
the Department to be present at any Meetings which the Committee might arrange 
from time to time with the BEA or other appropriate body, to discuss the question 
of the manufacture of particular groups of machinery in this country. In this way, 
the Department’s representatives might be able to make suggestions where 
research was likely to prove beneficial.
b) In other cases where it has emerged in the consideration of a particular license 
application that a potential individual manufacturer was hampered by lack of 
technical knowledge, reference might be made to the Department for such advice 
and assistance it could give. Mr. Hetherington suggested that possibly Mr. 
Bremner [Director of the BEA] might sometimes find it useful to call at the 
Department for a talk as to the direction in which the Department might be able to 
assist the British industry.650
650 PRO BT/10/59, part 3. Memorandum - “Notes on Points for Discussion with Mr. Bremner at 
3pm on 22 March, 33”.
Appendix 6.13
Document marked “Confidential’ - undated
Certain Cases in which manufacture in this country of machinery 
hitherto imported has been undertaken.
1. Textile looms - mentions 4 new types of looms, ‘These developments are all 
due to information and facilities made available as a result of the licensing 
system’.
2. Hand R at Knitting Machines
3. Warp Knitting Machines
4. Buttner patent turbo dryers
5. Copper Resin Still - in this case a foreign machine was imported duty free 
specifically for the purposes o f copying.
6. Machinery for manufacture of a certain patent food - similar to 5.
7. Machine Tools: Forst Vertical Breaching Machines; Cone-automatics;
Cleveland gear hobbing machines; Lorenz gear shapers; OK Cutters; Fay 
lathes.
Other Cases
‘The following types of machines were formerly made only on the continent and 
many have been imported duty-free in the past in accordance with 
recommendations made by the Committee. Foreign manufacturers have, however, 
now made agreements with suitable British machinery makers for their 
manufacture in this country and the Committee are putting applicants for duty­
free importation in touch with these British concerns:-
(i) Ste Colombe plain and automatic looms for silk and rayon fabrics.
(ii) Staubli dobbies of the lag operated type.
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(iii) Spinning jets for Rayon.651
Further, as a result of co-operation on the part of users at the instigation of the 
Committee, British manufacturers are now producing the following types of 
machines hitherto imported duty free:- 
Decatising machines.
3-roller padding machines.
Viscose Lubricated spinning pumps.
High speed warp looms.’652
Further examples are provided in this report: a machine for the production of full- 
fashioned hose; wax spraying plant. Discussions are also said to have taken place 
regarding the transfer of complete plants to Britain but it was noted no such 
transfer had actually taken place during the year.653
651 PRO BT/10/84 paragraph 13, page 10.
652 PRO BT/10/84 paragraph 14, page 10.
653 PRO BT/10/84 paragraph 18, page 11.
308
Bibliography
Manuscript sources
PRO
Board of Trade
BT 10/1-153 IDAC Papers
BT 64/2, IDAC Specialised Machinery (Industries and Manufactures 
Department)
3, IDAC Relations with the Board of Trade 
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
M AFF40, 52-57 
Treasury
T160, Treasury Registration System, finance files 
Guildhall
MSS. 16644 Glass and Allied Trades Association Ltd.
MSS.23791 Machinery Users Association
MSS. 16607 Electrical Traders Association
M SS.16615 Fancy Goods and Allied Trades Association
MSS. 16459 London Chamber of Commerce, Council Minutes
MSS. 16736 London Chamber of Commerce, Special Committee Minute Book
MSS. 16669 London Chamber of Commerce, Parliamentary and Commercial
Law Committee Minute Book
MSS. 16460 London Chamber of Commerce, General Purposes Committee 
Minute book
MSS. 16661 London Chamber of Commerce, Import and Export Merchants 
Minute book
MSS. 18262 Federation of Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce 
Warwick MRC
MSS.267 British Engineers Association
MSS.287 BEAMA
309
Theses
Gospel, H. (1974). Employer's Organizations: Their Growth and Function in the 
British System of Industrial Relations in the Period 1918-1939. PhD, University 
of London.
Mercer, H. (1989). The Evolution of British Government Policy Towards 
Competition in Private Industry, 1940-56. PhD, University of London.
Daly, M.E. “Government policy and the depressed areas in the inter-war years.”
D.Phil, unpublished, University of Oxford, 1979.
Roberts, Richard. “The Board of Trade, 1925-39.” DPhil, Oxford.
Official Publications
Board of Trade Survey o f  International Cartels and Internal Cartels 1944-1946 
London 1976
Board of Trade Final Report on the Fifth Census o f  Production and the Import 
Duties Act Inquiry, 1935 parts 1-4 London (1938-1944)
Board of Trade. Surveys o f  Industrial Development.
Board of Trade. Eighth Statistical Abstract fo r  the United Kingdom (1937)
Ministry of Health Seventeenth Annual Report of the Ministry of Health 1935-36,
Cmd. 5287 London 1936
Hansard Supply Committee 8th of June 1937
Hansard, Parl.Deb (Commons), 4th May 1932
Secondary Sources
Abel, Deryck. A history o f  British tariffs 1923-1942. London: Heath Cranton, 
1945.
Aldcroft, D.H. “The Development of the managed economy before 1939.” 
Journal o f  contemporary History 4, no. 4 (1969): 117-137.
Aldcroft, D.H. The European Economy1914-1990. Third edition. London 1993
310
E. Allen, ‘The Engineering Trades’ in British Association eds. Britain in Recovery 
London 1938
Allen, G.C. British Industries and their Organisation. 3rd ed, 1951.
Allen, G. C. British industry and economic policy. London New York: Macmillan, 
1979.
Allen, G.C. Economic thought and industrial policy.
Ashley, Percy. “An Experiment in Tariff Making.” The Manchester School XI., 
no. No.l April 1940(1940): 1-35.
B.E.A.M.A. The BEAM A: A short Account o f  its growth and Activities. London, 
1952.
Baack, B.D. &, and E.J. Ray. “The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: A Case 
Study of the United States.” Explorations in Economic History 20 (1983): 73-93. 
Backhouse, Roger E. Economists and the Economy, second ed. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd.,, 1994.
Baggott, Rob. Pressure groups: a question o f  interest. Politics in the 'nineties. 
Sheffield: Pavic, 1994.
Baldwin, R.W. “The Use of Advisory Bodies by the Board of Trade.” In Advisory 
Bodies, edited by R.V. & Mansergh Vernon, N, 126-175. London, 1940.
Ball, James. The causes o f  rising protectionism, Occasional paper /  British-North 
American Research Association; 7. London: British-North American Research 
Association, 1987.
Ball, Stuart. Baldwin and the Conservative Party: the crisis o f  1929-31 London 
1988
Barberis, P, and T May. Government, Industry and Political Economy. 
Buckingham: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Beer, Samuel. Treasury control. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
Beer, Samuel Hutchinson. M odem British politics: a study o f  parties and pressure 
groups, Society today and tomorrow series. London: Faber, 1965.
Beer, S.H. Treasury Control: The co-ordination o f  financial and economic policy 
in Great Britain. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
Bellman ‘The Building Trades’, in British Association for the Advancement of Science, Economic 
Science and Statistic Section eds. Britain in Recovery London, 1938 
Benham, F. Great Britain under protection. New York 1941.
311
Beveridge, W.H., ed. Tariffs, the case examined, 1931.
Bladen, Vincent Wheeler. An introduction to political economy. Rev. [3d edition] 
ed. [Toronto]: University of Toronto Press, 1956.
Blank, Stephen. Industry and Government in Britain. Famborough, 1973. 
Blondel, Jean. Voters, parties and leaders: the social fabric o f  British politics. 
Reprinted (with revisions) ed, A pelican original. Harmondsworth 1974.
Boleat, Mark. Trade association: strategy and management. London: Association 
of British Insurers, 1996.
Booth, Alan British Economic Policy 1931-49 Hemel Hempstead 1989 
Booth, Alan. “Britain in the 1930s: a managed economy?” Economic History 
Review XL, no. 4 (1987): 499-522.
Booth, Alan. “Britain in the 1930s: a managed economy? A reply to Peden and 
Middleton.” Economic History Review 2nd series XLII, 4(1989) (1989): 548-556. 
Booth, Alan. “The "Keynesian Revolution" in Economic Policy-making.” 
Economic History Review  (1982).
Booth, A.E. “An administrative experiment in unemployment policy in the 
'thirties.” Public Administration 56, no. 2 (1978): 139-57.
Booth, A.E. “The "Keynesian Revolution" in economic policy-making.” 
Economic History Review, second series 36, no. 1 (1983): 103-23.
Booth, A.E. & Glynn, S. “The public records and recent British economic 
historiography.” Economic History Review, second series 32, no. 3 (1979): 303- 
15.
Bowley, Marian. Innovations in building materials; an economic study London 
1960
Bowley, Marian. The British building industry: Four studies in response and 
resistance to change Cambridge 1966
Boyce, Robert W. D. British capitalism at the crossroads, 1919-1932: a study in 
politics, economics, and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987.
Brady, Robert A. Business as A System o f  Power. New York, 1943.
British Association for the Advancement of Science, Economic Science and 
Statistic Section eds. Britain in Recovery (London, 1938)
Broadberry, S N. The British economy between the wars.
312
Broadberry, S.N. “Fiscal policy in Britain during the 1930s.” Economic History 
Review, second series 37, no. 1 (1984): 95-102.
Brown, A.J. “The Use of Advisory Bodies by the Treasury.” In Advisory Bodies, 
edited by Vernon R.V. & Mansergh N., 86-125. London, 1940.
Buxton, N.K. “The role of the "new" industries in Britain during the 1930s: a 
reinterpretation.” Business History Review 49, no. 2 (1975): 205-22.
Buxton, Neil K., and Derek H. Aldcroft, eds. British industry between the wars: 
instability and industrial development, 1919-1939. London 1979.
British Association eds. Britain in Recovery
Capie, Forrest. Depression and protectionism: Britain between the wars. London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1983.
Capie, Forrest. Tariffs and growth: some illustrations from  the world economy 
1850-1940 Manchester (1994)
Capie, Forrest. “The British Tariff and Industrial Protection in the 1930's.” In 
Protectionism in the World Economy, edited by Forrest H. Capie. Aldershot 1992. 
Capie, Forrest. “The Pressure for Tariff Protection in Britain, 1917-31.” Journal 
o f  European Economic History 9 (1980): 431-447.
Capie, Forrest. “Shaping the British Tariff Structure in the 1930s.” Explorations 
in Economic History 18 (1981): 155/173.
Capie, Forrest. “The Sources and Origins of Britain's Return to Protection, 1931-
2.” In Free Trade and Its Reception 1815-1960, edited by Andrew Marrison, 246- 
259. London: Routledge, 1998.
Carpenter, L.P. “Corporatism in Britain, 1930-45.” Journal o f  Contemporary 
History 11 (1976): 3-25.
Casson, Mark and Rose, Mary B., ed. Institutions and the evolution o f  modem  
business. London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1886.
Chapman, Richard A. The Treasury in public policy making. London: Routledge, 
1997.
Chapman, Sir Sydney. A REPLY: To the Report o f  the Tariff Commission on the 
Cotton Industry Manchester and London 1905
Chapman, Sir Sydney. History o f  Trade Between the United Kingdom and the 
United States New York 1899
313
Chapman, Sir Sydney. Outlines o f  Political Economy. New Impression, revised 
1917 ed. London: Longmans, Green & Co.,, 1929.
Checkland, S. G. British public policy 1776-1939: an economic, social and 
political perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Chester, Norman, and Francis Michael Glenn Willson, eds. The Organization o f  
British central government. 2nd ed/ by F.M.G.Wilson ed.
Chick, Martin, ed. Governments, Industries and Markets. London, 1990.
Clark, Barry Stewart. Political economy: a comparative approach. New York: 
Praeger, 1991.
Clarke, Harold D. Controversies in political economy: Canada, Great Britain, the 
United States. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
Clarke, Peter. The Keynesian Revolution and its Economic consequences. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
Clarke, Peter. The Keynesian Revolution in the Making. Oxford: clarendon Press, 
1988.
Clay, Henry, ed. the Inter-War Years and other Papers: A Selection from  the 
writing so f Hubert Douglas Henderson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955.
Cole, G.D.H. Public Administration, 1931.
Cooper, Andrew Fenton. British Agricultural Policy, 1912-36: a study in 
conservative politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989.
Coxall, W.N. Parties and Pressure Groups. Hong Kong, 1981.
Crossman, Richard. How Britain is Governed, 1938.
Crouch, Colin, and Ronald Dore, eds. Corporatism and Accountability:
Organized Interests in British Public Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Crouch, Colin, and Ronald Dore. “Whatever Happened to Corporatism?” In 
Corporatism and Accountability: Organized Interests in British Public Life, edited 
by Colin Crouch and Ronald Dore, 1-. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Davenport-Hines, R. Speculators and Patriots, 1986.
Davenport-Hines, R. P. T. Dudley Docker: the life and times o f  a trade warrior. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Davenport-Hines, R.T. “Trade Associations and the Modernization Crisis of 
British Industry, 1910-35.” In Trade Associations in Business History, edited by
314
H. and Miyamoto Yamazaki, M., 205-226. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 
1988.
David, Wilfred L. Political Economy o f  Economic Policy. New York: Praeger, 
1988.
Davies, William Tudor. Trade associations and industrial co-ordination. London: 
Machinery Users' Association (incorporated), 1938.
Dennison, S.R. The Location o f  Industry and the Depressed Areas. Oxford: OUP, 
1939.
Dintenfass, Michael. “The Politics of Producers' co-operation: the FBI-TUC- 
NCEO Talks, 1929-1933.” In Businessmen and Politics, edited by John Turner, 
76-92. London, 1984.
Drummond, Ian M. British economic policy and the empire, 1919-1939,
Historical problems, studies and documents. London: Allen and Unwin, 1972. 
Drummond, Ian M. Imperial economic policy, 1917-1939: studies in expansion 
and protection. London: Allen and Unwin, 1974.
‘The Economist’ -  1932-1939 all volumes 
Eckstein, H. Pressure Group Politics.
Edgerton, D.E.H. and Horrocks, S.M. “British industrial research and 
development before 1945.” Economic History Review  XLV 11, no. 2 (1994): 213- 
238.
Eichengreen, Barry J. Sterling and the tariff, 1929-32, Princeton studies in 
international finance; no. 47. Princeton, NJ: International Finance Section, 1981. 
Eichengreen, Barry J. ‘The inter-war economy in a European Mirror’ pp. 291-319 
in Floud & McCloskey eds. The Economic History o f  Britain since 1700: Volume 
2 1860-1939 second edition Cambridge 1994
Elbaum, Bernard, and William Lazonick, eds. The Decline o f  the British 
Economy: an institutional perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Ely, Richard Theodore, and John K. Ingram. An introduction to political economy. 
London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1891.
FBI. The organisation o f  British industry, 1944.
Feinstein, Charles. “Introduction.” In The Managed Economy, edited by Charles 
Feinstein, 1-30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
315
Feinstein, Charles, ed. The Managed Economy. Oxford: Oxford University press,
1983.
Findlay, Ronald. Britain Under Protection. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,, 
1935.
Finer, S.E. Anonymous Empire, 1958.
Finer, S.E. “The Federation o f British Industries.” Political Studies IV, no. 1 
(1956): 61-84.
Floud & McCloskey eds. The Economic History o f  Britain since 1700: Volume 2 
1860-1939 second edition Cambridge 1994
Ford, P., and Grace Ford. A Breviate o f  Parliamentary Papers, 1900-1916: the 
foundation o f  the welfare state, Their Parliamentary papers series. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1957.
Ford, P., and Grace Ford. A Breviate o f  Parliamentary Papers, 1917-1939, [Their 
Parliamentary papers series]. Oxford: Blackwell, 1951.
Foreman-Peck, James. “The British Tariff and Industrial Protection in the 1930s: 
An Alternative Model.” Economic History Review  (1981): 132-139.
Foreman-Peck James, Andrew Hughes Hallett and Yue Ma. “The End of Free 
Trade.” In Free Trade and its Reception 1815-1960, edited by Andrew Marrison, 
262-286. London: Routledge, 1998.
Foreman-Peck, J.S. “Tariff Protection and Economies of Scale: The British Motor 
Industry Before 1939.” Oxford Economic Papers 31, no. July (1979): 237-259. 
Frost, Brian, ed. The tactics o f  pressure: a critical review o f  six British pressure 
groups. London: Galliard, 1975.
Garside, W R. “Party Politics, Political Economy and British Protectionism, 1919- 
32.” The Historical Association (1998).
Glynn, Sean. “Real Policy Options.” In The Road to Full Employment, edited by 
Glynn Sean and Booth Alan, pp. 154-174. London, 1987.
Glynn Sean, & Booth Alan, ed. The Road to Full Employment. London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1987.
Glynn, Sean & Oxborrow, John. Interwar Britan. A Social and Economic History. 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1976.
316
Goldin, Claudia, and Gary D. Libecap, eds. The regulated economy: a historical 
approach to political economy, National Bureau o f  Economic Research project 
report. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Gospel, Howard. “Employer's Organizations: Their Growth and Function in the 
British System of Industrial Relations in the Period 1918-1939.”, University of 
London, 1974.
Gourvish, T. “Business History: in defence of the empirical approach.”
Accounting Business and Financial History 5.
Gourvish, T.R. “Mechanical engineering.” In British industry between the wars: 
instability and industrial development, 1919-1939, edited by Neil K. Buxton and 
Derek H. Aldcroft. London, 1979.
Grant, Wyn. Business and Politics in Britain. Second ed. Basingstoke, 1993. 
Grant, Wyn. Chamber o f  Commerce in the UK system o f  business interest 
representation.
Grant, Wyn. “Govemment-industry relations in the British Chemical Industry.” In 
Governments, Industries and Markets, edited by Martin Chick, 142-156. London,
1990.
Grove, J.W. Government and Industry in Britain. London, 1962.
Hannah, Leslie. “Government and Business in Britain: The Evolution of the 
Modem Relationship.” , 107-124. In Nakagawa Keiichiro (ed) Government and 
Business (Tokyo, 1980),
Hannah, L. Rise o f  the Corporate Economy. 2nd ed. London, 1983.
Hart, P. E., and Roger Clarke. Concentration in British industry 1935-75: 
appendices IB, 5B, 6B, 6C, Discussion paper /  National Institute o f  Economic and 
Social Research; no.33. London: National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, 1980.
Hawke, G.R. “The United States Tariff and Industrial protection in the Late 
Nineteenth Century.” Economic History REview (1975): 84-99.
Hayes, Michael T. Lobbyists and Legislators. New Jersey, 1981.
Hayford, Marc &, and Carl A. Pasurka. “The Political Economy of the Fordney- 
McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts.” Explorations in Economic History 
29 (1992): 30-50.
317
Heim, C. E. “Interwar Responses to Regional Decline.” In The Decline o f  the 
British Economy, edited by Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick, 240-265. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Hirst, F.W. Principles o f  Prosperity. London: Hollis and Carter Ltd.,, 1944.
Hirst, Francis Wrigley, and Club Cobden. Safeguarding and protection. 
Westminster: The Cobden Club, 1926.
Holland, R.F. “The Federation of British Industries and the International 
Economy, 1929-39.” Economic History Review 34, no. 2 (1981): 287-300. 
Howson, Susan, and Donald Norman Winch. The Economic Advisory Council, 
1930-1939: a study in economic advice during depression and recovery. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
Hutchinson, Sir Herbert. Tariff-Making and Industrial Reconstruction. London, 
1965.
Ilersic, A.R. and Liddle, P.F.B. Parliament o f  Commerce. London: Newman 
Neame Ltd, 1960.
Irwin, Douglas A. An Intellectual History o f  Free Trade. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996.
Jessop, Bob. “The Capitalist State and the Rule of Capital: Problems in the 
Analysis of Business Associations.” West European Politics 6, no. 2, April 
(1983): 139-162.
Johnson, P. S. British industry: an economic introduction. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985.
Jones, Geoffrey. The Evolution o f  International Business: An Intro.
Jones, Geoffrey, and R. P. T. Davenport-Hines, eds. Enterprise, management and 
innovation in British business, 1914-80. London: Cass, 1988.
Jordan, Grant, William A. Maloney, and Andrew M. McLaughlin. Assumptions 
about the role o f  groups in the policy process: the British policy community 
approach, British Interest Group Project working paper series; 4. Aberdeen: 
University of Aberdeen., 1992.
Jordan, Grant, William A. Maloney, and Andrew M. McLaughlin. Insiders, 
outsiders and political access? British Interest Group Project working paper 
series; 3. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, 1992.
318
Jordan, Grant, William A. Maloney, and Andrew M. McLaughlin. Interest groups 
as artefacts: supply side influences over group size, British Interest Group Project 
working paper series; No. 7. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, 1994.
Jordan, Grant, William A. Maloney, and Andrew M. McLaughlin. Policy-making 
in agriculture: ’primary’ policy community or specialist policy communities, 
British Interest Group Project working paper series; 5. Aberdeen: University of 
Aberdeen, 1992.
Jordan, Grant, William A. Maloney, and Andrew M. McLaughlin. What is studied 
when pressure groups are studied?, British Interest Group Project working paper 
series; I . Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, 1992.
Jordon, A. G., and J. J. Richardson. British Politics and the Policy Process. 
London, 1987.
Jordon, A.G., and J.J. Richardson. Government and Pressure Groups in Britain. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
Keynes, M., ed. Essays on John Maynard Keynes. Cambridge: University press, 
1975.
Kirby, Maurice &, and Mary B. Rose, eds. Competitiveness and the State: 
government and Business in Twentieth-Century Britain. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1991.
Kirby, Maurice &, and Mary B. Rose. “Productivity and Competitive Failure: 
British Government Policy and Industry, 1914-19.” In Competitiveness and the 
State: government and Business in Twentieth-Century Britain, edited by Maurice 
& Kirby and Mary B. Rose, 20-39. Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1991.
Kirby, M W. “Industrial Policy.” In The Road to Full Employment, edited by 
Glynn Sean and Booth Alan, pp. 125-139. London, 1987.
Kitson, Michael. “Recession and Economic Revival in Britain: The Role of Policy 
in the 1930s and 1980s.” Contemporary European History 8, no. 1 (1999): 1-27. 
Kitson, M. &, and S. Solomou. “Bilateralism in the inter-war world economy.” 
Bulletin o f  Economic Research 47: 197-219.
Kitson, M. and S. Solomou. Protectionism and economic revival: the British 
inter-war years. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
319
Krasner, Stephen. “State power and the Structure of International Trade.” World 
politics 28 (1976): 317-48.
Lester, V. Markham. Victorian insolvency: bankruptcy, imprisonment fo r  debt, 
and company winding-up in nineteenth-century England, Oxford historical 
monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Levy, H. Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts, 1927.
Lowe, Rodney. “Labour Policy.” In The Road to Full Employment, edited by 
Glynn Sean and Booth Alan, pp. 140-153. London, 1987.
Lucas, A.F. Industrial Reconstruction and the Control o f  Competition, 1937. 
MacMillan, H. The State and Industry, 1933.
Marrison, Andrew. British business and protection, 1903-1932. Oxford New 
York: Clarendon Press, 1996.
Marsh, David, and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds. Policy networks in British government. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Marsh, David & Stoker, Gerry, ed. Theory and Methods in Political Science. 
London: MacMillan, 1995.
McGuire, E.B. The British Tariff System, 1943.
Mclvor, Arthur J. Organised Capital: Employers' Associations and Industrial 
Relations in Northern England, 1880-1939. Cambridge, 1996.
Mercer, Helen. “The Evolution of British Government Policy Towards 
Competition in Private Industry, 1940-56.”, London, 1989.
Mercer, Helen J. Constructing a competitive order: the hidden history o f  British 
anti-trust policies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Mercer, Helen J., Neil Rollings, and Jim Tomlinson, eds. Labour governments 
and private industry: experience o f  1945-1951. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1992.
Middlemas Keith. Politics in Industrial Society. London, 1979.
Middleton. Towards the managed economy: Keynes, the Treasury and the fiscal 
policy debate o f  the 1930s. London: Metheun & Co. Ltd., 1985.
Middleton, Roger. Government versus the Market: Growth o f  the Public Sector, 
Economic Management and British Economic Performance, c.1890-1979. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996.
320
Middleton, Roger. “The Treasury and Public Investment: A Perspective on 
Interwar Economic Management.” Public Administration 61 (1983).
Middleton, Roger. “The Treasury in the 1930s: Political and Administrative 
Constraints to the Acceptance of the "New" Economics.” Oxford Economic 
Papers 34 (1982).
Middleton, Roger. “Treasury Policy on Unemployment.” In The Road to Full 
Employment, edited by Glynn Sean and Booth Alan, pp. 109-124. London, 1987. 
Millward, A, and Singleton, eds. The Political Economy o f  Nationalisation in 
Britain 1920-1950. Cambridge, 1995.
Mowat, C L. Britain Between the Wars, 1956.
Nakagawa, Keiichiro. Government and Business, Fuji Conference. The 
International Conference on Business History 5. Tokyo, 1980.
National Institute Of Economic and Social Research, (NIESR). Trade Regulations 
& Commercial Policy O f The United Kingdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1943.
Page, Thomas Walker Making the Tariff in the United States New York 1927 
P.E.P. Report on International Trade, 1937.
P.E.P. Advisory Committees in British Government. London: Allen & Unwin, 
1960.
P.E.P. Government and Industry, 1952.
P.E.P. Industrial trade associations: activities and organisation, 1957, 1957.
P.E.P. Location o f  Industry in Britain. London, 1939.
Peacock, Alan, ed. The Regulation Game. Oxford, 1984.
Peden, G.C. British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret 
Thatcher. Second ed.
Peden, G.C. British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932-39. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, 1979.
Peden, G C. Keynes, the Treasury and British Economic Policy. London: 
MacMillan, 1988.
Peden, G.C. “Keynes, the treasury and unemployment in the later nineteen- 
thirties.” Oxford Economic Papers, new series 32, no. 1 (1980): 1-18.
321
Peden, G.C. “The Treasury as the central department of government 1919-1939.” 
Public Administration 61, no. 4 (1983): 371-385.
Pincus, J. J. “Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs.” Journal o f  Political and 
Economic Planning 83, no. 4 (1975): 757-778.
Pollard, Sidney. The Development o f  the British Economy. Third ed. London: 
Edward Arnold Ltd, 1983.
Prager, Theodore. ‘T rade Associations in Great Britain.” Agenda: A Quarterly 
Journal o f  Reconstruction 3, Nov (1944,): 59-71.
Rhodes, R.A.W. “The Institutional Approach.” In Theory and Methods in 
Political Science, edited by David & Stoker Marsh, Gerry, 42-57. London: 
MacMillan, 1995.
Richardson, H. Economic Recovery in Britain 1932-39. Bristol 1967 
Richardson, J.J. The Policy Making Process, 1969.
Richardson, J. J., ed. Pressure groups, Oxford readings in politics and 
government. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Ritschel, Daniel, the Politics o f  Planning. The Debate on Economic Planning in 
Britain in the 1930s. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Roberts, Richard. “The Administrative Origins of Industrial Diplomacy: an 
Aspect of Government-Industry Relations, 1929-35.” In Businessmen and 
Politics, edited by John Turner, 93-104. London, 1984.
Roberts, Richard. “Businessmen, Politics and Municipal Socialism.” In 
Businessmen and Politics, edited by John Turner, 20-32. London, 1984.
Rooth, Tim. British protectionism and the international economy: overseas 
commercial policy in the 1930's. Cambridge [England] New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993.
Rooth, T. “The Political Economy of Protectionism in Britain, 1919-32.” Journal 
o f  European Economic History 21 (1992).
Rooth, T. “Trade agreements and evolution o f British agricultural policy in the 
30's.” Agricultural History Review 38 (1985).
Roseveare, H. The Treasury: The evolution o f  a British institution. London: Allen 
Lane, 1969.
Schattschneider, E.E. Politics, Pressure and the Tariff. New York, 1935.
322
Scott, P. & Rooth, T. “Protectionism and Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
in Interwar Britain.” .
Scott, Peter & Rooth, Tim. “Public Policy and Foreign-Based Enterprises in 
Britain Prior to the Second World War.” The Historical Journal 42, no. 2 (1999): 
495-515.
Semmel, B. Imperialism and Social Reform, 1895-1914, 1960.
Sharkey, John. “The influence of British business interests on Anglo-Japanese 
relations, 1933-1937.”, 1994.
Smallbone, Linda, and Richard Storey, eds. Employers' and trade associations' 
history, M odem Records Centre sources booklet; no.4. Coventry: University of 
Warwick Library, 1992.
Snyder, Rixford Kinney. “The tariff problem in Great Britain, 1918-1923.”, 1944. 
Solomou, S. Themes in Macroeconomic History, the UK economy 1919-39. 
Spiegel, Henry William. The Growth o f  Economic Thought. Third ed. Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 1991.
Stewart, J. D. British pressure groups: their role in relation to the House o f  
Commons. London: Clarendon Press, 1958.
Streat, R. “Government consultation with industry.” Public Administration 27, 
Spring (1959).
Sykes, A. Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-13, 1979.
Taussig, F.W. The Tariff History o f  the United States. Vol. 8. New York, 1964. 
Thomas Mark ‘The Macroeconomics of the inter-war years’ pp.320-358 in Floud 
& McCloskey eds. The Economic History o f  Britain since 1700: Volume 2 1860- 
1939 second edition Cambridge 1994 
Times. The Times book o f  the House o f  Commons.
Tiratsoo, Nicholas, and Jim Tomlinson. Industrial efficiency and state 
intervention: Labour, 1939-51. London: New York: Routledge : LSE, 1993. 
Tivey, Leonard. “British Corporatism.” West European Politics 6, no. 1, Jan 
(1983): 125-128.
Tivey, Leonard, and Ernest Wohlgemuth. “Trade Associations as Interest 
Groups.” Political Quarterly 29 (1958): 59-71.
Tolliday, S. Business, Banking and Politics: The Case o f  the British Steel 1918- 
39, 1987.
323
Tolliday, S. “Steel and rationalization policies, 1918-1950.” In The Decline o f  the 
British Economy: an institutional perspective, edited by B and W. Lazonick 
Elbaum, eds. Oxford., 1986.
Tolliday, Steven. “Tariffs and Steel, 1916-1934: The Politics of Industrial 
Decline.” In Businessmen and Politics, edited by John Turner, 50-75. London,
1984.
Tomlinson, Jim. Can governments manage the economy? Fabian tract; no.524. 
London: Fabian Society, 1988.
Tomlinson, Jim. Government and the enterprise since 1900: the changing 
problem o f  efficiency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Tomlinson, J. “A "Keynesian revolution" in economic policy making?” Economic 
History Review, second series 37, no. 2 (1984): 258-62.
Tomlinson, J. Problems o f  British Economic Policy 1870-1945. London, 1981. 
Tomlinson, J. “Unemployment and government policy between the wars: a note.” 
Journal o f  Contemporary History 13, no. 1 (1978): 65-75.
Tomlinson, J. “Why was there never a "Keynesian revolution" in economic 
policy?” Economy and Society 10, no. 1 (1981): 72-87.
Tudor-Davis, W. Trade Associations and Industrial Co-ordination. London, 1938. 
Turner, B.S. Free Trade and Protection, 1971.
Turner, J., ed. Businessmen and Politics. London, 1984.
Turner, John. “The Politics of Business.” In Businessmen and Politics, edited by 
John Turner. London, 1984.
Turner, John. “The Politics of'Organised Business' in the First World War.” In 
Businessmen and Politics, edited by John Turner, 33-49. London, 1984.
Turner, J. “Servants of two masters: British Trade Associations in the First Half of 
the Twentieth Century.” In Trade Associations in Business History, edited by H. 
and Miyamoto Yamazaki, M., 173-198. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988.
Vernon, R.V. & Mansergh, N.S., ed. Advisory Bodies. London, 1940.
Viner, Jacob. Studies in the Theory o f  International Trade. London: George Allen 
& Unwin, c.1937.
324
Waltman, Jerold L., and Donley T. Studlar, eds. Political economy: public 
policies in the United States and Britain. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
1987.
Wheare, K.C. Government by Committee, 1955.
Wilcox, M., and R. Storey. The Confederation o f  British Industry predecessor 
archive.
Winch, Donald. “Britain in the 'Thirties: A Managed Economy?” In The Managed 
Economy, edited by Charles Feinstein, 47-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983.
Winch, Donald Norman. Adam Smith's politics: an essay in historiographic 
revision, Cambridge studies in the history and theory o f  politics. Cambridge New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Winch, Donald Norman. Economics and policy: A historical study, Twentieth 
century studies. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969.
Wurm, Clemens. Business, Politics and International Relations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Yamazaki, Hiroaki, and Matao Miyamoto. ‘T rade associations in business 
history: International Conference on business history: proceedings of the Fuji 
Conference.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Business 
History: 14th, Fuji, Japan 1987.
Youngson, A.J. The British Economy, 1920-57.
325
